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Chapter I – Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Procedural obligations in the field of EU climate change law 
A clear link between climate change and the increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
Earth’s atmosphere is now firmly scientifically established, and the interference with the 
climate system caused by humans is undeniable. According to the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), the anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases play an 
irrefutable role in the global average surface temperature.1 For Europe, it is predicted that, in 
a business-as-usual scenario,2 disasters resulting from weather conditions could affect about 
two-thirds of the European population annually by the end of this century.3 
The looming threat of climate change and the perceived lack of a strong political response to 
it has led the public to call more directly for decisive action to be taken. In Europe, 
organisations, such as the Campaign against Climate Change started to organise mass 
                                                          
1 The IPCC stated: “It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average 
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG 
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, 2014b, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf, p. 5. 
2 With a ‘business-as-usual’ baseline case, it is assumed that future development trends follow those of 
the past and no changes in policies will take place, see A. Markandya, K. Halsnaes, A. Lanza, Y. 
Matsuoka, S. Maya, J. Pan, J. Shogren, R. Seroa de Motta, T. Zhang and T. Taylor, ‘Costing 
Methodologies’, in B. Metz and O. Davidson (eds.), Climate change 2001: mitigation: contribution of 
Working Group III to the third assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 455-498, p. 470. 
However, “the term BAU has fallen out of favour because the idea of business as usual in century-long 
socio-economic projections is hard to fathom” K. J. Mach, S. Planton and C. von Stechow(eds.), ‘Annex 
II: Glossary ’, in R. K. Pachauri, M. R. Allen, V. R. Barros, J. Broome, W. Cramer, R. Christ, J. A. 
Church, L. Clarke, Q. Dahe and P. Dasgupta (eds.), Climate change 2014: synthesis report. 
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change,  (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2014), pp. 117-130, p. 119. 
3 The study was conducted in the 28 EU Member States and Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland. G. 
Forzieri, A. Cescatti, F. B. e Silva and L. Feyen, ‘Increasing risk over time of weather-related hazards 
to the European population: a data-driven prognostic study’ 1(5) The Lancet Planetary Health, (2017), 
pp. e200-e208, p. e200 and e206. 
24 
demonstrations in 2001 to raise awareness of the threats of climate change.4 Another example 
of individuals taking the streets to demand government action against climate change are the 
student strikes that took place in 2019. This movement, started by the Swedish teenager Greta 
Thunberg in August 2018, motivated thousands of students around the world to walk out of 
their classrooms and engage in demonstrations calling for action against climate change.5 
In addition to these expressions of increased public engagement, there have also been 
important developments in the use of legal instruments to attempt to force action on climate 
change-related issues. Generally, there are many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
which rely on the power of the law to protect the environment. In Europe, ClientEarth and 
Friends of the Earth are among the environmental NGOs (ENGOs) which believe that 
adequate laws are the main instrument to guarantee a safe environment. Their actions include, 
inter alia, litigation to try to influence the decision making by governments in a more 
environmentally friendly direction.6 
The apparent engagement from civil society, particularly ENGOs, asking for more ambitious 
climate change action raises the question of what rights members of the public actually have 
to access climate change-related information and to participate in climate change decision 
making. To answer this question, legal instruments, which deal with climate change and 
procedural rights, need to be studied.  
In terms of the legal response to climate change, the first global agreement to tackle climate 
change was adopted in 1992. This is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC),7 which was later supplemented by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.8 A new 
                                                          
4 Campaign against Climate Change. Mission Statement, 18 June 2020, https://www.campaigncc.org 
/aboutus/missionstatement. 
5 S. Laville, M. Taylor and D. Hurst, ‘It’s our time to rise up’: youth climate strikes held in 100 
countries, The Guardian, 15 March 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/15/its-
our-time-to-rise-up-youth-climate-strikes-held-in-100-countries. 
6 At the EU level, these NGOs, for instance, have started legal action against the European Union (EU) 
in view of the denial to access environmental information. See Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of 
the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and  Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v. European 
Commission, 13 November 2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:593. 
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, United Nations 
Treaty Series , vol. 1771, No. 30822, p. 107 (entrered into force on 21 March 1994). 
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 
December 1997, United Nations Treaty Series , vol. 2303, No. 30822, p. 162 (entrered into force on 16 
February 2005). The protocol was adopted in 1997 and was ratified eight years later, in 2005. The first 
commitment period ran from 2008 to 2012. The second commitment period was planned to run from 
2013 until 2020. However, the Doha Amendment, which regulates the targets for the second 
amendment period, had not yet been ratified at the time of writing. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Qatar, 8 December 2012, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (not into force). 
25 
international instrument has been introduced with the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 
which the Parties agreed to keep the temperature increase of the global average temperature 
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.9 
Meanwhile, in the area of environmental procedural rights (access to information, public 
participation and access to justice in environmental matters), a far-reaching regional 
agreement was adopted in 1998: the Aarhus Convention.10 The EU, as well as all EU Member 
States, is a Party to both the international climate change treaties and the Aarhus 
Convention.11 Regarding the Aarhus commitments of EU institutions, the EU adopted 
Regulation 1367/2006.12 However, thus far, the academic literature has not yet provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the interaction of, on the one hand, international climate change 
obligations with, on the other hand, environmental procedural rights. This thesis, therefore, 
                                                          
9 Article 2, Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113. 
C.N.63.2016.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d of 16 February 2016 (Opening for signature) and 
C.N.92.2016.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d of 17 March 2016 (Issuance of Certified True Copies) (entered 
into force on 4 November 2016). Hereinafter Paris Agreement. 
10 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2161, 
p. 447 (entered into force on 30 October 2001). Henceforth the Aarhus Convention, the Convention or 
AC. 
11 To clarify the responsibility of the EU and its Member States vis-à-vis the Aarhus Convention, a 
declaration was submitted by the EU to the Convention secretariat. See 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en>. The CJEU found that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention does not have 
direct effect, because the provision does not ‘contain any clear and precise obligation capable of directly 
regulating the legal position of individuals’. Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. 
Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125, para 45. 
On 17 February 2005, the EU (at that time the European Community) adopted the Decision on the 
conclusion of the Aarhus Convention. Decision 2005/370/EC on the Conclusion, on Behalf of the 
European Community, of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, OJ L124/1. At that point, the Convention 
became part of EU law and binding upon the EU institutions (Article 216(2), TFEU). M. Hedemann-
Robinson, ‘EU enforcement of International Environmental Agreements: The Role of the European 
Commission’ 21(1) European Energy and Environmental Law Review, (2012), pp. 2-31, p. 2. 
12 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 
on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community 
institutions and bodies, OJ L 264/13 [hereinafter Aarhus Regulation]. Regarding access to information, 
it complements the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ L145/43, and it extends its applicability to Community institutions and bodies. 
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will aim to fill this gap partially with an in-depth exploration of these legal interactions by 
examining how this plays out in the European Union (EU) legal order.  
To this end, two case studies have been selected: the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED). The following Venn diagram (figure 
01) highlights the legal instruments that will be studied in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 01:  Legal instruments discussed in this thesis.13 
The next sections will briefly present the UNFCCC, the Aarhus Convention and EU climate 
law in turn. 
1.2. The UNFCCC 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) emerged from 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. The UNFCCC is a global agreement that aims to respond to the threats posed 
by climate change. The primary goal of the agreement is to reduce the level of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions entering the atmosphere.14 In addition, the Convention includes 
provisions to promote public awareness, public access to information and public 
participation. Particularly, in its Articles 4.1(i) and 6 (ii) and (iii), the UNFCCC stipulates 
that its Parties shall promote public awareness related to climate change and encourage the 
                                                          
13 Diagram designed by the author. 
14 Article 2, UNFCCC. 
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widest participation in this process, public access to information on climate change and its 
effects, and public participation in addressing climate change and its effects, respectively.  
Under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, two other instruments have been adopted: the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol is the first international agreement to 
establish quantified greenhouse gas emissions targets complemented by a market-based 
approach. With regard to procedural rights, Article 10(e) emphasises the need for access to 
information and for public participation in the implementation of the Protocol’s mechanisms 
to achieve a reduction of emissions of at least 5% compared to the emissions levels in 1990.15 
The 2015 Paris Agreement leaves the targets and climate policies to be decided at the national 
level and then communicated to the international level.16 Next to various provisions on 
mitigation and adaptation, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement refers briefly to access to 
information and public participation, thereby – at least – acknowledging the importance of 
involving the public in climate change decision making. 
1.3. The Aarhus Convention 
Among the 196 UNFCCC Parties,17 44 European countries18 are also Parties to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: the Aarhus 
                                                          
15 The first commitment period shall represent a reduction of at least 5% GHG emissions compared to 
1990 levels (Article 3(1), Kyoto Protocol). The second commitment period, 2013 to 2020, has a target 
of at least 18% reduction of GHG emissions below 1990 levels (Article 3, (1 bis), Doha Amendment). 
For the most updated information on the state of ratification, see: United Nations Treaty Collection. 
Chapter XXVII - Environment - 7. c Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 15 April 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en.) 
16 “This [the NDCs of the Paris Agreement are a] bottom-up approach is in contrast to an approach 
whereby targets are imposed from ‘above’ in a treaty. The Kyoto Protocol has become a symbol of this 
failed top-down approach, and, hence, the idea of a new approach has since prevailed, creating an 
opportunity for another normative model” L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘One Swallow Does Not a 
Summer Make, but Might the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a Better Future Create?; 27(2) 
European Journal of International Law, (2016), pp. 253-256,  p. 254.  
“The Paris Agreement is an experiment in a bottom-up, managerial, transparency-building, and norm-
building approach to global cooperation. The shift in approach is a reasonable gamble in light of the 
failed efforts over the past two decades to implement the top-down approach under the Kyoto Protocol” 
M. Doelle, ‘The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experiment?’ 6(1-2) Climate 
law, (2016), pp. 1-20, p. 20. 
17 195 States plus the European Union. 
18 European countries refers to the countries which comprise the geographical region of Europe in 
accordance with the division used by Statistics Division of the United Nations in its publications and 
databases. For more information see: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/. 
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Convention. The Convention, the first legally binding instrument that covers all fields of 
environmental law, codifies Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.19 This principle highlights 
the importance of public participation in decision making processes, the right of the public 
to get access to environmental information held by public authorities and access to justice. 
Regarding access to information, the Aarhus Convention defines a citizen’s right to request 
environmental information held by the government (Article 4). Moreover, the government 
should provide information on its own initiative in case of any imminent threat to human 
health or to the environment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes 
(Article 5). With regard to public participation, the Aarhus Convention foresees public 
participation in decisions on specific activities (Article 6); public participation concerning 
plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment (Article 7); and public 
participation during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable 
legally binding normative instruments (Article 8). The Aarhus Convention also contains the 
right of the public to address courts to enforce their right to have access to environmental 
information and of the public concerned to enforce their right to participate in governmental 
decision making (Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively).  
By incorporating ENGOs in the definition of the public and the public concerned, the Aarhus 
Convention gives them a status of addressees of all the rights enshrined in the Convention. It 
consequently empowers ENGOs to become key players in the area of procedural 
environmental rights. In certain areas, such as technically complex climate change decision 
making, ENGOs may have an advantage, relative to individuals, due to the time and resources 
(financial, technical and human) they possess. The complexity of climate change issues has, 
in turn, stimulated the specialisation of certain ENGOs in this topic.  Already well-established 
ENGOs have created sections within their institutional framework in order to deal with 
climate change issues exclusively, as in the case of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)20 
and Greenpeace.21 There are even ENGOs that focus only on one very precise climate 
change-related topic (e.g. carbon markets with Carbon Market Watch22 and Carbon Trade 
Watch23). ENGOs with the same objective also organise in networks. An example of such a 
network is the Climate Action Network (CAN), which aggregates 1,100 NGOs and is 
                                                          
19 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) / 31 ILM 874 
(1992).  
20 WWF. Climate and Energy, 18 June 2020, http://wwf.panda.org/our_work/climate_and_energy/. 
21 Greenpeace. #Climate, 18 June 2020, https://www.greenpeace.org/international/tag/climate/. 
22 Carbon Market Watch. About, 18 June 2020, http://carbonmarketwatch.org/about/. 
23 Carbon Trade Watch. Filling a critical vacuum, 18 June 2020, http://www.carbontradewatch.org 
/about-us.html. 
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dedicated to “working to promote government and individual action to limit human-induced 
climate change to ecologically sustainable levels.”24 
In 2011, Jeremy Wates, who, for more than a decade, served as Secretary to the Aarhus 
Convention,25  put forward a number of questions about the future of the Aarhus Convention: 
“What will be the challenges for the Convention in the second decade of the new century? 
Will it be a matter of incremental progress within the same basic model, or will new frontiers 
be opened up?”26 In the meantime, as mentioned in section 1.1, civil society increasingly 
takes action, including legal action, trying to stimulate governments to adopt more ambitious 
climate actions. One of the current challenges is therefore to what extent the Aarhus 
Convention indeed enables society, including ENGOs, to use procedural rights in the field of 
climate law, including EU climate law. 
1.4. European Union climate policy and law 
The threat of climate change has provoked a variety of legal responses aimed at mitigating 
greenhouse gases emissions.27 The EU, in response to its international commitments under 
the UNFCCC, has adopted a diverse climate change policy to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions produced by its Member States. In 2008, the European Commission announced 
the ‘20 20 by 2020 – Europe’s climate change opportunity’28 which comprised the 20-20-20 
targets:29 a) a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to the 1990 levels; b) 
                                                          
24 Climate Action Network. About CAN, 18 June 2020, http://www.climatenetwork.org/about/about-
can. 
25 European Environmental Bureau. What we do, 18 June 2020, https://eeb.org/work-areas/. 
26 J. Wates, ‘The future of the Aarhus Convention: Perspectives Arising from the Third Session of the 
Meeting of the Parties’, in M. Pallemaerts (ed.), The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and 
Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law,  (Groningen: Europa 
Law Publishing, 2011), p. 385. 
27 B. David and J. Andrew, ‘Climate policy instrument choices’, in D. Farber and M. Peeters (eds.), 
Climate change law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), pp. 57-67, p. 59. 
28 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 20 20 by 
2020 Europe’s climate change opportunity, COM(20008) 30 final (2008a). 
29 European Council, Conclusions on 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework (SN 79/14) (2014b). 
The EU’s 20% target of emissions reductions by 2020 has been contested. “The triple 20 approach as 
pursued by the EU is according to the IPCC projections not ambitious enough to deal effectively with 
climate change: developed countries should aim at 25 to 40% emission reductions by 2020” (M. Peeters, 
‘Instrument mix or instrument mess? The administrative complexity of the EU legislative package for 
climate change’, in Peeters, M. and Uylenburg, R. (eds.), EU Environmental Legislation: Legal 
Perspectives on Regulatory Strategies, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 173-192, p. 184). 
According to the IPCC (2007), Annex-I countries (which include all EU Member States) should target 
between 25% to 40% emissions reductions by 2020. S. Gupta, D. A. Tirpak, N. Burger, J. Gupta, N. 
30 
having 20% of energy consumption produced from renewable resources, and; c) a 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency. In 2009, the European Union translated these 
commitments with the adoption of four key pieces of legislation addressing different aspects 
of climate and energy policy but all with the objective of reducing GHG emissions: (i) an 
extensive revision of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS);30 (ii) the 
Effort Sharing Decision, establishing targets for non-EU ETS sectors;31 (iii) the Renewable 
Energy Directive with renewable energy targets for the Member States;32 and (iv) a Directive 
on Carbon and Capture Storage.33 The area of energy efficiency was dealt with two years 
later starting with the 2011 Energy Efficiency Plan34 and later the Energy Efficiency 
Directive.35 A vast volume of literature has examined these key pieces of legislation, but there 
is as yet no research into whether they contain provisions regarding access to information 
and public participation and if so what those provisions encompass. This thesis will thus 
investigate how procedural rights (with a focus on access to information and public 
participation) are provided for at the EU level in the context of EU climate change law.  
                                                          
Höhne, A. I. Boncheva, G. M. Kanoan, C. Kolstad, J. A. Kruger, A. Michaelowa, S. Murase, J. 
Pershing, T. Saijo, A. Sari, ‘2007: Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements’ in B. Metz, 
O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 776. 
30 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 23  April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community, OJ L 140/63. 
31 Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse 
gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, OJ L 140/136. 
32 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/39, OJ L 140/63, as amended by Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to 
the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239/1. 
33 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, OJ L 140/114. 
34 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Energy 
Efficiency Plan 2011(COM(2011) 109 final) (2011a). 
35 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy 
efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC, OJ L 315/1. Hereinafter Energy Efficiency Directive or Directive 2012/27/EU. 
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2. Research questions 
Peeters emphasised more than a decade ago that “we still need to explore what the possible 
role of public participation and other forms of citizen involvement might […] be within 
climate change policies.”36 Since then, many legal measures have been adopted at the national 
and international level targeting the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However, the 
question of how exactly the public has access to climate-related information and how the 
public can participate in the climate change decision making process remains unresolved.37  
The EU is a Party to the UNFCCC, which is a global treaty on combating climate change, 
and to the Aarhus Convention, which deals with procedural rights in all environmental areas. 
Therefore, the EU itself needs to comply with the international obligations stemming from 
these conventions and implement these obligations at the EU level. In addition, the EU has 
an advanced approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In this vein, the combination 
of, on the one hand, the access to environmental information and public participation in 
environmental decision making, and on the other hand, the reduction of greenhouse gases, is 
clearly presented together in EU climate law.  This combination makes the EU a very 
important case study to assess whether and how the two dimensions are integrated. Thus, this 
thesis will examine the EU’s international commitments to assess which kind of obligations 
these entail in terms of access to environmental information and public participation in 
environmental decision making. Furthermore, this thesis will scrutinise how procedural 
rights are provided for in secondary EU climate legislation.  
On this basis, the central research question examined in this thesis is: 
To what extent do rights of access to environmental information and participation 
in governmental environmental decision making have to be provided for individuals 
and ENGOs at the EU level in the field of EU climate change law in the light of 
international treaty law, more particularly the UNFCCC and the Aarhus 
Convention? 
                                                          
36 M. Peeters, ‘Legislative choices and legal values: considerations on the further design of the 
European greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme from a viewpoint of democratic accountability’, 
in M. Faure and M. Peeters (eds.), Climate change and European emissions trading: lessons for theory 
and practice,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), pp. 17-52, p. 50. 
37 This thesis concentrates on the first two pillars: access to environmental information and public 
participation in environmental decision making. The third pillar of environmental procedural rights is 
access to justice. Given its research focus, this thesis will only explore access to justice to the extent 
that it relates to access to environmental information and participation in environmental decision 
making. The multiple other aspects of the right of access to justice in environmental matters could only 
be properly addressed in a separate piece of research beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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In order to answer this main question, the following four sets of sub-questions will be 
addressed: 
- Which provisions regarding access to information and public participation 
are established in the UNFCCC? What kind of obligations do they entail for the 
Parties? (Chapter II) 
- Does the climate change phenomenon fall under the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention? If yes, which obligations regarding access to information and public 
participation are established in the Aarhus Convention? How are they implemented 
at the EU level, as far as the EU institutions and bodies are concerned? (Chapter III)  
- How does the EU legal framework provide for access to information and 
public participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level under the auspices 
of the EU Emissions Trading System Directive? How compatible is this framework 
with the EU’s international obligations? (Chapter IV)  
- How does the EU legal framework provide for access to information and 
public participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level for the recognition 
of biofuels voluntary schemes under the auspices of the Renewable Energy 
Directive? How compatible is this framework with the EU’s international 
obligations? (Chapter V) 
3. Methodological approach 
3.1. Doctrinal legal research  
Legal methodology seems to be an area in which legal scholars often avoid clear discussions. 
It has been said that “most jurists know how to do doctrinal work, but are not able to tell how 
they do what they do.”38 With this in mind, the purpose of this section is to clarify how the 
doctrinal work was carried out for this thesis. This thesis is a doctrinal piece of legal research. 
The objective of this approach is to provide a “systematic description of the law in a certain 
field.”39 This type of research approach – which is sometimes regarded unfavourably for 
displaying a lack of creativity – 40 still requires a creative process since the researcher, while 
providing such a systematic description, selects the material to be analysed, develops a 
                                                          
38 J. Smits, ‘What is Legal Doctrine?: On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’ in R. 
van Gestel, H.-W. Micklitz and E. L. Rubin (eds.), Rethinking scholarship: a transatlantic dialogue 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 207-228, p. 221.  
39 J. Smits, ‘The mind and method of the legal academic’, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 11. 
40 J. Smits, op. cit. (2012), p. 13. 
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consistent and coherent interpretation and shapes the presentation of the findings.41 
Furthermore, such a systematic description of the law is essential for the development of 
legal research and demands legal academics to have thorough knowledge of the subject 
matter, as explained by Richard Posner: 
“The messy work product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of 
tidying up, of synthesis, analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellectually 
demanding tasks, requiring vast knowledge and the ability (not only brains and 
knowledge and judgment, but also Sitzfleisch) to organize dispersed, fragmentary, 
prolix, and rebarbative materials. These are tasks that lack the theoretical breadth or 
ambition of scholarship in more typically academic fields. Yet they are of 
inestimable importance to the legal system and of greater social value than much 
esoteric interdisciplinary legal scholarship.”42 
The doctrinal research employed in this thesis first concentrates on identifying the current 
international legal framework for access to information and public participation in climate 
change decision making. It starts with the UNFCCC and then addresses the Aarhus 
Convention and its implementation in the European Union, as far as the EU institutions and 
bodies are concerned. The second part of this thesis is dedicated to the examination of the 
design of the aforementioned procedural rights as they operate in two legal measures adopted 
by the EU to tackle climate change: the EU ETS Directive and the Renewable Energy 
Directive. The description of the current state of the law is followed by the analysis of the 
compatibility of the current framework with the EU’s international commitments. In fact, the 
thesis unveils what precise procedural rights exist in the area of EU climate law, which 
facilitates an improved understanding of the current state of the law, and it serves as a 
stepping stone towards the discussion on the future of climate change decision making.  
The conclusions of the thesis are also based on the methodology of doctrinal legal research. 
However, there are normative consequences, as the conclusions may provide arguments and 
possible solutions for the potential issues discussed in the case studies.43 In this case, 
normative consequences do not mean trying to find what the EU ought to do beyond the 
framework of the legal texts by making policy recommendations, but they merely indicate 
how, in the case studies, the legal framework needs to be designed in order to comply with 
EU treaties and EU international commitments.   
  
                                                          
41 J. Smits, op. cit. (2012), p. 13. 
42 R. A. Posner, ‘In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914-2007)’ 74(2) University of Chicago Law 
Review, (2007), pp. 435-438, p. 437. 
43 On the normative consequence of systematisation see: J. Smits, op. cit. (2012), pp. 17-20. 
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3.2. Case-based approach: focus on specific elements of EU climate change law 
In its geographical scope, this thesis is limited to the European Union. The EU and all its 
Member States are signatories to both the UNFCCC and the Aarhus Convention. However, 
this thesis will be limited to actions taken by the EU institutions and will, therefore, exclude 
national (meaning at the Member State level) actions in the field of climate change taken by 
Member States to implement EU law. 
Furthermore, this research will focus exclusively on mitigation policy which aims to reduce 
GHG emissions.44 Another important area in tackling the climate change problem is 
adaptation policy which puts measures in place to prevent or minimise the adverse effects 
posed by climate change.45 Due to regional specificities and vulnerability, climate impacts 
are experienced differently among regions and, consequently, this demands a variety of 
adaptation responses. The EU strategy on adaptation takes the differences in regional needs 
into consideration46 and leaves the “primary responsibility for the development of adaptation 
strategies” with the Member States.47 Although adaptation policy is a key element in 
combating the impact of climate change, it is mainly developed at the Member State level. 
Therefore, adaptation is beyond the scope of this thesis, which aims to investigate the climate 
measures adopted at the EU level.48 
Among the five key pieces of legislation addressing different aspects of climate mitigation 
policy, two core instruments were chosen to serve as a case study: the EU Emissions Trading 
                                                          
44 K. J. Mach, S. Planton and C. von Stechow (eds.), op. cit. (2014), p. 125. 
45 K. J. Mach, S. Planton and C. von Stechow (eds.), op. cit. (2014), p. 118. 
46 European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers: EU strategy on adaptation to climate change. Memo 
from 16 April 2013’, 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_13_334, p. 
2. 
47 D. Ellison, ‘Addressing adaptation in the EU policy framework’, in E. C. H. Keskitalo (ed.), 
Developing adaptation policy and practice in Europe: Multi-level governance of climate change,  
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 39-96, p. 47. 
48 Of course, the EU has an impact on the development of adaptation policies by the Member States. 
Apart from the EU Adaptation Strategy Package, legal measures from other different areas of the EU 
policy (such as transport and agriculture) may influence the adaptation strategy of Member States. E. 
C. H. Keskitalo, ‘Introduction – Adaptation to Climate Change in Europe: Theoretical Framework and 
Study Design’, in E. C. H. Keskitalo (ed.), Developing adaptation policy and practice in Europe : multi-
level governance of climate change,  (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 1-38, p. 3. 
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Directive (EU ETS)49 and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).50 The justification for the 
selection of these two case studies is outlined below.  
3.2.1.  Case study 1: The EU Emissions Trading System Directive 
The EU Emissions Trading System Directive (EU ETS) established a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowances trading within the European Union, which began to operate in 
January 2005. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, described as a “flagship measure”,51 a 
“centre piece”52 and a “parade horse”53 of EU climate policy, is applicable to more than 
11,000 installations, which represent around 45% of the greenhouse gas emissions of the 28 
Member States together with the three EEA-EFTA states.54 It also applies to the aviation 
sector concerning flights within this territory.55 The quantity of emissions covered and the 
attention it received as a core EU climate policy tool demonstrates the relevance of the ETS. 
Since the 2009 amendments, the structure of the EU ETS relies on a centralised approach at 
the EU level, which means that key decisions, such as the cap level and the allocation of 
allowances, are now taken by European institutions, with a key role for the European 
Commission. After eight years of functioning, the legal consequences of the centralisation of 
decision making at the EU level have started to take shape to the extent that today the legal 
measures adopted at the EU level and case law can be analysed. Due to its key relevance for 
EU climate law and the specificities of centralisation at the EU level, this directive was 
selected as one of the case studies. 
Thus far, only a few academic papers have explored the interplay between procedural rights 
and the EU ETS Directive.56 Before the 2009 amendments, Jendrośka discussed how the 
                                                          
49 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275/32 (consolidated version). 
50 Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
51 S. Dimas, ‘The Commission’s initiatives for shaping future policy’, 2005, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-567_en.pdf. 
52 M. Lee, EU environmental law, governance and decision-making, Second edition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2014), p. 101. 
53 M. Peeters and K. Deketelaere, ‘Key challenges of EU climate change policy: competences, measures 
and compliance’, in M. Peeters and K. Deketelaere (eds.), EU climate change policy: the challenge of 
new regulatory initiatives,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), pp. 3-21, p. 8. 
54 Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. As is the case in 13 of December 2019, see European 
Commission - DG Climate. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 20 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
55 The aviation sector was included under the EU ETS by an amendment introduced by Directive 
2009/29/EC.  
56 The author would like to thank Marjan Peeters and Dyonisios Stivas for sharing their compilation on 
the EU ETS literature.  
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provisions on access to information and public participation lived up to the requirements of 
the UNFCCC and the Aarhus Convention. He concluded that, regarding access to information 
and public participation, the EU ETS Directive met the requirements of the UNFCCC.57 
However, in his opinion, the provisions of the Directive were not clear and detailed enough 
to meet the Aarhus Convention requirements.58 De Cendra de Larragán and Grimaud 
examined the EU ETS in view of procedural rights with a focus on access to justice. They 
identified the most conflictive provisions of the EU ETS Directive and the possible legal 
scenarios in which these provisions could be challenged.59 MacDonald and Makuch provided 
an interesting and thorough comparison between the EU ETS Directive, as applicable in 
2006, and the Aarhus Convention.60 They found that the EU ETS Directive had some 
shortcomings regarding the requirements of the Aarhus Convention, but they were, mostly, 
overcome by amendments to the EU ETS Directive combined with other legal instruments 
on public participation and access to environmental information.61 By 2008, in view of the 
European Commission proposal to review the EU ETS Directive, Peeters had already 
highlighted that there was a “need to consider what the consequences of a further 
harmonization through the emissions trading instrument would be for public participation”.62 
After the 2009 amendments, which led to the centralisation of the decision making at the EU 
level, De Cendra de Larragán posed the question as to whether the public would be involved 
in the harmonised allocation measures but did not study all the provisions of the EU ETS 
Directive in light of public participation.63 In 2014, Van Zeben64 highlighted the importance 
of the discussion of procedural rights in the EU ETS context. However, none of these studies 
was specifically dedicated to a systematic analysis of the legal framework for access to 
                                                          
57 J. Jendrośka, ‘Public Participation and Information in the Emissions Trading Directive’ (1) 
Environmental Law Network International Review, (2004), pp. 7-11, p. 11. 
58 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2004), p. 11. 
59 D. Grimeaud and J. de Cendra de Larragán, ‘Procedural rights concerning the start of the European 
emissions trading scheme for greenhouse gases: (information, participation and) access to justice - 
Industry Project on equal competition and emissions trading’, 2005, p. 3. 
60 K. MacDonald and Z. Makuch, ‘Emissions Trading and the Aarhus Convention: A Proportionate 
Symbiosis?’, in Peeters, M. and Deketelaere, K. (eds.), EU Climate Change Policy: The Challenge of 
New Regulatory Initiatives, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), pp. 125-152. 
61 K. MacDonald and Z. Makuch, op. cit. (2006), pp. 147-148. The authors mentioned, for instace,  the 
amendment of Article 17 on access to information, which included the Kyoto Protocol project 
mechanisms and the amendment of Article 19(3) on registries, which required that information 
concerning the identification and use of CERs and ERUs within the ETS should also be made available 
on the registry. These amendments were brought by Directive 2004/101/EC. 
62 M. Peeters, op. cit. (2008), p. 50. 
63 J. de Cendra de Larragán, Distributional choices in EU climate change law and policy: towards a 
principled approach?, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011), p. 464. 
64 J. Van Zeben, The allocation of regulatory competence in the EU emissions trading scheme, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 217-218. 
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information and public participation within the EU ETS after its reform in 2009, including 
the EU’s international commitments. To a certain extent, Peeters and Nóbrega fill this gap by 
discussing EU ETS-related cases regarding environmental procedural rights before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).65 Nevertheless, the purpose of their paper was not 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the EU ETS legal framework in view of procedural 
rights; this analysis still needs to be undertaken.  
3.2.2.  Case study 2: The Renewable Energy Directive 
The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) was adopted in 2009 with legally enforceable targets 
for the Member States as the main objective: i.e. achieving 20% of renewable energy 
consumption in the European Union (EU) by 2020.66 Member States must also ensure that at 
least 10% of their transport fuels come from renewable sources by this deadline.67 The RED 
incentivises the use of biofuels and bioliquids by the Member States in order to achieve this 
10% renewables target in transport.68 However, only sustainable biofuels can be counted by 
the Member States in achieving this target.69 A way of recognising these biofuels as 
sustainable is via the certification granted by voluntary schemes. The European Commission 
is responsible for recognising biofuels voluntary certification schemes, which makes this a 
relevant case to understand how procedural rights have been integrated into this process. The 
sustainability criteria70 and the recognition process of biofuels voluntary schemes have been 
the subject of considerable discussions,71 but an in-depth analysis of this process in view of 
procedural rights has yet to be undertaken.  
                                                          
65 M. Peeters and S. Nóbrega, ‘Climate Change‐related Aarhus Conflicts: How Successful are 
Procedural Rights in EU Climate Law?’ 23(3) Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law, (2014), pp. 354-366, pp. 358-360. This research discussed case law until 30 
November 2013. 
66 Article 3(1), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
67 Article 3(4), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
68 Recital 69, Preamble, Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. The directive which will 
address the period after 2020 foresees a renewable target in the transport sector of at least 14 % by 
2030. Article 25, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328/82. 
69 The sustainability criteria are described in Article 17of the Renewable Energy Directive and will be 
explained further in Chapter V. 
70 T. Yue, ‘Different paths towards sustainable biofuels? A Comparative Study of the International, EU, 
and Chinese Regulation of the Sustainability of Biofuels’, (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 
2016). 
71 S. Ugarte, J. van Dam, S. Spijkers and M. Gaebler, ‘Recognition of Private Certification Systems for 
Public Regulation: Lessons Learned from the EU Renewable Energy Directive’, (Bonn-Berlin: 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 2013). Some authors have 
discussed the question of the transparency of the voluntary schemes, but there is no mention of the 
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3.3. Research limitations 
Most other existing legislative acts on EU climate change and energy package are less 
relevant to answer the research question, since they do not foresee much action to be taken 
at the EU level. The Effort Sharing Decision establishes binding annual greenhouse gas 
emission targets for the Member States for emissions from most non-EU ETS sectors.72 In 
contrast, with the EU ETS, the Member States are responsible for defining and implementing 
measures to curb emissions from the sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Decision.73  
The Energy Efficiency Directive was adopted to reach the EU’s target of 20% energy 
efficiency by 2020.74 It establishes a number of binding measures for the Member States 
which are required, in all stages of the energy chain, to use energy more efficiently. The role 
of the European Commission is limited to guiding the Member States to implement the 
directive and reviewing and monitoring its implementation by the Member States.75 
Therefore, the Commission does not have any role in further implementing this directive, 
unlike the case of the EU ETS and RED. 
The same reasoning applies to another legal measure which is part of the package, namely 
the Carbon and Capture Storage (CCS) Directive.76 The CCS “is a suite of technological 
processes which involve capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the gases discarded by industry 
and transporting and injecting it into geological formations.”77 The process is costly and the 
Member States are not obliged to adopt this technique in their territory. The European 
Commission is responsible for reporting on the implementation of the CCS Directive78 and 
may adopt guidelines.79 The Commission may also issue non-binding opinions on draft 
                                                          
Aarhus Convention. See: S. Romppanen, ‘The EU's Biofuels: Certified as Sustainable?’ 3(3) Renewable 
Energy Law & Policy Review, (2012a), pp. 173-186, pp. 183-184.; J. Lin, ‘Governing Biofuels: A 
principal-agent Analysis of the European Union Biofuels Certification Regime and the Clean 
Development Mechanism’ 24(1) Journal of Environmental Law, (2011), pp. 43-73, p. 56; P. Paiement, 
‘Transnational delegation, accountability and the administrative governance of biofuel standards’, in S. 
Wood, R. Schmidt, K. Abbott, B. Eberlein and E. Meidinge (eds.), Transnational business governance 
interactions: Enhancing regulatory capacity, ratcheting up standards and empowering marginalized 
Actors (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 227-252, pp. 234-236. 
72 Decision No 406/2009/EC, see footnote 30. 
73 The sectors which are covered by the Effort Sharing Decision are, for instance, transport, 
construction, agriculture, and waste. 
74 Directive 2012/27/EU, see footnote 34 for complete reference. 
75 Article 24, Directive 2012/27/EU. 
76 Directive 2009/31/EC, see footnote 32. 
77 European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers on the directive on the geological storage of carbon 
dioxide’, 2008b, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund/ccs_en#tab-0-3. 
78 Article 38(1), Directive 2009/31/EC. 
79 Articles 12(2), 18(2) and 20(2), 2009/31/EC. 
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storage permits.80 Therefore, the duty of implementing the CCS Directive is concentrated at 
the Member State level with a limited role for European institutions. For this reason, it is 
logical to exclude the CCS Directive from the choice of case studies. Of course, for these 
remaining measures, research on access to information and public participation is relevant in 
order to gain a full picture of the developments of these rights in the national frameworks, 
but it falls outside of the purpose of this thesis, which aims to provide a thorough 
understanding of the role of procedural rights in the field of EU climate change law in as far 
as the EU institutions and bodies are concerned. 
4. Outline of the thesis 
In its quest to provide an understanding of procedural rights in the field of EU climate change 
law, this thesis proceeds as follows. 
Chapters II and III set the ground for the analysis of the case studies. Chapter II examines the 
provisions regarding access to information and public participation contained in the 
international climate treaties, particularly the UNFCCC, and explores what kind of 
obligations these entail for the Parties. Chapter III complements the international picture by 
identifying the obligations emanating from the Aarhus Convention and by examining how 
these obligations have been implemented by the EU, as far as the EU institutions and bodies 
are concerned.  
Chapters IV and V provide the case studies. They delve into the question of how procedural 
rights are provided for in two of the legal measures adopted under the EU climate policy, 
namely the EU ETS Directive (Chapter IV) and the Renewable Energy Directive (Chapter 
V), and they assess the EU’s compliance with its obligations under international law.  
Chapter VI concludes by highlighting the main findings drawn from the thesis. If legal 
problems or shortcomings are identified, it will propose ways for the EU to ensure 
compliance with its international commitments regarding access to information and public 
participation in the field of EU climate law. 
  
                                                          
80 Article 10, Directive 2009/31/EC. The European Commission has so far delivered two opinions: 
Commission Opinion of 28.2.2012 relating to the draft permit for the permanent storage of carbon 
dioxide in block section P18-4 of block section P18a of the Dutch continental shelf, in accordance with 
Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide; 
and Commission Opinion of 20.1.2016 on a draft permit for the permanent storage of carbon dioxide 
in the depleted Goldeneye gas condensate field located in blocks 14/28b, 14/29a, 14/29e, 20/3b, 20/4b 
and 20/4c on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 
2009/31/EC of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide C(2016) 152 final. 
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Chapter II – The UNFCCC requirements for access 
to climate information and public participation in 
climate change decision making  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim and structure 
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a global 
treaty that aims to respond to the threats posed by climate change. The primary goal of the 
treaty is to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions entering the atmosphere. In addition 
to its primary goal, the Convention also stipulates in Article 6 that Parties should promote 
and facilitate public access to information on climate change and its effects and also public 
participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate responses. 
At the same time, Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol, adopted under the umbrella of the 
UNFCCC, emphasises the need for access to information and for public participation in the 
implementation of the Protocol’s mechanisms to achieve a reduction of emissions by 5% 
compared to emissions in 1990.1 The Paris Agreement, which was adopted by the Parties to 
the UNFCCC, is the most recent international agreement in the area of climate change.2 It 
provides for an international regulatory structure to keep the rise in temperature well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels.3 The Paris Agreement, in Article 12, also requires Parties to 
cooperate in taking measures to enhance public access to information and public 
participation.  
                                                          
1 Kyoto Protocol. The first commitment period shall represent a reduction of at least 5% GHG emissions 
compared to 1990 levels (Article 3(1), Kyoto Protocol.) The second commitment period, 2013 to 2020, 
has a target of at least 18% reduction of GHG emissions below 1990 levels (Article 3, (1 bis), Doha 
Amendment. For the state of ratification, see: United Nations Treaty Collection. Chapter XXVII - 
Environment - 7. c Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 15 April 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en.)  
2 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCC, Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement FCCC/ 
/CP/2015/10/Add.1. 
3 Article 1, Paris Agreement. 
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While Article 6 of the UNFCCC contains six priority areas (education, training, public 
awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation 
on these issues), this chapter focuses on the two areas which are within the scope of the main 
research question: access to information and public participation. By identifying which 
provisions are established in the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement 
regarding access to information and public participation and understanding what kind of 
obligation they entail for the Parties, including the EU, this chapter will place the first 
necessary building block to answer the overarching question of this thesis: To what extent do 
rights of access to environmental information and participation in governmental 
environmental decision making have to be provided for individuals and ENGOs at the EU 
level in the field of EU climate law?  
The chapter is structured as follows. The current section continues with an explanation of the 
research approach applied in this chapter. Section 2 provides a legal interpretation of Article 
6 of the UNFCCC through the rules enumerated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.4 Section 3 examines Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol and section 4 examines 
Article 12 of the Paris Agreement in order to identify whether these provisions go beyond 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC or not. Section 5 provides concluding remarks as to which kind of 
obligations concerning access to information and public participation in climate change 
decision making are established that the Parties should implement at the domestic level under 
the three agreements. 
1.2. Research approach 
This chapter intends to identify which kind of obligations regarding access to information 
and public participation in climate change decision making emanate from the international 
level for the EU and other treaty Parties.  
As Mayer explained, two types of obligations can be distinguished.5 The first type of 
obligations require a specific result, while the second type of obligations require that an 
honest endeavour is made.6 The first type of obligations are called obligations of result, and 
the second type of obligations are commonly referred to as obligations of conduct. The 
distinction can be used as a tool to interpret obligations with regard to climate change 
                                                          
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna on 23 May 1969, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 
(entered into force on 27 January 1980). 
5 B. Mayer, ‘Obligations of conduct in the international law on climate change: A defence’ 27(2) Review 
of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, (2018), pp. 130-140, p. 130. 
6 B. Mayer, op. cit. (2018), p. 130. Or differently phrased by Mayer: “An obligation of conduct requires 
one to try”, B. Mayer, op. cit. (2018), p. 137. 
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mitigation.7 However, in the area of international environmental law, for instance, Rajamani8 
and Hey9 have used the terminology obligations of effort (instead of obligation of conduct) 
to characterise an obligation to make best efforts to achieve an objective. This aligns with the 
definition elaborated in civil law typology,10 in which an obligation of conduct is an 
“obligation de s’efforcer”, i.e., an obligation to strive for or to make an effort towards a 
certain result.11 Therefore, the terms obligations of conduct and obligations of effort define 
the same kind of obligations. In this thesis, the term obligations of effort will be used 
throughout the text, since the term gives a clear and straightforward message that such 
obligations require efforts from the Parties towards the achievement of a goal. 
The distinction between obligations of effort and of result has been applied by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ found regarding the obligation of result that: 
 “[…] the obligation […] is one of result — that is to say, an obligation which requires 
a specific outcome. […] The Court observes that this obligation of result is one which 
must be met within a reasonable period of time.”12 
Concerning the obligation of effort, for which the Court prefers to use the term obligation of 
conduct over obligation of effort, the ICJ affirmed that:  
“it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in 
the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the 
circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States 
parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent 
genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the 
desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State 
                                                          
7 As stated by B. Mayer, op. cit. (2018), p. 130. 
8 L. Rajamani, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: a framework approach 
to climate change’, in D. A. Faber and M. Peeters (eds.), Climate Change Law,  (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), pp. 205-216, p. 208. 
9 E. Hey, Advanced Introduction to International Environmental Law, (Cheltenham, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), p. 92. 
10 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the difficulties of codification: on Ago's classification of obligations of 
means and obligations of result in relation to state responsibility’ 10(2) European Journal of 
International Law, (1999), pp. 371-385, p. 375. See also Mayer, 2018, p.130, who states that the 
distinction is drawn from civil law tradition.  
11 J. Combacau, ‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement: quelques questions et pas de 
réponse’  Le droit international: unité et diversité. Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, (1981), pp. 181-
204, p. 194. 
12 Request for Interpretion of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), 19 January 2009, para 27.  
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manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its 
power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.”13  
Nonetheless, the use of the distinction between obligations of effort and of result is not 
uncontroversial.14 The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts adopted by the International Law Commission do not require a distinction to be made 
between obligations of effort and obligations of result.15 The final idea presented in the draft 
is that the differentiation among obligations does not help to define the breach, but rather it 
“depends on the precise terms of the obligation, its interpretation and application, taking into 
account its object and purpose and the facts of the case.”16 While taking into account that, a 
precise interpretative exercise always has to be carried out for each provision, the distinction 
between obligations of effort and obligations of result remains relevant in the area 
international law, in general,17 and of international environmental law, in particular, as it has 
been used while investigating the nature of the legal obligations of environmental treaty 
provisions in order to ascertain what conduct should be expected from the Contracting 
Parties.18 According to Bodansky, “international environmental lawyers commonly refer to 
requirements to do particular things as obligations of conduct, and obligations to achieve 
particular results as obligations of result.”19 Considering the distinction between obligations 
of effort and of result a non-excessively complicated way of demonstrating which kind of 
                                                          
13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, para 430. 
14 T. M. Thorp, Climate justice: a voice for the future, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 197. 
Thorp uses the term obligation of conduct. 
15 Nevertheless, paragraph 11 of the commentary to article 12 is dedicated to the distinction between 
obligations of conduct and of result. International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on responsibility of 
states for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries’ 2 (Part II) Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, A/56/10, (2001), pp. 31-143, pp. 56-57. The future steps to be taken regarding the 
draft articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts is still under discussion by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. For further details on the developments, see: 
https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/74/resp_of_states.shtml, 10 January 2020. 
16 International Law Commission, op. cit. (2001), p. 54 (commentary in Article 12, para 1). 
17 C. P. Economides, ‘Content of the Obligation: Obligation of Means and Obligation of Result’, in J. 
Crawford, A. Pellet, S. Olleson and K. Parlet (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility,  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 371-381, pp. 377-379. 
18 For examples of authors in the area of environmental law who apply this distinction, see: C. Voigt, 
‘The Paris Agreement: What is the Standard of Conduct for Parties?’ 24 Questions of International 
Law, (2016), pp. 17-28, and L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2016) and C. P. Economides, op. cit. (2010). 
19 D. Bodansky, ‘The art and craft of international environmental law’, 2010, 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3300858, p. 76. 
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conduct is required by the Parties,20 this classification will be used throughout this thesis as 
a way of encompassing in one term the result of the interpretation of a provision. 
Given that a thorough interpretation of the treaty provisions requires that all aspects of the 
agreement are taken into account,21 the next section will carry out an interpretation of Article 
6 (a)(ii) and (iii) of the UNFCCC relying on the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), especially on Articles 31 and 32. Paragraphs 
1 and 2 Article 31 of the VCLT establish that a treaty should be interpreted through the 
ordinary meaning, context, object, and purpose; and paragraph 3 allows for subsequent 
agreement and practice in the application or interpretation of a treaty to be taken into account 
while interpreting a treaty.22 Article 32 of the VCLT foresees that recourse may be had to 
                                                          
20 T. M. Thorp, op. cit. (2014), p. 197. 
21 M. N. Shaw, International law, Seventh Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
676. 
22 Article 31 of the VCLT reads as follow:  
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
This provision establishes that a treaty should be interpreted through ordinary meaning, 
context, object and purpose.” 
46 
supplementary means of interpretation of a treaty.23 These rules are widely accepted and fall 
within the realm of customary law,24 and they are, consequently, applicable to all treaties.25 
2. Access to information and public participation under the 
UNFCCC  
2.1. Introduction to Article 6 of the UNFCCC 
An interpretation of Article 6 of the UNFCCC will allow for it to be clarified what Parties 
have to do precisely in order to comply with it.26 Article 6 contains six priority areas: 
education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and 
                                                          
23 Article 32 of the VCLT reads as follow:  
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
24 R. K. Gardiner, Treaty interpretation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 12-13. 
25 M. M. Mbengue, ‘Rules of Interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties)’ 31(2) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, (2016), pp. 388-412, p. 388. 
26 Article 6 reads as follows: 
“In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 (i), the Parties shall: 
(a) Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and regional levels, and in 
accordance with national laws and regulations, and within their respective capacities: 
(i) the development and implementation of educational and public awareness programmes on 
climate change and its effects; 
(ii) public access to information on climate change and its effects; 
(iii) public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate 
responses; and 
(iv) training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel; 
(b) Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where appropriate, using existing bodies: 
(i) the development and exchange of educational and public awareness material on climate 
change and its effects; and 
(ii) the development and implementation of education and training programmes, including the 
strengthening of national institutions and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in 
this field, in particular for developing countries.” 
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international cooperation on these issues.27 In view of the focus of this thesis, only two of 
these areas will be analysed: access to information (paragraph (a)(ii)) and public participation 
(paragraph (a)(iii)).28  
In the vein of the VCLT, as explained in section 1.2, the following section 2.2 will provide 
an analysis of the literal meaning of the terms contained in Article 6 (a)(ii) and (iii) in context 
with the other provisions and the purpose and objective of the UNFCCC. Section 2.2.3 will 
analyse whether decisions by the CoP regarding Article 6 may be understood as subsequent 
agreement and practice within the meaning of Article 31(3) VCLT and, consequently, used 
for the interpretation of Article 6 (a)(ii) and (iii). 
According to Article 32 of the VCLT, preparatory works and the circumstances of the 
conclusion of the treaty are to be used as a supplementary means of interpreting a treaty. The 
fact that this approach is supplementary does not mean that the analysis must be done in 
sequence. As stated by Gardiner, in some cases, it becomes more practical to first present the 
history of the provision and then follow with the application of the general rules of Article 
31.29 Although the circumstances of the time of the adoption of the text of the UNFCCC will 
be presented first in section 2.2.1,30 they will only be used in combination with the 
interpretation that follows from the application of the general rules contained in Article 31 
VCLT.31 For the purpose of the analysis carried out in this chapter, not to follow the sequence 
provided in the articles does make sense, since the contextualisation of the historical aspects 
will, in this way, be presented in a more coherent manner. Furthermore, starting the analysis 
with the historical circumstances leading up to the signing of the convention follows a 
chronological order that will ensure clearer results of the interpretative exercise.  
2.2. Circumstances of the drafting and conclusion of the UNFCCC 
2.2.1. Circumstance of the drafting: a choice for a framework convention 
                                                          
27 L. Paas, Action for climate empowerment: guidelines for accelerating solutions through education, 
training and public awareness (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2016), p. VI. 
28 International cooperation, which is dealt with in paragraph b of Article 6, is also excluded, since the 
aim is to examine which obligations the Parties will have to implement at the national level ultimately.  
29 R. K. Gardiner, op. cit. (2008), p. 10. 
30 It has also been done in treaty interpretations by courts, as exemplified by R. K. Gardiner, op. cit. 
(2008), p. 41. 
31 In this vein, Article 32 VCLT is not used as “autonomous method f or interpretation, divorced from 
the general rule.” I Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1984), 116 cited by A. 
Orakhelashvili, The interpretation of acts and rules in public international law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 312. 
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The UNFCCC is part of a broader movement that began in the 1970s which regulated 
international environmental issues using a framework treaty.32 This trend involved the 
adoption of a treaty with general provisions which, at a later stage, could be complemented 
by more specific international regulations, usually in the form of protocols. As was the case 
for many other environmental issues, the flexible characteristics of a framework convention 
were suitable for addressing climate change.33 Despite the fact that there exists no precise 
definition of the term framework convention in international law,34 it is possible to say that 
framework conventions generally follow two steps: i) the adoption of a convention with 
general provisions; ii) followed by the adoption of subsequent instruments with more detailed 
obligations.35 The first step helps in achieving an agreement collectively, while the second 
step allows for further commitments in the form of more specific obligations which have to 
be negotiated and ultimately adopted by the Parties. In other words, in a framework 
convention, the scope and content of the provisions are first put forward in a general way, 
while the more specific provisions should follow in a subsequent legal instrument, such as a 
protocol or a regulatory annex.36 Most of the framework provisions function as guidelines 
for further decision making. The UNFCCC has been considered to be somewhere between a 
framework and a substantive agreement,37 since it also contains provisions that attempt to 
impose specific commitments on the Parties,38 such as the obligation to reduce GHG 
emissions and a time limit for achieving this obligation.39 As Bodansky highlights, this is a 
                                                          
32 N. Matz-Luck, ‘Framework conventions as a regulatory tool’ 1(3) Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, (2009), pp. 439-458, p. 440. 
33 For an analysis of framework conventions, see N. Matz-Luck, op. cit. (2009). For an analysis of the 
framework approach to climate change, see L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2016), pp. 215-216. 
34 D. Bodansky, ‘The Framework Convention/Protocol Approach’ Paper 1(WHO/NDC/TFI/99.1) 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control - Technical Briefing Series, (1999), pp. 15-40, p. 15.   
35 According to Bodansky, “a variety of international agreements whose principal function is to 
establish a general system of governance for an issue area, and not detailed obligations. […] The so-
called framework convention/protocol approach to international lawmaking allows States to proceed 
incrementally. First, the framework convention establishes the general norms and institutions of the 
regime […]. Then, the protocols build on the parent agreement through the elaboration of additional 
(or more specific) commitments and institutional arrangements” D. Bodansky, op. cit. (1999), p. 15. 
Kiss and Shelton states that “the technique of ‘framework convention’ means that a convention of 
general scope is adopted, proclaiming basic principles on which consent can be achieved. The parties 
foresee the elaboration of additional protocols containing more detailed obligations.” A. Kiss and D. 
Shelton, International Environmental Law, 3rd [rev.] ed. (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2004), p. 
78. 
36 D. Bodansky, op. cit. (1999), p. 21. 
37 D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: a commentary’ 18(2) 
Yale Journal of International Law, (1993), pp. 451–558, p. 496. L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2016), p. 206. 
38 Rajamani has stated that “FCCC Article 4(2) containing specific and quantitative commitments is 
limited to Annex I Parties”, L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2016), p. 207. 
39 Article 4 (2), UNFCCC. 
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result of some Parties’ wishes to include specific commitments in the convention, but the 
result is a rather unclear provision, the legal effects of which are uncertain.40 Furthermore, as 
argued by Rajamani, even the specific and quantitative commitment of reducing GHG 
emissions is characterised by an obligation of effort, since the provision prescribes a target 
for developed countries but it only requires Parties to aim at achieving it.41  
2.2.2. Circumstances of conclusion 
The UNFCCC took a different step than previous framework conventions by introducing 
provisions in its text on education, training, and public awareness.42 In order to understand 
the reason the Parties decided to incorporate provisions on education, training and public 
awareness, despite the UNFCCC not being a human rights treaty, an investigation of the 
documents from the negotiations and from the literature on the topic follows below.  
The UNFCCC emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.43 At the time of the negotiations – 
and this is still the case today – there was no global convention addressing environmental 
procedural rights.44 It was during the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit – which resulted in, among 
other documents, the Rio Declaration and the UNFCCC – that attention was given to 
procedural rights. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration calls on states to find ways to facilitate 
access to information and public participation and, at the same time, to create mechanisms to 
enforce these rights via judicial remedies.45 The decision to include Article 6 in the UNFCCC 
                                                          
40 D. Bodansky, op. cit. (1999), p. 21.   
41 L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2016), p. 208. 
42 D. Bodansky, op. cit. (1993), pp. 510, footnote 355. 1992 introduced the inclusion of such provisions. 
The other two conventions that were opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio also contain 
provisions in the area of access to information and public participation. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity foresees public education and awareness in Article 13, and public participation in the context 
of impact assessment and minimising adverse impacts in Article 14. The Convention to Combat 
Desertification provides for capacity building, education and public awareness in Article 19. 
43 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 
1992).  
44 J. Razzaque, ‘Human rights to a clean environment: procedural rights’, in M. Fitzmaurice, D. M. Ong 
and P. Merkouris (eds.), Research handbook on international environmental law, (Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 284-300, p. 292. 
45 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states: “Environmental issues are best handled with participation 
of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities . . . and 
the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” 
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was, possibly, influenced by the general atmosphere of negotiations at the Earth Summit, 
which also included the adoption of principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.46  
The negotiations of the UNFCCC were conducted by an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC). Provisions on access to information and public participation were not 
included in its consolidated draft version of the future text of the convention for negotiation.47 
The negotiating documents reveal that one delegation introduced a draft proposal orally on 
“Education, training and public awareness”, but it does not make clear which one.48 
Bodansky states that later, “a small group met in Nairobi to draft what is now Article 6” 
without, however, mentioning the name of the members of this group.49 Therefore, the 
documents from the negotiations do not shed light on the reasons for the adoption of Article 
6 of the UNFCCC nor which countries (or persons) paved the way for its inclusion. 
2.3. Plain meaning of the terms in context and in the light of object and purpose 
of the UNFCCC 
Article 6(a)(ii) and (iii) of the UNFCCC reads as follows: 
“In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 (i), the Parties shall:  
Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and regional 
levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and within their 
respective capacities: 
[…]  
 (ii) public access to information on climate change and its effects;  
(iii) public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing 
adequate responses.” (emphasis added) 
The discrete elements of Article 6 highlighted above will be addressed in turn.  
                                                          
46 Even if it is outside of the scope of the present research, it is interesting to note that, although Principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration emphasises the importance of access to justice to handle environmental issues, 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC is silent on this issue and, therefore, does not impose obligations regarding 
access to justice. 
47 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework, ‘Single Text on Elements Relating to 
Mechanisms’, 1991b. 
48 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework, Report of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of its Third 
Section, held at Nairobi from 9 to 20 September 1991 (A/AC.237/12) (1991a), para 44. 
49 D. Bodansky, op. cit. (1993), p. 488.  
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2.3.1. “In accordance with national laws and regulations” 
While promoting and facilitating public access to information on climate change and public 
participation in addressing climate change, Article 6 requires Parties to do so in accordance 
with national laws and regulations. This suggests that, although Parties have to implement 
Article 6 obligations, it can be done with some flexibility, particularly in view of the rules 
established at the national level. In other words, this terminology gives Parties some room 
with regard to how they implement the provision.  
2.3.2. “Within their respective capacities” 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC is under the title of education, training and public awareness, and 
it is connected to Article 4(1)(i) of the UNFCCC, meaning that the Parties need to fulfil their 
obligations as prescribed by Article 4(1)(i) while observing the requirements of Article 6. 
Article 4 is under the title commitments,50 and it addresses different kinds of commitments 
the Parties need to fulfil in relation to the objective of the Convention to stabilise greenhouse 
gases in order to prevent hazardous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.  
Article 4(1)(i), to which Article 6 refers, determines that all Parties must be committed to 
promoting education, training, public awareness, and encourage the widest participation in 
this process, including that of non-governmental organisations. These duties have to be 
carried out according to their common but differentiated responsibilities.51 States’ common 
but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) are recognised in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC.52 
The concept of CBDR basically entails that, due to differences in states’ economic and 
technical capacities, and also due to the varying contributions of developing and developed 
countries to global environmental degradation, Parties should not be subjected to the same 
responsibilities under international environmental law.53 In the context of Article 4(1)(i), 
CBDR implies that all Parties have a common responsibility to promote and cooperate in 
education, training and public awareness and to encourage participation, but this 
responsibility is to be implemented in a differentiated manner among Parties, in view of their 
                                                          
50 Titles of the articles do not reveal content as explained by footnote in Article 1 of the UNFCCC, 
which states that “Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.” 
51 Article 4, heading, UNFCCC. 
52 It is also recognised in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. 
53 U. Beyerlin, ‘Different Types Of Norms In International Environmental Law Policies, Principles, 
And Rules’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 441-442. D. Shelton, ‘Equity’, in 
D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law,  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 639-662, pp. 656-658. 
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regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances.54 It is still not clear how the 
reference to CDBR in Article 4(1)(i) of the UNFCCC should be interpreted in view of Article 
6. For instance, it may be questioned whether the same interpretation of this principle should 
be applied as of that which was developed in the context of emission reductions where 
particularly the economic situation of the country is decisive.55 For example, in the Kyoto 
Protocol, emission-reduction targets were adopted only for developed countries. Applying 
the same reasoning to the procedural requirements would mean that a developing country 
would have a less stringent obligation to promote public awareness and encourage 
participation in climate change-related issues. Thus, a country such as Tuvalu, whose 
emissions “are less than 0.000005% of global emissions”,56 but which will very likely face 
the devastating consequences of climate change in this century,57 would have a less onerous 
obligation to inform the public of the threats of climate change than a country responsible for 
a larger proportion of GHG emissions. This seems to be an unreasonable outcome of applying 
CBDR since, in fact, the Tuvaluan public needs access to a great deal of information on 
climate change and its effects in order to develop adequate responses. In order to be consistent 
in relation to the purpose of the UNFCCC to achieve the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”,58 Article 4(1)(i) of the UNFCCC could rather be 
interpreted as requiring developed countries to help developing countries to implement their 
awareness and participation obligations properly, in light of the reduced capacity of the latter 
group of countries to do so.  
Furthermore, some textual remarks can be made as to how CBDR is formulated in the 
UNFCCC. The CBDR principle is first mentioned in the UNFCCC in Article 3(1), which is 
under the title of principles.59 There, the CBDR principle is accompanied by the term 
“respective capabilities”. This has led authors to call it the principle of CBDR&RC.60 
                                                          
54 Article 4 of the UNFCCC reads: “1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall: […]”. 
55 Article 4(4), Paris Agreement, where developed countries should continue taking the lead by 
undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. 
56 Government of Tuvalu, ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Communicated to the 
UNFCCC on 27 November 2015’, 2015, p. 4. 
57 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution 
of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2014c), 67. 
58 Article 2, UNFCCC. 
59 Titles of the articles do not reveal content as explained by footnote in Article 1 of the UNFCCC, 
which states that “Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.”  
60 D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and L. Rajamani, ‘International climate change law’: Oxford University 
Press, 2017); C. Voigt and F. Ferreira, ‘‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC, 
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Rajamani and Winkler argue that “the use of the term ‘respective capabilities’ in addition to 
CBDR suggests that there are two bases for differentiation – one based on capability, and 
another that draws from Rio Principle 7 which contains a definition of CBDR based on the 
contribution to environmental harm.”61 
In Article 4.1 of the Convention, instead of “respective capabilities”, the CBDR is 
accompanied by “their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances” when referring to the commitments of the Parties. It could be argued that 
“their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances” is 
equivalent to “respective capabilities”, since both terms allow for a balance of responsibilities 
between countries with different capabilities. In this vein, the two bases for differentiation 
described by Rajamani and Winkler would also be covered in Article 4(1), since CBDR and 
a differentiation based on the capability are both mentioned. 
Interestingly, Article 6 mentions “respective capacities” instead of “respective capabilities”. 
Rajamani seems to use these terms interchangeably since, while referring to the two bases of 
differentiation, she also refers to differing capacities: “the notion of differentiated 
responsibility derives both from the differing contributions of states to climate change and 
the differing capacities of states to take remedial measures.” (emphasis added).62 Assuming 
that the terms are interchangeable, there is no doubt that one needs to take into account the 
potential of each Party to implement the commitments.  
2.3.3. “Public access to information on climate change and its effects” 
Article 6 (a)(ii) of the UNFCCC requires Parties to promote and facilitate “public access to 
information on climate change and its effects”. The term climate change is defined by the 
Convention as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity 
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural 
climate variability observed over comparable time periods”.63 The term effects is used 
without making a distinction between positive and adverse effects. The text of the convention 
only defines adverse effects of climate change as “changes in the physical environment or 
biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the 
composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the 
                                                          
Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement’ 5(2) Transnational Environmental 
Law, (2016), pp. 285-303; H. Winkler and L. Rajamani, ‘CBDR&RC in a regime applicable to all’ 
14(1) Climate Policy, (2014), pp. 102-121.  
61 H. Winkler and L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2014), p. 104. 
62 L. Rajamani, ‘The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime’ 
16(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, (2005), pp. 81-118, doi: 10.1093/yiel/16.1.81, p. 
100. 
63 Article 1(2), UNFCCC. 
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operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.”64 Since Article 
6(a)(ii) makes no distinction between the effects, it can validly be argued that both positive 
and negative effects are encompassed by the use of the term effects. The inclusion of positive 
effects might be relevant in cases such as the one described by the IPCC: with medium 
confidence, “climate change is likely to increase cereal crop yields in northern Europe”.65 
Considering that Article 6(a)(ii) makes no distinction among the types of effect, information 
on these possible positive effects are also included among the effects of climate change. In 
sum, it can be argued that all effects, whether positive or negative, should be subject to public 
access to information obligations. 
Regarding the beneficiaries of the provision, Article 6(a)(ii) points to public access without 
any definition of the term. Therefore, in the absence of a definition, it is possible to assume 
that Article 6 of the UNFCCC does not intend to limit this to any segment of society. In this 
sense, anyone, including both legal and natural persons, are beneficiaries and there is no 
restriction as to who may have access to information.   
Article 6 (a)(ii) does not explicitly regulate to what extent information used by governments 
for decision making related to climate change and its effects must also be made accessible to 
the public. This decision making, for instance, concerns the climate change mitigation 
policies and particularly measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is, however, not 
clearly stipulated whether Parties are under the obligation to promote and facilitate public 
access to information regarding these policies, since it is not certain how broad the access to 
information provision which relates to “climate change and its effects” is to be interpreted 
and whether specific information held by the government has to be disclosed to the public.66 
It is for instance not clear whether the amount of emissions produced by a sector or an 
individual installation is covered by Article 6. Given the institutional framework of the 
UNFCCC, which allows the Conference of the Parties (CoP) “to make recommendations on 
any matters necessary for the implementation of the Convention”,67 the CoP could provide 
for clarification on the interpretation of the exact coverage and application of Article 6.  
  
                                                          
64 Article 1(1), UNFCCC. 
65 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014a), p. 75. 
66 Regarding grounds for refusal as regulated by the Aarhus Convention and implemented by the EU, 
see Chapter III, section 5.3. 
67 Article 7(2)(g), UNFCCC. 
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2.3.4.  “Public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing 
adequate responses” 
According to Article 6 (a)(iii) of the UNFCCC, Parties shall also promote and facilitate 
“public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate 
responses”. Due to the broad formulation mentioning “addressing climate change and its 
effects”, and particularly by referring to “developing adequate responses”, both mitigation 
and adaptation measures are covered by the provision. The fact that Parties are under an 
obligation to promote and facilitate public participation implies that sufficient information 
needs to be made available in order to allow the public to participate effectively in the 
decision making process.  
Regarding the beneficiaries in relation to access to information, Article 6 (a)(iii) of the 
UNFCCC mentions public participation without making any exception. Therefore, a 
reasonable interpretation is to consider all individual and legal persons as potential 
beneficiaries. In conclusion, given the broad formulation of the provision, the latter can be 
interpreted as meaning that governments should involve the public while developing their 
climate policies.68 
2.4. Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice: work programmes 
According to Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the VCLT, an interpretation of a treaty may take into 
account, together with the context, “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provision,” and “any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation”, respectively. 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC was further developed by work programmes adopted through the 
Conference of the Parties (CoP) decisions.69 The CoP was established “to make, within its 
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention”.70 Therefore, the CoP decisions may not deviate from obligations established in 
the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the Convention does not establish a clear mandate for the CoP 
to adopt legally binding decisions. There is currently no consensus on whether CoP decisions 
are legally binding. Bodle and Oberthür state that CoP decisions are not legally binding per 
                                                          
68 Thus far, no further discussion has been carried out on the meaning of this provision in the legal 
scholarship. 
69 Using the format of work programmes contrasts with the quantified emissions targets, which are 
regulated within a protocol establishing binding commitments. The protocol can either deal with 
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70 Article 7(2), UNFCCC. 
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se.71 They explain that one of the reasons that CoP decisions are not legally binding is that, 
in dualistic systems, countries would require parliamentary approval in order to be bound 
internationally in a way which is similar to a ratification procedure.72 Furthermore, “there is 
hardly any state practice confirming that states are willing to accept formal 
bindingness of cop decisions per se, even if in practice they find it difficult not to 
follow such decisions.”73 However, other authors, such as Brunnée, see that 
some CoP decisions could impose consequences on the Parties that, although not legally 
binding, would amount to de facto consequences comparable to legally binding decisions.74  
Even considering that CoP decisions are not legally binding, the adoption of work 
programmes on Article 6 UNFCCC by the CoP can be considered a subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the application of its provisions, since the work programmes 
intend to help the Parties to implement Article 6. Consequently, these decisions can be taken 
into account to interpret Article 6 of the UNFCCC, according to Article 31 (3)(a) VCLT.75 
Having established that the decisions of the CoP regarding work programmes on Article 6 
UNFCCC can be used to interpret Article 6 of the UNFCCC, the next step is to investigate 
whether the content of these decisions gives more body to Article 6 of the UNFCCC.  
For this examination, the methodology proposed by Wiersema will be used. Wiersema breaks 
free from traditional categories of sources of international law and proposes an analysis of 
the legal status of the consensus-based CoP activities based on four different axes: voting and 
                                                          
71 S. Oberthür and R. Bodle, ‘Legal Form of the Paris Agreement and Nature of Its Obligations’, in D. 
Klein, M. Pía Carazo, M. Doelle, J. Bulmer and A. Higham (eds.), The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change: Analysis and Commentary,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016b), pp. 91-103, p. 93.  
72 S. Oberthür and R. Bodle, ‘Legal form and nature of the Paris outcome’ 6(1-2) Climate law, (2016a), 
pp. 40-57, pp. 43-44. 
73 S. Oberthür and R. Bodle, op. cit. (2016a), p. 44. 
74 D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2017), p. 91. J. Brunnée, ‘COPing with consent: 
law-making under multilateral environmental agreements’ 15(1) Leiden Journal of International Law, 
(2002), pp. 1-52, p. 26. 
75 Some would rather classify a CoP decision under Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, such as Churchill and 
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for the purpose of treaty interpretation. 
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level of consent, level of authorisation by the treaty, intent, and effect.76 She proposes such a 
method of interpretation, because the traditional classification into hard law, soft law and 
non-law would not reflect “the complex relationship between consensus-based COP activity 
and the underlying treaty obligations of the parties to that treaty.”77 The four axes need to be 
used in combination, since the use of one axis in isolation cannot give the full picture of the 
relationship between consensus-based CoP decision and international legal obligation.78  
By relying on Wiersema’s method, the CoP decisions related to Article 6 of the UNFCCC 
will be analysed to determine whether they thicken the obligations on access to information 
and public participation contained in Article 6. The CoP adopted three work programmes on 
Article 6: the 2002 New Delhi Work Programme;79 the 2007 Amended New Delhi Work 
Programme;80 and the Doha Work Programme, which runs until 2020.81  
2.4.1.  Voting and level of consent 
The analysis of the level of consent aims to explore whether a decision “has achieved the 
status of either a new agreement between the parties or some form of instant or emerging 
customary international law.”82 
The work programmes on Article 6 do not mention which voting procedure was used for the 
decisions through which they were adopted. However, it can be assumed that these decisions 
were adopted by consensus for two reasons. First, the Draft Rules of Procedure of the 
Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies have not yet been adopted, but the 
UNFCCC factually operates under the existing draft rules. Even though the CoP has agreed 
to apply the draft rules of procedure, the draft rule 42, which would potentially allow for 
majority in decision making, was excluded.83 Second, consensus means “the practice of 
                                                          
76 A. Wiersema, ‘The new international law-makers? Conferences of the parties to multilateral 
environmental agreements’ 31(1) Michigan Journal of International Law, (2009), pp. 231-287, pp. 250-
259. 
77 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 233. 
78 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 256. 
79 Decision 11/CP.8 New Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the Convention 
FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1. 
80 Decision 9/CP.13 Amended New Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the Convention 
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81 Decision 15/CP.18 Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2. 
82 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 251. 
83 Paragraph 2 of the note by the secretariat, Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Organizational 
Matters - Adoption of the Rules of Procedure (1996). 
The Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies has still not 
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adoption of resolutions or decisions by general agreement without resort to voting in the 
absence of any formal objection that would stand in the way of a decision being declared 
adopted in that manner.”84 In the reports of the CoP in which the decisions on work 
programmes were adopted, there is no concern noted or formal objection.85 
Taking into consideration that the decisions adopting the work programmes were adopted via 
consensus, it can be argued that these decisions acquired a significant degree of consent from 
the Parties. Furthermore, a meeting as large as the CoP of the UNFCCC requires substantial 
investment from governments to have skilled negotiators to defend their interests. This can 
hinder the active participation of countries with limited resources in decision making. Even 
in the case of weak representation, these Parties “will still be part of the consensus, and will 
still be affected by any legal implications that flow from it.”86 In view of this, Parties may 
also prioritise putting effort into the more contentious aspects of the Convention (in this case: 
emission reduction, finance and adaptation to climate change), while surrounding aspects of 
the Convention, such as access to information and public participation, will be given less 
attention, especially because the decisions are assumed not to be legally binding. Therefore, 
supposing that these decisions would gain a status of a new agreement would risk creating 
obligations that are not foreseen by the Parties. Nonetheless, this aspect also needs to be 
considered in view of the other three axes.  
2.4.2.  Level of authorisation in the treaty – Delegated consent 
Relying on “a notion of consent to delegated law-making power”,87 Wiersema proposes that 
the decisions, such as those which adopted the work programmes on Article 6, can have their 
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2 to 15 December 2018 (2018). 
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Parties would highlight a specific position but the result would be the adoption by consensus. R. C. 
Gardner, op. cit. (2004), p. 4. 
86 R. C. Gardner, op. cit. (2004), p. 9. 
87 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 253. 
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legal status evaluated according to the degree of authorisation contained in the treaty. The 
UNFCCC does not empower the CoP with the specific capacity to adopt a work programme 
on Article 6. Therefore, these decisions on work programmes fall within the general 
authorisation of the CoP to adopt decisions to promote the effective implementation of the 
UNFCCC,88 read in combination with the commitments of Parties in Article 4(i) and Article 
6. Against this background, the decisions which adopted the work programmes on Article 6 
have a “lesser legal status than specifically authorized activities”,89 such as on the rules of 
procedure90 and financial mechanisms.91   
2.4.3.  Obligation contained in the language of the CoP Activity – Intent 
This axis aims to assess the normative force of the CoP decisions through the analysis of the 
language used in the text. A reading of all work programmes carried out by this author 
revealed that the CoP decisions on work programmes are mainly in soft language, which 
repeatedly uses terms such as encourages,92 recognises93 and invites.94 This provides a clear 
message that the CoP had no intention to move in the direction of defining specific 
commitments for Parties on how to implement Article 6. In contrast, the same decisions use 
mandatory terms when dealing with internal actions or addressing the UNFCCC bodies. For 
instance, the decisions request the Global Environmental Facility to provide for financial 
support 95 and request actions from the secretariat.96 Nonetheless, even the requests made to 
the secretariat are softened by the condition that the actions are subject to the availability of 
financial support.97 These findings are consistent with the comments from Wiersema who 
observed that “sometimes differences in language seem to track whether a COP is addressing 
parties directly with regard to their external obligations, where less forceful language might 
be used, or whether it is addressing its own internal operations or its subsidiary organs, where 
                                                          
88 Article 7(2), UNFCCC. 
89 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 253. 
90 Article 7(3), UNFCCC. 
91 Article 11(4), UNFCCC. 
92 Decision 11/CP.8, para 4 and 7. Decision 9/CP.13, para 4. Decision 15/CP.18, para 5. 
93 Decision 11/CP.8, para 4. Decision 9/CP.13, para 5. Decision 15/CP.18, para 7. 
94 Decision 11/CP.8, para 4 and Annex, para 17, 18, 23 and 24. Decision 9/CP.13, Annex para 20, 21, 
26 and 28. Decision 15/CP.18, para 3, 4, 6, Annex para 22(k), 24, 25, 26, among others. 
95 Decision 11/CP.8, para 4. Decision 9/CP.13, para 5. Decision 15/CP.18, para 7. 
96 Decision 11/CP.8, Annex para 25. Decision 9/CP.13, Annex para 29. Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para 
35. Other examples of the use of mandatory terms: decided that the efforts under Article 6 should be 
titled Action for Climate Empowerment and not Article 6 as previously was the case (Decision 
17/CP.22 Improving the effectiveness of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention 
FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.2, para 14); and decided on the format and content of the annual in-session 
dialogue on Article 6 (as an example of an internal practical decision) (Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para 
10). 
97 Decision 17/CP.22, para 16. 
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more forceful language is used.”98 In this sense, the language used by the CoP regarding 
Article 6 obligations addressed to the Parties is clearly less forceful than those addressed to 
the secretariat or when deciding internal practical matters and it leans towards soft rather than 
hard legal commitments. 
2.4.4.  Effect in implementation 
The fourth axis focuses on the practical significance of these decisions. The idea is to examine 
to what extent the Parties implement the decisions, in this case, the work programmes, as if 
they were legally binding.  
To investigate whether Parties implement the decisions on work programmes as if they were 
legally binding, the reports elaborated by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) on 
the progress of the work programmes will be analysed, focusing on the progress regarding 
access to information and public participation.99 So far, there are two reports from the SBI: 
one on the implementation of the 2002 New Delhi Work Programme100 and one on the 
implementation of the 2007 Amended New Delhi Work Programme, the terms of which 
expired in 2007 and 2012 respectively.101 For the Doha Work Programme, which is running 
until 2020, only the report on the intermediate review of progress is thus far available and 
therefore this is the document which will be analysed.102 The final SBI report will only be 
ready in 2020 when the term of this programme ends.  
i. Information contained in the SBI Reports 
Before the reports are analysed, a brief explanation of the information contained in these 
documents may be helpful. The reports elaborated by the SBI are based on the national 
communications (NCs) that the Parties submit to the secretariat.103 The time schedule for 
submission and the review process of these communications are different for Annex I and 
                                                          
98 A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), p. 254. 
99 The SBI, which is one of the two permanent subsidiaries bodies – the other being the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) – is responsible for assisting the CoP in 
conducting the assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention and, 
consequently, has the duty of elaborating the reports on the progress of the work programmes. Article 
10, UNFCCC. 
100 Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the UNFCCC, Review of the implementation of the New 
Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the Convention FCCC/SBI/2007/22. 
101 Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the UNFCCC, Report on progress made in, and the 
effectiveness of, the implementation of the amended New Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the 
Convention FCCC/SBI/2012/3 (2012), para 51. 
102 Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the UNFCCC, Progress made in implementing the Doha 
work programme on Article 6 of the Convention FCCC/SBI/2016/6. 
103 Article 12(1), UNFCCC. 
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non-Annex I Parties in accordance with the common but differentiated responsibility 
principle. Annex I Parties were required to submit their first communication within six 
months of the entry into force of the Convention for that Party; while non-Annex I Parties 
must submit within three years or in accordance with their financial capacity; and least 
developed countries may submit their first NC at their discretion.104 The periodicity of the 
submission of subsequent NCs was decided by CoP decisions and currently both Annex I and 
non-Annex I Parties are required to submit them every four years.105 Nonetheless, for non-
Annex I Parties, the requirement of how often the NC should be submitted is conditional 
upon the provision of financial resources to cover the agreed full costs which must be spent 
in preparing their NCs.106 The NCs are subject to a technical review, which is coordinated by 
the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.  
Almost all Annex I countries have submitted all required NCs, with very few exceptions.107 
In contrast, the submission of NCs by non-Annex I Parties is not that robust.108 For instance, 
significant emitters such as Brazil, India and China, for whom the Convention entered into 
force in 1994, only submitted their first NCs in 2004. It is important to note that, although 
the reports of the SBI on implementation gives a picture of the implementation of Article 6 
by the Parties, these reports lack information from many non-Annex I Parties.  
ii. Review of implementation of the work programmes on Article 6 UNFCCC 
The review of the implementation of the 2007 New Delhi Work Programme conducted by 
the SBI found that public participation played an important role in climate change decision 
making processes in Annex I Parties.109 This was reflected by the practice of Parties to hold 
national consultations with the general public and interested stakeholders regarding action 
plans and policies in the area of climate change.110 The report showed that most Annex I 
                                                          
104 Article 12(5), UNFCCC. 
105 Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 para 14. Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun 
Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para 60.  
106 Decision 1/CP.16, para 60b. 
107 The information on the submissions can be found here: 
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/national_communications_and_biennial_reports/submissions/items/
7742.php, accessed on 18 June 2020.  
108 A full overview of the Submitted National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties can be found 
here: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/10124.php, accessed on 18 June 
2020.  
109 Review of the implementation of the New Delhi work programm, para 31. 
110 Ibid. 
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Parties made an effort to disseminate information and to encourage public participation, 
while also noting that the same actions had been undertaken by many non-Annex I Parties.111  
In 2012, the review of the implementation of the amended New Delhi Work Programme 
mentions the Aarhus Convention for the first time as a framework to regulate public 
participation and public access to information.112 The review highlights positively how 
countries that are signatories to the Aarhus Convention have binding procedural obligations, 
which are implemented via national legislation and policies. Furthermore, in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, “all countries in the region have a mechanism to promote public 
participation in climate change-related decision-making processes”;113 while in Africa “(62 
per cent) of countries in that region have such a mechanism”.114 The report does not clarify 
whether these mechanisms are prescribed by legislation or are only policies. Still, 
mechanisms for public participation can only be effective if the public is provided with 
adequate information, and the review noted that more than half of the people in these regions 
were still unaware that climate change was happening.115 This low level of awareness 
persists, despite the fact that the number of national focal points for Article 6 increased in 
both developed and developing countries.116 
The intermediate review of the Doha Work Programme conducted in 2012 again highlights 
that, for Parties which are signatories of the Aarhus Convention, the latter is the main 
international framework on environmental procedural rights.117 The report also notes that 
certain Parties, including those that are Parties to the Aarhus Convention, have adopted legal 
frameworks for public access to environmental information, which also includes information 
on climate change.118 Although the CoP recognised that progress had been made in the six 
areas covered by Article 6,119 for instance, the simple but crucial action of establishing focal 
                                                          
111 Review of the implementation of the New Delhi work programm, para 53 and Annex I, para h and 
I. The document does not specify which countries have taken the actions. 
112 Report on progress made in, and the effectiveness of, the implementation of the amended New Delhi 
work, para 50 and 61. It is quite late, considering that the Aarhus Convention has been in force since 
2001. 
113 Report on progress made in, and the effectiveness of, the implementation of the amended New Delhi 
work, para 51. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Report on progress made in, and the effectiveness of, the implementation of the amended New Delhi 
work, para 43.  
116 Counting, in December 2012, 19 focal points for Annex I parties and 52 for non-Annex I parties. 
117 Intermediate Review on the Doha work programme, para 46. 
118 Intermediate Review on the Doha work programme, para 52. 
119 Decision 17/CP.22, para 1. 
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points for Article 6 of the UNFCCC is still only undertaken by a limited number of the 
Parties: only 94 out of the 197 Parties nominated focal points.120 
From the information available in the reports, it becomes clear that many Parties are trying 
to implement some recommendations suggested in the work programmes. However, the 
implementation attempts vary substantially between the Parties. It is however perhaps not 
surprising, since, with such a diverse group, it is to be expected that implementation will 
differ, especially due to the different degrees of financial and technical capacity among them. 
As described earlier, even the most basic actions, such as the nomination of focal points, still 
need to be implemented by many Parties. It is thus not possible to argue conclusively that 
non-implementation is a sign that the Parties do not see the provisions of the work 
programmes as non-binding, since it could be mainly due to a lack of financial and technical 
capacity. However, it is possible to affirm that the relatively slow implementation, coupled 
with the great degree of differentiation between Parties is a sign that the CoP work 
programmes have not been seen as legally binding.  
2.5. Interim conclusion 
Based on a textual analysis, it can be argued that Article 6(a)(ii) and (iii) of the UNFCCC 
cover a diverse range of information on climate change and its effects, to be made available 
to the public proprio motu by public authorities or upon request from a member of the public, 
although the limits of the scope of this provision must still be tested. Regarding public 
participation, the provision also seems to encompass the widest participation of members of 
the public. However, the implementation of such broad formulations by the Parties are 
restricted by the terms within their respective capacities and the national laws and 
regulations.  
The analysis also considered whether the work programmes on Article 6 of the UNFCCC 
thicken the obligation contained in Article 6 of the UNFCCC. Using the four axes suggested 
by Wiersema, the following results were found. First, despite the fact that the decisions on 
work programmes were consensus based, there is no evidence that the level of consent could 
give these decisions the status of a new binding agreement among the Parties. Second, the 
CoP is not specifically authorised in the UNFCCC to take decisions to adopt work 
programmes on Article 6 of the UNFCCC, which make them fall within the general 
authorisation and, therefore, gives them a lesser level of authorisation than specifically 
authorised activities. Third, the language used in these decisions to address the Parties is less 
forceful than those addressed to the secretariat or when deciding internal practical matters, 
which shows that the obligations lean towards soft legal commitments. Fourth, based on the 
analysis of the reports on the implementation of the work programmes, it is possible to affirm 
                                                          
120 Intermediate Review on the Doha work programme, para 8. 
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that the implementation differentiates vastly among the Parties and that there is no evidence 
that the Parties implement the decisions on the work programmes as if they were legally 
binding. 
In conclusion, Article 6 of the UNFCCC lacks clear and specific commitments, which renders 
the provision lacking a precise result to be achieved. According to its text, Parties need to 
promote and facilitate access to information on climate change and its effects and public 
participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate responses. 
However, these obligations are not accompanied by a specific action or a target that must be 
complied with by the Parties. Therefore, since the Parties only have to honestly apply their 
best efforts, which does not necessarily mean that they have to achieve a specific result, 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC contains obligations of effort. 
3. Access to information and public participation under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
The Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.121 The Kyoto Protocol is a 
legally binding agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC, which contains substantive 
provisions – particularly explicit targets for the emission reduction of GHG for developed 
countries – and procedural provisions regarding its institutions. The Protocol entered into 
force in 2005, eight years after its adoption. The first commitment period ran from 2008 to 
2012. The second commitment period was planned to run from 2013 until 2020. However, 
the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which regulates the emission reduction targets 
for the second amendment period, has not been ratified by a sufficient number of Parties in 
order for it to enter into force.122  
The Kyoto Protocol reiterates the importance of Article 6 UNFCCC in its Article 10(e): 
“All Parties [..] shall: 
(e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using 
existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training 
programmes, including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular 
human and institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to 
train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries, and facilitate at the 
                                                          
121 Article 17, UNFCCC. 
122 Status of ratification available at: United Nations Treaty Collection. Chapter XXVII - Environment 
- 7. c Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 15 April 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en. 
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national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate 
change. Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these activities through 
the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the 
Convention” 
Just like Article 6 of UNFCCC, the provision explicitly mentions public access to information 
on climate change. However, Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol does not refer to effects, as 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC, although such a terminological difference is not necessarily a 
cause for concern.  
A similarity between the provisions is the use of the term shall, which indicates a strong 
commitment, but which is followed by terms such as cooperate and promote without 
referring to clear and specific commitments, echoing what was explained in section 2.3 with 
respect to the UNFCCC. As Article 6 of the UNFCCC, Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol 
constructs an open-ended obligation from which it is very difficult to extract clear rules that 
Parties need to comply with.123 
A clear difference with Article 6 of the UNFCCC is that Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol 
does not refer to public participation explicitly. Hence, in a textual sense, the content of 
Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol is narrower than what is provided in Article 6. However, 
the Kyoto Protocol is linked to the UNFCCC and should be read in accordance with the 
commitments already established in this framework convention. Moreover, Article 10(e) of 
the Kyoto Protocol explicitly refers to Article 6 of the UNFCCC. In this context, the same 
level of information and public participation which is required under Article 6 also applies to 
the Protocol and there is no indication that public participation should be restricted when 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is important to mention that Article 10(e) of 
the Kyoto Protocol is very vague. More detailed provisions can be found in the decisions of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP). This is particularly true in relation to market-based mechanisms which Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol may use to comply with their targets.  
The Protocol establishes three mechanisms: clean development mechanism (CDM), joint 
implementation (JI) and emissions trading. The CMP has adopted decisions on how these 
instruments must be applied. The decisions on project-based instruments (CDM and JI) 
contain some provisions on access to information and public participation.124 Also, the 
decision on the transaction of the assigned amounts which are applicable to emissions trading 
                                                          
123 P. M. Lawrence, Justice for future generations: climate change and international law, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 109. 
124 Decision 9/CMP.1 Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 and Decision 3/CPM.1 Modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1. 
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contains provisions on publicly accessible information.125 However, these CMP decisions are 
confined within the boundaries of the implementation of these market-based instruments and, 
consequently, cannot be used to support an analysis of the application of Article 10(e) in 
general. Moreover, by now, the Paris Agreement has been adopted and the practical value of 
the Kyoto Protocol for addressing climate change in the near future is non-existent. 
In conclusion, Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol does not provide elements that deepen the 
obligations of Article 6 UNFCCC. Furthermore, due to the lack of clear and specific 
commitments, it can be concluded that Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol also contains 
obligations of effort. 
4. Access to information and public participation under the Paris 
Agreement 
The Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015126 and entered into force less than 
one year later, on 4 November 2016.127 It sets a goal of keeping the increase in “the global 
average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.128 To achieve this goal, 
all Parties are obliged to submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) based on which 
Parties are expected to progress over time.129  
The preamble of the Paris Agreement affirms the importance of the six areas covered by 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC, among which are public participation and public access to 
information.130 This purpose is further elaborated on in Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, 
which specifically focuses on public participation and access to information. It reads as 
follows: 
“Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change 
education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to 
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing 
actions under this Agreement.” 
                                                          
125 Decision 13/CMP.1 Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, para 4, of 
the Kyoto Protocol FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2. 
126 Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. 
127 Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php, accessed on 18 June 2020. 
128 Article 2, Paris Agreement. 
129 Article 2, Paris Agreement. D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and L. Rajamani, op. cit. (2017), p. 210. 
130 Recital 14, Preamble, Paris Agreement. 
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Similar to Article 6 of the UNFCCC, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement explicitly mentions 
public access to information and public participation, but the obligations in the two provisions 
seem different from those contained in Article 6 of the UNFCCC. Article 6 of the UNFCCC 
states that parties shall promote and facilitate “public access to information on climate change 
and its effects” and “public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and 
developing adequate responses”. Article 12 of the Paris Agreement also uses the imperative 
shall, but it imposes an obligation of cooperation among Parties while taking measures to 
enhance public participation and public access to information.  
While Article 6 UNFCCC imposes an obligation for the Parties to promote and facilitate 
access to information and public participation at the national level and Article 10(e) of the 
Kyoto Protocol imposes an obligation for the Parties to facilitate public access to information 
at the national level, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement focuses on cooperation among Parties 
without focusing on the national dimension. Unlike Article 6 UNFCCC and Article 10(e) of 
the Kyoto Protocol, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement therefore has predominately an 
international dimension.131 
In contrast to Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement does not 
recall Article 6 UNFCCC. However, even if it does not refer to Article 6 UNFCCC, it ought 
to be read in light of the UNFCCC since the Paris Agreement has been considered subsidiary 
to the UNFCCC.132 This subsidiary status is confirmed by the Durban Mandate, which says 
that the future agreement was to be “under the Convention”,133 and Article 2 of the Paris 
Agreement, which states that the agreement is “enhancing the implementation of the 
Convention”. Therefore, the interpretation of the Paris Agreement should be guided by the 
UNFCCC. In this vein, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement adds to the already existent 
obligation to promote and facilitate access to information and public participation and an 
obligation for the Parties to cooperate while taking the measures to enhance access to 
information and public participation. However, it fails to introduce the more specific 
language that one may have expected, since the Paris Agreement is intended to further 
implement the obligations of the UNFCCC.134  
                                                          
131 D. Misonne, ‘Access to Information and the Paris Agreement’, in J. Jendrośka and M. Bar (eds.), 
Procedural Environmental Rights: Principle X in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017), 
p. 473.  
132 M. Wewerinke-Singh and C. Doebbler, ‘The Paris agreement: Some critical reflections on process 
and substance’ 39(4) The University of New South Wales Law Journal, (2016), pp. 1486-1517, p. 1516.  
133 Decision 1/CP.17 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, para 2. 
134 M. Wewerinke-Singh and C. Doebbler, op. cit. (2016), p. 1512. 
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In summary, Article 12 of the Paris Agreement is formulated in a vague and imprecise 
manner without prescribing any specific commitments, which makes the obligations 
contained in the provision exclusively obligations of effort. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigated which kind of obligations are established for the Parties concerning 
access to information and public participation in climate change decision making, which are 
intended to be implemented at the domestic level under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement. The analysis disclosed the following. 
Based on a textual analysis, Section 2 argued that Article 6(a)(ii) and (iii) of the UNFCCC 
cover a diverse range of information on climate change and its effects to be made available 
to the public by public authorities own initiative or upon request from a member of the public. 
Section 2 also found that the Convention requires public participation, which seems to 
encompass the widest participation of members of the public.  
Nevertheless, such broad formulations are restricted by the terms within their respective 
capacities and the national laws and regulations. This means that Parties have to fulfil their 
obligations only to the extent that their capacity to do so allows and in accordance with their 
domestic laws. For instance, to verify whether a Party has satisfied its obligation, it would 
first be necessary to determine what would be the real capacity in view of the promotion and 
access to information and public participation. Furthermore, the provision demands Parties 
to promote and facilitate access to information and public participation without referring to 
clear and specific commitments.  
The textual and contextual analysis of Article 6 of the UNFCCC was followed by the analysis 
of the work programmes on Article 6. This examination was carried out because Article 
31(3)(a) of the VCLT establishes that “any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provision,” together with the 
context, may be taken into account for treaty interpretation. By applying the four axes 
suggested by Wiersema, the analysis of the work programmes on Article 6 of the UNFCCC 
disclosed that these work programmes do not expand the obligation contained in Article 6 of 
the UNFCCC. Since there is no clear result that needs to be achieved in order to render a 
Party in compliance, it was concluded that Article 6 contains obligations of effort.  
In section 3, the analysis moved to examine Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol. It was shown 
that this provision only deals with access to information and it does so in a vague and 
imprecise manner. Thus, this obligation has also been characterised as an obligation of effort. 
Furthermore, public participation is not even mentioned in its text. By now, however, the 
Kyoto Protocol is no longer relevant for addressing climate change, since no new emission 
reduction targets have been adopted for the period after 2020. 
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Finally, section 4 discussed Article 12 of the Paris Agreement. It was shown that this 
provision focuses on international cooperation and does not provide for more specific 
provisions compared to Article 6 of the UNFCCC. Furthermore, it was concluded that the 
mandatory character of Article 12 of the Paris Agreement is the same: it creates legal 
obligations for Parties to make an effort without stipulating specific results, which are also 
characterised as obligations of effort.  
In sum, the importance of a procedural approach is recognised in the UNFCCC, revealing a 
new approach in international environmental law to incorporate procedural provisions in 
treaties. However, while the importance of access to information and public participation is 
acknowledged, no precise commitments and certainly no obligation of result can be 
identified. Consequently, there are no clearly identifiable results that need to be implemented 
by Parties at the national level. The next chapter will continue to explore the EU’s 
international obligations with regard to procedural rights by examining the Aarhus 
Convention. 
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Chapter III – The Aarhus Convention, the EU  
and Climate Change 
 
1. Introduction 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters1 recognizes that enhanced access to information and public participation in decision 
making can improve the quality of decision making in environmental matters, lead to public 
awareness of environmental concerns, and can provide more effective participation by 
allowing the public to put forward its concerns and enabling public authorities to take due 
account of the expressed concerns.2 Ultimately, the Aarhus Convention is based on the 
premise that access to information, public participation in decision making and access to 
justice are condiciones sine quibus non in guaranteeing the right for everyone to live in an 
environment that is adequate for their health and well-being.3 
Although it has only been ratified by European countries,4 the entry into force of the Aarhus 
Convention was an important milestone in International Environmental Law. The 
Convention can be seen as the first international agreement that specified rights and duties 
regarding access to environmental information and provided clear rules for the right to public 
participation in governmental environmental decision making that are applicable to the whole 
field of environmental law. Both rights can be enforced by related rights to access to courts. 
These procedural rights can theoretically play an important role in combating climate 
change.5  
                                                          
1 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2161, 
p. 447 (entered into force on 30 October 2001). Henceforth the Aarhus Convention, the Convention or 
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4 For the current status on the ratification, see United Nations Treaty Collection (Aarhus Convention). 
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en, accessed 18 June 2020. 
5 S. Kravchenko, ‘Procedural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat Climate Change’ 38(3) Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative, (2009), pp. 613-648, p. 617. 
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The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, to investigate if and to what extent the climate 
change problem is part of the scope of the Aarhus Convention even while the Convention 
does not include the terms climate change and GHG emissions in its text; second, to introduce 
the rights to access environmental information and to public participation, as foreseen by the 
Aarhus Convention; and third to examine the implementation of these rights at the EU level. 
In the context of the EU, Article 10(3) TEU (which prescribes that decisions shall be taken 
as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen) and Article 11 TEU (which requires 
institutions to have an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations 
and civil society, including the carrying out of consultation) should be considered while 
giving an interpretation of the rights of access to information and public participation in EU 
law. However, the tangible legal effects that can be derived from these provisions are still 
uncertain.6 Without denying the relevance of the discussion on the possible legal effects of 
these articles from the TEU,7 this chapter will focus on the specific procedural provisions 
that confer rights of access to environmental information and of public participation in 
governmental environmental decision making for individuals and representative associations 
in their relationships with EU institutions. 
This chapter, therefore, lays the foundation for the analysis of the case studies contained in 
the subsequent chapters, which will examine and clarify the extent to which the requirements 
concerning access to environmental information and public participation in governmental 
environmental decision making, as provided for by the Aarhus Convention, are applicable to 
the field of EU climate law. To that end, this chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 
2 introduces the Aarhus Convention. Section 3 carries out an analysis of the potential 
coverage of climate change by the Aarhus Convention. This analysis is undertaken using the 
rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention.8 Section 4 describes the manner in which 
the Aarhus Convention has been integrated into the EU legal framework. Section 5 discusses 
the right to access environmental information as provided for by the Aarhus Convention, and 
its implementation at the EU level. Section 6 introduces the right to public participation in 
governmental environmental decision making as provided for by the Aarhus Convention and 
its implementation at the EU level. Finally, section 7 draws a conclusion on the relevance of 
the Aarhus Convention for climate change decision making. 
                                                          
6 “While Article 11 TEU is framed in obligatory terms, there is also discretion accorded to the EU 
institutions, as manifest in language such as ‘by appropriate means’, within Article 11(1) TEU. It is as 
yet unclear how the CJEU will interpret Article 11 TEU.” P. P. Craig, H. Hofmann, J.-P. Schneider and 
J. Ziller, ReNEUAL model rules on EU administrative procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), p. 126. See also: P. P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and treaty reform (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p. 70; J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon: A Legal 
View on Article 11 TEU’ 48(6) Common Market Law Review, (2011), pp. 1849-1878, p. 1866. 
7 As proposed, for instance, by P. P. Craig, op. cit. (2013) and J. Mendes, op. cit. (2011). 
8 Henceforth the Vienna Convention or VCLT. 
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2. Introduction to the Aarhus Convention 
2.1. A convention about procedural rights 
During the 1995 Third Ministerial Environment for Europe Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, 
Ministers of Environment from 49 countries in the UNECE region endorsed the Guidelines 
on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental 
Decision-Making9 and agreed on “the development of a regional Convention on Public 
Participation […] with appropriate involvement of NGOs.”10 The fourth Ministerial Europe 
for Environment Conference was held in June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark; it marked the 
signing of the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.11 In accordance with 
Article 20(1), the Convention entered into force on 30 October 2001.  
The Aarhus Convention builds its legal framework on the rights of freedom of environmental 
information, public participation and access to justice based on a number of previous 
international texts. It is the first treaty to translate Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
into a binding international document.12 This Principle 10 highlights the importance of public 
participation in decision making processes, access to environmental information held by 
                                                          
9 These guidelines, which shaped the scope of the future convention, are known as the Sofia Guidelines, 
in reference to Sofia, Bulgaria where the conference took place. The Sofia Guidelines are specifically 
mentioned in the preamble of the Aarhus Convention: “Conscious of the role played in this respect by 
ECE and recalling, inter alia, the ECE Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public 
Participation in Environmental Decision-making endorsed in the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the 
Third Ministerial Conference ‘Environment for Europe’ in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 25 October 1995”. 
10 Declaration by the Ministers of Environment of the region of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), para 47. 
11 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, ‘The Aarhus Convention: an 
implementation guide’, 2nd edition (Geneva: United Nations, 2014), p. 15. 
12 C. Pitea, ‘Procedures and Mechanisms for Review of Compliance under the 1998 Aarhus Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’, in T. 
Treves (ed.), Non-compliance procedures and mechanisms and the effectiveness of international 
environmental agreements; Non-compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Agreements,  (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), p. 221. 
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public authorities and access to justice.13 The Convention was also inspired by Principle 1 of 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,14 which states that: 
“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations. […]” 
The influence of the Stockholm Declaration is evident in the preamble of the Aarhus 
Convention, which explicitly mentions Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration and states 
that:  
“Every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and 
well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect 
and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.” 
The Aarhus Convention has also endorsed “the right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being”,15 but it 
does not regulate a substantive right to a healthy environment.16 The Convention rather 
acknowledges the right of every individual to live in an adequate environment and that 
procedural rights serve as the means through which this human right should be achieved.17 
In other words, the Aarhus Convention does not provide a substantive right to a healthy 
                                                          
13 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 10: “Environmental issues are best 
handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each 
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage 
public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” 
14 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, (16 June 1972). 
15 Article 1, Aarhus Convention. 
16 M. Dellinger, ‘Ten Years of the Aarhus Convention: how Procedural Democracy is Paving the Way 
for Substantive Change in National and International Environmental Law’ 23(2) Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy, (2012), pp. 309-366, p. 21. 
17 For a discussion on the issue of the environment as a human right see: D. Shelton, ‘Human Rights 
and the Environment: Substantive Rights’, in M. Fitzmaurice, D. M. Ong and P. Merkouris (eds.), 
Research handbook on international environmental law,  (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2010), pp. 265-283; D. Shelton, ‘Human rights, environmental rights, and the right to 
environment’ 28(1) Stanford Journal of International Law, (1991), pp. 103-138, A. Boyle, ‘Human 
Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ 18(3) Fordham Environmental Law Review, (2007), 
pp. 471-511.  
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environment, but it establishes a set of procedural rights that aim at realising a healthy 
environment. 
As asserted by Sartoretti, “the AC prefers to defend the right to a healthy environment in its 
‘procedural’ dimension, recognising that citizens have the right to be involved in decisions 
taken by institutions.”18 Boyle also acknowledges that “the Aarhus Convention is strictly 
procedural in content, limited to public participation in environmental decision-making, 
access to justice and information.”19 Hey points out that “it is through these procedural rights 
that individuals and groups in society are able to invoke substantive environmental law before 
various national and regional (quasi-) judicial bodies.”20 On the one hand, Mason sees this 
“indeterminate coupling of substantive and procedural rights”21 as an inconsistency within 
the Aarhus framework which hinders the Convention’s commitment to human rights.22 On 
the other hand, by examining the relationship between procedural and substantive rights, 
Cittadino concludes that “participatory requirements are functional to the realization of 
substantive rights”.23 The non-recognition of an enforceable substantive right to a healthy 
environment can be seen as the Achilles’ heel of the Aarhus Convention;24 however, the 
guarantee of procedural rights can help to realise the ultimate objective of the Convention: a 
healthy environment.25  
                                                          
18 C. Sartoretti, ‘The Aarhus Convention Between Protection of Human Rights and Protection of the 
Environment’, in E. J. Lohse, M. Poto and G. Parola (eds.), Participatory rights in the environmental 
decision-making process and the implementation of the Aarhus Convention: a comparative perspective,  
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), pp. 46-58, pp. 49-50. 
19 A. Boyle, op. cit. (2007), p. 477. 
20 E. Hey, ‘The interaction between human rights and the environment in the European ‘Aarhus space’’ 
Chapters, in A. Grear and L. J. Kotzé (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 353-376, p. 374. 
21 M. Mason, ‘Information disclosure and environmental rights: the Aarhus convention’ 10(3) Global 
environmental politics, (2010), pp. 10-31, p. 11. 
22 M. Mason, op. cit. (2010), p. 26. 
23 F. Cittadino, ‘Public Interest to Environmental Protection and Indigenous Peoples'rights: Procedural 
Rights to Participate and Substantive Guarantees’, in E. J. Lohse, M. Poto and G. Parola (eds.), 
Participatory rights in the environmental decision-making process and the implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention: a comparative perspective,  (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), pp. 76-90, p. 88. 
24 M. Poto, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of Environmental Participation Under the Aarhus Convention: 
What Lies Beyond Rhetorical Procedualisation?’, in E. J. Lohse, M. Poto and G. Parola (eds.), 
Participatory rights in the environmental decision-making process and the implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention: a comparative perspective (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), pp. 93-104, p. 
101.  
25 G. Parola, Environmental democracy at the global level rights and duties for a new citizenship, 
(London: Versita, 2013), p. 130. 
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In this vein, the Aarhus Convention prescribes that the Parties shall guarantee the rights of 
access to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters. 
These are known as the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention. The three pillars are contained 
in Articles 4 and 5 (access to information), Articles 6, 7 and 8 (public participation in decision 
making) and Article 9 (access to justice).  
The first pillar of the Aarhus Convention is dedicated to access to environmental information. 
There are two forms in which the public can have access to environmental information: upon 
request for information held by a public authority (passive form – Article 4) or when the 
information has to be made available promptly by a public authority (active form – Article 
5). Exceptions to the right to access environmental information do apply and will be 
discussed in section 5.3. 
For public participation, the second pillar of the Aarhus Convention establishes four regimes 
divided into three articles. Article 6 establishes that Parties shall guarantee the public 
participation of the public concerned in the decision making regarding specific activities 
listed in Annex I of the Convention, and they shall determine whether the same public 
participation requirements also apply to activities not listed in Annex I which may have a 
significant impact on the environment. Article 7 provides for the participation of the public 
selected by the public authority in the preparation of plans and programmes, and it refers to 
some paragraphs of Article 6 being applicable in this case. Distinctly, Article 7 prescribes 
weaker requirements in the preparation of policies. It requires that Parties only endeavour to 
provide for public participation but without any precise requirements for how and when 
public participation should be ensured. Article 8 provides for an even more loose regime by 
asking Parties to strive to promote public participation in the preparation of executive 
regulations and generally applicable legally binding normative instruments by public 
authorities. 
In the event that the first two pillars are breached, the third pillar (Article 9) provides for 
access to justice in order to secure these rights. The first paragraph of Article 9 ensures that 
the public has access to a court, or another independent and impartial body established by 
law to protect their right guaranteed under Article 4 (information requests). The second 
paragraph of Article 9 states that members of the public concerned that have a sufficient 
interest or impairment of a right have access to review procedures relating to a breach of 
public participation requirements under Article 6 (decisions on specific activities).26 
Furthermore, paragraph 3 of Article 9 requires that Parties ensure that members of the public 
                                                          
26 Article 9(2) AC can also apply to “other relevant provisions” of the Convention if provided for under 
national law. Therefore, the Parties have the discretion to extend the review procedures prescribed in 
Article 9(2) AC to be applicable to other provisions of the Convention. 
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have access to administrative or judicial procedures in case of any violation of national 
environmental law.27 
2.2. A regional convention with global relevance 
Although it is a UNECE regional convention, the Aarhus Convention has the potential to 
become a global convention.28 Article 19(3) of the Aarhus Convention states that, upon 
approval of the Meeting of the Parties (MoP), any UN Member State can accede to the 
Convention. In the 2010 Extraordinary Session of the Meeting of the Parties, the MoP 
“mandated the Working Group of the Parties to consider the procedure for decision-making 
concerning expressions of interest in accession to the Convention by non-UNECE States and 
on that basis to propose, if appropriate, a decision regarding the process of accession to the 
Convention for adoption at the fourth session of the Meeting of the Parties.”29  
In 2011, during the Fourth session of the Meeting of the Parties, the MoP adopted a decision 
encouraging and setting out the procedural steps for the approval of accession by non-
UNECE States.30 During the fifth Meeting of the Parties, it was suggested that the Convention 
should be amended to remove the provision requiring that the accession of non-ECE 
members must be approved by the MoP.31 The argument was that there was no similar 
requirement for non-ECE members that would like to access the Protocol on Parties to the 
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers, which is a legally binding international 
instrument for the regulation of pollution information.32 However, no decision was made on 
                                                          
27 Article 9(3) AC will be discussed in connection with the enforcement of the second pillar of the 
Aarhus Convention, see section 5.3. 
 28 E. Morgera, ‘An Update on the Aarhus Convention and its Continued Global Relevance’ 14(2) 
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, (2005), pp. 138-147, p. 138. 
29 European Commission, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report (2014a), p. 5. 
30 Decision IV/5 on accession to the Convention by non-United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe Member States Adopted by the Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at its fourth 
session (2011), p. 26-27. 
31 “Representatives of Switzerland and the European ECO Forum suggested amending the text of the 
Convention to remove the current provision requiring approval by the Meeting of the Parties for such 
accessions, also noting that there was no such provision regarding approval for States outside the ECE 
region that wished to join the Protocol on PRTRs.” Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, Report of the fifth session of the Meeting of the Parties ECE/MP.PP/2014/2, (2014b), p. 11, 
para 37. 
32 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the fifth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties ECE/MP.PP/2014/2,  (2014b), p. 11, para 37. “The objective of this Protocol is to enhance 
public access to information through the establishment of coherent, integrated, nationwide pollutant 
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this matter. The topic was revisited in the sixth session of the MoP in 2017. A representative 
of the European ECO Forum suggested removing the requirement of approval for the 
accession of non-ECE countries by the MoP from the text of the Convention, via an 
amendment.33 The MoP only took note of the statement by the European ECO Forum 
representative34 and no further decision was taken on this topic.35 
Viewed alongside this uncertainty, current developments suggest that it is unlikely that the 
Aarhus Convention will be ratified on a global scale. To date, all 47 Parties to the Convention 
are part of the UNECE region,36 but not all UNECE member states are Parties to the Aarhus 
Convention. This is the case for the Russian Federation, Canada and the United States, which 
are members of the ECE but have not signed the Aarhus Convention.37 As of yet, only three 
non-UNECE members have submitted official expressions to the secretariat (Cameroon in 
                                                          
release and transfer registers (PRTRs) in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, which could 
facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making as well as contribute to the prevention 
and reduction of pollution of the environment.” Article 1, Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Kiev, 21 May 2003, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
2626, p. 119. Doc. MP.PP/2003/12 (entered into force on 8 October 2009). (hereinafter Kiev Protocol) 
33 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the sixth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties (2017a), p.17, para 71. 
34 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the sixth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties (2017a), p. 17, para 73. 
35 There is no further decision regarding the accession to the Convention by non-ECE members, as the 
report of the sixth session of the MoP containing the decisions adopted by the MoP shows. Meeting of 
the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the sixth session of the Meeting of the Parties - 
Addendum - Decisions adopted by the Meeting of the Parties ECE/MP.PP/2017/2/Add.1, (2017b). 
36 Chapter XXVII - Environment - 13. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 26 June 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en. 
37 V. Koester, ‘The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)’, in G. Ulfstein, T. Marauhn and A. 
Zimmermann (eds.), Making Treaties Work, Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control,  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 179-217. 
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201038, Mongolia in 201139 and Guinea-Bissau in 201740), while Morocco communicated its 
“potential interest in acceding to the Convention” in 2014.41 In addition to these 
developments, at the time of writing, these countries had not yet acceded to the Convention. 
Furthermore, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
adopted a regional treaty on access to environmental information, public participation and 
access to justice in environmental matters.42 It is apparent from this development that the 
more widespread codification and ratification of the rights contained in the Aarhus 
Convention are more likely to occur at the regional level, through the proliferation of similar 
treaties, rather than through a global ratification of the Convention itself. This development 
resembles the elaboration of parallel regional regimes to provide for the protection of human 
rights. The preference for this approach does not preclude the Convention from having a 
global significance; it has already inspired further developments in this area and will probably 
continue to do so.43 For instance, the Organization of America States (OAS) has recognised 
the Aarhus Convention as “a good example of a mechanism that formalizes the States Parties’ 
commitments to the three access areas [information, participation and justice]”.44 As the first 
group of states to draw up a binding convention on procedural environmental rights, the 
experience of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention is unique, and other countries can learn 
from their success as well as the obstacles they have faced in implementing the Convention. 
  
                                                          
38 European Commission, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report, C(2017) 5129 final, (2014a), p. 
5. 
39 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the fourth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties (ECE/MP.PP/2011/2) (2011), 9, para 34. 
40 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the sixth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties (2017a), p. 16-17, para 70.  
41 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the fifth session of the Meeting of 
the Parties (2014b), p. 11, para 37. 
42 Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental 
Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, Escazú on 4 March 2018 (not yet entered into force). 
43 U. Etemire, Law and Practice on Public Participation in Environmental Matters: The Nigerian 
Example in Transnational Comparative Perspective, (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 13. 
44 Organization of American States, Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation 
in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development (2011), p. 24. 
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2.3. Shaping the meaning of the Aarhus Convention  
2.3.1.  The Compliance Committee’s findings 
Certain provisions of the Aarhus Convention are worded in a general manner. Others, despite 
their precision, still confer a large margin of discretion on the Parties regarding how they can 
fulfil the relevant obligations.45 This means that further interpretations will be needed to 
clarify what is understood as a proper implementation of the Convention by the Parties. This 
interpretation is undertaken by domestic courts and also by the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee (ACCC). The ACCC was created in the first Meeting of the Parties 
in 2002.46 It is a board composed of nine members47 who are nominated by the Parties and/or 
environmental non-governmental organisations and elected by the MoP by consensus.48 The 
                                                          
45 As observed by Mercadié: “To meet local needs and cover the wide range of possible situations, the 
participation framework must be sufficiently flexible. Such flexibility appears to be taken into account 
by the Aarhus Convention. Firstly, because the wording of certain provisions is general (Article 7). 
Secondly, because the wording of the more normative provisions retains genuine flexibility (Article 
6).” A. Mercadié, Application of the Aarhus Convention in the Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) Process (1999), p. 13. On the ambiguous nature of the text of the Aarhus Convention see Lee 
and Abbot: “Although access to information is the strongest, and perhaps least controversial, pillar of 
the Aarhus Convention, it is by no means completely straightforward. The relevant articles are 
ambiguous in places, leaving room for state (or EC) discretion, and its interaction with the range of 
existing provisions may be awkward.” M. Lee and C. Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation 
Under the Aarhus Convention’ 66(1) The Modern Law Review, (2003), pp. 80-108, p. 93. 
Rose-Ackerman and Halpaap stated that the language of the Convention can be “sometimes vague and 
deferential to existing national laws.” S. Rose-Ackerman and A. A. Halpaap, ‘The Aarhus convention 
and the politics of process: the political economy of procedural environmental rights’  Research in law 
and economics: a research annual, (2002), pp. 1-42, p. 4. 
46 The Meeting of the Parties is the main body of the Convention which meets every two years to ensure 
the review of compliance of the Convention. For all the tasks and powers held by the MoP, see Article 
10 AC. 
47 Originally the Committee was composed of eight members, according to Meeting of the Parties to 
the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - Decision I/7 Review of 
Compliance (2002), Annex, section I.1. The number of members changed to nine from the third 
ordinary meeting of the Parties which took place in 2008. Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on 
Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, DECISION II/5 General Issues of Compliance (2005), Addendum, section 12. 
48 Failing consensus, the MoP shall elect the members by secret ballot. Meeting of the Parties to the 
Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - Decision I/7 Review of Compliance 
(2002), Annex, section I.7. 
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members act in their personal capacity.49 They make a solemn declaration that they will 
perform their functions impartially and conscientiously,50 which must also be signed in 
writing as requested by the Committee.51  
The main role of the Committee is to examine, report and make recommendations to the MoP 
on issues related to Parties’ compliance with the Convention. The MoP can then decide on 
the adoption of the recommendations and take suitable action.52  
A request to review a Party’s compliance can be initiated in five different ways: a) a 
submission from a Party regarding compliance by another Party;53 b) a submission from a 
Party concerning its own compliance;54 c) a referral by the secretariat to the Committee;55      
                                                          
49 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section I.11. 
50 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
<aking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section I.11. 
51 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘Guide to the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee’ (Geneva: United Nations, 2017), p. 9.  
52 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002)., Annex, section III.13. J. Jendrośka, ‘Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee: Origins, Status and Activities’ 8(4) Journal for European Environmental & 
Planning Law, (2011a), pp. 301-314, p. 304. 
53 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section IV.15. 
54 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section IV.16. According to Article 12 of the 
Aarhus Convention, the secretariat is the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE). He or she is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. United Nations, Terms 
of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the Economic Commission for Europe (2009), para 17.  
55 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section V.17. 
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d) a communication by members of the public concerning a Party’s compliance;56 or e) the 
Committee can start a compliance exam on its own initiative (proprio motu).57 
The Aarhus Convention compliance mechanism is one of the few mechanisms in 
international environmental law that allows members of the public to address their concerns 
about a Party’s compliance directly to a board of independent experts nominated to analyse 
the merits of the communication.58 On the one hand, this allows for public control in 
monitoring the implementation of the Convention; on the other hand, “the Compliance 
Committee cannot issue binding decisions, but rather may make recommendations either to 
the MoP, or, in certain circumstances, directly to individual Parties”.59 Therefore, the power 
of the Committee is recommendatory and, consequently, the Meeting of the Parties has the 
power to consider whether or not to adopt its recommendations.60 As the highest authority of 
the Convention, the MoP, upon consideration of a report and any recommendations of the 
Committee, may take appropriate measures and accordingly: a) make recommendations and 
advice and assist Parties on the Convention’s implementation;61 b) request the Party 
concerned to submit a strategy plan and to report on its implementation;62 c) recommend the 
Party concerned on specific measures raised by the member of the public;63 d) declare non-
                                                          
56 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section VI.18. 
57 “Guidance Document on the Aarhus Convention Compliance Mechanism.” United Nation Economic 
Commission for Europe, www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/CC_GuidanceDocument.doc. p. 1. 
58 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘Guide to the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee’ (Geneva: United Nations, 2019), p. 6.  
59 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘Guidance Document on the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Mechanism’ (Geneva: United Nations, 2010), p. 1. 
60 F. Marshall, ‘Two Years in the Life: The Pioneering Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
2004–2006’ 8(1) International Community Law Review, (2006), pp. 123-154, p. 133. 
61 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(a) and (b). 
62 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(c). 
63 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(d). 
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compliance;64 e) issue a caution;65 f) suspend a Party;66 or g) take “other non-confrontational, 
non-judicial and consultative measures”.67  
In the international realm, the relevance of the findings and recommendations of the 
Compliance Committee will discussed in section 3.5 in view of their importance for the 
interpretation of the Aarhus Convention. In the EU realm, even if it is not followed by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Advocate General Jääskinen stated (in the 
context of the interpretation of EU law in light of the Aarhus Convention) that “reference 
should also be made to the position adopted by the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee […]”.68   
2.3.2.  The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide 
The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide was developed with the support of the 
Parties.69 By the time the Guide was published, the Second Meeting of the Signatories to the 
Convention noted that “it was hoped that the Guide would serve as a valuable tool to assist 
countries in implementing the Convention.”70 This shows the support of the Parties in the 
                                                          
64 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(e). 
65 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(f). 
66 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(g).  
67 Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the first Meeting of the Parties - 
Decision I/7 Review of Compliance (2002), Annex, section XII.37(h). C. Pitea, op. cit. (2009), pp. 240-
241. S. Stec, ‘‘Aarhus Environmental Rights’ in Eastern Europe’ 5 Yearbook of European 
environmental law, (2005), pp. 1-22, p. 18. 
68 AG Opinion in Joined Cases C-401/12 P to C-403/12 P Council of the European Union, European 
Parliament and European Commission v. Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop 
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, 8 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:310, para 114. See also: A. Delgado 
Casteleiro,  The Effects of International Dispute Settlement decisions in EU Law’, in M. Cremona, A. 
Thies and R. A. Wessel (eds.), The European Union and international dispute settlement,  (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2017), pp. 302, p. 210. 
69 Meeting of the Signatories to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report on the first meeting (1999), 
para 40 (a). 
70 “The Meeting was informed that the Implementation Guide on the Convention, produced as a 
collaborative project of the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), the 
Danish Environmental Protection Agency and ECE, had reached the point of publication. Advance 
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elaboration and use of the Guide to aid in the interpretation and implementation of the 
Convention. The Implementation Guide has also been referred to in the findings and 
recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.71 In view of these 
elements, and despite the non-binding status, the Implementation Guide can be considered 
nonetheless an important source.72 
In the European realm, the CJEU stresses the non-legal character of the Guide, but it has also 
recognised its relevance for the interpretation of the Convention73 and referred to the 
Implementation Guide in its decisions.74 As stated by Advocate General Kokott,75 the Guide 
constitutes a source for the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention. However, the CJEU has 
also expressly disagreed with the Guide’s interpretation.76  
  
                                                          
copies of the Guide, in English and in Russian, were distributed to participants. The foreword to the 
Guide had been contributed by the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan. It was hoped 
that the Guide would serve as a valuable tool to assist countries in implementing the Convention.” 
Meeting of the Signatories to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report on the second meeting 
(2000), para 43. 
71 Ms. Artmann concerning compliance by Czechia ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/3, 13 September 2016, para 
99, and the Environmental Law Foundation concerning compliance by the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2016/10, 17 June 2015, para 71 and 99. 
72 In this vein, Jassen reiterates that the Implementation Guide has no legal value and, regarding its 
relevance for interpretation, caution should be used: “Although this implementation guide has an 
enormous value for the interpretation and implementation of the Convention, one must keep in mind 
that it was drawn up by the NGOs, who were actively involved in the drafting process of the 
Convention. So, while the information in the Implementation Guide comes from a ‘privileged source’, 
it might also be coloured or perhaps even biased by the point of view of the NGOs. Yet, one should not 
underestimate its moral authority.” K. Janssen, The availability of spatial and environmental data in 
the European Union at the crossroads between public and economic interests, (Austin: Wolters Kluwer, 
2010), pp. 255, footnote 261. 
73 Case C-182/10, Marie-Noëlle Solvay and Others v. Région Wallonne 16 February 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:82, para 27.  
74 Case C-260/11, David Edwards and other v. Environment Agency, 11 April 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:221, para 34. 
75 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Vereniging 
Milieudefensie, Vereniging Goede Waar & Co. v. College voor de toelating van 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden, 23 September 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:546, para 88.  
76 For instance, in Case C-204/09, Flachglas Torgau GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, 14 
February 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:71, para 36. 
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2.3.3.  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
In the European Union context, which is the focus of the next chapters of this thesis, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interprets EU law to ensure that it is 
consistent in all Member States and that EU institutions comply with EU law.77 As the Aarhus 
Convention is part of EU law, the CJEU may be requested to interpret the Aarhus Convention 
when, among other things, it needs to rule on the EU secondary legislation which has 
transposed the Convention’s obligations into EU law. The challenge of an EU measure can 
occur either through direct action under Article 263 TFEU or through the preliminary ruling 
procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.78 In either case, the ruling of the CJEU will 
constitute a source of interpretation in the EU realm. The interpretation of the court will be 
analysed alongside the text while examining the implementation of the Aarhus Convention 
into EU law and especially while discussing the specifics of the case studies. The possible 
synergies between the interpretations of the Court and the Compliance Committee will be 
specifically highlighted. 
3. The Aarhus Convention and climate change 
The Aarhus Convention does not include the terms climate change or GHG emissions and 
this raises the question of whether and, if so, to what extent the climate change problem is 
part of the scope of the Convention or not. To answer this question, it is necessary to 
determine what the term environmental encompasses and whether climate change is part of 
its scope, since, as mentioned above, the Aarhus Convention covers access to environmental 
information and public participation in governmental environmental decision making. 
To arrive at the determination of whether the Aarhus Convention captures the climate change 
problem, the word environmental needs to be interpreted. To do so, the Vienna Convention 
                                                          
77 Article 19, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326/13. 
78 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326/47. See: C. 
Backes and M. Eliantonio, ‘Access to court for environmental NGOs at European and national level: 
improvements and room for improvement since Maastricht?’, in M. de Visser and A. P. van der Mei 
(eds.), The Treaty on European Union 1993-2013: Reflections from Maastricht (Cambridge, Antwerp, 
Portland: Intersentia, 2013), pp. 557-580, pp. 568-569. Although outside of the scope of this thesis, 
since it concerns actions taken at the Member State level, infringement proceedings may also offer an 
interpretation of the Aarhus Convention. According to Article 258 TFEU, the Commission has the right 
to initiate infringement proceedings against a Member State which failed to comply with its 
(environmental) obligations. The Commission may ultimately bring the non-compliant Member State 
before the CJEU. M. Eliantonio, ‘The role of NGOs in environmental implementation conflicts: ‘stuck 
in the middle’ between infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings?’ 40(6) Journal of European 
Integration, (2018), pp. 753-767, pp. 755-757. 
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on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) will be the primary point of reference. Articles 31 and 32 
of the VCLT contain the rules of treaty interpretation.79 
Article 31 of the VCLT lays down the general rules of interpretation, and Article 32 
prescribes the supplementary means of interpretation. According to Article 32 of the VCLT, 
preparatory works and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty are to be used as a 
supplementary means of interpreting the Treaty. Although the preparatory work and the 
circumstances of the time of the adoption of the text of the Aarhus Convention will be 
presented first in this chapter, they will only be used to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of the general rule in Article 31 VCLT.80 For the purpose of the analysis 
carried out in this chapter, not to follow the sequence provided in the VCLT articles does 
make sense since the contextualisation of the historical aspects can be presented in this 
manner in a more coherent way. Furthermore, starting the analysis with the historical 
circumstances leading up to the signing of the convention follows a chronological order that 
enables clearer results to be garnered from the interpretative exercise. 
3.1. Circumstances of drafting and conclusion of the Aarhus Convention 
The 1990s were a particularly active period for the discussion of environmental problems 
and the need to translate measures to tackle these problems into international agreements. 
Regarding the initiatives to combat climate change, the United Nations Framework 
Convention was open for signature in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, and the Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted in 1997. Despite this progress with regard to addressing climate change 
at the international level, there is no research on how this influenced the negotiations starting 
in 1996 and resulting in the Aarhus Convention. For this reason, the preparatory documents 
of the negotiation are analysed in the following section in order to determine if there is any 
indication that measures tackling climate change were meant to be encompassed by the 
Aarhus Convention. 
3.2. Climate (change) in the preparatory documents of the Aarhus Convention 
This section clarifies to what extent attention was paid to climate change during the 
preparation and negotiation of the Aarhus Convention, which started in 1996.  
At the time of the negotiation of the Convention, there was an emerging recognition of the 
existence of climate change and the need to address this problem in the international 
community. Given the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, the problem of climate change was 
likely not out of sight during the preparation and negotiation of the Aarhus Convention. 
                                                          
79 See Chapter II, section 1.2. 
80 Courts have also not followed the sequence of the articles, i.e. general rules (Article 31) in treaty 
interpretations as exemplified by R. K. Gardiner, op. cit. (2008), p. 41. 
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Nevertheless, the final text of the Aarhus Convention does not contain any reference to 
climate or climate change.81  
An analysis of the preparatory documents82 reveals that the inclusion of climate as one of the 
elements in the definition of environmental information was considered.83 The first draft of 
the Aarhus Convention84 included the word climate in the definition of environmental 
information, but this reference was removed from the definition that appears in the final 
version.85 The official documents provide little guidance as to the reason the word climate 
was omitted. In the third report on the negotiation of the Convention, two options were 
                                                          
81 A former but shorter discussion on the coverage of climate change by the Aarhus Convention can be 
found in M. Peeters and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014). This section builds on this article. 
82 An investigation of all official reports on the negotiation of the Convention was carried out to find 
out whether there was a discussion on climate change issues. The reports are available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/adwg.html.  
83 “Delegations taking part in the discussion on the definition of ‘environmental information’ made 
proposals for its content. It was considered that the following elements should be covered by such a 
definition: human health and safety, bio-diversity, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, natural 
resources, noise, radiation, land, protected landscapes, physical planning, land use, historic and cultural 
monuments or natural and cultural heritage and built structures, socio-economic conditions resulting 
from environmental change, biosphere, genetically modified organisms, outer space, waste, deep sea 
bed and chemicals.” (emphasis added) Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on 
access to environmental information and public participation in environmental decision-making, Report 
of the third session (1997d), p. 2. 
84 The first draft of the Convention “was produced prior to the first ad hoc working group meeting in 
Geneva in 1996.” E. Dannenmaier, ‘A European Commitment to Environmental Citizenship: Article 
3.7 of the Aarhus Convention and Public Participation in International Forums’ 18(1) Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law, (2008), pp. 32-64, p. 45. 
85 A definition of environmental information was contained in Article 1 (iii) of the Working Group for 
the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and public participation 
in environmental decision-making, Draft elements for the Convention on Access to Environmental 
Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making (1996), and read as follows: 
“‘Environmental information’ means any environmental information in written, visual, aural or data-
base form in registers, reports and returns as well as computer records and other records kept otherwise 
than in a document. This information includes information on human health and safety, biodiversity, 
flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, natural resources, noise, radiation, land and historical monuments 
or other physical structures or the interaction among these factors; it also includes information on 
cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors and on 
activities or measures adversely affecting, or likely to affect these factors and on activities or measures 
designed to protect these factors, including administrative measures and environmental management 
programmes as well as economic or financial analysis used in environmental decision-making” 
(emphasis added). 
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proposed for the definition of environmental information (which at the time, was contained 
in Article 1). These were as follows:86 
“Option 1 (a) Elements of the environment such as biodiversity, flora, fauna [and other 
biological lifeforms], soil, atmosphere, air, water (including drinking-water), climate, 
natural resources, land, landscape, sites of natural or cultural interest [, built 
structures];  
Option 2 (a) Elements of the environment, namely air, water, land and biological life.” 
(emphasis added) 
In the fourth report, the only amendment regarding this provision was the inclusion of the 
state of: 87 
“OPTION I (a) [The state of] elements of the environment such as biodiversity, flora, 
fauna [and other biological lifeforms], soil, atmosphere, air, water (including drinking 
water), climate, natural resources, land, landscape, sites of natural or cultural interest 
[, built structures];  
OPTION II (a) [The state of] elements of the environment, namely air, water, land 
and biological life (biodiversity).” 
Regarding these two options, the Environmental Citizens Organizations (ECO)88 stressed its 
preference for Option 1, since “elements such as climate change, the ozone layer, landscape, 
sites of natural or cultural interest and the built environment would not necessarily be covered 
by option 2”.89 This demonstrates that, at least from the NGOs’ perspective, climate change-
related information would have to be covered explicitly by the definition. 
                                                          
86 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report of the third session (1997d). 
87 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report of the fourth session (1997b), p. 4. 
88 ECO (which is referred to as Environmental NGOs Coalition) was a very active coalition of European 
NGOs and prepared a number of unofficial reports, showing the NGOs perspective on the matters 
discussed during the negotiation meetings. E. Dannenmaier, op. cit. (2008), pp. 41-42. Jeremy Wates 
was the chair of the Environmental Citizens Organizations (ECO) delegation and later became the first 
chair of the Secretariat and worked with the Secretariat until 2010.  
89 J. Wates, M. T. Nagy and S. Stec, ECO Report on the Fourth Negotiating Session and Preparatory 
Meetings (1997), p. 7. 
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In the fifth report on the negotiations of the Convention, there was no discussion regarding 
this provision, and in the sixth report it appears that Option 1 was accepted with amendments, 
since the text was presented as follows:90 
“(i) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, 
land, landscape 1/ and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, and the 
interaction among these elements.” 
However, the term climate disappeared without further explanation.91 
Apart from the suggestion to include the term climate in the definition of environmental 
information, the negotiation documents also reveal two other proposals which show that the 
climate change problem was not out of sight during the negotiations, at least for some actors 
involved in the negotiation process. The Czech Republic suggested that the reporting 
obligations in the provision related to the obligatory active dissemination of information by 
the government should include the Parties’ contributions “to solving global environmental 
problems, such as climate change […]”.92 The NGOs coalition stated that a national system 
for pollutant release and transfer registers should incorporate a list of individual reportable 
substances which would include, among others, the substances “contributing to global 
warming […]”.93 However, these proposals were not adopted in the final text. 
In conclusion, although the precise term climate change is not present in the final text of the 
Aarhus Convention, the analysis of the circumstances of the drafting and adoption of the 
Convention show that the climate change problem formed part of the discussions during the 
negotiation. However, remarkably, there is no explicit mention of the climate in the 
concluded text. This finding is a result of an examination of a supplementary source for 
interpreting the treaty and must be considered in view of the interpretation of the actual text 
and context of the Aarhus Convention, as will be carried out in the next section. 
  
                                                          
90 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report of the sixth session (1997c), p. 3. 
91 The other four reports do not deal with the content of this article. The only mention of this provision 
is in the report of the ninth session which states that Article 1 bis will be renumbered as Article 2. 
Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report on the ninth session, p. 8. 
92 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report of the fifth session (1997a), p. 6. 
93 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making, Report of the sixth session (1997c), p. 13. 
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3.3. Plain meaning of the text and context 
The analyses in this section uses the text and context of the Aarhus Convention to identify 
whether climate change is covered by the Convention.  
The first VCLT rule of interpretation requires the interpreter to look for the plain or ordinary 
meaning of the words embodied in the treaty text.94 However, the word climate is not 
mentioned throughout the text of the Aarhus Convention, nor are definitions of environment 
or environmental matters provided.  
In the absence of a term, as is the case for climate change in the Aarhus Convention, the 
interpreter may resort to the context of the treaty. The Aarhus Convention provides a 
definition of environmental information. The meaning given to environmental information 
acts as a guide when interpreting whether environmental issues are covered by the 
Convention, since it is from this definition that it becomes possible to interpret whether 
environmental issues,95 such as climate change, are covered by the Convention or not. 
Therefore, this analysis will proceed with a textual examination of the definition of 
environmental information contained in Article 2(3) of the Aarhus Convention.  
3.3.1.  Interpretation of the term environmental information 
Environmental information is broadly defined in Article 2(3) AC as: 
 “any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on: 
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, 
land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; (b) 
Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, 
including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, 
plans and programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment 
within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other economic 
analyses and assumptions used in environmental decision-making; (c) The state of 
human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures, 
inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the 
environment or, through these elements” 
This provision does not constitute an exhaustive list, but rather it provides an example of 
what environmental information may refer to. This means that Parties can include any other 
element in this provision, but it cannot narrow it down since the definition constitutes the 
                                                          
94 A. Orakhelashvili, op. cit. (2008), p. 318. 
95 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 44. 
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minimum requirements.96 While interpreting the provision, Parties should bear in mind that 
“the clear intention of the drafters, however, was to craft a definition that would be as broad 
in scope as possible”.97 This broad interpretation of the definition of environmental was 
already recognised by the CJEU when the Court interpreted the definition of environmental 
information provided by Access to Information Directive, which mirrors the Aarhus 
Convention definition.98  
3.3.2.  Climate change as part of the definition of environmental information 
As is clear from the aforementioned text, the word climate is not included in the definition 
of environmental information provided by the Convention. In light of this fact, this section 
will move to interpret the term environmental in the context of the whole provision in which 
this term in contained. In particular, the term atmosphere needs to be considered. As 
suggested by Koester “atmosphere is considerably broader than climate, and [that] 
information on climate change, taking into consideration the other elements contained in the 
provision on environmental information, was not needed”.99 Indeed, atmosphere is, by 
definition, broader than climate: the atmosphere comprises the layers of air around planet 
Earth.100 Weather is the condition of the atmosphere at a specific location and time,101 and 
the average weather of a certain area is the climate of a region. Therefore, the term 
                                                          
96 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 50.  
97 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 50. 
98 The CJEU, while referring to Article 2(a) of previous Access to Environmental Information Directive 
(Directive 90/313), stated that: “It must be noted in the first place that Article 2(a) of the directive 
includes under ‘information relating to the environment’ any information on the state of the various 
aspects of the environment mentioned therein as well as on activities or measures which may adversely 
affect or protect those aspects, ‘including administrative measures and environmental management 
programmes’. The wording of the provision makes it clear that the Community legislature intended to 
make that concept a broad one, embracing both information and activities relating to the state of those 
aspects.” Case C–321/96, Wilhelm Mecklenburg v. Kreis Pinneberg – Der Landrat, 17 June 1998, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:300, para 19. 
99 S. Nóbrega, Personal communication via email with the previous Chair to the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee, Mr. Veit Koester (09 April 2013). [Access to Environmental Information]. 
100 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and S. E. Planton, ‘Annex III: Glossary ’, in M. Collins, 
R. Knutti, J. Arblaster, J. Dufresne, T. Fichefet, P. Friedlingstein, X. Gao, W. Gutowski, T. Johns and 
G. Krinner (eds.), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group 
I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 1448, 1450.  
101 “[…] this includes winds, clouds, precipitation, temperature, and relative humidity.” J. H. Seinfeld 
and S. N. Pandis, ‘Atmospheric chemistry and physics: from air pollution to climate change’, Second 
Edition (Hoboken, New Jersey John Wiley & Sons, 2006), p. 4. 
92 
atmosphere encompasses climate. Since atmosphere is part of the definition of 
environmental, climate is consequently also part of the definition.102 
Moreover, greenhouse gases “act as atmospheric thermal insulators”103 and one of the effects 
of global increases in the concentration of these gases in the atmosphere is the exacerbation 
of the greenhouse gas effect and the resulting climate change.104 Therefore, since climate 
change relates to the state of the atmosphere, and the atmosphere is included in what is 
considered environmental under the definition of environmental information in Article 
2(3)(a) of the Aarhus Convention, climate change can be deemed to be part of what is 
considered environmental under the Convention. 
Climate change could also be dealt within the context of Article 2(3)(b) of the Aarhus 
Convention, which is related to all factors (such factors being e.g. substances, energy, noise, 
and radiation) that affect or are likely to affect the elements of the environment. First, 
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane105 are substances106 and can, therefore, 
be considered factors. Second, greenhouse gases are likely to affect the elements of the 
environment, since these gases have the potential to affect the state of the environment, 
particularly the atmosphere, as scientists have found that it is extremely likely that the 
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is the main cause for global warming in 
                                                          
102 Replacing climate with the broader term atmosphere appears to justify the omission of the term 
when examined in isolation. However, when the definition is examined as a whole, one may wonder 
why air got a specific mention in the definition and climate did not. On the one hand, the inclusion of 
air, which could also be characterised as a narrower element of the atmosphere, suggests that the drafters 
of the Convention may not have considered that atmosphere would be interpreted as an umbrella term. 
On the other hand, perhaps the drafters understood air as being of particular importance as the substance 
that humans breathe and, for this reason, intended to emphasise the quality of the air in the layer of the 
atmosphere that is closest to the Earth’s surface. In this sense, the explicit mention of air does not 
exclude that atmosphere also covers climate, even if it is not mentioned explicitly.  
103 J. H. Seinfeld and S. N. Pandis, op. cit. (2006), p. 2. 
104 “The term of air pollution is often used in a misleading way. Actually, air pollution covers many 
phenomena which are driven by distinct processes and sometimes coupled: greenhouse effect due to 
the so-called greenhouse gases (e.g. carbon dioxide and methane) and the resulting climate change […]” 
B. Sportisse, Fundamentals in air pollution: from processes to modelling: Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2010), p. 9. 
105 The Kyoto Protocol lists six greenhouses gases in its annex A: Carbon dioxide (C02), Methane 
(CH4), Nitrous oxide (N20), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), Sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6). 
106 In scientific terms, a substance can be an element such as the oxygen (O2) or a compound as the 
CO2. “A pure substance is something with a uniform and fixed composition at the nanoscopic level. As 
you will see, pure substances can be recognized by the unchanging nature of their properties. An 
element is a pure substance composed of only one kind of atom.” M. D. Joesten, J. L. Hogg and M. E. 
Castellion, ‘The world of chemistry: essentials’, Fourth Edition: Cengage Learning, 2007), p. 19. 
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the mid-20th century.107 Therefore, greenhouse gases can be considered to be factors that 
affect or are likely to affect the atmosphere and, since climate change relates to the state of 
the atmosphere and greenhouse gases emissions affect the atmosphere, both climate change 
and greenhouse gases are included in what is considered environmental under the definition 
of environmental information in Article 2(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention. 
3.4. Object and purpose 
Having concluded that the term environmental might be interpreted as encompassing climate 
change matters, the analysis now turns to examine whether such an interpretation is in line 
with the object and purpose of the Aarhus Convention. As clarified by Gardiner: “[I]n the 
Vienna rules, object and purpose function as a means of shedding light on the ordinary 
meaning rather than merely as an indicator of a general approach to be taken to treaty 
interpretation.”108 
Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention, which is titled objective, states its object and purpose as 
follows: 
“In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and 
future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-
being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public 
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” 
Since climate change issues, such as the threat of heatwaves109 and floods,110 are closely 
connected to the environmental conditions that affect human health and living conditions, the 
proposed interpretation the term environmental under the definition of environmental 
information (Article 2(3) AC) as including climate change matters is therefore in line with 
the objective of the Aarhus Convention of contributing to adequate living environments.  
3.5. Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice 
The conclusion, reached by examining the meaning of the text, objective and purpose of the 
Convention, is that climate change is addressed by the Aarhus Convention. In order to give 
                                                          
107 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, op. cit. 2014b, p. 2 and 4. The term extremely likely is 
used throughout the report to express a level of confidence of between 95–100%. Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, op. cit. 2014b, p. 2. 
108 R. K. Gardiner, op. cit. (2008), p. 190. 
109 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, op. cit. 2014b, p. 2 and 4. 
110 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, op. cit. 2014b, p. 2 and 4. 
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more robustness to the argument, the analysis will continue with the examination of 
subsequent agreements or practice regarding the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention.111  
Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT refers to “any subsequent agreement between the Parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provision,” while Article 
31(3)(b) mentions “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Although they are formulated as 
two different sources that can be taken into consideration for treaty interpretation, there is 
some overlap between the two provisions. As clearly noted by Orakhelashvili: 
“There seems to be no clear-cut distinction between the concepts of subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice, either in terms of the nature of the concepts or 
their place in terms of the structure of international law-making. For the purposes of 
treaty interpretation, there is hardly any substantial difference between these two 
elements, both of them referring to the agreement as to interpretation, except perhaps 
the fact that the former presumably refers to straightforward (express) agreement 
between the parties, while the latter seeks to infer such agreement from the practice 
of the application of the treaty.”112 
These challenges in classifying a specific document under paragraphs a or b of Article 31(3) 
VCLT seem to permeate the discussion on how to classify the findings and recommendations 
of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.113 These findings and recommendations 
are the instruments through which the Committee evaluates the application of the Convention 
by the Parties and interprets the Convention. There is no explicit provision in the decision on 
compliance mechanisms regarding the binding status of the findings and recommendations 
of the Compliance Committee. Koester understands that they can become binding if endorsed 
by the Meeting of the Parties. He further iterates that the endorsement by the Parties may 
mean “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions”, according to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties.114 Tanzi and Pitea (2011) classify the decisions of the Committee as 
subsequent practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT in the following terms: 
                                                          
111 Also in view of the fact that there is no hierarchy in the elements of interpretation in Article 31 
VCLT. R. K. Gardiner, ‘Treaty interpretation’, Second (USA: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 182-
183.  
112 A. Orakhelashvili, op. cit. (2008), p. 355. 
113 For more information on the Committee, see section 2.3.1. 
114 V. Koester, ‘The Aarhus Convention Compliance Mechanism and Proceedings before its 
Compliance Committee’, in C. Banner (ed.), The Aarhus Convention: A Guide for UK Lawyers,  
(Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), pp. 201-216, p. 205. See also Appendix 13 – Tabular Analysis 
of the Meeting of the Parties’ Consideration of the Compliance Committee’s Findings in 
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“[…] any decision of the Committee, when it is backed by the MOP through adoption 
by consensus, may be considered as falling within the concept of ‘subsequent practice’ 
under the latter provision [Article 31(3)(b) VCLT]. This is particularly so when a 
given provision of the Convention has been consistently interpreted in the same way 
in different cases without objections by parties at the MOP.”115  
Both authors agree that the Committee’s findings and recommendations, once adopted by the 
MoP, have legal consequences on the interpretation of the Convention. Despite a possible 
disagreement on whether the decisions of the Committee fall within the concept of 
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice, the outcome is the same: the decisions of the 
Compliance Committee can be qualified as subsequent agreement or practice and can, 
therefore, be taken into consideration to interpret the meaning of its provisions. To date, all 
but one of the Committee’s recommendations discussed during a MoP received the 
endorsement of the MoP.116 Furthermore, as noted by Banner, “the decisions [of the MoP] 
usually contain little if any additional reasoning over and above that given by the Compliance 
Committee.”117 
Having established that the decisions of the ACCC can be taken into consideration to interpret 
the meaning of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, the analysis turns to examine 
whether the ACCC has dealt with the definition of environmental information in view of 
climate change. The Compliance Committee has dealt with access to information within the 
context of different Communications.118 However, there are only two Communications which 
                                                          
Communications and referrals Concerning the Parties’ Compliance in C. Banner, ‘The Aarhus 
Convention: A Guide for UK Lawyers’, (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), pp. 327-330. 
115 A. Tanzi and C. Pitea, ‘The Interplay between EU law and International Law Procedures in 
Controlling Compliance with the Aarhus Convention by EU Member States’, in M. Pallemaerts (ed.), 
The Aarhus Convention at Ten. Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law 
and EU Environmental Law,  (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2011), p. 380.  
116 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2011a), p. 304. V. Koester, op. cit. (2015), p. 205. There is only one pending 
decision regarding the compliance by the European Union, which is planned to be discussed again in 
the next MoP in 2021. Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the sixth 
session of the Meeting of the Parties ECE/MP.PP/2017/2  (2017a), p. 14-15. 
117 C. Banner, op. cit. (2015), p. 8. 
118 Among others, there were questions regarding whether environmental information encompasses: “a 
proposal to import and dispose of foreign radioactive waste” (Green Salvation (Kazakhstan) with regard 
to compliance by Kazakhstan UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.1, 11 March 2005, pp. 2 and 4); 
“government decrees on land use and planning” (Communication by the Center for Regional 
Development/Transparency International Armenia, the Sakharov Armenian Human Rights Protection 
Center and the Armenian Botanical Society (Armenia) with regard to compliance by Armenia UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/2/Add.1, 10 May 2006, p.5); “EIA studies in their entirety, including specific 
methodologies of assessment and modelling techniques used in their preparation” (The non-
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deal with climate-related information, and both cases are related to renewable energy 
programmes. In Communication 54, the communicant alleged that insufficient or incorrect 
information was disseminated by the public authorities.119 For the analysis of the scope of 
the definition of environmental information, the allegation regarding the insufficient 
provision of information is relevant, since the findings of the Committee could have 
addressed what information should be disclosed. The Compliance Committee found that the 
“the Party concerned is obliged to ensure that each public authority possesses the 
environmental information which is relevant to its functions” but could not decide whether 
the Party concerned was not compliant because the allegation was not sufficiently 
substantiated.120 Therefore, no analysis of the scope of the definition was provided. In 
Communication 68, the communicant alleged that information regarding the CO2 emission 
savings calculations was imprecise.121 In its findings, the Committee reaffirmed the 
obligation of the Parties “to possess and update environmental information which is relevant 
for their functions”122 and added that “for public authorities engaged in decision-making 
regarding wind energy, this includes data arising from the application of different methods 
for calculating the CO2 reductions generated by wind energy projects, including data from 
actual measurements.”123 This finding brings clarification to the scope of environmental 
information regarding the information that the public authority needs to possess in the area 
of wind energy, i.e., the data from the measurement of CO2 reductions and therefore confirms 
                                                          
governmental organisation Alburnus Maior (Romania) with regard to compliance by Romenia UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.7, 10 May 2006, p. 5); “finance contract” (The Albanian non-governmental 
organisation Civic Alliance for the Protection of the Bay of Vlora regarding compliance by the 
European Community UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/2/Add.1, 8 February 2011, pp. 5-6); and 
“contracts for rent of lands” (The non-governmental organisation Eco-TIRAS International 
Environmental Association of River Keepers regarding compliance by the Republic of Moldova UN 
Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/6/Add.3, 8 February 2011, p. 5). For more examples on what the definition 
of environemtal information includes, see E. Hey, ‘Compliance Procedure: Aarhus Convention’ Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law [MPEiPro], (2019), para 24. 
119 Mr. Pat Swords concerning compliance by the European Union UN Doc.  ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2012/12, 
2 October 2012, para 88. 
120 Mr. Pat Swords concerning compliance by the European Union UN Doc.  ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2012/12, 
para 90. 
121 Ms. Christine Metcalfe on behalf of the Avich and Kilchrenan Community Council concerning 
compliance by the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/5, 17 June 1998, para 51.  
122 Ms. Christine Metcalfe on behalf of the Avich and Kilchrenan Community Council concerning 
compliance by the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/5, para 85.  
123 Ms. Christine Metcalfe on behalf of the Avich and Kilchrenan Community Council concerning 
compliance by the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/5, para 88. 
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that climate-related information, particularly CO2 emissions, fall under the definition of 
environmental information. 
3.6. Interim conclusion 
The Aarhus Convention does not include the terms climate change or GHG emissions and 
this raises the question of whether, and, if so, to what extent, the climate change problem is 
part of the scope of the Convention. To answer this question, it was examined what the term 
environmental encompasses and whether climate change is part of its scope, since the Aarhus 
Convention covers access to environmental information and public participation in 
governmental environmental decision making. To carry out this research, in particular for the 
interpretation of the word environmental, the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
(VCLT) was the primary point of reference. Articles 31 (general rules of interpretation) and 
32 (the supplementary means of interpretation) of the VCLT contain the rules of treaty 
interpretation. 
The analysis started with the historical circumstances leading up to the signing of the 
Convention, which is a supplementary means of interpretation. The circumstances of the 
conclusion and the preparatory work of the Aarhus Convention provided a nuanced 
perspective on how the climate change problem was part of the discussions: the preparatory 
works demonstrate an attempt to include the word climate and also that discussions took 
place regarding climate change,124 but they fail to provide a clear justification for the 
substitution of the first term for atmosphere, and nor for the exclusion of the term climate 
change.  
The analysis continued with the general rules of interpretation as provided in Article 31 
VCLT. Although there is no mention of the exact term climate or climate change in the text 
of the Convention, the definition of environmental information encompasses information on 
the condition of the atmosphere and consequently the climate (and climate change). 
Furthermore, greenhouse gases are substances and can, therefore, be considered factors that 
affect or are likely to affect the atmosphere, which is one of the elements listed in the 
definition. This interpretation is in line with the objective of the Convention, since climate 
change impacts may interfere with environmental conditions and affect the health and well-
being of human beings. Hence, by examining the meaning of the text, objective and purpose 
of the Convention, it can be held that climate change matters are encompassed by the Aarhus 
Convention. The examination of subsequent agreements or practice regarding the 
interpretation of the Aarhus Convention could provide more elements to support this 
interpretation. The analysis showed that the decisions of the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee fall within the meaning of subsequent agreement or subsequent practice 
                                                          
124 See sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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according to Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT. In this vein, these should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the provisions of the Convention. Although the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee has thus far dealt with only a few cases related to climate 
change matters, one case clearly demonstrates that climate change, and particularly CO2 
emissions, have been regarded as part of the scope of the Convention. This corroborates the 
proposed interpretation according to which climate change falls within the scope of the term 
environmental, which is the closest to a definition of the environment under the Convention.  
In sum, on the basis of the rules of interpretation provided in the VCLT, it is possible to 
conclude that climate change can be seen as being included in what is considered 
environmental under the definition of environmental information according to the Aarhus 
Convention. As previously ascertained, understanding the scope of environmental under the 
definition of environmental information is not only important for the provisions on access to 
environmental information, but it is also relevant for the other provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention, since, in the absence of a definition of the environment itself, it is from this 
definition that it becomes possible to interpret whether environmental issues are covered by 
the Aarhus Convention or not. 
Based on the proposed interpretation, it is expected that, for instance, the following 
information held by public authorities falls within the definition of environmental 
information: the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the greenhouse gas 
emissions savings from the installation of renewable energy, such as wind power installations 
and solar panels; the amount of greenhouse gas emissions produced by different sectors such 
as agriculture, industry or transport.  However, climate change is a broad term and whether 
any climate change-related case falls under the scope of the Convention has to be interpreted 
on a case-by-case basis. 
4. Access to environmental information under the Aarhus Convention 
and its implementation at the EU level 
4.1. Introduction 
This section is dedicated to the first pillar of the Convention (access to environmental 
information), which is one of the two core rights examined in this thesis. The analysis 
contained in this section will explain the framework established in the Aarhus Convention 
and how this was implemented in the EU. This will help to understand how the right of access 
to environmental information has to be provided for individuals and ENGOs at the EU level. 
This examination, in turn, allows, in the case studies, to understand how this framework has 
to provide for rights to request environmental information in the field of EU climate change 
law. The third pillar, access to justice, will be examined only to the extent that it relates to 
the enforcement of the first pillar. 
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One of the most important aspects of establishing the public’s right of access to 
environmental information is deciding on the scope and content of that right. In particular, 
what information can be requested (ratione materiae), who the beneficiary of the right is and 
who is obliged to provide this information (ratione personae) are crucial. Therefore, this 
section will focus on the following definitions: (a) environmental information, (b) the public 
and (c) public authorities. 
4.1.1.  The definition of environmental information 
The definition of environmental information provided by the Aarhus Convention in Article 
2(3) of the Aarhus Convention was already explained in section 3.3.1.125 The definition is 
broad and includes a non-exhaustive list which is subject to interpretation by the Parties. 
However, such a definition sets the minimum standards and cannot be narrowed by the 
Parties. 
Article 2(1)(d) of Regulation 1367/2006 (hereinafter: Aarhus Regulation), which closely 
follows the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, although the text is distributed across a 
greater number of paragraphs, provides that environmental information relates to any 
information in written, visual, aural, electronic, or any other material form on: (i) the state of 
the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land etc.; (ii) factors, 
such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, 
discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements 
of the environment; (iii) measures; (iv) reports on the implementation of environmental 
legislation; (v) cost-benefit and economic analyses; and (vi) the state of human health and 
safety. Regarding climate-related information, what has been argued about the Aarhus 
Convention definition of environmental information applies equally to the Aarhus Regulation 
definition; therefore, this definition can also be regarded as encompassing climate-related 
information, such as the condition of the atmosphere and the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the air, for the purpose of the Aarhus Regulation.  
4.1.2.  The addressees of the right to environmental information: the public 
The definition of the public provided by the Aarhus Convention encompasses legal and 
natural persons and explicitly mentions associations, organisations and groups established in 
accordance with national legislation or practice.126 Under this definition, it is possible to 
identify three groups: (a) natural persons, (b) legal persons and (c) associations, organisations 
or groups. A natural person is a human being, while the concept of legal person “refers to 
an administratively, legislatively or judicially established entity with the capacity to enter 
                                                          
125 Article 2(3), Aarhus Convention. 
126 This wide definition applies to the provisions on access to environmental information which are 
discussed in section 5.2. 
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into contracts on its own behalf, to sue and be sued, and to make decisions through agents, 
such as a partnership, corporation or foundation.”127 If an association, organisation or group 
has legal personality, it will fall under the definition, since it is a legal person. The emphasis 
on associations, organisations or groups, according to national legislation or practice as part 
of the public, suggests that associations, organisations or groups without legal personality 
may also be considered members of the public under these definitions.128 For instance, an ad 
hoc organisation established to deal with water pollution in a specific municipality could be 
deemed part of the public if it fulfils the requirement of national legislation or practice. Such 
requirements must be in accordance with the objective of the Aarhus Convention to ensure 
broad access to environmental information.129 
The Aarhus Regulation provides a definition of the public which mirrors the definition in the 
Convention.130 However, this definition is only used in the context of Article 4, which deals 
with the active form of access to environmental information, i.e. the collection and 
dissemination of information by public authorities without a request from the public.131 
Concerning the passive form (which will be examined in section 4.2.1), Article 3 of the 
Aarhus Regulation provides that an applicant may request access to environmental 
information held by EU institutions or bodies. An applicant is defined by Article 2(1)(a) of 
the Aarhus Regulation as “any natural or legal person requesting environmental 
information”. The difference between the definitions of an applicant under the Aarhus 
Regulation and the public under the Aarhus Conventions is that the latter explicitly includes 
associations, organisations or groups, in accordance with national legislation or practice. The 
absence of associations, organisations or groups, in accordance with national legislation or 
practice in the Aarhus Regulation indicates that the definition adopted at the EU level does 
not give special treatment to NGOs. This means that the EU’s implementation of the 
provision limits its application to natural persons and organisations which are legal persons. 
Thus, the Regulation only permits associations with legal personality to request 
environmental information. Since the Aarhus Convention gives discretion to the Parties to 
define associations, groups and organisations in accordance with national legislation or 
practice, in the present case, EU legislation is permitted to establish such a requirement. 
Therefore, the Aarhus Regulation can be regarded as being in compliance with the Aarhus 
                                                          
127 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 46. 
128 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 55. 
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Convention since the latter does not impose an obligation on Parties to recognise 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) without legal personality. 
The question that arises, however, is whether the requirement of having legal personality, as 
required by the Aarhus Regulation, creates obstacles for the ENGOs established under the 28 
different legal regimes of the Member States, should they seek to request environmental 
information at the EU level. The issue is very much linked to the question of standing before 
the CJEU. 
Technically, standing of ENGOs before the European Courts is a different issue than the 
request for information from public authorities by ENGOs. However, at the EU level, the 
question of legal personality concerns both issues: ENGOs must have legal personality to 
request environmental information and to request an internal review, which is necessary 
under EU law to gain access to justice in case of an environmental law violation at the EU 
level.132 In the case of European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European 
Commission, the Court of Justice discussed the question whether legal personality was 
necessary for the purpose of initiating an action against a decision that rejected the request 
made by the applicant for internal review.133 Despite the fact that this discussion was carried 
out for the purposes of assessing standing, it is, for the reason just mentioned, nevertheless 
relevant for the discussion of access to environmental information. 
The EPAW case deals with the question of the legal personality of NGOs in the context of an 
action for annulment that originated from a denial of a request for internal review under the 
Aarhus Regulation.134 EPAW, the applicant, had initiated an action for annulment against the 
decision of the European Commission that rejected the request made by the applicant for 
internal review under Article 10 of Regulation 1367/2006 of the communication entitled 
‘Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy market’.135 According to Article 
263(4) TFEU, in order to be able to bring an action for annulment, the applicant should be a 
legal person. The Court stated that EPAW did not submit any constituting instrument or any 
other proof of its existence in law.136 EPAW recognised that it had no registration in any 
Member State of the European Union, but it argued that it was based primarily in Ireland, 
and this country does not require registration with the national authorities. Thus, EPAW 
                                                          
132 Article 10, Aarhus Regulation. 
133 The question of legal personality dealt with in Case T-168/13 was discussed in T. Moolenaar and S. 
Nóbrega, ‘Access to justice: Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations according to the Aarhus 
Regulation’ (2/2016) ELNI Review, (2016), pp. 76-84, pp. 79-81. 
134 Case T-168/13, European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European Commission, 18 
March 2013, ECLI:EU:T:2014:47. 
135 Case T-168/13, European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European Commission, para 5. 
136 Case T-168/13, European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European Commission, para 11.  
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claimed that “it must be recognised as having legal personality under Irish law”.137 To support 
its argument, the organisation drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the Planning and 
Development Act 2000 entitles a private body or organisation that satisfies the following 
conditions to appeal to An Bord Pleanála, a quasi-judicial authority, against a decision on an 
application for development: “(i) the aims or objectives of which relate to the promotion of 
environmental protection, (ii) which has, during the period of 12 months preceding the 
making of the appeal, pursued those aims or objectives, and (iii) which satisfies such 
additional requirements (if any) as are prescribed under paragraph (e)”.138 Under paragraph 
(e), the Minister could prescribe as an additional requirement “the possession of a specified 
legal personality and the possession of a constitution or rules”.139 The Court acknowledged 
that such a possibility was not enforced by the Minister.140 However, the Court understood 
that such a right is limited to a specific field and is not capable of giving “general legal 
personality under Irish law”,141 which would enable the organisation to bring an action before 
EU Courts on the basis of Article 263 (4) TFEU.142 In the absence of “constitutive 
instruments or of any other document relating to its constitutional structure and internal 
processes,” it was not possible to prove its capability of acting as a responsible association in 
legal matters.143 In other words, in order to get standing before the EU courts, the organisation 
must be able to prove it has legal personality according to national law.144 
The ruling of the Court does not shed light on the methods through which an organisation 
could possibly prove its constituency if the national law does not impose a registration 
requirement, as is permitted by the Aarhus Convention. Neither the Implementation Guide to 
the Aarhus Convention nor the case law of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
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143 Case T-168/13, European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European Commission, para 25. 
144 There is no legal provision at the EU level for recognising legal personality.  
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offer an explanation on this matter. In practice, at the EU level, this means that an ENGO, 
which is recognised in practice in a Member State, will not be able to request information at 
the EU level due to a lack of legal personality. A practical alternative to this problem would 
be to request environmental information as an individual (natural person), such as a person 
cooperating with the ENGO or a staff member, as this would remove the need to demonstrate 
legal constituency.  
4.1.3.  The authorities who are (and are not) subjected to the obligation to provide 
information 
The Aarhus Convention’s definition of public authorities includes all governmental 
authorities (national, regional and other levels); natural or legal persons with public 
administrative functions under national law; and those having public responsibilities or 
providing public services in relation to the environment.145 This detailed definition 
demonstrates a deliberate choice to accommodate private actors to perform environment-
related public functions.146 Such private actors entrusted with, for instance, public 
responsibilities are then deemed to be a public authority according to the Aarhus 
Convention.147 This is extremely important in view of the measures adopted by the EU to 
tackle climate change by outsourcing public responsibility or functions to private actors.148 
This development should not allow information on activities affecting the environment to be 
placed outside of the scope of procedural rights.149 In contrast, the Aarhus Regulation is 
applicable to “public institution, body, office or agency established by, or on the basis of, the 
Treaty”.150 However, as rightly detailed in the preamble of the Aarhus Regulation, provisions 
of EU law should be consistent with that of the Aarhus Convention;151 therefore, a consistent 
                                                          
145 Article 2(2), Aarhus Convention. 
146 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 46. 
147 Article 2(2), Aarhus Convention. 
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judicial or legislative capacity. However, the provisions under Title II shall apply to Community 
institutions or bodies acting in a legislative capacity”. 
151 Recital 3, Preamble, Aarhus Regulation. 
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interpretation with the Convention will allow for a definition which is at least as inclusive as 
the Convention.152  
The Convention’s definition of public authority excludes bodies or institutions acting in a 
judicial or legislative capacity153 and, consequently, they are not obliged to provide 
information under Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention. In comparison, the Aarhus Regulation 
also excludes from its scope “any public institution, body, office or agency established by, 
or on the basis of, the Treaty” when acting in a judicial or legislative capacity.154 However, 
according to Article 2(1)(c) of the Aarhus Regulation, which provides an exception to this 
general exclusion, the provisions on access to environmental information shall also be 
applicable to EU institutions and bodies acting in a legislative capacity,155 thereby expanding 
the scope of application of the right to access environmental information as provided by the 
Aarhus Convention.  
4.2. Forms of access to environmental information 
The Aarhus Convention prescribes two forms of acquiring environmental information from 
public authorities: the passive and the active. The passive form imposes the obligation on 
public authorities to disclose information upon the request of members of the public (Article 
4), while the active form obliges public authorities to collect and disseminate information on 
their own initiative (Article 5). These provisions were implemented in relation to EU 
institutions and bodies in Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the Aarhus Regulation.  
  
                                                          
152 There is no case law interpreting the Aarhus Regulation on this matter. 
153 Article 2(2), Aarhus Convention. 
154 Article 2(1)(c), Aarhus Regulation. 
155 “In that regard, it is true that, as was noted by the General Court in paragraph 103 of the judgment 
under appeal, when the Commission prepares impact assessment documents, such as the documents at 
issue, it does not itself act in a legislative capacity. In addition, the impact assessment procedure takes 
place upstream of the legislative procedure sensu stricto, which does not formally begin until a 
legislative proposal is submitted by the Commission.” Case C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v. European 
Commission, 4 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:660, para 86. For a discussion on the exemption 
provided by Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4, see Case C-515/11, Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 18 July 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:523 in which the Court ruled that 
information regarding the preparation and adoption of normative regulations of a lower rank than a law 
shall be made available, at para 36; and Case C-204/09, Flachglas Torgau GmbH v. Federal Republic 
of Germany in which the Court decided that the legislative capacity exemption will apply only during 
“the period between the beginning and the end of the legislative procedure concerned”, at para 76. See 
also M. Peeters and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014), pp. 359-360. 
105 
4.2.1.  Passive access to environmental information 
Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention establishes the right of the public to obtain existing 
environmental information from public authorities upon request. This is commonly called 
passive access to environmental information, because the public authority remains inert until 
a member of the public exercises her or his right to request environmental information. In 
order to implement this provision, Parties are obliged to establish a system which allows a 
member of the public to request environmental information from a public authority.156 The 
Aarhus Convention prescribes that the requested environmental information must be 
disclosed within one month of the request being submitted. According to the Convention, 
this period can only be extended for one additional month in cases where it is justified by the 
volume and complexity of the request.157 Moreover, if the public authority imposes a fee to 
provide the requested environmental information, this fee should not exceed a reasonable 
amount.158 Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention thus establishes specific commitments: the 
provision of environmental information within a timeframe which can only be denied on the 
basis of very specific grounds. This framework clearly characterises an obligation of result, 
by prescribing a specific outcome, namely to provide environmental information upon the 
request of a member of the public and in accordance with the conditions of the Article.159 
Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention has been implemented through Article 3 of the Aarhus 
Regulation. 
Article 3 of the Aarhus Regulation stipulates that “Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 shall apply 
to any request by an applicant for access to environmental information held by Community 
institutions and bodies”. In other words, in relation to requests for environmental information, 
the Aarhus Regulation has to be read in combination with Regulation 1049/2001, which sets 
a general framework for access to documents at the EU level. According to Article 3 of 
Aarhus Regulation read in combination with Article 2 of Regulation 1049/2001, members of 
the public may request environmental information. Regulation 1049/2001 limits the right to 
request access to EU documents to EU citizens and any natural or legal person residing in or 
having its registered office in a Member State.160 The Aarhus Regulation extended the right 
to access environmental information to any member of the public “without discrimination as 
to citizenship, nationality or domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without 
                                                          
156 Article 4(1), Aarhus Convention. 
157 Article 4(2) of the Aarhus Convention reads: “The environmental information referred to in 
paragraph 1 above shall be made available as soon as possible and at the latest within one month after 
the request has been submitted, unless the volume and the complexity of the information justify an 
extension of this period up to two months after the request. The applicant shall be informed of any 
extension and of the reasons justifying it.” (Emphasis added) 
158 Article 4(8), Aarhus Convention. 
159 For a discussion on obligations of effort and of result, see Chapter II, section 1.2. 
160 Article 2(2), Regulation 1049/2001. 
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discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or an effective centre of its activities.”161 
As the Aarhus Regulation can be considered as a lex specialis vis-à-vis Regulation 
1049/2001, the broader provision of the Aarhus Regulation prevails over that contained in 
Regulation 1049/2001 and, as a consequence, no violation of the Aarhus Convention can be 
detected at this instance. 
The public authority concerned shall answer the request within 15 working days. This period 
can be extended by 15 working days in exceptional cases, such as when the application deals 
with a very large document or a very large number of documents.162 However, the conditions 
for extending the period to answer the request, i.e. volume and complexity of the requested 
information, are cumulative under the Aarhus Convention, while Regulation 1049/2001 
allows for a deadline extension when only one of these two conditions is met, in this case, 
volume.163 The ACCC has emphasised that the volume of a request is not valid as a sole 
justification for a refusal and has offered a suggestion to the Parties on how to manage these 
situations: 
“Finally, information within the scope of article 4 should be provided regardless 
of its volume. In cases where the volume is large, the public authority has several 
practical options: it can provide such information in an electronic form or inform the 
applicant of the place where such information can be examined and facilitate such 
examination, or indicate the charge for supplying such information, in accordance 
with article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention.”164 (Emphasis added) 
As a consequence, the Aarhus Regulation read in combination with Regulation 1049/2201 
allows for the refusal to provide environmental information under easier conditions than 
foreseen by the Aarhus Convention, which amounts to a violation of the Convention. 
In regard to the timeframe, 30 working days (2 x 15 days as allowed by Regulation 
1049/2001) usually amounts to six weeks, but it can be more depending on the number of 
holidays which will fall within that period. This means that the Aarhus Regulation 
requirement is somewhat stricter for the public authorities than that of the Aarhus 
Convention, which allows for two months. However, in practice, cases before the CJEU and 
                                                          
161 Article 3, Aarhus Regulation corresponds to Article 3(9) AC. 
162 Article 7(1) and (3), Regulation 1049/2001. 
163 J. J. Paradissis, ‘The right to access environmental information: an analysis of UK law in the context 
of international, European, and comparative law’, 2005, 
http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8454/1/The_right_to_access_environmental_information-
_an_analysis_of_UK_law_in_the_context_of_international%2C_European%2C_and_comparative_la
w.pdf, p. 118. 
164 Ukraine ACCC/C/2004/3 and ACCC/S/2004/1; ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.3, 14 March 2005, 
para 33. 
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the EU Ombudsman have shown that EU institutions have not respected this timeframe and, 
consequently, applicants have experienced long delays.165  
Regarding the costs for producing and sending copies of environmental information, 
according to Regulation 1049/2001, the applicant may be charged for documents of more 
than 20 pages and but the charge should “not exceed the real cost of producing and sending 
the copies”.166 The text of Regulation 1049/2001 could result in a breach of the Aarhus 
Convention if all of the costs passed on to the applicant would exceed a reasonable amount, 
as prescribed by Article 4(8) of the Aarhus Convention. Furthermore, Article 4(8) of the 
Aarhus Convention prescribes that “public authorities intending to make such a charge for 
supplying information shall make available to applicants a schedule of charges which may 
be levied, indicating the circumstances in which they may be levied or waived and when the 
supply of information is conditional on the advance payment of such a charge.” Article 10(1) 
of Regulation 1049/2001 establishes the conditions for waiving the costs (“copies of less than 
20 A4 pages and direct access in electronic form or through the register shall be free of 
charge”) but there is no schedule of charges in Regulation 1049/2001. In addition, Article 7 
of Commission Decision 2001/937 states that “if the volume of the documents requested 
exceeds twenty pages, the applicant may be charged a fee of EUR 0,10 per page plus carriage 
costs. The charges for other media shall be decided case by case but shall not exceed a 
reasonable amount.”167 In the 2017 EU’s implementation reports, the European Commission, 
on behalf of the EU, informed the Meeting of the Parties that requested information 
comprising “the EU institutions do not currently have a practice of charging for access to 
documents.”168 Therefore, in practice, it seems that costs impose no obstacle to accessing 
environmental information, since charges are not applied at the EU level, at least this was the 
case until 2017.  
                                                          
165 S. Wolf, ‘Access to EU environmental information: EU compliance with Aarhus Convention’ 14(4) 
ERA Forum, (2013), pp. 475-491, p. 487. On the delays by the European Commission to reply to 
requests, see for example: Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, 9 November 2011, 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:646, Case T-449/10, ClientEarth and others v. Commission, 9 November 2011, 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:647, Case T-168/13, European Platform Against Windfarms (EPAW) v. European 
Commission and Case T-111/11, ClientEarth v. Commission, 13 September 2013, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:482. Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing His Inquiry into Complaint 
339/2011/AN against the European Commission 
(http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/11193/html.bookmark) and Decision of 
the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 355/2007/(TN)FOR 
(http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/en/5515/html.bookmark). See also M. Peeters 
and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014), pp. 361-362.  
166 Article 10(1), Regulation 1049/2001. 
167 Commission Decision 2001/937/EC of 5 December 2001 amending its rules of procedure, OJ L 
345/94. 
168 European Commission, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report (2017a), p. 9. 
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4.2.2.  Active access to environmental information 
The Convention provides an active right to information in Article 5, which means that in 
some circumstances, the public authority must provide environmental information on its own 
initiative. Article 5(1) creates an obligation to collect and disseminate environmental 
information which applies to the public authorities of the Parties. This Article also provides 
that the Parties have an obligation to achieve a specific result: in this case, the possession and 
dissemination of information. Therefore, Article 5(1) of the Aarhus Convention is also 
characterised as an obligation of result.169 
Article 5(1)(a) of the Aarhus Convention imposes an obligation on the public authorities to 
possess and update environmental information relevant to their functions. One manner of 
collecting information from private actors is to impose self-monitoring obligations, including 
an obligation to keep a record of environmental data that must be periodically reported to the 
public authorities.170 Another potential approach is to request information as a compulsory 
condition of licensing and permitting procedures for their renewal by public authorities. An 
example of such a requirement at the moment of licensing is the publication of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in its entirety.171 
Article 5(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention requires that an informational system is established 
in order to ensure “an adequate flow of information to the public authorities about proposed 
and existing activities which may significantly affect the environment”.172 The active 
dissemination of environmental information is strengthened by the Kiev Protocol on 
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR Protocol), which was adopted in 2003 and 
entered into force on 8 October 2009.173 The objective of PRTR Protocol is “to enhance 
public access to information through the establishment of coherent, integrated, nationwide 
pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTRs) in accordance with the provisions of this 
Protocol, which could facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making as 
well as contribute to the prevention and reduction of pollution of the environment.”174 
Furthermore, Article 5(1)(c) of the Aarhus Convention establishes that, in the event of any 
                                                          
169 According to Article 5(1) AC, the public authority has the obligation to possess the environmental 
information. This information can also be requested by the member of the public under Article 4 AC. 
Therefore, there is a clear link between Article 5(1) AC and Article 4 AC that justifies the choice of 
concentrating on the first paragraph of Article 5. 
170 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 98.  
171 Alburnus Maior (concerning compliance by Romania ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.7 16 April 2008, 
para 27. 
172 Article 5 (1) (b), Aarhus Convention. 
173 Kiev Protocol, see footnote 30. 
174 Article 1, Kiev Protocol. 
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imminent threat to human health or the environment, all relevant information shall be 
disseminated immediately and without delay to members of the public who may be affected. 
The Aarhus Regulation implements Article 5(1)(a) of the Aarhus Convention by establishing 
that EU institutions “shall organise the environmental information which is relevant to their 
functions and which is held by them, with a view to its active and systematic dissemination 
to the public […]”.175 A distinction with the Aarhus Convention is that the Aarhus Regulation 
requires the EU institutions and bodies to organise the information already held by them, 
while the Aarhus Convention provides a clear obligation to possess environmental 
information.  
Regarding Article 5(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, the Aarhus Regulation prescribes that 
EU institutions and bodies are also under an obligation to provide public access to a register 
of documents, in electronic form, and “references to documents shall be recorded in the 
register without delay”.176 EU laws, and EU case law, among others, are made available via 
EurLex.177 Furthermore, the EU has established a specific register managed by the European 
Commission. The Commission register intends to complement the EurLex database and 
contains a number of different types of documents, such as communications from the 
Commission to other EU institutions; preparatory papers; agendas and 
minutes of Commission meetings; and staff working documents.178 However, 
some documents, such as initial drafts, may not be made available.179 The EU is also a Party 
to the PRTR Protocol and it has established the European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
                                                          
175 Article 4(1), Aarhus Regulation. 
176 Article 11 of Regulation 1049/2001 referred to by Article 4 of Regulation 1367/2006. 
177 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/welcome/about.html. 
178 According to the website of the Register of Commission Documents, these are the types of 
documents which the database contains: “C  Documents relating to official instruments for which 
the Commission has sole responsibility. Some are transmitted to the Council or Parliament for 
information; SEC Documents which cannot be classified in any of the other series; COM Proposed 
legislation and other Commission communications to the Council and/or the other institutions, and their 
preparatory papers. Commission documents for the other institutions (legislative proposals, 
communications, reports, etc.); SWD Commission staff working document; JOIN Commission and 
High Representative Joint Acts; OJ Agendas of Commission meetings PV Minutes of Commission 
meetings ETU References of studies entrusted by the Commission to external experts”. European 
Commission. Help on document types, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=helpcote. 
179 L. Krämer and A. Berthier, ‘The Aarhus Convention: Implementation and compliance in EU law’, 
2014, p. 38. 
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Register (E-PRTR), which provides environmental data from industrial installations in the 
EU Member States and in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Serbia, and Switzerland.180 
The Aarhus Regulation also provides that, in the event of an imminent threat to human health, 
life or the environment, EU institutions and bodies shall, upon request of public authorities 
from Member States, work with those public authorities in order to enable the public 
authority to disseminate all relevant environmental information immediately and without 
delay to the public that might be affected.181 However, in contrast to what is prescribed in 
Article 5(1)(c) of the Aarhus Convention, EU institutions and bodies will act upon the request 
of Member States’ public authorities, while the Aarhus Convention does not foresee a 
possibility for the obligation to disseminate information to be triggered by a request in these 
cases. Hence, the Aarhus Regulation can be regarded as being too restrictive to comply with 
requirements imposed by the Aarhus Convention. 
Article 5 (1) (c) of the Aarhus Convention prescribes that, in the case of an imminent threat 
to human health or the environment, the public authority should disseminate the relevant 
information immediately and without delay. Article 8 of the Aarhus Regulation requires EU 
institutions and bodies only to act upon the request of public authorities of the Member States, 
and only the latter are under the obligation to disclose information immediately and without 
delay.182 
4.3. Grounds for refusal to provide public access to environmental information 
This section will discuss the grounds for a refusal to provide public access to environmental 
information as established in the Aarhus Convention and transposed at EU level. First, the 
Aarhus Convention exceptions to the right to have access to environmental information will 
be presented. Second, the implementation of these exceptions at the EU level will be 
discussed.  
  
                                                          
180 Regulation (EC) No 166/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 
concerning the establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register and amending 
Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC, OJ L33/1. The European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register (E-PRTR) is available at: http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/#/home.  
181 Article 8, Aarhus Regulation. 
182 However, EU documents “shall be recorded in the register without delay”, according to Article 11(1) 
of Regulation 1049/2001. 
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4.3.3.  Aarhus Convention 
According to Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention, public requests can only be refused on the 
basis of an exhaustive list of reasons. More precisely, refusal is permitted on formal (Article 
4 (3)) or on substantive (Article 4(4)) grounds.  
The Aarhus Convention stipulates that public authorities may refuse to provide information 
on the following formal grounds: when the public authority does not hold the environmental 
information;183 when the request is manifestly unreasonable or is formulated too generally;184 
or when the request is for information which is still being prepared or is related to “internal 
communications of public authorities where such an exemption is provided for in national 
law or customary practice, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure.”185  
Requests may also be refused on a substantive ground when the disclosure of the information 
would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities;186 the 
confidentiality of personal data and/or files relating to a natural person where that person has 
not consented to the disclosure of the information to the public;187 or the confidentiality of 
commercial and industrial information.188 Each of these grounds needs to be provided for 
under national law – which for the EU, as a Party to the Aarhus Convention, is EU legislation 
– and a ground for refusal will not be applicable if the requested information pertains to 
emissions that are relevant for the protection of the environment.189 Other substantive 
grounds are if the disclosure adversely affects international relations, national defence or 
public security;190 the course of justice;191 intellectual property rights;192 the interests of a 
third party who has supplied the information requested193 or; the environment to which the 
information relates.194 These substantive grounds are to be interpreted in a restrictive way, 
taking the public interest into account.195 
  
                                                          
183 Article 4(3)(a), Aarhus Convention. 
184 Article 4(3)(b), Aarhus Convention. 
185 Article 4(3)(c), Aarhus Convention. 
186 Article 4(4)(a), Aarhus Convention. 
187 Article 4(4)(f), Aarhus Convention. 
188 Article 4(4)(d), Aarhus Convention. 
189 Article 4(4)(d), Aarhus Convention. 
190 Article 4(4)(b), Aarhus Convention. 
191 Article 4(4)(c), Aarhus Convention. 
192 Article 4(4)(e), Aarhus Convention. 
193 Article 4(4)(g), Aarhus Convention. 
194 Article 4(4)(h), Aarhus Convention. 
195 Article 4(4), last indent, Aarhus Convention. 
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4.3.4.  EU’s implementation 
With regard to the implementation of the grounds to refuse requests for access to 
environmental information, the Aarhus Regulation provides, as a starting point, that the 
exceptions contained in Regulation 1049/2001 will apply to requests for environmental 
information. However, the Aarhus Regulation has a system of derogations from the grounds 
of refusal contained in Regulation 1049/2001 in an effort to comply with the Aarhus 
Convention. It provides that the exceptions to the right to access environmental information 
regarding commercial interests and inspections and audits contained in Regulation 
1049/2001 do not apply to the request for environmental information related specifically to 
emissions into the environment.196 Furthermore, all other exceptions contained in Article 4 
of Regulation 1049/2001 have to be interpreted in a restrictive way if the information 
requested relates to emissions into the environment.197 Even with this attempt to align the 
EU regime with the Aarhus Convention, the following incompatibilities are evident: 
i) Military matters: the Aarhus Convention only provides for the possibility to refuse 
information if the disclosure would adversely affect national defence,198 while 
Regulation 1049/2001 broadens the exception by adding military matters.199 
However, military matters do not always refer to defence matters.200 For instance, the 
renovation of a military airport or pollution due to military activities, including 
greenhouse gas emission during training operations, can be seen as military matters, 
but it is questionable whether all such operations can be considered defence matters 
and the information should therefore probably be disclosed on the basis of the Aarhus 
Convention.201  
ii) Financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member 
State: Regulation 1049/2001 establishes in Article 4(1)(a) the non-disclosure of 
information, which would undermine the protection of the financial, monetary or 
                                                          
196 Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation reads: “1. As regards Article 4(2), first and third indents, of 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, with the exception of investigations, in particular those concerning 
possible infringements of Community law, an overriding public interest in disclosure shall be deemed 
to exist where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment […].”    
197 Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation reads: “[…] As regards the other exceptions set out in Article 
4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, the grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, 
taking into account the public interest served by disclosure and whether the information requested 
relates to emissions into the environment.” 
198 Article 4(4)(b), Aarhus Convention. 
199 Article 4(1)(a), second indent, of Regulation 1049/2001. 
200 L. Krämer and A. Berthier, op. cit. 2014, p. 18. 
201 L. Krämer, ‘The Aarhus Convention and the European Union’, in C. Banner (ed.), The Aarhus 
Convention: a guide for UK lawyers,  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 18. 
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economic policy of the Community or a Member State. However, the Aarhus 
Convention does not contain any similar provision. 
iii) Commercial interest: Regulation 1049/2001 provides for non-disclosure of 
information that “would undermine the protection of commercial interests of a natural 
or legal person”.202 Under the Aarhus Convention, public authorities may refuse the 
disclosure of information if the disclosure would adversely affect “the confidentiality 
of commercial and industrial information, where such confidentiality is provided by 
law in order to protect a legitimate economic interest”.203 The Regulation broadens 
the Aarhus Convention exception in two aspects: 1) there is no requirement that the 
confidentiality is established by law; and 2) there is no qualification that the protection 
should concern a legitimate economic interest. Thus, this seems to allow a greater 
variety of interests that could be kept confidential. 
iv) Legal advice: Regulation 1049/2001 provides for the refusal to disclose 
information if it would undermine the protection of legal advice.204 However, there is 
no corresponding provision in the Aarhus Convention. 
v) Inspections, investigations and audits: Regulation 1049/2001 provides for 
non-disclosure of information that would undermine the protection of “the purpose of 
inspections, investigations and audits”.205 The Aarhus Convention allows for the 
possibility of non-disclosure if the information would adversely affect “the ability of 
                                                          
202 Article 4(2), first indent, Regulation 1049/2001. 
203 Article 4(4)(d), Aarhus Convention. As mentioned above, according to Article 6(1) of the Aarhus 
Regulation, access to environmental information regarding commercial interests does not apply if the 
request for environmental information is related specifically to emissions into the environment. For all 
other types of environmental information, an overriding pubic interest is required by regulation 
1049/2001. The requirement of having and overriding public interest (i.e. that the public interest should 
be considered more important than any other matter) may conflict with the Aarhus Convention which 
only requires to take into account the public interest. The ACCC already noted that in cases where the 
public interest is significant and the harm to the interests concerned is considered small, environmental 
information may still be deemed to be disclosed. In the words of the ACCC: “[…] The Committee 
wishes to point out that this exemption may not be read as meaning that public authorities are only 
required to release environmental information where no harm to the interests concerned is identified. 
Such a broad interpretation of the exemption would not be in compliance with article 4, paragraph 4, 
of the Convention which requires interpreting exemptions in a restrictive way, taking into account the 
public interest served by disclosure. Thus, in situations where there is a significant public interest 
in disclosure of certain environmental information and a relatively small amount of harm to the 
interests involved, the Convention would require disclosure.” (Emphasis added) The Albanian non-
governmental organisation Civic Alliance for the Protection of the Bay of Vlora regarding compliance 
by the European Community UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/2/Add.1, 8 February 2011, para. 30(c). 
204 Article 4(2), second indent, Regulation 1049/2001. 
205 Article 4(2), third indent, Regulation 1049/2001. 
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a public authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature”.206 
Therefore, the provision of Regulation 1049/2001 is much broader than that of the 
Aarhus Convention. 
vi) Protection of decision making: Article 4(3) first part of Regulation 
1049/2001 provides that “access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal 
use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not 
been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would 
seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an 
overriding public interest in disclosure.” Furthermore, the next part adds that “access 
to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and 
preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after 
the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine 
the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest 
in disclosure.” The Aarhus Convention has no similar provision for the protection of 
the decision making of public authorities. Nonetheless, the reading of the other 
exceptions in the Convention may allow for a reading that allows for the compatibility 
of the Regulation with the Convention. According to the Aarhus Convention, public 
authorities may refuse the disclosure of environmental information “if the request 
concerns material in the course of completion or concerns internal communications 
of public authorities where such an exemption is provided for in national law or 
customary practice, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure”.207 
The Aarhus Convention also allows for the withholding of information if “the 
disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality of proceedings of public 
authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for under national law”.208 It could 
be concluded that the Regulation is compatible with the Convention. 
Furthermore, the EU adopted the exceptions and additionally limited the discretion of the 
public authorities to decide whether to provide the requested environmental information, 
since Article 4(1) and (2) of Regulation 1049/2001 provides that “the institutions shall refuse 
access […]”. This approach may not be compliant with the Aarhus Convention, as explained 
by Krämer and Berthier:  
“Regulation 1049/2001 provides for “absolute” grounds for refusal. Article 4(1) and 
(2) provide that “the institutions shall refuse access…”, whereas Article 4 of the 
Aarhus Convention states that “a request for environmental information may be 
refused if…”. Where the Regulation sets out an obligation to refuse access, the 
Convention only provides the possibility of doing so. An official working for an EU 
                                                          
206 Article 4(4)(c), Aarhus Convention. 
207 Article 4(3)(c), Aarhus Convention. 
208 Article 4(4)(c), Aarhus Convention. 
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institution is obliged to withhold a piece of information if it falls under the scope of 
an exception in Regulation 1049/2001 whereas she/he is offered a choice in deciding 
whether to disclose information despite the fact that an exception provided by the 
Aarhus Convention applies with regard to environmental information. As Regulation 
1367/2006 refers to Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001, the distinction between the 
obligation and the mere possibility to refuse to provide access is not correctly 
transposed and as a result, the quantity of information that is made publicly accessible 
is reduced.”209  
As the comparative textual analysis reveals, there is no full compatibility between the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention and Regulation 1049/2001 read in combination with 
Regulation 1367/2006. It is important to note that Article 4(3) and (4) of the Aarhus 
Convention provide an exhaustive list of exceptions and these are the only grounds on which 
a Party may allow public authorities to refuse a request for information. As clarified by the 
implementation guide to the Aarhus Convention, “[…] paragraphs 3 and 4 outline the only 
circumstances under which exceptions to the general rule apply.”210 Consequently, national 
law – meaning EU law and in the present case Regulations 1049/2001 and 1367/2006 – may 
not exceed the limits set out in the Convention. The general rule is that information must be 
disclosed,211 and the optional regime of exceptions of the Convention set the ceiling for the 
discretion of the Parties. Nonetheless, the scope of the exceptions to access to environmental 
information provided at the EU level is broader than that which is allowed by the Aarhus 
Convention. 
4.4. Enforcing the right to access environmental information 
As explained in section 4.3, the right to access environmental information is not absolute and 
exceptions apply. However, if the request is ignored, wrongly refused or inadequately 
addressed, Article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention provides for access to justice. According 
to this provision, the member of the public whose right of access to environmental 
information has been violated must have access to a review procedure before a court of law 
or another independent and impartial body established by law. The cost of seeking such a 
remedy must not be prohibitively expensive.212 Furthermore, when a Party provides for 
review by a court of law, the Party shall also ensure that the existence of an “expeditious 
procedure established by law that is free of charge or inexpensive for reconsideration by a 
public authority or review by an independent and impartial body other than a court of law.” 
(Article 9(1) AC, emphasis added) This means that, according to the Aarhus Convention, 
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Parties must ensure the presence of an administrative procedure before the applicant is able 
to access the court.  
According to Regulation 1049/2001, applicants seeking reconsideration from an EU 
institution or body may submit a confirmatory application in case of a refusal or omission by 
the public authority.213 The confirmatory application – the term used in Regulation 
1049/2001 to describe the act of the applicant asking the institution to reconsider the total or 
partial refusal of the request to disclose information – shall be answered within a maximum 
of 30 working days.214 The confirmatory application corresponds to the public authority’s 
reconsideration prescribed by Article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention, second subparagraph. 
The CJEU described the objective of these two stages as follows: 
“With regard to Regulation No 1049/2001, it should be pointed out that Articles 7 and 
8 of that regulation, by providing for a two-stage procedure, aim to achieve, first, the 
swift and straightforward processing of applications for access to documents of the 
institutions concerned and, second, as a priority, a friendly settlement of disputes 
which may arise. For cases in which such a dispute cannot be resolved by the parties, 
the abovementioned Article 8(1) provides two remedies, namely the institution of 
court proceedings or the lodging of a complaint with the Ombudsman.  
That procedure, in so far as it provides for the making of the confirmatory application 
enables, in particular, the institution concerned to re-examine its position before 
taking a definitive refusal decision which could be the subject of an action before the 
courts of the Union. Such a procedure makes it possible to process initial applications 
more promptly and, consequently, more often than not to meet the applicant’s 
expectations, while also enabling the institution to adopt a detailed position before 
definitively refusing access to the documents sought by the applicant, in particular 
where the applicant reiterates the request for disclosure of those documents 
notwithstanding a reasoned refusal by that institution.”215 
In a case where a confirmatory decision entails the refusal of access to environmental 
information, in full or in part, or the institution or body does not reply within the prescribed 
timeframe, the applicant has the right to challenge the decision before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union216 or to make a complaint to the Ombudsman, pursuant to Article 8(3) 
of Regulation 1049/2001. The confirmatory decision is addressed to the applicant, and 
consequently, s/he will have access to review by a court under Article 263(4) TFEU. 
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Therefore, applicants will mostly face no standing problem while seeking judicial review 
before the General Court.217 However, it should be noted that a successful annulment action 
does not mean that the General Court will grant access to the requested documents, but only 
that the institution is under an obligation to re-examine its answer.218  
On the basis of the analysis carried out above, it can be concluded that the provisions on 
access to justice regarding access to environmental information contained in Regulation 
1049/2001 are in conformity with the requirements set out in the Aarhus Convention.219  
However, one significant gap in the system can be identified in the fact that there is no 
provision to enforce the obligation of public authorities to disseminate information (active 
form), neither in the Aarhus Convention nor the Aarhus Regulation. Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention, which provides for redress in the case of a violation of national 
environmental law, may be of help to remedy this problem.220 This would be possible because 
the non-dissemination of environmental information amounts to a breach of Article 4 of the 
Aarhus Regulation. In turn, the violation of the Aarhus Regulation constitutes a breach of 
national environmental law for the purposes of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
However, at the EU level, this provision has not been fully implemented.221 This means that, 
in practice, a member of the public would not have access to justice in the case of a violation 
of the obligation to disseminate information. Furthermore, the CJEU, in a preliminary ruling, 
already denied direct effect to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.222 In sum, the 
application of the right in practice may still be problematic, as was highlighted by the 
Communication regarding the European Union’s failure to comply with Article 9 (3) and (4) 
of the Aarhus Convention.223 
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5. Public participation in environmental decision making under the 
Aarhus Convention and its implementation at the EU level 
5.1. Introduction 
This section is dedicated to the second pillar of the Convention, which deals with public 
participation in governmental environmental decision making. This is one of the two core 
rights analysed in this thesis, the other being access to information. The analysis contained 
in this section will explain the framework established in the Aarhus Convention and how this 
was implemented in the EU. This enables an understanding of how the right to participate in 
governmental environmental decision making has to be provided for individuals and ENGOs 
at the EU level. It provides the bases for examining the public participation rights in the case 
studies following in the next chapters. The third pillar, access to justice, will be examined to 
the extent that it relates to the enforcement of public participation provisions. 
5.2. Types of public participation 
The Aarhus Convention approaches public participation in decision making in four different 
regimes laid down in three articles.224 The most detailed set of procedural rules relates to 
decisions on specific activities (Article 6). For plans, programmes and policies relating to 
the environment (Article 7) and the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally 
applicable legally binding normative instruments (Article 8), less detail is provided in terms 
of what the regime must entail.225  
5.2.1.  Public participation in decisions on specific activities 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention deals with decisions that permit activities listed in Annex 
I226 or any other non-Annex I activity which may have a significant effect on the 
environment.227 According to this provision, the public concerned shall be informed early in 
the decision making procedure, and in an adequate and timely manner, of the details of the 
decision making process.228 The relevant information shall be made available at no cost to 
the public concerned.229 The public authority must take due account of the outcome of public 
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participation230 and inform the public promptly of the decision along with the reasons and 
considerations upon which it was based.231 
Public concerned is defined under Article 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention as “the public 
affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-
making; non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting 
any requirements under national law are considered to have an interest.” The public 
concerned can be seen as a subgroup of the public, since only the members of the public who 
are affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision 
making is considered the public concerned. Non-governmental organisations promoting 
environmental protection and meeting requirements under national law are deemed to have 
this interest and, therefore, fall under the scope of the definition of the public concerned.232 
It is interesting to note that there was no differentiation between the public and the public 
concerned in the first draft of the Aarhus Convention. The first draft only contained the 
definition of the public, and the article related to public participation in environmental 
decision making, therefore, referred to the public.233 If this had been the final text, the 
potential number of persons entitled to participate would have been greater, since the 
definition of the public is broader than that of the public concerned.  
Concerning implementation at the EU, in the European Commission’s view, the first part of 
Article 6, which relates to activities listed in Annex I to the Convention (Article 6(1)(a)), did 
not need implementation at the EU level since the “decisions to authorise the listed activities 
are not taken at Community level, but by Member States, at local, regional or national 
level”.234 Likewise, the Commission understood that Article 6(1)(b), which provides for 
public participation in decisions on other proposed activities “which may have a significant 
effect on the environment”, is also not applicable at the EU level based on the following 
grounds: 
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“Administrative decisions on the authorisation of chemicals, pesticides and biocides 
are, as a rule, taken at the level of Member States. Decisions taken at Community 
level, such as the establishment of lists of active substances or the classification of 
substances, are as such not aimed at as specific activities in the sense of Article 6. 
Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 on ozone-depleting substances provides for 
administrative decisions at Community level. However, the decisions concerned do 
not have a significant effect on the environment, as they concern only the 
management of the different quota for the placing on the market or importation of 
such substances.”235 (Emphasis added) 
The question which however may be raised is whether the Commission was correct with 
regard to the inapplicability of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention at the EU level. In 
ACCC/C/2008/32, the communicant, ClientEarth, presented several examples to the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee of decisions that are taken by the Commission which 
could fall under Article 6(1)(b), including authorisations to place on the market or the 
cultivation of genetically modified plants; decisions on active substances of biocidal 
products; and decisions on waiving the obligation for certain types of packaging from the 
requirement on concentration levels of heavy metals.236 This opinion clearly contradicts the 
point of view presented by the Commission. However, the ACCC did not provide a clear 
standpoint on the issue. It stated instead that:  
“While the Committee does not rule out that some decisions, acts and omissions by 
the EU institutions—even if labelled “regulation”—may amount to some form of 
decision-making under articles 6–8 of the Convention, it will not carry out any 
examination on this issue.”237  
Therefore, the ACCC did not clarify whether the decisions mentioned by the communicant 
would fall under the scope of the Article 6(1)(b) and would consequently also require 
implementation at the EU level. 
5.2.2  Public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the 
environment 
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i. Aarhus Convention 
For plans and programmes, Article 7 provides legally binding language: “Each party shall 
make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the 
preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment”. Furthermore, the 
requirements of Article 6(3), (4) and (8) apply, which means that reasonable timeframes need 
to be in place, that early participation must be ensured and that due account of the outcome 
of the public participation is taken. In relation to policies, the language is weaker, only 
establishing that Parties “to the extent appropriate […] shall endeavour to provide 
opportunities for public participation”. Thus, the obligation regarding policies established is 
only one of effort, while for plans and programmes, Article 7 creates an obligation of 
result.238 
While Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention focuses on decisions on specific activities, “where 
the underlying policy decisions have generally already been taken”,239 Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention requires public participation during the preparation of plans, programmes and 
policies related to the environment. The Aarhus Convention does not specifically define 
plans and programmes. The Implementation Guide, however, uses as an example the 
definition contained in the Kiev Strategic Environmental Assessment Protocol.240 According 
to the protocol, plans and programmes mean the ones that are “required by legislative, 
regulatory or administrative provisions” and which are prepared and/or adopted “by an 
authority for adoption, through a formal procedure, by a parliament or a government”.241 
Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention also covers policies and, as with plans and programmes, 
it  does not define policies. In a pure textual sense, policies can be considered as “a course or 
principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization or individual”.242 According to 
the Implementation Guide, policies are subject to a different treatment compared to plans 
and programmes, because they are less concrete and they “require a more thorough and 
profound understanding of the legalities and political context of a particular place. Policy 
incorporates history and culture and entire legal frameworks that extend beyond the finite 
area in which they are developed.” 243 Apparently, a choice has been made in the Aarhus 
Convention to have a less stringent requirement for policies compared to plans and 
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programmes. It may, however, not be easy to provide a clear distinction between, on the one 
hand, plans and programmes and, on the other hand, policies. 
Unlike Article 6, which is directed towards the public concerned, Article 7 addresses the 
public. However, the public as used here is not the same as the public of the articles dealing 
with access to environmental information. In this case, the public will be determined by “the 
relevant public authority, taking into account the objective of the [Aarhus] Convention”.244 
This means that, as distinct from the public which is defined by the Convention in Article 
2(4) and must be understood and implemented by the Parties accordingly, the public of 
Article 7 will be defined by the relevant public authorities. However, this should not be seen 
as an opportunity for the Parties to limit the scope of participation severely, since the public 
authority must take into account the objectives of the Aarhus Convention, which include the 
encouragement of widespread public participation.245  
The reason for applying such a distinction regarding the addressees of the right to participate 
is not clear. Jendrośka suggests that the rationale behind this distinction could be to 
streamline public participation “in order to make it more effective”.246 However, he does not 
give an explanation or example to clarify how introducing this distinction can make public 
participation more effective, particularly in light of the fact that the Convention already 
introduces a narrower concept of the public by providing a definition of the public concerned. 
The use of the term public concerned, where a more limited subset of applicants is considered 
desirable, would provide more certainty, as it is defined by the Convention, whereas public 
in Article 7 is left up to the discretion of the relevant public authorities. Furthermore, if the 
participation of the public, in general, was intended, then the use of the term the public, as 
defined in Article 2(4) of the Aarhus Convention, would allow for broader participation, as 
this term does not provide for any limitation. 
ii. EU’s implementation 
The Aarhus Regulation provides for public participation only for plans and programmes but 
not for policies. Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation states that institutions and bodies shall 
provide early and effective participation for the public,247 a time limit of at least eight weeks 
to receive comments and four-weeks’ notice prior to meetings and hearings which can be 
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reduced in urgent cases or when the public has already had the opportunity to comment,248 
and due account of the outcome of the public participation should be taken.249 The Aarhus 
Regulation provides for a fixed timeframe, while the Aarhus Convention keeps the possibility 
of adjusting the time according to different phases and allowing sufficient time for informing 
the public and for ensuring effective participation during the environmental decision making. 
Therefore, if the fixed timeframe would hinder effective participation, then a violation of the 
Aarhus Convention would be at issue. 
According to Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation, in order to assess whether a document is a 
plan or programme some cumulative conditions apply: i.e. the measures need to be prepared 
or adopted by EU institutions or bodies and required by law or administrative provisions, and 
they need to contribute to achieving the objectives of the EU environmental policy.250 The 
explanatory memorandum of the Aarhus Regulation proposal refers to Commission v. 
Greece.251 In this document, the Commission, by relying on the Commission v. Greece case, 
states that the definition of plans and programmes encompasses all “sets of measures that, 
although not officially called ‘plans’ or ‘programmes’, in substance constitute an ‘organised 
and co-ordinated system in order to reach certain objectives’”.252 Jendrośka253 argues that this 
judgment has to be seen in the specific regulatory context of the case and cannot be 
interpreted as determining “general criteria to be met by a document in order to be called 
‘plan’.”254 He explains that such an interpretation would lead to the undesirable situation 
where plans and programmes which do not provide an “organised and coordinated system” 
would be not obliged to be subject to public participation according to public participation 
rules for plans and programmes, despite the potential impact that it might have on the 
environment.255 However, he does not provide an example of such a situation.256 Krämer does 
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not ponder the possible further restrictive impacts of adopting such a definition and he, while 
referring to the same case, categorically states that “[It] is decisive that the paper constitutes 
an organised and coordinated system for reaching certain objectives.”257 While 
acknowledging Jendrośka’s concerns, this thesis will take the view that the plans and 
programmes which constitute an organised and coordinated system to reach certain 
objectives fall under Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation. 
While Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention also provides for public participation regarding 
policies, the Aarhus Regulation is silent concerning this legal provision. This can be 
explained by the fact that the point of departure for the proposal of the Aarhus Regulation 
was “limited to the legally binding requirements of the Århus Convention, i.e. Articles 6 and 
7, where the latter concerns public participation in the preparation of plans and programmes 
relating to the environment.”258 However, albeit a weak one, Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention does contain an obligation of effort regarding policies. As a consequence, the EU 
remains under the obligation to endeavour to provide opportunities for public participation 
in the preparation of policies relating to the environment. 
5.2.3  Public participation concerning executive regulation and/or generally applicable 
legally binding normative instruments 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention requires Parties to strive “to promote effective public 
participation at an appropriate stage, and while options are still open, during the preparation 
by public authorities of executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding 
rules that may have a significant effect on the environment.” This provision has a broad 
scope, providing for public participation not only in the drafting of classic environmental 
measures, in areas such as pollution prevention and conservation of biodiversity, but also in 
the preparation of measures in areas that may have a significant effect on the environment, 
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such as energy and transport.259 Despite its broad scope, the provision only requires Parties 
to strive to promote effective public participation. In fact, the draft of the provision was more 
ambitious, but “in the course of negotiations the requirement as originally proposed was 
diluted (despite strong opposition from Denmark, Norway and others).”260 Consequently, 
Article 8 does not require Parties to achieve effective public participation, but it does create 
an obligation to make efforts to achieve it. 
Article 8 confirms a general observation “that decisions at the highest levels have the least 
prescriptive requirements for public participation, even though they have the most far-
reaching effects”.261 This shows that “the public participation pillar of the Convention is 
much more focused on decisions on specific activities than on strategic decisions.”262 As 
acknowledged by Jendrośka, “the Convention reflects the European tradition of granting the 
public broad information and participation rights during permitting procedures, which was 
motivated by the need to protect property rights, rather than the American concept of ‘open 
government’”.263 
This specific approach, with an emphasis on greater involvement in local decision making, 
was referred to in the first edition of the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide as the 
“ladder of participation”.264 The second edition of the Implementation Guide does not include 
this reference. The change could be explained due to the influence of academic literature 
which does not believe that the Convention followed a specific public participation theory. 
For instance, Jendrośka, who suggested that the structure of the Convention’s framework for 
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public participation is similar to the so-called ladder of public participation,265 later stated 
that it would be an “over-interpretation to suggest that the Convention is guided by a clear 
vision of public participation and provides a consistent and comprehensive legal framework 
reflecting any particular theory of public participation”.266 The Convention is the result of the 
ambitions and compromises of the negotiating parties and, despite the discussion on whether 
it has a background theory for public participation, it does “provide a benchmark against 
which the entire framework or particular instances of its operation in practice can be 
assessed.”267 
Since the European Commission understood Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention as not 
providing any legally binding requirement,268 there is no implementation of this provision at 
the EU level. Some scholars also argue that Article 8 is not of a legally binding nature269 and 
they perceive it as more of a guideline for public participation mechanisms.270 Nonetheless, 
the EU remains under the obligation to strive to promote public participation during the 
preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative 
instruments.271 
5.3. Enforcing the right to public participation in environmental decision making 
According to Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, members of the public concerned having 
a sufficient interest or maintaining the impairment of a right, where it is required under 
national law, shall have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another 
independent and impartial body established by law in order “to challenge the substantive and 
procedural legality of any decision, act or omission” subject to the provisions of Article 6 of 
the Aarhus Convention. ENGOs that meet national requirements are deemed to have 
sufficient interest and have rights capable of being impaired; therefore, they have access to 
justice under Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. Thus, it is clear that the Convention 
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provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC institutions and bodies, COM(2003) 622 final C 
96/22 (2004), p. 13. 
269 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2011b), p. 97. 
270 B. Toth, ‘Public participation and democracy in practice-Aarhus convention principles as democratic 
institution building in the developing world’ 30(2) Journal of Land Resources & Environmental Law, 
(2010), pp. 295-330, p. 303. 
271 Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention is further examined in section 4.4.3 of Chapter IV. 
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requires the Parties to provide for access to justice in case of a breach of the provisions 
relating to public participation in decisions on specific activities (Article 6 AC).  
A further question to be examined is whether Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention would 
also serve as a legal basis for access to justice in relation to plans and programmes.272 In 
ACCC/C/2008/32, the communicant argued that, since the preparation of plans and 
programmes needs to follow the requirements of Article 6 (3), (4) and (8) of the Aarhus 
Convention, and Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention applies to “any decision, act and 
omission subject to the provisions of Article 6”, the preparation of plans and programmes 
would also be subject to the review procedures provided by Article 9(2).273 Such an 
interpretation was not examined by the ACCC, since the Committee decided to “concentrate 
on the main allegation of the communicant, and examine the jurisprudence of the EU Courts 
on access to justice in environmental matters generally.”274  
A further point to be considered is that Article 7 refers to the public which shall be identified 
by the relevant public authority, while Article 9(2) refers to the public concerned. A 
hypothetical result would be that, as the public identified by the public authority encompasses 
more participants than the public concerned, the member that had participated during the 
preparation of plans and programmes would not be able to rely on Article 9(2) of the Aarhus 
Convention, since the latter is addressed only to the public concerned. Conversely, a member 
of the public concerned which was not identified by the public authority during the decision 
making process could still rely on Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not provide for a specific provision on access to 
justice in the case of a lack of participation in the elaboration of an executive regulation 
and/or generally applicable legally binding normative instruments. If a Party has adopted 
public participation requirements for executive regulations and/or generally applicable 
legally binding normative instruments in its national law, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention may be used to guarantee access to justice, since a breach of the national 
legislation which implemented the provision would constitute a violation of national 
environmental law.  
Regarding the EU’s implementation, as discussed in section 5.2.1, in its proposal for the 
Aarhus Regulation, the Commission explained that Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention did 
                                                          
272 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2009), p. 500. 
273 ClientEarth concerning compliance by the European Union (Part I) UN 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1, 24 August 2011, para 47. 
274 ClientEarth concerning compliance by the European Union (Part I) UN 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1, para 63 and 72. Jendrośka also noted that this interpretation “requires 
careful consideration” but did not elaborate further on the topic since it was outside of the scope of his 
analysis. J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2009), p. 500. 
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not require implementation at the EU level. Consequently, there is no specific provision for 
access to justice in such cases. Concerning the participation rights to the elaboration of plans 
and programmes, the EU also understood that there is no legal obligation for the Parties under 
the Aarhus Convention to provide for access to justice, where there is a violation of the right 
to participation in the elaboration of plans and programmes relating to the environment. Since 
the EU opted only to implement those provisions which were considered to be legally 
binding, there is no provision on access to justice in case of a breach of Article 9 of the Aarhus 
Regulation, which focuses on public participation concerning plans and programmes relating 
to the environment at the EU level. However, the requirements of Article 6 (3), (4) and (8) 
of the Aarhus Convention apply to the preparation of plans and programmes. Therefore, there 
is an obligation for the EU to ensure the application of these public participation requirements 
and, according to Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, guarantee access to justice in case 
of a breach.  
Regarding the second part of Article 7 (policies) and Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, as 
explained in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, the EU has not transposed these provisions in the 
Aarhus Regulation, since they were considered not to be legally binding. Therefore, even in 
the case that the EU would have fully implemented Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, it 
would still not be possible to base a claim on this provision since there is no implementation 
of Article 7 regarding policies and Article 8 concerning executive regulation and/or generally 
applicable legally binding normative instruments at the EU level, and, consequently, there 
would be no breach of national law that could trigger the application of Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention. 
For these cases, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which provides for redress in the case 
of a violation of national environmental law, may be of help to remedy this problem. This 
would be possible because the non-dissemination of environmental information could 
amount to a breach of Article 4 of the Aarhus Regulation. In turn, the violation of the Aarhus 
Regulation constitutes a breach of national environmental law for the purposes of Article 9(3) 
of the Aarhus Convention. However, at the EU level, this provision has not been implemented 
fully.275 This means that, in practice, a member of the public would not have access to justice 
in the case of a violation of the obligation to disseminate information. Furthermore, the 
CJEU, in a preliminary ruling, already denied direct effect for Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention. Therefore, there is hence no provision on access to justice, which focuses on 
public participation concerning executive regulation and/or generally applicable legally 
binding normative instruments at the EU level. 
  
                                                          
275 M. Eliantonio, op. cit. (2018), pp. 759-762.  
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter had three main objectives: first, to investigate if the Aarhus Convention 
encompasses the climate change phenomenon; second, to introduce the rights of access to 
environmental information and to public participation, as foreseen by the Aarhus 
Convention; and third to examine the implementation of these rights at the EU level. The 
analysis disclosed the following. 
Climate Change under the scope of the Aarhus Convention 
Although there is no mention of the term climate change in the text of the Aarhus Convention, 
the interpretation of the definition of environmental information demonstrates that the term 
environmental encompasses the climate change phenomenon. By elaborating on what is 
encompassed by environmental, the definition provides insight into what is meant by the 
environment and which environmental issues are covered by the Convention.276 Therefore, 
since environment itself is not defined in the Convention, understanding the term 
environmental is not only important for the provisions on access to environmental 
information, but it is also important in interpreting other provisions of the Convention that 
refer to environment. Nonetheless, the limits of such an interpretation have not yet been tested 
by the CJEU and the ACCC.  
Access to environmental information 
Articles 4, 5 and 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention provide the framework for access to 
environmental information. In view of the clear and explicit commitments as to what has to 
be done by public authorities, the commitments contained in these provisions can be 
characterised as obligations of result. This means that the Parties have to achieve a specific 
result ensuring that their public authorities provide upon request (Article 4) and disseminate 
environmental information (Article 5). 
Regarding the implementation of access to information at the EU level, it was shown that this 
has taken place via the Aarhus Regulation, which should be read in combination with 
Regulation 1049/2001 for the request of environmental information. Concerning access to 
environmental information, it was concluded that the provisions have mostly been transposed 
in a way which ensures compliance with the Aarhus Convention. However, regarding the 
implementation of the exceptions to the obligations to provide access to environmental 
information upon request, the analysis revealed that the EU requirements impose more 
limitations than those allowed by the Aarhus Convention. It is important to note that Articles 
4(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention provide an exhaustive list of exceptions and they are 
the only grounds on which a Party may allow public authorities to refuse a request for 
                                                          
276 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 41. 
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information. This means that the law of the Parties (in this case, the EU law provisions 
addressed to the EU institutions and bodies, in the present case) may not exceed the limits 
set out for exceptions in the Convention. In this regard, the EU is not compliant with the 
Aarhus Convention. 
The Aarhus Convention provides for access to justice in cases of a violation of the right to 
receive information upon request. According to Regulation 1049/2001, at the EU level, 
applicants may seek a reconsideration from an EU institution with regard to a decision 
concerning a request for environmental information, which is followed by the possibility of 
instituting court proceedings. This shows the compliance of the EU with the Aarhus 
Convention requirements for access to justice to redress a violation of the right to access 
environmental information upon request. 
Regarding the active form of this right, which is the obligation imposed on public authorities 
to disseminate information, the Aarhus Convention does not provide for similar specific 
provisions for access to justice in cases where public authorities do not disseminate 
environmental information. Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which provides for 
redress in the case of a violation of national environmental law, may be of help to remedy 
this problem, since the non-dissemination of environmental information may amount to a 
breach of Article 4 of the Aarhus Regulation. However, at the EU level, Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention has not been fully implemented in the EU. Furthermore, the Aarhus 
Regulation also does not provide a specific provision for access to justice in the case of a 
failure to disseminate environmental information. 
Public participation in environmental decision making 
Regarding public participation, there is no clear indication that the Convention followed a 
specific public participation theory. The Convention is the result of the aspirations and 
compromises of the negotiating parties and, despite the discussion on whether it has a 
background theory for public participation, it does provide a benchmark against which the 
legal framework of the Parties has to be assessed. 
The obligations contained in Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention establishing public 
participation in decisions on specific activities can be generally characterised as an obligation 
of result. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum to the Aarhus Regulation’s proposal 
clarifies that there are no measures related to specific activities which are taken at the EU 
level.277 As a consequence, the provision was not transposed. It was shown that this approach 
                                                          
277 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the 
provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC institutions and bodies, COM(2003) 622 final C 
96/22 (2004), 13. 
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is controversial, since some EU decisions may amount to a decision on specific activities 
within the scope of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. 
Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention on public participation concerning plans, programmes 
and policies relating to the environment establishes two separate regimes for public 
participation. First, for plans and programmes, parts of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention 
requirements apply to ensure participation during the development of plans and programmes. 
This first part is characterised by an obligation of result. Second, for policies, Parties are only 
required, to the extent appropriate, to endeavour to provide opportunities for public 
participation. This weak and imprecise formulation, which fails to explain the exact result to 
be achieved, makes the second part of Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention an obligation of 
effort. The Aarhus Regulation only provides for public participation concerning plans and 
programmes. This is due to the fact that the Aarhus Regulation is limited, according to its 
explanatory memorandum, to the “legally binding requirements” of the Aarhus 
Convention.278 This means that, since Article 6 was deemed not to apply at the EU level, only 
public participation concerning plans and programmes relating to the environment was 
implemented. However, it must be noted that, even if these are obligations of efforts, there 
remains an obligation for EU institutions and bodies to endeavour to provide opportunities 
for public participation during the preparation of policies. 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention concerning public participation during the preparation of 
executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative instruments does 
not require parties to achieve effective public participation and it is also characterised as an 
obligation of effort. There is no implementation of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention at the 
EU level since the European Commission understood that Article 8 does not provide any 
legally binding requirement. However, Article 8 creates an obligation to make efforts to 
achieve it, and this obligation applies to each of the EU institutions and bodies. 
The Aarhus Convention also provides for access to justice in cases of a violation of the right 
to participate in decisions on specific activities which is foreseen in Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention. Since Article 6 was not implemented at the EU level, there is no specific 
provision for access to justice. Furthermore, neither the Aarhus Convention nor the Aarhus 
Regulation provide for a specific provision on access to justice in the case of a violation of 
the right to participate in the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the 
environment, let alone policies. It was argued that the preparation of plans and programmes 
would also be subject to the review procedures provided for by Article 9(2) of the Aarhus 
Convention, since the preparation of plans and programmes needs to follow the requirements 
                                                          
278 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the 
provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC institutions and bodies, COM(2003) 622 final C 
96/22 (2004), 13. 
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of Article 6 (3), (4) and (8) of the Aarhus Convention. Moreover, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention has the potential to fill this gap, since the non-participation in the preparation of 
plans and programmes may amount to a breach of Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation. 
In sum, this chapter disclosed that climate change falls within the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention and demonstrated that there are incompatibilities between EU law and the Aarhus 
Convention. The next chapters will investigate how the EU legal framework provides for 
access to information and public participation in the field of EU climate change law. 
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Chapter IV – The EU Emissions Trading System: 
Access to environmental information and public 
participation at the EU level 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is one of the measures adopted 
by the EU to tackle the climate change problem. The EU ETS covers approximately 45% of 
the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, and, according to the European Commission, it is the 
cornerstone of EU climate policy1 and the key tool to achieve the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions in a cost-effective manner.2 The EU ETS entered the EU legal order via the 
adoption of Directive 2003/87 (the EU ETS Directive), which establishes a scheme for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission allowance trading within the European Union.3 The EU ETS 
                                                          
1 European Commission, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)’, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu 
/clima/sites/clima/files/factsheet_ets_en.pdf, 10.2834/6083, p. 1. The Council has considered the EU 
ETS as the main instrument to achieve the EU 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. 
European Council, 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, EUCO 169/14 (2014a), 2. Directive 
2018/410 which amends the EU ETS Directive has replaced the word “scheme” with “system” (Article 
1(2), Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon 
investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814, OJ L 76/3). 
2 European Commission - DG Climate. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 20 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
3 Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Since the focus of this chapter is on the EU ETS until 
2020, the consolidated version referred to in this chapter is the version of 30 of April of 2014 and not 
the most recent one dated 08 April 2018 which already includes the rules for the period after 2020.  
The consolidated version of 30 of April of 2014 contains the following amendments: Directive 
2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, OJ L 338/18; Directive 
2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, OJ L 8/3; Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 March 2009 adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure referred 
to in Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC with regard to the regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny — Adaptation to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny — Part Two, OJ L 87/109; 
Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 23  April 2009 amending 
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Directive was amended in 2009 by Directive 2009/29, which implemented more harmonised 
rules for the period from 2013 to 2020.4 
Despite the relevant role that the EU ETS has in EU climate policy, so far only a small number 
of scholars have discussed the interplay between procedural rights and the EU ETS 
Directive.5 In light of this knowledge gap regarding the current state of procedural rights 
under the EU ETS, this chapter seeks to determine to what extent rights, in terms of access 
to environmental information and participation in governmental environmental decision 
making, have to be provided to citizens and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations 
(ENGOs). More precisely, this chapter will investigate how the EU legal framework provides 
for access to environmental information and for public participation in the context of acts 
adopted at the EU level under the auspices of the EU ETS Directive, as well as how 
compatible this framework is with the Aarhus Convention.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the gradual development of the 
legislative framework of the EU ETS. Section 3 introduces the legal framework for access to 
environmental information under the EU ETS at the EU level by discussing whether the 
Aarhus Regulation is applicable or not and by examining the provisions on access to 
information under the EU ETS Directive (section 3.2). This is followed by an investigation 
of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the 
problems surrounding access to EU ETS-related information upon request (section 3.3), and 
an analysis of the legal requirements for dissemination of information according to the EU 
ETS Directive and their compatibility with the Aarhus Convention (section 3.4). Section 4 
offers an investigation of the legal framework for public participation under the EU ETS. 
First, the provisions which empower the European Commission to act will be analysed in 
view of the public participation requirements imposed by the EU ETS Directive (section 4.2). 
Second, the analysis will consider whether the Aarhus Regulation provides any obligation 
for public participation for the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS (section 
4.3). Third, it investigates whether the acts that may be adopted by the Commission fall under 
                                                          
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community, OJ L 140/63; Decision No 1359/2013/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 December 2013 amending Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on the 
timing of auctions of greenhouse gas allowances Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 343/21; Regulation 
(EU) No 421/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 Amending Directive 
2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the 
Community, in View of the Implementation by 2020 of an International Agreement Applying a Single 
Global Market-Based Measure to International Aviation Emissions, OJ L 129/1; Treaty on the 
accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, OJ L 112/10. 
4 See footnote 3. 
5 The author would like to thank Marjan Peeters and Dyonisios Stivas for sharing their compilation on 
the EU ETS literature. See Chapter I, section 3.2.1 for an overview of the literature on this topic. 
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one of the public participation regimes prescribed by the Aarhus Convention or not (section 
4.4). Last, the compatibility of the public participation requirements under the EU ETS with 
the Aarhus Convention is analysed (section 4.5). Finally, section 5 concludes by delineating 
the legal barriers and the prospects regarding access to environmental information and public 
participation under the EU ETS.   
2. The EU ETS Directive 
The adoption of the EU ETS Directive, on 13 October 2003, marks the establishment of a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the European Union.6 The aim 
of this Directive, as explained in its own text, is “to promote reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”.7  
The EU ETS is based on cap-and-trade,8 which means that emitters are allowed to trade 
emissions allowances within an overall limited level of emissions (cap). The system basically 
requires that operators covered by the system must have a permit issued by the competent 
national authority in order to be allowed to emit greenhouse gases.9 The Member State 
competent authority grants an authorisation to emit greenhouse gases only if the emitter is 
deemed capable of monitoring and reporting emissions.10 Each year the operators must 
surrender one EU Allowance (EUA) for each tonne of carbon emitted;11 in this way, they are 
                                                          
6 Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. See footnote 3 for the amendments included in this 
consolidated version. 
7 Article 1, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. The same text is still maintained in the 
consolidated version. 
8 E. Woerdman, ‘The EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme’, in E. R. Woerdman, M.M.;  
Holwerda, M. (ed.), Essential EU Climate Law,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), p. 43. 
9 Articles 5, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. The aviation sector is not covered by the 
permit requirement. According to Article 3g, each aircraft operator shall “submit[s] to the competent 
authority in that Member State a monitoring plan setting out measures to monitor and report emissions 
and tonnekilometre data for the purpose of an application under Article 3e and that such plans are 
approved by the competent authority in accordance with the regulation referred to in Article 14”. 
10 Article 6, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version.  
11 Article 6(2)(e), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Each allowance allows the emission of 
one tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2), or the equivalent amount of two greenhouse gases: nitrous oxide 
(N2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Annex I, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Although 
these gases are in a lower concentration in the atmosphere, the potential impact for climate change is 
much greater. European Environment Agency. Contribution of different greenhouse gases to the overall 
greenhouse gas concentration, 18 June 2020, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/daviz 
/contribution-of-the-different-ghgs-3#tab-chart_3.  
For example, reducing one tonne of N2O would be equivalent to reducing 298 tonness of CO2 emissions. 
“Each greenhouse gas has a different capacity to cause global warming, depending on its radiative 
properties, molecular weight and the length of time it remains in the atmosphere. The global warming 
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obliged to surrender allowances equal to the total emissions they released in the year.12 
Allowances are allocated to emitters, either free of charge13 or via auctions,14 and may be 
traded between allowance holders (any individual or legal person who has bought 
allowances), while anyone may buy allowances at auctions.15 If an operator does not 
surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions, the Member State must impose 
penalties.16 
The EU ETS has gone through three phases. Phase I (2005-2007), the so-called “learning by 
doing” phase was a pilot period.17 This laid the groundwork for Phase II (2008-2012), where 
the system had to start functioning effectively in order to help the EU comply with the 
emissions reduction obligations according to the Kyoto Protocol.18 It left a great deal of 
policy space to Member States, putting them in charge of setting their own emissions levels 
(a national cap for the EU ETS emissions) and allocating their allowances through National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs). In Phase I, 95% of the allowances had to be allocated free-of-
charge (grandfathering),19 while in Phase II 90% of the allowances still had to be 
grandfathered.20  
                                                          
potential (GWP) of each gas is defined in relation to a given weight of carbon dioxide for a set time 
period (for the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol a period of 100 years). GWPs are used to convert 
emissions of greenhouse gases to a relative measure (known as carbon dioxide equivalents: CO2-
equivalents). The weighting factors currently used are the following: carbon dioxide = 1, methane = 25, 
nitrous oxide = 298, and sulphur hexafluoride = 22.800; hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons 
comprise a large number of different gases that have different GWPs.” Eurostat. Greenhouse gas 
emission statistics, 25 Jan, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics. 
12 Article 6(2)(e), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. The GHG allowances are the tradable 
rights of the EU ETS that may be traded among EU ETS installations and other actors. Each allowance 
allows operators to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide. 
13 Article 10a, 10b and 10c, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
14 Article 10, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
15 Article 19(2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
16 Article 16, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
17 European Commission. Phases 1 and 2 (2005-2012), 19 June 2020, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm. 
18 Phase II coincided with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
19Article 10, Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275/32. 
20 Article 10, Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. K. Kulovesi, E. Morgera and M. Muñoz, 
‘Environmental integration and multifaceted international dimensions of EU law: unpacking the EU’s 
2009 Climate and Energy Package’ 48(3) Common market law review, (2011), pp. 829-891, p. 853.  
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The 2009 amendments to the EU ETS Directive introduced more harmonised rules to be 
applied in Phase III (2013-2020).21 In this phase, the system has an EU-wide cap, which 
means that there is a maximum amount of allowances that can be distributed across the EU 
and auctioning is the default method for allocating allowances. Phase III began with 20% of 
the allowances within the manufacturing industry sector being auctioned, with the goal of 
achieving 70% auctioning in 2020 and 100% auctioning in 2027.22 For the allowances that 
are still allocated for free, harmonised allocation rules also apply. The European Commission 
is empowered to determine, among the most important: (i) the quantity of emission 
allowances;23 (ii) the sectors and subsectors, which are part of the carbon leakage sector and 
may, therefore, get 100% free allocation of allowances, up to the sector’s benchmark;24  (iii) 
the rules for the free allocation;25 and (iv) the rules for auctioning.26 
                                                          
21 Recital 8, Preamble, Directive 2009/29/EC. 
22 Article 10(a)(11), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. For a better explanation on how the 
allowances will be allocated, see section 3.2. 
23 See for example Commission Decision 2010/384/EU of 9 July 2010 on the Community-wide quantity 
of allowances to be issued under the EU Emission Trading Scheme for 2013 (notified under document 
C(2010) 4658), OJ L 175/36.  
24 Commission Decision 2010/02/EU determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to 
be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage  C(2009) 10251, OJ L  1/10. 
25 Decision Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide 
rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 130/1. Hereinafter the Benchmark 
Decision. 
26 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12  November 2010 on the timing, administration 
and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowances trading within the Community, OJ L 302/1 (Auctioning Regulation). This chapter 
refers to the consolidated version of 27 of February 2014 which contains the following amendments: 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1210/2011 of 23 November 2011 amending Regulation (EU) No 
1031/2010 in particular to determine the volume of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned 
prior to 2013, OJ L308/2; Commission Regulation (EU) No 784/2012 of 30 August 2012 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 to list an auction platform to be appointed by Germany and correcting 
Article 59(7) thereof, OJ L 234/4; Commission Regulation No 1042/2012 of 7 November 2012 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 to list an auction platform to be appointed by the United 
Kingdom, OJ L 310/9; Commission Regulation No 1143/2013 of 13 November 2013 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of 
greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the 
Community in particular to list an auction platform to be appointed by Germany, OJ L 303/10; 
Commission Regulation No 176/2014 of 25 February 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 
in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned in 2013-
20, OJ L 56/11.  
138 
3. Access to environmental information under the EU ETS  
3.1. Introduction 
While the EU has adopted rules regarding access to environmental information (Directive 
2003/4 and Regulation 1367/2006), the EU ETS Directive,27 which was adopted in 2003 and 
has been amended frequently since then,28 still contains articles that deal with access to 
environmental information.29 In order to understand the overall framework on access to EU 
ETS-related information, this section will take the following steps.  
First, section 3.2 will identify whether the Aarhus Regulation, which is the general 
framework for access to environmental information at the EU level, is applicable for 
accessing EU ETS-related information followed by a discussion of three articles from the EU 
ETS Directive which form the regime for access to environmental information under the EU 
ETS namely, Articles 17, 15a and 19.30 Articles 17 and 15a deal specifically with access to 
information, while Article 19 focuses on the registries which disseminate key information 
about the functioning of the EU ETS.31 Second, using the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, section 3.3 will investigate the problems related to the right to request 
EU ETS-related information. Last, section 3.4 will discuss governmental obligations 
regarding the dissemination of EU ETS-related information. 
3.2. The legal framework for access to EU ETS-related information 
                                                          
27 Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
28 See footnote 3 for the amendments until 2014. In addition to these amendments, other amendments 
have been brought about by Directive (EU) 2018/410. 
29 The term “information” has been mentioned 30 times in the text of the EU ETS Directive (including 
annexes). 
30 These articles do not make any distinction between stationary installations and the aviation sector, 
and they also do not apply a caveat to the application of a specific sector. Therefore, the articles on 
access to information are also applicable to the aviation sector. 
31 The other provisions related to access to environmental information scattered throughout the EU ETS 
Directive will not be analysed, as they do not concern EU institutions or bodies, and/or they do not 
address the public as defined by the Aarhus Convention. The exclusion of these provisions is justifiable 
since one of the aims of this chapter is to identify the legal framework for access to environmental 
information (within the definition of the Aarhus Convention under the EU ETS) at the EU level.  
These provisions concentrate primarily on reporting obligations, which rest on the European 
Commission to report to the European Parliament and to the Council (see for instance Articles 10b(1) 
and 10(5), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version) and on the Member States to publish 
information (Article 16(2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version) or to provide information to 
the Commission (Article 10c(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version). 
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3.2.1.  The EU ETS Directive and the Aarhus Regulation 
The preamble of the EU ETS Directive states the following: 
 “In order to ensure transparency, the public should have access to information relating 
to the allocation of allowances and to the results of monitoring of emissions, subject 
only to restrictions provided for in Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental 
information.”32   
The preamble thus refers to Directive 2003/4 (the Access to Environmental Information 
Directive),33 which obliges Member States to implement the provisions on access to 
environmental information of the Aarhus Convention to their national legislation. However, 
as discussed in section 2, the 2009 amendments of the EU ETS Directive shifted the decision 
making in important aspects of the EU ETS from the national level to the EU level. 
Consequently, the applicable legal instrument for requesting information from the European 
Commission is Regulation 1367/2006 (the Aarhus Regulation) and not Directive 2003/4/EC. 
The fact that the Aarhus Regulation is not mentioned anywhere in the EU ETS Directive does 
not entail that the Aarhus Regulation is not applicable, since EU institutions and bodies are 
bound by this instrument. Furthermore, there is no explicit derogation in the EU ETS 
Directive from the Aarhus Regulation. Before discussing the Aarhus Regulation vis-à-vis the 
EU ETS Directive, the next section examines the specific EU ETS provisions on access to 
information.  
3.2.2.  Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive 
The EU ETS Directive includes a specific provision on access to environmental information. 
Article 17 reads as follows: 
“Decisions relating to the allocation of allowances, information on project activities 
in which a Member State participates or authorises private or public entities to 
participate, and the reports of emissions required under the greenhouse gas emissions 
permit and held by the competent authority, shall be made available to the public in 
accordance with Directive 2003/4/EC”. 
The EU ETS Directive was amended several times, but Article 17, which deals specifically 
with access to information, has been amended only once (in 2004) to accommodate the Kyoto 
Protocol’s project mechanisms.34 After the 2009 amendments, Article 17 maintained 
                                                          
32 Recital 13, Preamble, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
33 Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 on Public Access to Environmental Information and 
Repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, OJ L41/26. 
34 Amended by Directive 2004/101/EC. 
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reference only to Directive 2003/4, thus giving the impression that the provision did not take 
into account the changes that had been brought about in Phase III of the EU ETS. These 
amendments could have included a reference to the Aarhus Regulation, which would have 
highlighted the new role of the Commission under the current phase of the EU ETS, 
particularly with regard to its decision making related to the allocation of allowances. 
Although Article 17 does not refer to the Aarhus Regulation, the latter applies to requests for 
environmental information when such information is held by the Commission, since EU 
institutions are bound by this instrument. 
Despite this lack of fine-tuning, the examination of Article 17 remains relevant to understand 
how transparent the legislator intended the system to be, particularly with respect to the issue 
of the allocation of allowances. 
Article 17 does not make clear whether it is applicable to the active dissemination of 
information by authorities and/or to requests for information.35 In the absence of more 
                                                          
35 Neither the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Commission’s proposal for the EU ETS 
Directive nor the legislative process brings clarification on whether Article 17 encompasses the active 
and passive form of access to environmental information. Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, COM/2001/0581 final - COD 
2001/0245 (2001b). 
The following documents of the legislative process were examined: 1)  Opinion of the Committee of 
the Regions on the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC (2002/C 192/14), OJ C 192/59 (2002); 2) Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC (2002/C 221/08), OJ C 221/27 (2002); 3) European Parliament legislative 
resolution on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, COM(2001) 581 - C5-0578/2001 - 2001/ 0245(COD), Codecision procedure: first reading, 
OJ C 279 E/96 (2002); 4) Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, COM(2002) 680 final (2003a); 5) Common Position (EC) 
No 28/2003 adopted by the Council on 18 March 2003 with a view to adopting Directive 2003/. . ./CE 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (2003/C 125 
E/05), OJ C 125 E/72 (2003); 6) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the Common 
Position of the Council on the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, SEC/2003/0364 final - COD 2001/0245 (2003b); 7) European 
Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
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specific terminology, the provision is most likely applicable to both situations. Furthermore, 
as mentioned, the current version of Article 17 refers to Directive 2003/4, which governs 
passive and active access to environmental information.36 The original version of Article 17 
referred to Articles 3(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/4 which regulate the right to request 
information.37 Such a reference could lead to the interpretation that Article 17 only governs 
the passive form (upon request) of access to information. However, the current version of 
Article 17 refers to Directive 2003/4 in general and the exceptions in Article 4(1) and (2) 
may also apply to the obligation to disseminate information, according to Article 7(5) of 
Directive 2003/4. In this vein, a possible interpretation is that Article 17 creates a double 
obligation for public authorities to disseminate environmental information and to disclose 
environmental information upon request.  
Nonetheless, the material scope of the provision is limited by the second part of the Article, 
which refers to only three different kinds of information: (i) decisions relating to the 
allocation of allowances; (ii) information on project activities in which a Member State 
participates or authorises private or public entities to participate; and (iii) the reports of 
emissions required under the greenhouse gas emissions permit and held by the competent 
authority. Since the decision making for the allocation of allowances has shifted to the EU 
level, there is a need to analyse the possible meaning of Article 17 for acts concerning the 
allocation of allowances adopted at the EU level.38  
At the time of the adoption of Article 17, as well as at the time of its only amendment in 
2004, the allocation of allowances was made by Member States through the elaboration of 
National Allocation Plans. The provision most likely intended to address the allocation 
                                                          
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 15792/1/2002 — C5‑0135/2003 — 2001/0245(COD), 
Codecision procedure: second reading, OJ C 74 E/642 (2003); 8) Opinion of the Commission pursuant 
to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s 
amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, COM(2003) 463 final (2003c). 
36 The text of the provision as it is presented in the consolidated version of 30 of April of 2014. 
37 The original text of Article 17 reads as follows: “Decisions relating to the allocation of allowances 
and the reports of emissions required under the greenhouse gas emissions permit and held by the 
competent authority shall be made available to the public by that authority subject to the restrictions 
laid down in Article 3(3) and Article 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC.” The text was amended in 2004, see 
footnote 34. 
38 The two other kinds of information (information on project activities in which a Member State 
participates or authorises private or public entities to participate; and the reports of emissions required 
under the greenhouse gas emissions permit and held by the competent authority) will not be analysed 
because they are related to obligations that must be fulfilled at the Member State level and fall, 
therefore, outside of the scope of the present research which focuses on the EU level. 
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decisions taken at the Member State level and to fine-tune the obligation under the EU ETS 
with the Access to Environmental Information Directive. With the empowerment of the 
Commission to take decisions on the allocation of allowances in Directive 2009/29, one may 
wonder what the shift of the decision making to the EU level may mean for the interpretation 
of Article 17.  
However, the fact that the obligation under Article 17 was created before the empowerment 
of the Commission and was linked to the Access to Environmental Information Directive, it 
is likely to refer to decisions that Member States still have to make in the allocation process.39 
Nonetheless, the potential limitation of Article 17 to Member States does not exempt the 
Commission from disclosing its acts on the allocation of allowances, since the TFEU and the 
Aarhus Regulation are applicable. Yet, this does show that the current provision does not 
reflect the shift in the decision making from the Member State level to the EU level.  
3.2.3.  Article 15a of the EU ETS Directive 
As concluded above, Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive was not fine-tuned to reflect the 
empowerment of the European Commission brought about by the 2009 amendments, but 
these amendments did introduce Article 15a which explicitly refers to the Commission, as 
follows: 
“Member States and the Commission shall ensure that all decisions and reports 
relating to the quantity and allocation of allowances and to the monitoring, reporting 
and verification of emissions are immediately disclosed in an orderly manner ensuring 
non-discriminatory access. 
Information covered by professional secrecy may not be disclosed to any other person 
or authority except by virtue of the applicable laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions.” 
Article 15a, first indent, states that not only Member States, but also the Commission, “shall 
ensure that all decisions and reports relating to the quantity and allocation of allowances and 
to the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions are immediately disclosed in an 
orderly manner ensuring non-discriminatory access”.40 The use of the term immediately 
disclosed addressed to the Member States and the Commission reads as if the information is 
to be disclosed to the public as soon as the competent authority possesses the information. 
This is especially so because the term immediately disclosed is not followed by the term upon 
                                                          
39 Article 11, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
40 Artticle 15a, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
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request, and therefore it confers an active character on the provision: the obligation of the 
public authority to disseminate information.  
Content-wise, there is an overlap in the type of information that is covered by Articles 17 and 
15a.41 Both provisions refer to decisions on the allocation of allowances but with the 
difference that Article 15a prescribes the obligation on the Member States and the 
Commission to provide information, while Article 17 only mentions the Members States. 
Also, both provisions require the Member States to make reports of emissions available to 
the public. Article 17 specifies that the reports are those required under the greenhouse gas 
emissions permit, while Article 15a goes a step further and not only requires Member States 
but also the Commission to disclose not only reports but also decisions immediately relating 
to the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions. The reference to the Commission 
and the inclusion of the quantity of allowances suggests that Article 15a acknowledges, at 
least regarding the calculation of the number of allowances, the role of the European 
Commission in determining an EU-wide cap. Another feature that seems to corroborate the 
argument that Article 15a reflects, partially, the new role of the Commission in the third 
phase of the EU ETS is that Article 15a neither refers to Directive 2003/4 nor the Aarhus 
Regulation, while Article 17 refers to Directive 2003/4. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
Article 15a does not refer explicitly to information on project activities, as does Article 17, it 
can also be interpreted as including this kind of information when it refers to the quantity of 
allowances, since installations can use international credits towards fulfilling part of their 
obligations under the EU ETS.42 
A major distinction between Articles 17 and 15a is that Article 15a pays special attention to 
the disclosure of information covered by professional secrecy, an aspect that is not present in 
Article 17. The second indent of Article 15a states that information protected by professional 
secrecy – a term that is not defined by the EU ETS Directive – may only be disclosed to third 
parties in accordance with “applicable laws, regulations or administrative provisions.” In this 
vein, it is possible to argue that the provision implicitly refers to the Environmental 
Information Directive and the Aarhus Regulation as applicable laws. 
                                                          
41 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14 and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, 12 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:754, 
para 145. 
42 Article 11a, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
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Furthermore, as in Article 17, Article 15a limits the kind of information that should be 
disclosed. Therefore, Article 15a is not capable of covering all aspects regarding access to 
information under the EU ETS.43 
3.2.4.  Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive 
Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive deals with the creation and maintenance of a registry for 
accounting allowances issued under the EU ETS, as follows: 
“1. Allowances issued from 1 January 2012 onwards shall be held in the Community 
registry for the execution of processes pertaining to the maintenance of the holding 
accounts opened in the Member State and the allocation, surrender and cancellation 
of allowances under the Commission Regulation referred to in paragraph 3.  
Each Member State shall be able to fulfil the execution of authorised operations under 
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. 
2. Any person may hold allowances. The registry shall be accessible to the public and 
shall contain separate accounts to record the allowances held by each person to whom 
and from whom allowances are issued or transferred. 
3. In order to implement this Directive, the Commission shall adopt a Regulation for 
a standardised and secured system of registries in the form of standardised electronic 
databases containing common data elements to track the issue, holding, transfer and 
cancellation of allowances, to provide for public access and confidentiality as 
appropriate and to ensure that there are no transfers which are incompatible with the 
obligations resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. That Regulation shall also include 
provisions concerning the use and identification of CERs and ERUs in the Community 
scheme and the monitoring of the level of such use. That measure, designed to amend 
non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in 
accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(3).  
4. The Regulation referred to in paragraph 3 shall contain appropriate modalities for 
the Community registry to undertake transactions and other operations to implement 
arrangements referred to in Article 25(1b). That Regulation shall also include 
processes for the change and incident management for the Community registry with 
regard to issues in paragraph 1 of this Article. It shall contain appropriate modalities 
for the Community registry to ensure that initiatives of the Member States pertaining 
                                                          
43 Moreover, some elements mentioned in Article 15a concern information that the Commission would 
usually not possess, such as information related to the verification of emissions. 
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to efficiency improvement, administrative cost management and quality control 
measures are possible.”44 
The original version of paragraph 1 stipulated that the Member States should establish and 
maintain a registry in order to ensure the proper transactions of allowances.45 The European 
Commission, in accordance with Article 19(3) of the EU ETS Directive, adopted Regulation 
2216/2004 for a standardised and secured system of registries.46 The EU system of registries 
has been in place since January 2005 with the role of providing a standardised and secure 
system of electronic registries, which tracks the issuance, holding, transfer, and cancellation 
of all allowances issued under the EU ETS.  
The 2009 amendments brought changes to Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive, which 
stipulates that emission allowances issued from 1 January 2012 onwards must be held in a 
single Union Registry on accounts managed by the Member States.47  
In 2013, Commission Regulation 389/2013 established a centralised Union Registry,48 which 
has replaced Member States’ national registries, and it currently covers all 31 countries 
participating in the EU ETS.  The Union Registry is related to the European Union 
Transaction Log (EUTL), which is managed by a central administrator designated by the 
European Commission.49 The European Union Transaction Log is a virtual database that 
“automatically checks, records, and authorises all transactions that take place between 
                                                          
44 Article 19, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
45 Article 19(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. Article 19(1) of the EU ETS Directive before 
the 2009 amendments read: “1. Member States shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of 
a registry in order to ensure the accurate accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of 
allowances. Member States may maintain their registries in a consolidated system, together with one or 
more other Member States.” (Article 19(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, original version). 
46 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured 
system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the CouncilText with EEA relevance, 
OJ  L 386/1. 
47 After the 2009 amendments, Article 19 reads: “1. Allowances issued from 1 January 2012 onwards 
shall be held in the Community registry for the execution of processes pertaining to the maintenance of 
the holding accounts opened in the Member State and the allocation, surrender and cancellation of 
allowances under the Commission Regulation referred to in paragraph 3.  
Each Member State shall be able to fulfil the execution of authorised operations under the UNFCCC or 
the Kyoto Protocol.” 
48 Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant 
to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC 
and No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission 
Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 1193/2011, OJ L 122/1. Article 19(3) of the EU ETS Directive 
empowers the European Commission to adopt a regulation. 
49 Article 20(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
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accounts in the Union Registry. This verification ensures that any transfer of allowances from 
one account to another is consistent with EU ETS rules.”50  
Paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive states that:   
“Any person may hold allowances. The registry shall be accessible to the public and 
shall contain separate accounts to record the allowances held by each person to whom 
and from whom allowances are issued or transferred.” 
Through the use of the words accessible to the public, it seems that there is an obligation for 
the central administrator to actively make the information available to the public. However, 
because the sentence that establishes the obligation comes just after the statement “Any 
person may hold allowances”, the accessibility to the public seems to be established in view 
of giving access to the public to participate in the system and hold allowances. However, the 
paragraph does not clarify whether accessibility would include access to all accounts, which 
would entail access to information on the number of emissions allowances transferred and 
acquired by holders, the dates of the transactions, and the names of the holders, among others. 
Furthermore, there is no timeframe for when the information should be made accessible. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive brings more clarity on which kind of 
information the registry needs to contain: 
“In order to implement this Directive, the Commission shall adopt a Regulation for a 
standardised and secured system of registries in the form of standardised electronic 
databases containing common data elements to track the issue, holding, transfer and 
cancellation of allowances, to provide for public access and confidentiality as 
appropriate and to ensure that there are no transfers which are incompatible with the 
obligations resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. That Regulation shall also include 
provisions concerning the use and identification of CERs and ERUs in the Community 
scheme and the monitoring of the level of such use. That measure, designed to amend 
non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in 
accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(3).” 
Paragraph 3 seems to create a special regime for the Union Registry apart from the general 
regime set by Article 17. This is because, while Article 17 in principle governs access to 
information under the EU ETS, Article 19 says that the registry shall provide for “public 
access and confidentiality as appropriate”. Therefore, according to the Article, it will be the 
further regulatory instrument, in this case, a regulation adopted by the Commission, that will 
determine which kind and when the information should be made available.51 Of course, this 
                                                          
50 European Commission Climate Action, Union Registry, 19 June 2020, https://ets-
registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml. 
51 The regulations adopted by the Commission are discussed in section 3.3.1, iii. 
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determination has to be carried out in accordance with the limits prescribed by the EU treaties 
and international agreements. 
3.3. Passive Access to EU ETS-related information 
Having examined the general regime for access to information under the EU ETS Directive 
contained in Articles 15a, 17 and 19, using the case law, this section will investigate the 
problems concerning the right to request EU ETS-related information. First, it delves into the 
boundaries of the definition of environmental information (section 3.3.1), and, second, into 
the limits of application of the grounds for refusal of environmental information (section 
3.2.2) in the context of the EU ETS. 
3.3.1. Definition of environmental information: the extent to which EU ETS-related 
information is environmental information 
i. Access to data for the calculation of the Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor 
The free allocation of allowances is based on ex-ante benchmarks, which have to be 
determined by the Commission on the basis of “the average performance of the 10% of 
installations in a sector or subsector in the Community [now the EU] that are most efficient 
in the years 2007-2008.”52 This means that installations with low carbon emissions are 
favoured in free allocation because they have the most efficient installations.53 
The Commission adopted a decision establishing the benchmark criteria (the Benchmark 
Decision).54 According to Article 15(1) and (2) of this Benchmark Decision, all Member 
States elaborated the so-called national implementation measures (NIMs), which contain a 
preliminary calculation of the number of free allowances to be allocated to each installation 
in their territory, which they must notify to the Commission.55 Following the submission of 
the NIMs for the third period (EU ETS Phase III), the Commission evaluated the data 
provided by the Member States, to check if all installations were included and if the 
harmonised allocation rules were applied correctly. The Commission calculated the 
maximum amount of free allocation according to Article 10a(5) of the EU ETS Directive, 
and the “preliminary allocation through the NIMs exceeded the maximum amount of 
allowances available in 2013.”56 Therefore, as provided for in Article 10a(5) of the ETS 
                                                          
52 Article 10a (2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
53 E. Woerdman, op. cit. (2015), p. 57. 
54 Commission Decision 2011/278/EU, see footnote 25. 
55 Article 11, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
56 European Commission. Free allocation, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances_en. 
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Directive, the Commission had to apply a Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) to reduce 
the total number of allowances for free allocation.57 
Consequently, in September 2013, the Commission adopted a decision establishing the first 
Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor.58 Some operators challenged the Commission decision 
since they believed that the CSCF was calculated wrongly, which would imply a too-low 
allocation of free allowances.59 In Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, 
and C-391/14 to C-393/14, the Court of Justice answered preliminary questions posed by 
courts from Austria, the Netherlands and Italy as to whether the Commission calculated the 
number of free allowances to be allocated to installations correctly in the period after 2013.60  
In particular, Article 10a(5) of the EU ETS Directive establishes how to determine the 
maximum amount of allowances that will be allocated for free. However, there was a 
divergence in the interpretations of Article 10a(5)(b) of the EU ETS Directive due to different 
translations of the provision. As explained by the Court: 
“[…] the different language versions are not consistent with one another. Whereas the 
French version of subparagraph (b) of Article 10a(5) of Directive 2003/87 refers to 
‘emissions … which are only included in the Community scheme from 2013 
onwards’, other language versions, such as the Spanish, Danish, German, English, 
                                                          
57 A uniform Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) is applied to ensure the annual free allocation 
remains within this limit and consequently within the overall EU ETS cap. The CSCF, which is 
determined in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Benchmarking Decision, is the factor that adjusts 
the difference between the sum of free allocations elaborated by Member States and calculation of the 
maximum amount that can be allocated for free in accordance with Article 10a(5) of the EU ETS 
Directive. In other words, the CSCF is the result of a comparison between the bottom-up sum of 
preliminary free allocations and the top-down calculation of the maximum amount that can be handed 
out for free and it is set out in Annex II of Decision 2013/448/EU. Although the calculations by the 
Member States are based on the Benchmarking Decision, the difference is due to fact that installations 
could choose for different periods for the production of data (2005-2008 and 2009-2010) and also for 
the increase in the number of sectors and subsectors in the list of sector and subsectors deemed to be in 
risk of carbon leakage. (Questions and Answers on the cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF), 19 June 
2020, https://www.karlsruhe.ihk.de/blueprint/servlet/resource/blob/2470276/810edae144345f4716c95 
6c99715080e/faq-data.pdf, p. 5) 
58 Commission Decision (EU) No 2013/448/EU concerning national implementation measures for the 
transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in accordance with Article 11(3) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 240/27. 
59 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14 and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 24. 
60 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14 and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, 28 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:311, para 87.  
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Italian, Netherlands, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovene and Swedish language 
versions, refer to ‘emissions from installations … which are only included in the 
Community scheme from 2013 onwards’.”61 (emphasis added) 
To solve this question, the Court argued that, when there is a divergence among the language 
versions, the provision must be interpreted in accordance with the context and purpose of the 
legal rules into which the provision is inserted.62 In this case, the Court looked to the purpose 
of the directive and its subsequent amendments and concluded that “[…] when establishing 
the maximum annual amount of allowances, the Commission was required, in accordance 
with subparagraph (b) of Article 10a(5) of Directive 2003/87, to take account only of the 
emissions from the installations included in the Community system from 2013 onwards.”63 
(Emphasis added) 
Since the Commission took emissions of installations that were covered by the EU ETS 
before 2013 into account,64 the court concluded that this calculation was based on erroneous 
                                                          
61 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 89. 
62 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 90. 
63 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 94. 
64 The conclusion by the Court that there is an obligation to include only installations subject to the 
scheme for the first time from 2013 onwards leaves the question unanswered as to what happens to the 
emissions from installations that were already part of the scheme and cover activities that are subject 
to the scheme from 2013 onwards. (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-
192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. 
Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 104). 
Advocate General Kokott explains that the EU ETS Directive (Article 10a(5)(b) and Article 9a(2) 
Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended) does not provide a clear answer to this question (Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to 
C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, 
Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 105), and that the Commission “was under no obligation 
to redress the asymmetry in the implementing rules”. (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined 
Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine 
GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and 
others, para 108) 
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data which led to the allocation of more free allowances than was permitted by Article 
10a(5)(b) of the EU ETS Directive.65 The Court then ruled that the decision was invalid.66  
This ruling is important for the purpose of defining the scope of the right of access to 
environmental information under the EU ETS because, by the time the CSCF was adopted, 
the Commission stated that “the value of the CSCF is the result of mathematical calculations 
based on verified Member State data.”67 Indeed, the calculation is the result of a mathematical 
calculation stipulated by Article 15(3) of the Benchmark Decision.68 However, the Dutch 
Council of State (Raad van State) pointed out that the decision does not contain the data to 
replicate such a calculation.69 Furthermore, the Italian Court (Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale per il Lazio) considered that the statement of reasons for the decision on the CSCF 
was inadequate, since the reasons did not contain information on the actual data used by the 
Commission.70 The questions referred by the Dutch Council of State and the Italian Court 
thus related to whether a sufficient statement of reasons for the determination of the CSFC 
was provided. However, these questions were not further discussed by the Court.71 The Court 
shied away from them on the grounds that there was no need to answer other questions, since 
the answer to the previous questions already invalidated the CSCF.72 The Advocate General 
                                                          
65 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 95. 
66 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 99. 
67 European Commission. Questions and Answers on the cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF), 19 
June 2020, https://www.karlsruhe.ihk.de/blueprint/servlet/resource/blob/2470276/810edae144345 
f4716c956c99715080e/faq-data.pdf. p. 5. 
68 Commission Decision 2011/278/EU, see footnote 25. 
69 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 28. 
70 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 28. 
71 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 28. Fifth and sixth questions referred by the Raad van State and third 
question by the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale. Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-
389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- 
und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 29 and 37, respectively. 
72 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 100. Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-
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Kokott, on the other hand, explored the issue of the availability of the data to the public to 
calculate the CSCF by the Commission. 
The Advocate General started by mentioning that the decision determining the CSCF does 
explain how the factor was calculated.73 However, she continued, this decision does not 
contain all the data used by the Commission to calculate the correction factor. For example, 
it is not clear which installations the Commission considered electricity generators,74 and 
only by accessing the NIMs could a member of the public be aware of the preliminary total 
annual amount for the free allocation.75 The NIMs are recorded in the Union Registry. 
Although any individual can sign on to the Union Register by creating an account with a 
username and password,76 information about the NIMs is not available when one logs into 
the Union Registry website.77 To collect the data needed to calculate this information, it 
would be necessary to log in to the page of the registry of each of the 31 countries which are 
Parties to the EU ETS, and this registration has a financial cost.78 
Almost two months after the decision was adopted,79 DG Climate Action released a document 
which attempts to provide further information on the calculation of the CSCF.80 For instance, 
it states that electricity generators are, in accordance with Article 3(u) of the EU ETS 
Directive, “installations that, on or after 1 January 2005, have produced electricity for sale to 
                                                          
391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 100. 
73 Recital 25, Preamble, Commission Decision (EU) No 2013/448/EU. 
74 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, Opinion in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-
192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, para 137. 
75 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 139. 
76 European Commission. Union Registry, 19 June 2020, https://ets-
registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml. 
77 European Commission. Union Registry, 19 June 2020, https://ets-
registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml.  The only documents available are the Kyoto 
Protocol Public Reports. (European Commission. Kyoto Protocol Public Reports, 19 June 2020, 
https://ets-registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml.) 
78 For the fees charged by Member States for the accounts in the Union registry, see: European 
Commission. Union Registry - Phase 3 (2013-2020), 20 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en#tab-0-1. 
79 The decision is from 09 September 2013 and the explanatory document is from 22 October 2013. 
80 The document can be found here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/docs/cross_sectoral_correction_factor_en.p
df 
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third parties and in which no activity listed in Annex I is carried out other than the 
‘combustion of fuels’”, but the list of such installations is not provided. The lack of available 
information means, in the Advocate General’s view, that members of the public cannot 
identify precisely whether the Commission used the correct method and data according to the 
EU ETS Directive and the Benchmark Decision.81 Advocate General Kokott pointed out that, 
even if the data were not available in the text of the Decision, the Commission could have 
made it possible to access the raw data and refer to such availability in the statement of 
reasons.82 The court did not rule on this matter, and, therefore, there is not yet a judicial 
decision on the need to provide access to all relevant data used for the calculation in the 
decision making for the allocation of allowances. This is despite the command of Article 15a 
of the EU ETS Directive that the Commission shall disclose all decisions and reports related 
to the quantity and allocation of allowances immediately. 
ii. Request for a document on the allocation of free allowances submitted by a Member 
State  
The Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission Case is also related 
to the Union-wide rules for the harmonised free allocation of emission allowances. 83  In this 
case, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland, a company which operates installations falling under 
the EU ETS, had requested a document (an excel table) communicated by Germany to the 
European Commission. This document contained information related to the estimation made 
by German authorities of free emission allowances to be allocated the industries falling under 
the EU ETS in the German territory.84 The communication of the German authorities was 
made in accordance with the Benchmark Decision.85 This provision refers to Article 11(1) of 
the EU ETS Directive, which states that Member States shall publish and submit to the 
European Commission the list of installations covered by the EU ETS in its territory, and 
also the number of allowances to be allocated for free. Since Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland 
                                                          
81 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 133. 
82 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 140.  
83 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, 11 December 
2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1059. 
84 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, 13 July 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:540, para 17. (Please note that, although discussing the case before the General Court, 
reference regarding the facts of the case refers to the appeal, since it was translated into English.  M. 
Hillebrandt and L. Leppävirta, ‘On the Administration of Pollution: How Much “Space to Think” May 
the EU Claim?’ 8(4) European Journal of Risk Regulation, (2017), pp. 791-797, p. 791.  
85 Commission Decision 2011/278/EU. 
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did not receive a reply within the timeframe established by Regulation 1049/2001, it initiated 
an action for annulment of the Commission’s implied refusal to grant the applicant access to 
the information.86 
Regarding the interpretation of the definition of environmental information, the General 
Court understood that the requested information constituted environmental information 
within the definition of the Aarhus Regulation.87 The General Court explained that the 
requested information is closely related to GHG emissions and that the information concerns 
the state of elements of the environment, such as air and the atmosphere, within the meaning 
of Article 2(1)(d)(iii) of the Aarhus Regulation. The General Court added that the aim of the 
measure to protect the environment is confirmed by the preamble of the EU ETS Directive, 
which shows that the EU ETS was established in order to reduce GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere and stabilise the concentrations of that gas at a level, which prevents any 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the atmosphere climate system.88 There was a 
consensus among the Parties on the fact that the document falls under the definition of 
environmental information of the Aarhus Regulation (Article 2(1)(d)(iii)) and this was not a 
point challenged in the appeal.89 The case illustrates that industries also make use of the 
access to environmental information right, and that they had to appeal in order to get access 
the requested information.90 
iii. Request for data related to the transfer of allowances under national registry 
In Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, the city of Lyon requested the 
administrator of the French national registry of greenhouse gas emission allowances to 
provide information on the number of greenhouse gas emission allowances sold by the 
operators of 209 urban heating sites in 2005, the dates of the transactions and the names of 
the those transferring and acquiring the emissions allowances.91 
                                                          
86 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 29. 
87 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, para 61. 
88 Recitals 3 and 5, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass 
Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, para 60. 
89 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-60/15 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. 
Commission, 23 September 2010, EU:C:2016:778, para 86. M. Hillebrandt and L. Leppävirta, op. cit. 
(2017), p. 792. The appeal concerned the interpretation of Article 4(3) (first subparagraph) of 
Regulation No 1049/2001 according to Article 6(1) (second sentence) of Regulation No 1367/2006. 
90 The ground for a refusal to provide the requested information will be discussed in section 3.3.2.i. 
91 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, 22 December 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:822, para 29 and 41. See: M. Peeters and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014), pp. 358-359. 
H. von Holleben, ‘Judgment of the General Court of the EU on Access to Information Under Substance 
Law: Case T-545/11, Judgment of 08 October 2013’ 4(4) European Journal of Risk Regulation, (2013), 
pp. 565-578, pp. 569-570. 
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Advocate General Kokott examined whether the information requested constitutes 
environmental information within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2003/4. She 
considered that information on emission allowance transactions qualifies as environmental 
information within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4 as “factors, ... such as 
emissions …, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment”.92  
The Court took a different approach, in contrast to the AG’s opinion, by not focusing on the 
definition of environmental information. The Court acknowledged that the EU legislature has 
adopted access to information requirements in the EU ETS Directive, but it did not intend to 
“make the reporting of all information or data” under the EU ETS subject to the Access to 
Environmental Information Directive.93 The Court understood that the requested information 
does not fall under Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive, which provides that decisions relating 
to the allocation of allowances shall be made available to the public in accordance with the 
Access to Environmental Information Directive. In fact, according to the Court, such trading 
data information falls under the scope of Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive and Regulation 
2216/2004.94 Article 19, which deals with registries, does not refer to Directive 2003/4, but 
rather it states that the Commission shall adopt a regulation which, among other subject 
matters, provides for “public access and confidentially as appropriate”.95 At the time of the 
judgment, this was Regulation 2216/2004.96 The Court favoured the application of the special 
provision97 of the EU ETS Directive (Article 19) and ruled that the information should be 
available after a five-year period has passed, in accordance with the Regulation 2216/2004,98 
allowing, therefore, a specific provision to outweigh Article 17, which is governed by 
Directive 2003/4. Nonetheless, the judgment lacked an analysis as to whether such a 
                                                          
92 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, para 33 and 42. 
93 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, para 38. 
94 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, para 39. 
95 Article 19(3), Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. 
96 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004. This regulation was repealed by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 920/2010 of 7 October 2010 for a standardised and secured system of registries 
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 270/1 subsequently repealed by 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013. 
97 The Court also favoured the application of special provisions in other cases. See Case C-552/07 
Commune de Sausheim v. Azelvandre, 17 February 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:96, para 55, in which the 
Court favoured the application of Article 25(4) of Directive 2001/18 of the European Parliament and 
of Council on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, OJ. L 
106/1, instead of the general rule of Directive 2003/4. P. Oliver, ‘Access to Information and to Justice 
in EU Environmental Law: The Aarhus Convention’ 36 Fordham International Law Journal, (2013), 
pp. 1423-1470, p. 1439. 
98 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004. 
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categorisation of trading data (within a special category that is not governed by the Directive 
2003/4) complies with the Aarhus Convention.  
Although this case does not deal with environmental information held by an EU institution 
or body, and the application of the Aarhus Regulation is therefore not triggered if a request 
for trading data information would be addressed to the Central Administrator of the Union 
Registry, based on the same line of reasoning and expecting the case law would follow a 
consistent approach, it is likely that the outcome of the case would be the same. In case C-
556/14P, the Court of Justice dealt with the refusal by the Commission of a request from an 
operator for information on alleged stolen allowances.99 The request for information 
addressed to the Commission was handled by the Director-General of DG Climate Action in 
the capacity of Central Administrator of the EU Transaction Log.100 The Central 
Administrator is the person designated by the Commission to operate and maintain the Union 
transaction log.101 The Court, as in the Ville de Lyon Case, ruled that the information was 
governed by Regulation No 2216/2004 which was adopted pursuant to Article 19(3) of the 
EU ETS Directive.102 Whether the general regime of Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive 
would apply was not considered in this judgment. Again, the Court considered the non-
disclosure of information lawful by favouring the application of the special regime 
established by Article 19 without pondering whether such an approach is compatible with the 
regime for access to environmental information under the Aarhus Convention.103 In 
conclusion, the outcome would be the same if the request would be addressed to the 
                                                          
99 Case C‑556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) SA v. European Commission 7 April 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:207. 
100 Case C‑556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) SA v. European Commission , para 24. 
101 Article 20(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. At the time of the ruling the definition 
could be found in Article 2(h), Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004. At the time of writing, this 
regulation had been repealed and the definition of Central Administrator is based on Article 3(2) of 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013.  
102 Case C‑556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) SA v. European Commission , para 46. 
103 If the Court had considered the application of Article 17, the first step would have been to consider 
whether the Aarhus regulation is applicable to the Central Administrator or not. The Aarhus Regulation 
applies to Union institutions or bodies, which is a narrower definition than public authorities in the 
Aarhus Convention (Chapter III, section 4.1.3, of this thesis). Based on the facts of case C-556/14P, the 
Director-General of DG Climate Action was acting as the Central Administrator, since the Director-
General of DG Climate Action is a member of an EU institution, the Aarhus Regulation would be 
applicable. In a hypothetical case where the Central Administrator would be not be a member of an EU 
institution or body, the Court could still consider that the Aarhus Regulation would be applicable, since 
the person was designated by the Commission and the information is ultimately held by it. The second 
step would be to analyse whether the requested information is environmental information or not. If the 
answer is affirmative, the final step would be to considerer if the information could be kept confidential 
based on the grounds for refusal established in the Aarhus Regulation.  
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Commission: non-immediate disclosure of the requested information. However, if the same 
request for information would be made under the 2013 amended regulation, in which the 
rules for the disclosure of information had different requirements for the time for releasing 
the information. At the time of the Ville de Lyon Case and Case 556/14P, information had to 
be released only after a five-year period had elapsed.104 A request for information under the 
current regulation would require the information to be released earlier, three years after the 
transaction was concluded.105 This difference in the time to release the information reveals 
that, for EU ETS-related information, such as information about transactions related to 
allowances, the Commission has the discretion to decide for how long information should be 
kept out of public sight.106 
3.3.2.  Grounds for refusal 
i. Non-disclosure of information which relates to ongoing decision making 
The Saint-Gobain case also sheds light on the grounds for refusal relied upon by the 
Commission when refusing the disclosure of the document (an excel table) communicated 
by the German authorities to the Commission.107 This document contains information related 
to the estimation made by Germany regarding emission allowances allocated for free to the 
industries falling under the EU ETS in the German territory.108 At the time of the request, the 
Commission had not taken the decision on the final number of allowances that could be 
allocated free of charge. For this reason, the General Court held that the disclosure of this 
information could undermine the ongoing decision making process.109  
To reach this conclusion, the General Court interpreted the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) 
of Regulation 1049/2001 in conjunction with Article 6(1) (second sentence) of the Aarhus 
Regulation. Article 3 of the Aarhus Regulation stipulates that requests for access to 
environmental information held by EU institutions or bodies are to be dealt with within the 
framework of Regulation 1049/2001. This regulation provides for exceptions to the 
disclosure of information in Article 4. Among these exceptions is 4(3) of Regulation 
                                                          
104 Annex XIV, para 12, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004. 
105 Annex XIV, para 4, Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013. 
106 The Commission operates under the control of the Member States and, hence, its discretion is 
limited. 
107 This case was already introduced in section 3.3.1.ii. 
108 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 17. Please note that, although 
the case before the General Court is discussed, references regarding the facts of the case come from the 
appeal case, since only the latter has been translated into English.  M. Hillebrandt and L. Leppävirta, 
op. cit. (2017), p. 791. 
109 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 39. 
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1049/2001, which allows the refusal of the information where a decision has not been taken 
by the concerned institution. However, according to Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation, 
this exception must be interpreted in a “restrictive way, taking into account the public interest 
and whether the information requested related to emission into the environment”. When 
interpreting this provision and specifically the concept of public interest, the General Court 
stated that Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland was pursuing particular interests with the 
disclosure of this information to correct any mistakes in the information provided by the 
German authorities to the Commission.110 Thus, no public interest could be identified in its 
request.111 The General Court, therefore, considered the exception applicable, and the non-
disclosure of information was deemed lawful.112 
In order for the exception to be applicable, allowing the non-disclosure of information which 
could undermine the decision making, two conditions need to be present: (i) the existence of 
public interest and (ii) the fact that the information is related to emissions into the 
environment. In his opinion, Advocate General Szpunar stated that the Commission’s 
decision denying the information requested by Saint-Gobain “fails to specify whether or not 
the information requested relates to emissions into the environment and fails to take into 
account the public interest served by disclosure.”113 AG Szpunar also noticed that the right 
of access to information is guaranteed to any natural or legal person without the need to state 
any interest.114 Therefore, the fact that the applicant is an operator covered by the EU ETS 
and is a recipient of the free allowances should not be relevant to whether there is public 
interest in the disclosure. In fact, access to environmental information allows members of the 
public to become aware of relevant information regarding the protection of the environment 
and subsequently voice their concerns.115 Furthermore, if a member of the public, being a 
beneficiary of the system or not, identifies an error in data submitted by a Member State, it 
could potentially help the Commission to fulfil its obligation under the EU ETS properly.116 
However, as noticed by the Court of Justice, although the Aarhus Regulation mentions the 
need to provide effective opportunities for public participation in environmental decision 
making, the Regulation does not require examination or reaction to public concerns regarding 
                                                          
110 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, para 103. The 
judgment of this case is only available in German and French. 
111 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, para 101. 
112 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission, para 111. 
113 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-60/15 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. 
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Commission, para 90. 
158 
the disclosure of documents.117 Therefore, it is difficult to see how the disclosure of 
information could delay the Commission’s administrative procedures.118   
On a side note, it would be interesting to see whether the General Court would have achieved 
the same conclusion regarding public interest in the context of the ground of refusal as 
regulated by Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation, if the request was made by an 
environmental NGO or an individual. However, it is difficult to predict the outcome, since 
the concept of public interest remains a “ghost concept”.119 
In its judgment of the appeal, the Court of Justice did not focus on the two aforementioned 
conditions. Rather, it focused on the distinction between decision making and administrative 
procedures.120 The Court of Justice found that the General Court did not interpret the first 
subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 in conjunction with the second 
sentence of Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation correctly, which requires a strict 
interpretation of the exception for enabling the non-disclosure of information which could 
undermine the decision making process.121 The judgment established that there is a 
distinction between decision making itself and the entire administrative procedure, which led 
to the decision.122 In this case, the information sent by the German authorities to the 
Commission is part of the administrative procedure, and it is distinct from the Commission’s 
decision making process itself, which was the process to achieve the decision.123 Therefore, 
under a narrow interpretation, as required by the second sentence of Article 6(1) of the Aarhus 
Regulation, on the exception which allows for the non-disclosure of information which could 
undermine decision making process,124 the information should be disclosed.  
The Court of Justice also affirmed that “the mere reference to a risk of negative repercussions 
linked to access to internal documents and the possibility that interested parties may influence 
                                                          
117 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 84. 
118 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 84. 
119 “However, the concept of ‘public interest’, which offers a perspective from which to assess and 
resolve the tension between confidentiality and public access and ultimately to ensure the right of the 
public to participate, has remained a ghost concept. This makes it difficult to anticipate how individual 
decisions will be taken, and what, in fact, will count as a ‘public interest’ for the purposes of the act of 
balancing.” E. Korkea-Aho and P. Leino, ‘Who owns the information held by EU agencies? Weed 
killers, commercially sensitive information and transparent and participatory governance’ 54(4) 
Common Market Law Review, (2017), pp. 1059-1091, p. 1068. 
120 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 76. R. Moules, ‘Significant 
EU Environmental Cases: 2017’ 30(1) Journal of Environmental Law, (2018), pp. 157-167, p. 158. 
121 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 86. R. Moules, op. cit. 
(2018), p. 158. 
122 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 76. 
123 R. Moules, op. cit. (2018), p. 158. 
124 Article 4(3), first subparagraph, Regulation 1049/2001. 
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the procedure do not suffice to prove that disclosure of those documents would seriously 
undermine the decision-making process of the institution concerned.”125 As a consequence 
of this ruling, the exception, which allows for non-disclosure which could undermine the 
decision making process, should be interpreted as only applying to the decision making and 
not to the administrative procedure which precedes it. Furthermore, the Saint-Gobain case 
shows that the supposed threat to the decision making process is not sufficient to justify the 
non-disclosure of the information.126 
ii. Confidentiality of commercial and industrial information  
a) Ville de Lyon Case 
a.1)  The opinion of the Advocate General and Judgment of the Court of Justice 
The Ville de Lyon Case is not only relevant for understanding what is covered by the 
definition of environmental information,127 but also for the interpretation of the limits of the 
grounds for refusal related to commercial information. In this case, Advocate General Kokott 
answered the question of whether information on allowance trading data qualifies as 
information on emissions into the environment within the meaning of Article 4 of Directive 
2003/4 against which the “confidentiality of commercial and industrial information” 
exception cannot be invoked.128 The Advocate General reached the conclusion that the 
information being sought did not qualify as information on emissions into the environment, 
since the trading of emission allowances takes place before substances are released.129 
Indeed, under the EU ETS, if a private or legal person has bought allowances, there is a 
choice to bank, sell or use them to covering emissions that have already been released in the 
environment.130 
Since Advocate General Kokott reached the conclusion that information on allowance trading 
data does not qualify as information on emissions into the environment, she then explained 
that the confidentiality of commercial and industrial information exception applies in this 
                                                          
125 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 83. 
126 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Commission, para 83. R. Moules, op. cit. 
(2018), p. 158. Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland could also have requested the information directly from 
the German authorities and see whether its request would be denied. Such approach could potentially 
result in the disclosure of the information.  
127 See section 3.3.1.iii. 
128 Artcile 4(4)(d), Access to Environmental Information Directive.  
129 Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott in Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations, 14 October 2010, EU:C:2010:613, ECLI:EU:C:2010:613, para 74. 
130 Private or legal persons can even decide not to use or cancel allowances. See for an example footnote 
155. 
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case.131 Therefore, there is a presumption of confidentiality interests within the meaning of 
Regulation on the Registry,132 and an overriding public interest had to be present in order to 
disclose the information.133 Advocate General Kokott concludes that, since the reference for 
a preliminary ruling failed to show overriding public interest, the confidentiality interests 
prevail and the information shall not be disclosed.134  
Presupposing that the information would be requested at the EU level – the question would 
be addressed to the Central Administrator of EU Transaction Log – would the AG reach the 
same conclusion? Assuming that the Advocate General will consider that Central 
Administrator as being appointed by the Commission will also be subject to the Aarhus 
Regulation,135 the analysis would follow the same line of reasoning: the information is not 
related to emissions into the environment. In this circumstance, the Aarhus Regulation also 
requires that the public interest has to be weighed against the interest served by the refusal, 
136  but the Advocate General did not find that the questions referred by the national court 
indicated any overriding public interest served by the disclosure of the requested 
information.137 Therefore, the Advocate General would likely reach the same conclusion, if 
the information would be requested from the Central Administrator: non-disclosure of the 
requested information. 
The Court of Justice does not deal with the ground for refusal related to commercial 
information, since it deemed that the requested information falls under the special regime of 
Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive. Consequently, the Court did not test whether the 
information requested was emissions into the environment. After this test, the Court could 
have achieved the same conclusion (lawful rejection of the request), but it would have 
provided a greater level of clarification on the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention.138 
Further clarification into the question of what constitutes emissions into the environment can 
                                                          
131 Article 4(2)(d), Access to Environmental Information Directive. 
132 Commission Regulation 2216/2004 adopted according to Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive on the 
regulation of the registry, which contains trading information data. See section 3.2.4. 
133 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations, para 84. 
134 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations, para 85. 
135 The answer on whether the Central Administrator is covered by the Aarhus Regulation is not clear 
due to the narrow definition of Union institutions and bodies contained in the Aarhus Regulation. See 
Chapter III, section 4.1.3. 
136 Article 6(1), Aarhus Regulation. 
137 Article 6(1), Aarhus Regulation. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-524/09, Ville de 
Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, para 84. 
138 Peeters and Nóbrega have already pointed out that the Court could have provided more clarification 
on the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention. M. Peeters and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014), p. 359. 
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be found in another case to be discussed below which, despite not dealing with the EU ETS 
emissions, discusses the definition of emissions into the environment. 
a.2)  Are greenhouse emission allowances ‘emissions into the environment’? 
The Court revisited the question regarding the concept of emissions into the environment in 
European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland.139 The case deals with a request 
for information by NGOs regarding the authorisation of glyphosate. The European 
Commission rejected the request for access to information on the basis of the exception in 
the Aarhus Regulation that allows for the protection of commercial interests (Article 6(1)). 
However, the same provision provides for an absolute obligation for disclosure if the 
information relates to emissions into the environment. The court ruled that emissions into the 
environment encompass actual and potential emissions, but not hypothetical ones.140 The 
court clarified: 
“Although the placing on the market of a product or substance is not sufficient in 
general for it to be concluded that that product or substance will necessarily be 
released into the environment and that information concerning the product or 
substance relates to ‘emissions into the environment’, the situation is different as 
regards a product such as a plant protection product, and the substances which that 
product contains, which, in the course of normal use, are intended to be released 
into the environment by virtue of their very function. In that case, foreseeable 
emissions, under normal or realistic conditions of use, from the product in question, 
or from the substances which that product contains, into the environment are not 
hypothetical and are covered by the concept of ‘emissions into the environment’ 
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation 
No 1367/2006.”141 (emphasis added) 
The Court also set aside the Commission’s argument that emissions must relate to emissions 
originating from installations such as factories and power stations.142 This line of 
argumentation also seems to be present in the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide. 
                                                          
139 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, 23 November 
2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:889. 
140 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 71. See 
also V. A. Buonsante and A. Friel, ‘What is Information Relating to Emissions into the Environment?’ 
8(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation, (2017), pp. 453-460, p. 457. 
141 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 75. The 
same was stated in case Case C-442/14, Bayer CropScience SA-NV and other v. College voor de 
toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden, 23 November 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:890, 
para 78.  
142 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 40. 
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Considering the lack of a definition of the term emissions under the Aarhus Convention, the 
Guide suggests, in the context of Article 4(4)(d) of the Aarhus Convention (confidentiality 
of commercial and industrial information exception), to use the definition of the Industrial 
Emissions Directive,143 which defines an emission as “direct or indirect release of substances, 
vibrations, heat or noise from individual or diffuse sources in the installation into air, water 
or land”.144 However, the Court ruled that neither the Aarhus Regulation nor the Aarhus 
Convention contains elements to support the view that emissions into the environment are 
limited to emissions originating from specific industrial installations such as factories and 
power stations.145 
By analogy, under normal conditions, the EU ETS allowances are intended to be released 
into the environment (i.e., using allowances to compensate for the emissions of installations). 
In exceptional cases, for instance when the holder does not make use of allowances or when 
the holder buys with the intention of removing the allowances from the market,146 then the 
allowance will not be translated into emissions into the environment. However, GHG 
emission allowances, by the nature of their function, are intended to be released into the 
environment. Although the case European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland 
deals with pesticide emissions and not with greenhouse gas emissions, it does clarify the 
concept of emissions into the environment which can be applied to the discussion of the 
release of any kind of emissions into the environment. However, such an interpretation still 
needs to be tested by the European courts with respect to emissions in the context of the EU 
ETS. 
Another aspect that still needs clarification by the courts is whether the difference in 
terminology in the transposition of Article 4(4)(d) of the Aarhus Convention into EU law is 
in compliance with the Convention.147 While the Aarhus Convention establishes that the 
                                                          
143 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 88. 
144 Article 3(4), Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control), OJ L 334/17. 
145 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 60 and 
61. 
146 See for instance the Carbonkiller which is an initiative of WISE (World Information Service on 
Energy) through which individuals can buy allowances that are removed from the market and cannot 
be used by the industries. This is done with the intention of increasing the price of the allowances which 
will, as a consequence, stimulate industries to search for more efficient technologies due to the high 
prices of the allowances. 
147 According to Article 4(4)(d) of the Aarhus Convention, in order for commercial and industrial 
information be considered confidential, it must fulfil three requirements: (i) the confidentiality of the 
information must be expressly protected by national law; (ii) the confidentiality shall protect a 
“legitimate economic interest”; and (iii) the information must not concern “emissions which are 
relevant for the protection of the environment”. In Ville de Lyon Case, the information was considered 
confidential under Commission Regulation 2216/2004 and it can be possibly interpreted as a legitimate 
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exception applies if the information is on emissions which is relevant for the protection of 
the environment, the Aarhus Regulation148 and Directive 2003/4149 refer to information on 
emissions into the environment. Because of this terminology, AG Kokott understood in the 
Ville de Lyon Case that greenhouse gas emission allowances could not be considered 
emissions into the environment since they are not yet released into the environment. 
Therefore, AG Kokott considered that only actual emissions could be considered emissions 
into the environment. Even without discussing the possible incompatibility between the 
different terminology in the transposition of Article 4(4)(d) of the Aarhus Convention into 
EU law, the court ruled that emissions into the environment encompass actual and potential 
emissions, 150 therefore giving a much more inclusive interpretation to what encompasses 
emissions into the environment. 
For the specific grounds for refusal to protect commercial and industrial information, Article 
4(4)(d) of the Aarhus Convention states that any emission which would be relevant for the 
protection of the environment should be disclosed. This is broader than the Aarhus Regulation 
and Directive 2003/4 which refer to information on emissions into the environment.151 By not 
referring to emissions into the environment, the text of the Aarhus Convention does not leave 
space for the discussion on whether the emission needs to have actually been released into 
the environment or not. In fact, any emission which would be relevant for the protection of 
the environment should be disclosed. This would also include information on greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, since they may affect the environment. It is true that the holder of these 
allowances may never use them, and the emissions would therefore not be released into the 
environment.152 However, these allowances still have the potential to impact the environment 
if used to compensate emissions. In particular, if the allowances are granted for free, it is 
expected that these allowances will be released into the environment, since the installation 
will use up all the allowances received for free before buying allowances to fulfil their 
obligations under the EU ETS. 
                                                          
economic interest since competitors could gain a commercial advantage based on the trading data 
information. Therefore, the first two requirements are fulfilled. See, Ebbesson, J., Gaugitsch, H., 
Jendrośka, J., Marshall, F. and Stec, S., 2014, pp. 87-88. 
148 Article 6(1), Aarhus Regulation. 
149 Article 4(2) last paragraph, Directive 2003/4. 
150 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 71. See 
also V. A. Buonsante and A. Friel, op. cit. (2017), p. 457. 
151 Article 4(2) last paragraph, Access to Environmental Information Directive. Article 6(1), Aarhus 
Regulation. 
It is interesting to note that, while the Aarhus Convention allows for non-disclosure of information in 
order to protect commercial and industrial information, the Aarhus Regulation read in combination with 
Regulation 1049/2001 foresees non-disclosure of information only to protect commercial interests. 
152 P. Oliver, op. cit. (2013), p. 1439. 
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b) Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor Case 
In the Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) case, the raw data for the calculation of the 
CSCF was not made available to the public and the Commission even refused a request for 
access to the data.153 In doing so, the Commission relied on the argument that the data 
contained business secrets.154 The question that may arise is whether this data can be treated 
confidentially and whether this ground for refusal is applicable to this situation. 
Article 15a of the EU ETS Directive provides that the Commission shall disclose all decisions 
and reports relating to the quantity and allocation of allowances. In its second paragraph, it 
allows for the protection of information covered by professional secrecy in accordance with 
applicable laws, regulations and administrative provisions. In this case, the Aarhus 
Regulation is applicable, even if Article 15a did not directly refer to it. According to Article 
6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation, information related to emissions into the environment should 
be disclosed, even if the information concerns the commercial interests of a legal person by 
virtue of the existence of an overriding public interest in the disclosure.155 This means that, 
if the information is related to emissions into the environment, which seems to be the case 
for most or all of the information at stake in this case since the data concerned emissions 
already released by the installations (verified emissions), then the data should be disclosed. 
As pointed out by Advocate General Kokott, during the proceedings it was not possible to 
conclude whether the data could be treated confidentially.156 However, in order to rely on the 
exception for confidentiality in relation to commercial interests, the Commission should have 
conducted an analysis of the data to make a distinction between those that are related to 
emissions into the environment and those that are not, and subsequently releasing all of the 
former.  
As mentioned in section 3.3.1.iii, the Court of Justice did not delve into the application of the 
exception or the protection of business or trade secrets, as the Court looked directly at 
                                                          
153 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 141. 
154 The Commission is supported by Germany in this argumentation; see Opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 142. 
155 Looking at the Aarhus Convention, Article 4(4)(d) prescribes that commercial and industrial 
information may be kept confidential in order to protect an economic interest, but this protection is 
overturned when the information is related to emissions into the environment. 
156 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 150.  
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whether the Commission calculated the correction factor correctly. Since the Court found 
that the calculation was based on incorrect data (due to a divergent interpretation of which 
installations should be taken into account to determine the maximum annual amount of 
allowances),157 the Court ruled that the decision was invalid.158 Due to the invalidity of the 
decision, the Commission adopted a new CSCF.159 Again, the Commission only published 
the data after the decision was undertaken.160 Moreover, once again this publication was not 
accompanied by the raw data that could allow for the replication of the calculation. 
This case demonstrates that even decisions which do not require the exercise of discretion by 
the Commission may still be subject to error. The different translations and consequent 
interpretations of the text of the Directive, and the asymmetry in the implementation rules, 
demonstrate the complexity of the system.161 Nevertheless, groups, such as specialised NGOs 
and researchers having access to information, can provide technical arguments which may 
                                                          
157 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 87. 
158 Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis 
Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 99. 
159 Commission Decision (EU) No 2017/126 of 24 January 2017 amending Decision 2013/448/EU as 
regards the establishment of a uniform cross-sectoral correction factor in accordance with Article 10a 
of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 19/93. 
160 The decision was adopted on 25 January 2017 and the aggregated data was published in February 
2017. Publication of aggregated production data used to determine free allocations under the EU ETS 
for the period 2013-2020:  
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/euets_product_benchmarks_en.pdf. 
161 M. Peeters, ‘HvJ EU van 28 april 2016 in de gevoegde zaken C 191/14, C 192/14, C 295/14, C 
389/14 en C 391/14 tot en met C 393/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:311’ 44(6) Tijdschrift Milieu & Recht, 
(2017), pp. 537-540, paragraph 2. The original text in Dutch reads as follows: “Het is niet gemakkelijk 
de casus te begrijpen: het administratief-technische pakket aan juridische criteria voor gratis toedeling 
is zeer moeilijk te doorgronden. Bij een dergelijke hoge mate van complexiteit van regulering wordt de 
transparantie van de bestuurlijke besluitvorming, en daarmee ook de democratische en rechterlijke 
controle op deze besluitvorming, kwetsbaar. Immers, een voorwaarde voor adequate controle op 
besluitvorming is dat de gronden voor de besluitvorming bekend en begrijpelijk zijn. Bij heel complexe 
criteria – zoals overduidelijk het geval is bij de gratis toewijzing van broeikasgasemissierechten – zal 
het alleen voor specialisten nog inzichtelijk zijn of de juiste informatie gebruikt is, en of de juiste 
gevolgtrekking heeft plaatsgevonden. Bovendien speelt in EU verband vaak de taalkwestie een rol: ook 
in onderhavige zaak bestond verwarring over de uitleg van criteria vanwege discrepantie in 
verschillende taalversies (paragraaf 89 en verder). Daarnaast zit er een ingewikkelde asymmetrie in het 
geregelde systeem van toewijzingscriteria (zie daarover paragraaf 78). Door de AG wordt zelfs 
geopperd dat dit probleem wellicht over het hoofd is gezien door de wetgever (zie met name paragrafen 
76-79 en de paragrafen 107-108 van de conclusie: er ontbreken ‘duidelijke uitlatingen van de wetgever’ 
en er is geen verplichting voor de Commissie de asymmetrie op te heffen).” 
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help to arrive at a correct decision. Furthermore, in light of the Aarhus Convention, 
independent of the complexity of the information, what matters is whether a ground for an 
exception to disclosure could be granted to keep information confidential. When dealing with 
emissions into the environment, the regime is even stricter, and the analysis of whether the 
information should be disclosed has to take into account that, in these cases, the ground for 
refusal (i.e. protection of commercial and industrial information) is not applicable. In the 
CSCF Case, the court did not deal precisely with this question, because the main issue 
concerned the proper calculation of the correction factor. However, if a member of the public 
would make a request for the raw data used by the Commission, the limits of the application 
of the exception would have to be clarified.  
3.4. Dissemination of EU ETS-related information 
Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive provides that the Union Registry shall contain separate 
accounts to record the transactions related to allowances and it needs to be accessible to the 
public. Therefore, it is important to see what is made available and what possible legal 
problems can emanate from the implementation of this obligation. 
The EU ETS information related to the allocation and transactions related to allowances is 
scattered among three web pages: the Union Registry webpage that is part of the EU ETS 
website,162 the Union Registry website163 and European Union Transaction Log website.164 
On the Union Registry webpage, which is part of the European Commission website, 
information is made available regarding compliance data, i.e., the name of the installations 
and the respective number of allowances surrounded by each installation, the number of 
verified emissions per installation, and the exchange of international credits under the EU 
ETS.165 Complementing this information, the EU Transaction Log also provides information 
on the allocation of allowances, i.e., the distribution per country of the surrendered and free 
allocated emissions per country.166 Interestingly, the Union Registry website only makes the 
reports on the Kyoto Protocol available.167 Although any individual can sign in to the Union 
                                                          
162 European Commission. Union Registry - Phase 3 (2013-2020), 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en#tab-0-1. 
163 European Commission. Union Registry, 20 June 2020, https://ets-
registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml. 
164 European Commission-Directorate-General Climate Action. European Union Emissions 
Transaction log, 18 June 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/ets/napMgt.do. 
165 European Commission. Union Registry - Phase 3 (2013-2020), 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en#tab-0-1. 
166 European Commission-Directorate-General Climate Action. European Union Emissions 
Transaction log, 18 June 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/ets/napMgt.do. 
167 The Kyoto Protocol Reports are reports on the transactions related to international credits for the 
purpose of meeting the EU’s obligations as a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and under Article 10 of 
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Register by creating an account with a username and password,168 the only information 
available is on the reports on the Kyoto Protocol and a tab for accounts become visible. This 
evidences that the “accessible to the public” referred in Article 19(2) probably refers to access 
to enable any member of the public to create an account to hold and trade allowances, but it 
does not provide for ample access to EU ETS-related information. 
Article 19(3) of the EU ETS Directive requires that information on Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) must also be made available on 
the Union Registry. Until 2013, it was possible to trace the number of allowances originating 
from international offset credits (CERs and ERUs) that were used by operators to cover their 
emissions.169 However, in 2014 the Commission published the information on compliance 
data and verified emissions for 2013 without the data on international credits exchanged.170 
After public complaints from civil society groups, the Commission released another 
document with the volume and type of offsets surrendered.171 However, unlike in previous 
years, the names of the companies did not appear in the document. The Commission 
explained the absence of the information as follows:    
“Companies can exchange CERs and ERUs for allowances up to their individual 
entitlement limits set in the registry. In contrast with phase two, no information is 
available on the number of CERs and ERUs used for compliance. Since in phase 3 
CERs and ERUs are no longer directly surrendered but exchanged for 
allowances, it is impossible to trace how many CERs and ERUs were used in a 
particular compliance year.”172 (Emphasis added) 
The Commission Regulation on the Union Registry explained that fungible credits (i.e., units 
that are interchangeable) were necessary in order to have a well-functioning system.173 It may 
                                                          
Regulation 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism 
for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national 
and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC, OJ L 165/13. 
168 European Commission. Union Registry, 20 June 2020, https://ets-
registry.webgate.ec.europa.eu/euregistry/EU/index.xhtml. 
169 CERs are credits issued for emission reductions from CDM project activities, while EURs are issued 
for JI projects. 
170 Ember. Transparency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has been unnecessarily reduced. 
Available at: https://ember-climate.org/2014/05/16/transparency-issues-compound-problems-with-eu-
carbon-market/. 
171 Ember. Transparency issues compound problems with EU carbon market. Available at: 
https://ember-climate.org/2014/05/16/transparency-issues-compound-problems-with-eu-carbon-
market/. 
172 European Commission. “Number of international credits exchanged totals 132.8 million”. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014050201_en.htm. 
173 Recital 8, Preamble, Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013. 
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occur that transactions recorded in the system need to be undone (reversal of transactions), 
because there was an unintentional or erroneous transaction.174 Furthermore, in the case of 
theft, there will be a claim to restore the stolen credits. In all of these situations, the fungibility 
of the allowances means that the allowance holder may claim the same amount of allowances, 
but not the specific allowances.175  
Since the above-mentioned situation deals with information at the EU level, the Aarhus 
Regulation will also apply. Article 4(2)(e) of the Aarhus Regulation states that, among others, 
registries shall include “data or summaries of data derived from the monitoring of activities 
affecting, or likely to affect, the environment”. Considering that the international credits used 
in the system are used to compensate emissions that have an impact on the environment, 
combined with the potential impact that the projects from which these credits originated may 
have in the hosting countries, it can be considered an activity affecting or likely to affect the 
environment.176 In this vein, there is an obligation for the registry to make the information 
about the use of international credits in the EU ETS available, according to Article 4(2)(e) of 
the Aarhus Regulation. The fact that the information is not available on the Union Registry 
website but rather in the website of the DG Climate action about the Union Registry does not 
constitute a barrier to fulfilling the obligation prescribed under the Aarhus Convention, 
because the ultimate result, which is to make the information available to the public, is 
fulfilled. However, the issue regarding the disclosure of the names of the installations that 
have used international credits to compensate their emissions is not clarified by this 
provision. It could be argued that, by disclosing the number of credits used in the system and 
the projects from which the credits originated would be enough to fulfil the obligation under 
the Aarhus Regulation. However, it can also be argued that the use of credits is part of data 
that affects the environment and, therefore, should also be disseminated. These arguments 
have not yet been considered by the Court of Justice. 
The need to harmonise the system in order to guarantee the free circulation of carbon credits 
among EU ETS installations seems to have come at the expense of public access to 
information. Since the names of the companies which use the international credits cannot be 
known due to the fungibility of the allowances and international credits, NGOs claimed that 
the restriction on information on CERS and ERUS will have an impact on the behaviour of 
                                                          
174 Article 70, Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013. 
175 European Commission. General Questions and Answers on Registries (05/2013), 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en#tab-0-2. 
176 Regarding claims of negative impacts of CDM projects, see: R. Spalding-Fecher, A. N. Achanta, P. 
Erickson, E. Haites, M. Lazarus, N. Pahuja, N. Pandey, S. Seres and R. Tewari, Assessing the impact 
of the clean development mechanism - Report commissioned by the High Level Panel on the CDM 
policy Dialogue (2012), 47- 49. 
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companies.177 Companies that purchase credits from responsible projects could use this kind 
of information to differentiate themselves towards consumers, but with this change, the 
differentiation becomes harder. 
3.5. Interim conclusion 
The general regime for access to environmental information under the EU ETS can be found 
within Articles 17, 15a, and 19 of the EU ETS Directive. Articles 17 and 15a deal specifically 
with access to information, while Article 19 focuses on the registries, which contain key 
information about the functioning of the EU ETS. 
The analysis carried out in section 3.2 showed that, despite the fact that  Article 17 of the EU 
ETS Directive does not reflect the shift of decision making from the national level to the EU 
level, the Aarhus Regulation applies to information requests addressed to the Commission, 
since EU institutions are bound, in any case, by the Aarhus Regulation. Furthermore, it was 
also identified that Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive obliges public authorities to either 
disseminate environmental information and to disclose it upon request.  
Secondly, section 3.2 concluded that the second part of Article 15a of the EU ETS Directive 
implicitly refers to these Directive 2003/4 as well as to the Aarhus Regulation when it makes 
reference to “applicable laws, regulations or administrative provisions”.178  
Finally, section 3.2 showed that Article 19 establishes a provision on the dissemination of 
information that also involves the European Commission. However, the extent to which this 
provision allows for access to information is not clear from the wording of the provision. 
The limited scope of Article 15a and 17 cannot cover all the possible requests for information 
under the EU ETS. To examine the definition of environmental information and the limits of 
the grounds for the disclosure of environmental information further, an investigation of the 
case law was carried out in section 3.3. 
Concerning the definition of environmental information, the case law dealt with information 
regarding data used for the calculation the CSCF, information on the allocation of free 
allowances by a Member State and trading data. Regarding the calculation of the CSCF, the 
opinion of the Advocate General showed that the raw data needed to replicate the calculation 
should be made available to the public. Unfortunately, the CJEU did not delve specifically 
into this question in its judgment. In the Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland case, the Court 
                                                          
177 Ember. Transparency issues compound problems with EU carbon market, 19 June 2020, 
https://ember-climate.org/2014/05/16/transparency-issues-compound-problems-with-eu-carbon-
market/. 
178 Article 15a deals with professional secrecy, an aspect which is not present in Article 17 of the EU 
ETS Directive. 
170 
tackled the information concerning the allocation of free allowances and confirmed that the 
list of installations covered by the EU ETS and also the number of allowances allocated for 
free by a Member State constitute environmental information within the definition of the 
Aarhus Regulation. The opinion of the Advocate General in the Ville de Lyon case further 
demonstrated that trading data constitutes environmental information, although this issue did 
not receive particular attention in the judgment. These cases reveal that a significant amount 
of EU ETS-related information falls within the definition of environmental information, 
although, in the Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland case and in the Ville de Lyon case, such an 
interpretation still needs confirmation from the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Regarding the grounds for refusal, the case law showed that these grounds have to be 
interpreted in a restrictive way. On the topic of applying the exception for refusal in case of 
information in that could undermine the decision making process, the CJEU made a 
distinction in the Saint-Gobain case between decision making itself and the entire 
administrative procedure, which leads to a decision. It concluded that all information that is 
part of the administrative procedure should be disclosed. Concerning, secondly, the 
application of the exception for the protection of the confidentiality of commercial and 
industrial information, the Ville de Lyon and CFCS cases, despite not dealing directly with 
this exception, allowed for the possibility to explore its application, since the public authority 
relied on this ground to refuse access to the environmental information. The analysis in this 
chapter showed that the application of this exception, when dealing with emissions into the 
environment, is even stricter, and the analysis of whether the information should be disclosed 
has to take into consideration that, in these cases, the ground for refusal (i.e. protection of 
commercial and industrial information) is not applicable. Furthermore, the discussion on 
what constitutes emissions into the environment in view of the EU ETS suggests that there is 
a need for an interpretation of the Aarhus Convention in light of the new developments to 
combat climate change, such as emissions trading. At the time of the adoption of the Aarhus 
Convention, emissions trading was still a concept that needed further practical development, 
and it can be assumed that the broad term emissions was related to the actual release of 
substances from installations within more classic command-and-control instruments. With 
the advent of a market-based instrument, such as emissions trading, there is a need for further 
interpretation in view of the potential release of substances and the creation of new concepts 
such as greenhouse gas emission allowances. 
Regarding, finally, the active dissemination of information by the Commission, which was 
discussed in section 3.4, the Union Registry is the main tool used to make information 
available to the public, according to Article 19 of the EU ETS Directive. However, in reality, 
the EU ETS information related to the allocation and transaction of allowances is scattered 
among three web pages. The fact that the EU ETS Directive empowers the Commission to 
adopt a regulation, which provides for public access and confidentiality as appropriate, results 
in a possibility of tailoring how and when the information is available. The compatibility of 
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the exercise of this discretion – as the change in the way the information about international 
credits or the time transaction-related information is released to the public – with the Aarhus 
Convention has yet to be tested by the European courts. 
Furthermore, the analysis in section 3.4 makes it possible to identify that there is no registry 
available to the public that would provide information on the number and nature of requests 
to access EU ETS-related information. This is an indication of the limitations on access to 
environmental information rights in the EU. A readily available registry with a compilation 
of all requests would not only help the members of the public to get information, but it would 
also avoid the situation in which civil servants have to answer the same questions repeatedly. 
These examples demonstrate that there is still much room for a further and more ambitious 
interpretation of the Aarhus Convention with regard to disclosing environmental information 
under the EU ETS. 
4. Public Participation in the decision making of the EU ETS 
4.1. Introduction 
This section will undertake a systematic analysis of the provisions which empower the 
European Commission to act under the EU ETS Directive at the EU level in view of public 
participation requirements mandated by the Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Regulation. 
First, the provisions which empower the European Commission to act are mapped. 
Concomitantly, it will be identified whether the provisions, on the basis of which the acts 
may be adopted at the EU level, require public participation or not. Second, the analysis will 
consider if the Aarhus Regulation provides any obligation for public participation for acts 
adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS. Third, this section will study if these 
decisions fall within the scope of the second pillar of the Aarhus Convention and, if they do, 
which legal requirements the Commission needs to fulfil in order to comply with the 
requirements of the Aarhus Convention. Fourth, the current EU legal framework is contrasted 
to the legal requirements found in the previous section to test its compatibility with the 
Aarhus Convention. 
4.2. Public participation under the EU ETS Directive at the EU level 
In contrast to access to information, the EU ETS Directive does not provide any specific 
provision on public participation that applies to all provisions of the Directive. Moreover, 
none of the amendments to the EU ETS Directive, thus far, were aimed at implementing 
public participation in the decision making process.179 
                                                          
179 For the amendments to the EU ETS Directive, see footnote 3. 
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In order to identify the current legal framework for public participation at the EU level, a 
mapping of the core acts (prescribed by the EU ETS Directive) to be taken at the EU level 
must, therefore, be carried out to identify what is the legal procedure through which these 
acts may be adopted and whether the procedure imposes public participation requirements. 
With respect to the acts that will be analysed, it is important to note that, in the third phase 
of the EU ETS, the EU ETS Directive empowers the European Commission to regulate the 
cap, the allowance allocation rules and the harmonised rules regarding monitoring and 
verification. The implementation of the monitoring and verification provisions falls under 
the competence of the Member States. This section will thus focus on public participation in 
the setting of the cap and allocation of allowances, with monitoring and verification only 
analysed in view of the harmonised rules established at the EU level.  
4.2.1.  Cap 
The EU ETS emissions cap is related to the EU commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to 
reduce its emissions by 8% in the first commitment period (2008-2012) and 20% in the 
second commitment period (2012-2020).180  
In Phase I, the learning by doing phase from 2005-2007, and in Phase II, running from 2008-
2012, the Member States were in charge of stipulating the overall amount of allowances 
needed;181 that is, they could set their own national cap through National Action Plans 
(NAPs). For the purpose of this chapter, the most relevant aspect is that the NAPs were 
subject to public participation at the Member State level. The NAPs had to be based on 
“objective and transparent criteria, including those listed in Annex III, taking due account of 
comments from the public” and had to be notified to the Commission.182 The Commission 
had the power to reject each NAP, in whole or in part.183  
Phase III began in 2013 and ran until 2020. NAPs no longer exist, and the amended EU ETS 
Directive provides for an EU-wide cap on emissions based on the allowances allocated in 
2008-2012. This means that, since 2013, there is an EU-wide cap that will be reduced “in a 
linear manner” by 1.74%184 in order to achieve a general reduction of 21% below the 2005 
emissions levels by 2020.185  
The establishment of the EU-wide cap may be affected by the entrance and withdrawal of 
sectors and subsectors in the system and the use of international credits that may be used to 
                                                          
180 Article 1, Doha Amendment. 
181 A more detailed explanation of these phases is provided in section 2. 
182 Article 9(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. 
183 Article 9(3), Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. 
184 Article 9, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
185 Recital 14, Preamble, Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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offset the greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the acts adopted by the Commission in this 
realm will also be analysed.  
i. EU-wide Cap 
Article 9 of the EU ETS Directive prescribes how the cap shall be established by the 
Commission. The cap for emissions from stationary installations is established, according to 
Article 9 of the EU ETS Directive, by the decision of the European Commission acting alone. 
The decision is thus taken solely by the College of Commissioners which is based on the 
principle of collegiality.186 This means that the College of Commissioners – which is 
composed of 28 members – is seen as one body responsible collectively for the decisions 
taken.187  
It should be noted that the question of whether the implementing power of the Commission 
should be subject to control by the Member States is determined by the EU legislator.188 The 
Regulation on Committee Procedure states that the mechanisms for control will “apply where 
a legally binding Union act […] identifies the need for uniform conditions of implementation 
and requires that the adoption of implementing acts by the Commission be subject to the 
control of Member States.” 189 In the case of Article 9 of the EU ETS Directive, the Council 
and the Parliament, when adopting the Directive, did not require Member State control and 
the Commission can thus adopt the implementing decisions on the cap without a committee 
procedure.190 The absence of a requirement for Member State control could be due to the fact 
that Article 9 prescribes precisely how the cap should be determined: “based on the total 
quantities of allowances issued or to be issued by the Member States in accordance with the 
Commission Decisions on their national allocation plans for the period from 2008 to 
                                                          
186 Article 9, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. On the Principle of collegiality see N. 
Nugent, W. E. Paterson and V. Wright, The European Commission, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 91-93.  
187 European Commission, Rules of Procedure of the European Commission  C(2000) 3614, OJ L 
308/26 (2000). 
188 Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, Application of Articles 290 (delegated acts) 
and 291 (implementing acts) TFEU (2011), p. 11. 
189 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of 
the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55/13. 
190 First Commission decision determining the Cap for 2013: Commission Decision 2010/384/EU. 
Second Commission decision determining the Cap for 2013 was adopted: Commission Decision 
2010/634/EU of 22 October 2010 adjusting the Union-wide quantity of allowances to be issued under 
the Union Scheme for 2013 and repealing Decision 2010/384/EU (notified under document C(2010) 
7180), OJ L 279/34. After the adoption of the first decision, additional information was made available 
and the first decision had to be repealed and replaced (Recital 2, Preamble, Commission Decision 
2010/634/EU) 
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2012”,191  leaving no space for the exercise of discretion by the Commission on how to 
calculate the cap.  
While the legislator did not find it necessary to provide for Member State control, Article 9 
of the EU ETS Directive also does not foresee any public participation requirement for the 
adoption of the decision on the cap.  
ii. Opt-in and opt-out of the EU ETS 
Member States may take further measures to include additional activities or types of gases 
(called opt-in) in the EU ETS, but these inclusions are subject to the approval of the European 
Commission.192 In the period from 2008 to 2012, Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive served 
as the legal basis for five Commission decisions regarding the inclusion of nitrous oxide 
(N2O) emissions associated with the production of nitric acid. The requests, which were 
approved by the Commission, were made by Austria,193 Italy,194 Latvia,195 the Netherlands,196 
and the United Kingdom.197 Since 2013, the N2O emissions associated with the production 
of nitric acid are covered by the EU ETS.198 
The five decisions related to N2O emissions are implementing decisions which were adopted 
by the Commission following the regulatory procedure with scrutiny according to Article 5a 
of Council Decision 1999/468/EC, which prescribes how the implementing powers conferred 
                                                          
191 Article 9, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
192 Article 24, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
193 Décision de la Commission concernant l'inclusion unilatérale par l'Autriche de gaz à effet de serre 
et d'activités supplémentaires dans le système communautaire en application de l'article 24 de la 
directive 2003/87/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil (C(2009)9849/F1)2009. 
194 Décision de la Commission concernant l'inclusion unilatérale, par l'Italie, de gaz à effet de serre et 
d'activités supplémentaires dans le système d'échange de quotas d'émission de gaz à effet de serre dans 
l'Union en application de l'article 24 de la directive 2003/87/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil 
Commission (C(2012)497/1).  
195 Commission Decision concerning the unilateral inclusion of additional installations by the Republic 
of Latvia in the Community emission allowance trading scheme pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (C(2009)3032/F1). 
196 Commission Decision of 17.12.2008 concerning the unilateral inclusion of additional greenhouse 
gases and activities by the Netherlands in the Community emissions trading scheme pursuant to Article 
24 of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (C(2008) 7867), OJ L 
175/36.  
197 Commission Decision of 6.6.2011 concerning the unilateral inclusion of additional greenhouse gases 
and activities by the United Kingdom in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Union pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (C(2011)3798). 
198 Article 1(30) and Annex I, Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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on the European Commission shall be exercised.199 Comitology, which is the procedure 
through which the Commission exercises its implementing powers with the assistance of 
committees composed by the Member States representatives,200 does not foresee the 
participation of the public and the Member States participate only through their representative 
on the committee. Likewise, Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive does not require any public 
participation. 
Member States may also exclude small installations (called opt-out) which are subject to 
measures that achieve equivalent emissions reductions.201 In this case, there is no need for 
explicit approval from the Commission: i.e. if the Commission does not object, the exclusion 
is deemed approved.202 Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Italy have all excluded installations with low emissions from the EU ETS.203 The 
Commission has a period of three months to object to the Member State’s decision. Article 
27 of the EU ETS Directive does not clarify how this objection of the Commission is to be 
expressed in legal terms but the provision, per se, does not provide any requirement for public 
participation (only consultation with the operator by the Member State is prescribed). It 
should be noted that public participation may take place at the Member State level regarding 
the national decision if prescribed by national law, but this would not exclude the possibility 
of public participation taking place at the EU level, which could, for instance, have been 
provided for in the EU ETS Directive.  
iii. Restrictions on the use of international credits  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, there are two mechanisms which generate international credits, 
namely: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI).204 
                                                          
199 Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L 184/23. 
200 P. Ponzano, ‘The Reform of Comitology and Delegated Acts: An Executive’s View’, in C. F. 
Bergström and D. Ritleng (eds.), Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for 
Delegation of Powers,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 37- 54, p. 37. 
201 Article 27, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
202 Article 27(2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
203 Recital 2, Preamble, Commission Implementing Decision 2013/634/EU of 31 October 2013 on the 
adjustments to Member States’ annual emission allocations for the period from 2013 to 2020 pursuant 
to Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 292/19 provided the 
information about the Member States that excluded installations with low emissions from the EU ETS. 
It can be that other Member States will take similar measures and therefore it remains important for the 
present discussion to examine which legal instrument the Commission may use to intervene and 
whether the decision making allows for public participation. 
204 According to Article 12(2) of the Kyoto Protocol: “The purpose of the clean development 
mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and 
in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in 
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The use of such project-based credits is allowed under the EU ETS until 2020205 but their use 
is subject to quantitative206 and qualitative restrictions.207 The use of CDM and JI credits are 
limited to 11% of the operator allocation in the 2008-2012 period, and to 4.5% of their 
verified emission in the 2013-2020 period for newcomers.208 The EU ETS Directive has 
blocked the use of credits originating from nuclear energy products, afforestation or 
reforestation activities,209 and it has established that, from 2013 onwards, the use of credits 
from new CDM projects is limited to projects located in Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).210 In the third period, the Commission may also adopt restrictions on the use of 
specific credits (qualitative restriction).211  The Commission has used this possibility to block 
the use of credits from projects involving the destruction of industrial gases.212 The 
                                                          
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3.” Article 12(2), Kyoto Protocol. 
The mechanism known as “joint implementation” is defined under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It 
allows an Annex B Party to use emission reduction units (ERUs) from projects in another Annex B 
Party to achieve its target. 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes a mitigation mechanism which will replace the CDM and 
JI after 2020.  
205 Article 11a(4), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
206 Article 11a(9), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. The existing power conferred on the 
Commission by Article 11a(9) of the EU ETS Directive has been revoked for the period after 2020. 
Recital 27 and Article 1(18), Directive (EU) 2018/410. 
207 Article 11a(8), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. The existing power conferred on the 
Commission by Article 11a(8) of the  EU ETS Directive has been revoked for the period after 2020. 
Recital 27 and Article 1(18), Directive (EU) 2018/410. 
208 The limitation already established in Article 11a(8) of the EU ETS Directive and further detailed in  
Article 1 (2), Comission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2013 of 8 November 2013 on determining 
international credit entitlements pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, OJ L 299/32. 
209 Article 1 (2), Directive 2004/101/EC.  
210 Article 11a(4), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
211 Article 11a(9), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. This amendment was introduced 
through Article 1(13), Directive 2009/29/EC. 
212 Commission Regulation (EU) No 550/2011 of 7 June 2011 on determining, pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restrictions applicable to the use of 
international credits from projects involving industrial gases, OJ L 149/1. 
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Commission has also adopted a decision to avoid the double counting213 of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions.214  
In sum the Commission has adopted three acts: (i) a Commission Regulation on quantitative 
restrictions;  (ii) a Commission Regulation on the prohibition of the use of credits from 
projects involving the destruction of industrial gases and (iii) a Commission Decision on 
rules to avoid double counting. These measures were adopted via the comitology procedure, 
which, as already explained, does not foresee public participation.215 Likewise, the provisions 
of the EU ETS Directive (Articles 11a(8), 11a(9) and 11b(7)) on which these acts were based 
do not contain public participation requirements for the adoption of these acts.  
4.2.2.  Allocation of allowances 
As described in the introduction on the EU ETS Directive (section 2), the first two phases of 
the EU ETS were primarily based on free allocation, and Member States could define how 
the emissions allowances would be allocated to their industries.216 For Phase III, which is the 
first phase of the centralised regime, auctioning is the default method of allocating allowances 
                                                          
213 “Double counting occurs when a single GHG emission reduction or removal, achieved through a 
mechanism issuing units, is counted more than once towards attaining mitigation pledges or financial 
pledges for the purpose of mitigating climate change.” L. Schneider, A. Kollmuss and M. Lazarus, 
‘Addressing the risk of double counting emission reductions under the UNFCCC’ 131(4) Climatic 
Change, (2015), pp. 473-486, p. 474. 
214 The legal basis for the adoption of the act is Article 11b(7), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated 
version. The decision to avoid the double counting of greenhouse gas emission reductions Commission 
Decision 2006/780/EC of 13 November 2006 on avoiding double counting of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions under the Community emissions trading scheme for project activities under the Kyoto 
Protocol pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 316/12. 
215 According to the EU ETS Directive, the acts based on Articles 11a(8), 11a(9), in the present case 
the two Regulations, should follow the regulatory procedure with scrutiny in accordance with Articles 
5a(1) to (4) and 7, Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission (1999/468/EC), OJ L 184/23. While the acts 
adopted under and 11b(7) EU ETS Directive, in this case the Commission decision on the avoidance of 
double counting, should follow the regulatory procedure with scrutiny in accordance with Articles 5a(1) 
to (4) and Article 7, Council Decision 1999/468/EC. This decision was repealed by Regulation (EU) 
No 182/2011. However, the effects of Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC was provisionally 
maintained to allow the transition of existing basic acts which refer to this Article (see Recital 21 of 
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011), such as is the case of the EU ETS Directive. 
216 Article 11, Directive 2003/87/EC, original version. 
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within the EU ETS.217 However, this default method is subject to many exceptions that full 
auctioning is not expected to occur until 2027.218  
The power sector has been subject to full auctioning since 2013.219 However, eight Member 
States benefit from a transitional period of free allocation for power generators in order to 
help modernise their electricity production.220 
Within the manufacturing sector, the transition to auctioning is taking shape gradually. The 
manufacturing industry started receiving 80% of its allowances free-of-charge in 2013, but 
this decreases progressively each year to 30% in 2020 with a target of no free allocation by 
2027.221  
In the aviation sector, only 15% of aviation allowances will be auctioned until 2020.222 The 
aviation sector was only incorporated into the EU ETS in 2009 through an amendment to the 
EU ETS Directive that, among other changes, introduced a chapter dedicated to the aviation 
sector.223 Airlines can use any allowances for compliance purposes,224 but stationary 
installations cannot use aviation allowances.225 Only emissions from flights within the 
European Economic Area are covered by the EU ETS.226 
                                                          
217 Article 10 (1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
218 The rules on free allocation might change if an international agreement is reached, Article 10(a)(1) 
of Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
219 Article 10a (1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
220 The countries that derogates from the full auctioning in the power section are: Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Cyprus, Estonia, and Lithuania. 
221 Article 10(a)(11), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
222Article 3d(2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
223 Thus, one might wonder if such provisions would also produce implications for procedural rights. 
For the sake of clarification, the EU ETS Directive does not include any special rules regarding access 
to environmental information and public participation for the aviation sector. Therefore, the analysis in 
this chapter  also applies to the aviation sector. 
224 Article 12(2a), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
225 Article 12(3), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. This is because the aviation sector is not 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol and, therefore, its emissions were not calculated within the targets of 
the Protocol. A. Anger and J. Köhler, ‘Including aviation emissions in the EU ETS: Much ado about 
nothing? A review’ 17(1) Transport Policy, (2010), pp. 38-46, p. 39. 
226 The original idea was to apply the EU ETS to emissions from flights from, to and within the 
European Economic Area, see Directive 2008/101/EC. However, the EU limited the scope of the EU 
ETS to flights within the European Economic Area until 2016 while waiting for the development of a 
global measure by the International Civil Aviation Organization (Article 1 (1),  Regulation (EU) No 
421/2014.) Due to the adoption of a resolution by the 2016 International Civil Aviation Organization 
Assembly on the global measure, the EU decided to maintain the application of the EU ETS limited to 
flights within the European Economic Area from 2017 to 2023 (see Article 1(6)(b)(i), Regulation (EU) 
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Hence, under the third phase of the EU ETS, operators either receive allowances for free or 
buy them. These allowances can then be traded as needed. The rules for the allocation of 
allowances (stationary and aviation) are determined in the EU ETS Directive and further 
developed through the adoption of acts by the Commission. The next sections explain the 
rules for the allocation of allowances highlighting whether these decisions were taken 
allowing for public participation or not. 
i. Auctioning 
In the third phase of the EU ETS, all the allowances which are not allocated for free shall be 
auctioned.227 According to Article 10(4) of the EU ETS Directive, the Commission adopted 
a regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of the auctioning of greenhouse 
gas emission allowances through comitology, which does not foresee any public 
participation.228 This regulation has been amended several times but none of these 
amendments introduced public participation requirements.229 
ii. Free allocation 
The free allocation of allowances is based on ex-ante benchmarks, which have to be 
determined based on “the average performance of the 10% of installations in a sector or 
subsector in the Community [now the EU] that are most efficient in the years 2007-2008”.230 
This means that installations with low-carbon emissions are favoured.231 The total amount of 
free allowances received by each installation is determined based on such emission 
benchmarks. The Commission adopted a decision establishing the benchmark criteria.232 
Article 10a(1) EU ETS on which this decision was based does not prescribe the Commission 
to carry out a public participation procedure but only requires the Commission to consult the 
relevant stakeholders. However, the provision does not offer a further explanation of how 
                                                          
2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2017 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to implement 
a global market-based measure from 2021, OJ L 350/7). See E. Woerdman, op. cit. (2015), pp. 54-55. 
227 Article 10(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
228 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010. 
229 Comission Regulation (EU) No 1210/2011. Commission Regulation (EU) No 784/2012.; 
Commission Regulation No 1042/2012. Commission Regulation No 1143/2013. Commission 
Regulation No 176/2014. Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1902 of 18 October 2017 amending 
Commission Regulation (EU) No  1031/2010 to align the auctioning of allowances with Decision (EU) 
2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council and to list an auction platform to be appointed 
by the United Kingdom, OJ L 269/13.  
230 Article 10a (2), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
231 E. Woerdman, op. cit. (2015), p. 57. 
232 Commission Decision 2011/278/EU. 
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these relevant stakeholders are to be selected. The Commission carried out five stakeholders 
meetings, but it was not clear which stakeholders participated.233 
To ensure the annual free allocation remains within the overall EU ETS cap, a uniform cross-
sectoral correction factor (CSCF) is applied.234 Article 10a(5) of the EU ETS Directive, which 
prescribes the application of a CSCF, does not require any public participation. As discussed 
in relation to the EU-wide cap (Article 9(a) EU ETS Directive), it could be argued that the 
legislator felt that no public scrutiny would be necessary, since no discretion is given to the 
Commission on the calculation of the maximum annual amount of allowances, and the CSFC 
is just a factor to ensure that the total is within this limit. In this vein, the instruction on the 
calculation provided in the EU ETS Directive would not require any exercise of discretion.  
iii. Carbon Leakage  
The term carbon leakage refers to the risk that emission-intensive production will move to a 
jurisdiction that does not regulate carbon emissions.235 To avoid this potential problem, 
sectors and subsectors deemed to be at a significant risk of carbon leakage will continue, until 
2020, to receive 100% free allocation of allowances, up to the sector’s benchmark.236  
                                                          
233 European Commission, Impact Assessment of the Commission Decision on determining transitional 
Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC, 
C(2011) 2772 final (2011b), p. 7. 
234 For an explanation on the CSCF see section 3.4.1.i. 
235 “This [carbon leakage] might happen if in a specific country or regional organization the government 
wants to introduce carbon policies, while other important countries in the rest of the world hesitate to 
do so.” M. Peeters, op. cit. (2008), p. 27. In order to support her argument, Peeters refers to E. 
Woerdman, S. Clò and A. Arcuri, ‘European emissions trading and the polluter-pays principle: 
assessing grandfathering and over-allocation’, in M. Faure and M. Peeters (eds.), Climate Change and 
European Emission Trading,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 128-150. 
“Abatement activities of the industrialized countries might result in a movement of the GHG emissions 
into the regions with no restrictions. This effect has been called leakage.”  
S. V. Paltsev, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Regional and Sectoral Contributions to the Carbon Leakage’ 22(4) 
The Energy Journal, (2001), pp. 53-79, p. 54. 
 “Carbon leakage can be defined as the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the 
country (as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission reductions in the 
sector (again, as a result of the environmental policy).” J. Reinaud, Issues behind CompetItIveness and 
Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy Industry (2008), 3. 
“In the EU-ETS context, carbon leakage is defined as an increase in emissions outside the region as the 
result of the policy to cap emission in the EU. It is measured by the ratio of emissions increase outside 
the EU (as a result of the EU-ETS) over the emissions reductions in the EU (again, as a result of the 
EU-ETS).” J. Reinaud, Issues behind CompetItIveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy Industry 
(2008), 56. 
236 Article 10(a)(12), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
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Article 10a(13) of the EU ETS Directive prescribes that the Commission shall consult with 
Member States, the sectors or subsectors concerned and other relevant stakeholders to 
determine the list of sectors and subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage.237 However, concerning the free allocation of allowances, the provision does not 
offer a further explanation on how the relevant stakeholders are to be selected. The 
Commission adopted the carbon leakage list in 2009 (for the 2010-2014 period),238 which 
was amended in 2011,239 2012240 and 2013.241 A second list was adopted in 2014 (for the 
2015-2020 period).242 Both lists were subject to open public consultations, which are open to 
the general public and are online-based,243 and the Commission received input from 
companies, NGOs, individuals, and researchers. 244 
                                                          
237 Article 10a(13) reads: “By 31 December 2009 and every five years thereafter, after discussion in the 
European Council, the Commission shall determine a list of the sectors or subsectors referred to in 
paragraph 12 on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraphs 14 to 17.  
Every year the Commission may, at its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, add a sector 
or subsector to the list referred to in the first subparagraph if it can be demonstrated, in an analytical 
report, that this sector or subsector satisfies the criteria in paragraphs 14 to 17, following a change that 
has a substantial impact on the sector’s or subsector’s activities.  
For the purpose of implementing this Article, the Commission shall consult the Member States, 
the sectors or subsectors concerned and other relevant stakeholders. 
Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall 
be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(3).” 
(Emphasis added), Article 10a(13), Directive 2003/87, consolidated version. 
238 Commission Decision 2010/02/EU. 
239 Commission Decision 2011/745/EU amending Decisions 2010/2/EU and 2011/278/EU as regards 
the sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage  
C(2011) 8017, OJ L 299/9.  
240 Commission Decision 2012/498/EU amending Decisions 2010/2/EU and 2011/278/EU as regards 
the sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage 
C(2012) 5715, OJ L 241/52.  
241 Commission Decision 2014/9 amending Decisions 2010/2/EU and 2011/278/EU as regards the 
sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage C(2013) 
9186, OJ L 9/9. 
242 Commission Decision 2014/746/EU of 27 October 2014 determining, pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019 C(2014) 7809, 
OJ L 308/114.  
243 A. Bunea, ‘Designing stakeholder consultations: Reinforcing or alleviating bias in the European 
Union system of governance?’ 56(1) European Journal of Political Research, (2017), pp. 46-69, p. 52. 
Public consultation at the EU level is discussed further in section 4.5.2. 
244 Four stakeholder meetings on the subject of carbon leakage were held in 2008 and 2009. 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/leakage/docs/sec_2009_1710_en.pdf. 
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iv. Option for transitional free allocation 
Eight Member States – Bulgaria,245 Cyprus,246 the Czech Republic,247 Estonia,248 Hungary,249 
Lithuania,250 Poland,251 and Romania252 – have applied for a derogation of the obligation to 
auction all allowances for the energy sector.253 All applications were approved by the 
Commission and, as a result, these Member States are allowed to give a “decreasing number 
of free allowances to existing power plants for a transitional period until 2019”.254 Two other 
Member States, Latvia and Malta, could also have applied for this derogation, but they did 
                                                          
Consultation on methodology for Commission Decision determining the list of sectors and subsectors 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015-2019 from 06 June 
2013 to 30 August 2013. 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/articles/0021_en. 
245 Commission Decision of 6.7.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation for the 
modernisation of electricity generation notified by Bulgaria (C(2012) 4560 final). 
246 Commission Decision of 23.5.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation 
for the modernisation of electricity generation notified by Cyprus (C(2012) 3260 final). 
247 Commission Decision of 6.7.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation for the 
modernisation of electricity generation notified by the Czech Republic (C(2012) 4576 final). 
248 Commission Decision of 23.5.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation 
for the modernisation of electricity generation notified by Estonia (C(2012) 3271 final). 
249 Commission Decision of 30.11.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation 
for the modernisation of electricity generation notified by Hungary (C(2012) 8675 final). 
250 Commission Decision of 23.5.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation 
for the modernisation of electricity generation notified by Lithuania (C(2012) 3237 final). 
251 Commission Decision of 13.7.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation 
for the modernisation of electricity generation notified by Poland (C(2012) 4609 final). 
252 Commission Decision of 6.7.2012 concerning the application pursuant to Article 10c (5) of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to give transitional free allocation for the 
modernisation of electricity generation notified by Romania (C(2012) 4564 final). 
253 Article 10c, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
254 European Commission. Transitional free allocation to electricity generators, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/electricity_en. European Commission. Transitional 
free allocation to electricity generators, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/electricity_en. 
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not do so.255 These decisions, like those regarding the cap, are taken solely by the 
Commission, and Article 10c(6) EU ETS Directive does not foresee any public participation. 
4.2.3.  Monitoring and verification 
While monitoring and verification are tasks to be carried out at the Member State level, the 
EU ETS Directive has empowered the Commission256 to adopt regulations harmonising the 
monitoring and reporting of emissions,257 and standards for verification and accreditation.258 
These legal bases for the adoption of these regulations do not prescribe public participation 
requirements,259 and these two regulations were adopted via comitology, which, as already 
explained, does not foresee public participation. 
4.3. The Aarhus Regulation and the EU ETS Directive 
Even though the EU ETS Directive does not refer to the Aarhus Regulation, which provides 
for the application of the Aarhus Convention to European institutions and bodies, European 
institutions and bodies still have to comply with the Regulation.260  
The Aarhus Convention has been partially implemented at the EU level via the Aarhus 
Regulation, with public participation requirements only applicable in relation to plans and 
programmes.261 Therefore, the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive 
would only be subject to public participation requirements, as prescribed by the Aarhus 
                                                          
255 European Commission. Transitional free allocation to electricity generators, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/electricity_en. 
256 Articles 14(1) and 15, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. 
257 Article 14(1), Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Commission Regulation 601/2012 on the 
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 181/30. Commission Regulation 601/2012 repealed 
Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of 18 July 2007 establishing guidelines for the monitoring and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (notified under document number C(2007) 3416), OJ L 229/1. However, its effects 
were maintained for the first two trading periods. Article 76(2), Commission Regulation 601/2012. 
258 Article 15, Directive 2003/87/EC, consolidated version. Commission Regulation 600/2012 on the 
verification of greenhouse gas emission reports and tonne-kilometre reports and the accreditation of 
verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 181/1. 
259 The three decisions establishing the guidelines for monitoring and reporting for the first two trading 
periods were decisions taken by the commission without the control of the Member States. These 
guidelines were adopted in the form of a Commission Decision (these decisions contained the 
guidelines), and since decisions are binding in their entirety according to Article 288, these guidelines 
are, therefore, binding.  
260 Article 288, TFEU. 
261 Article 9, Aarhus Regulation. 
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Regulation, if the act would fall under the definition of plans and programmes.262 As 
explained in Chapter III, plans and programmes under the Aarhus Regulation encompass 
“measures that, although not officially called ‘plans’ or ‘programmes’, in substance 
constitute an ‘organised and co-ordinated system in order to reach certain objectives’”.263 The 
acts adopted by the Commission in the EU ETS context and described above do not seem to 
constitute plans and programmes, since they are clearly binding provisions setting rules, for 
instance, for auctioning and benchmarking, and are hence, in this respect, to be distinguished 
from plans and programmes. Therefore, the Aarhus Regulation does not impose any 
obligation regarding public participation for the acts described in the previous section. 
Of course, the lack of proper implementation does not limit the legal effects of the 
Convention, which has been ratified by the European Union, since the obligation remains 
under international public law in accordance with Article 216(2) TFEU. In this vein, the 
Court of Justice has ranked the Aarhus Convention as higher than other secondary EU 
legislation, such as the Aarhus Regulation.264 In view of this obligation, the acts adopted 
under the EU ETS Directive must be examined in light of the provisions for public 
participation in the Aarhus Convention. The question that follows is whether, even in the 
absence of provisions under the Aarhus Regulation, there is still an obligation under the 
Aarhus Convention for the Commission to provide for public participation in the decision 
making process under the EU ETS. This question is extremely relevant for two reasons: (i) 
if the answer is yes, it means that the Aarhus Convention has been implemented incorrectly; 
(ii) if the answer is no, it means that the Aarhus Convention does not cover all environmental 
issues, especially market-based instruments. The next section will delve into these questions. 
4.4. Public participation under the EU ETS: an analysis of the compatibility with 
the Aarhus Convention 
The participatory rights of the Aarhus Convention are laid down in Articles 6 (specific 
activities), 7 (plans, programmes and policies) and 8 (executive regulations and/or generally 
applicable binding normative instruments).265 EU acts, despite their official title – for 
instance decision and regulation – may be considered measures which fall under Articles 6, 
                                                          
262 For further explanation on the Aarhus Regulation see Chapter III. 
263 Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece. For a discussion on the scope of the definition of plans and 
programmes, see Chapter III, section 5.2.2. 
264 Joined Cases C-401/12 P to 403/12 P, Council of the European Union, European Parliament and 
European Commission v. Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht 
13 January 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:4, para 52. See also L. Krämer, ‘Procedural Environmental Rights: 
Principle X in Theory and Practice’, in J. Jendroska and M. Bar (eds.), The Aarhus Convention at Ten. 
Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law,  
(Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2017), p. 124. 
265 For an analysis of these provisions, see Chapter III of this thesis. 
185 
7 or 8 of the Aarhus Convention.266 In order to identify the correct legal basis for public 
participation under the Aarhus Convention, it is important to define the nature of the 
decisions of the acts adopted by the Commission under the auspices of the EU ETS 
Directive.267 The following sections will analyse if the acts mentioned in section 4.2 and 
taken by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive fall under one of the aforementioned 
articles of the Aarhus Convention. 
4.4.1.  Public Participation in Decisions on Specific Activities (Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention) 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention prescribes public participation in specific activities.268 
Regarding the applicability of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, the Compliance 
Committee to the Aarhus Convention decided that: “The extent to which the provisions of 
article 6 apply [..]  depends inter alia on the extent to which the [decisions] can be considered 
‘decisions on specific activities’, that is, decisions that effectively pave the way for specific 
activities to take place.” 269 (Emphasis added) Moreover, the Implementation Guide states 
that the decision making under Article 6 results in directions only to those involved in the 
particular matter before the authority (such as permit, authorisation or any other required 
administrative procedure). 270 
To test whether the decisions adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive fall 
under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, three steps are needed. First, it is necessary to 
                                                          
266 The ACCC “does not rule out that some decisions, acts and omissions by the EU institutions — even 
if labelled ‘regulation’ — may amount to some form of decision-making under articles 6–8 of the 
Convention.” ClientEarth concerning compliance by the European Union (Part I) UN 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1, para 72. 
267 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2009), p. 504.  
268 The title of Article 6 refers to decisions on specific activities, while alineas a and b refer to decisions 
on proposed activities. Despite the difference in terminology, it seems that the terms specific activities 
and proposed activities have the same function: to define which kind of activities the article is referring 
to. However, neither proposed activities nor specific activities are terms defined in the Aarhus 
Convention. The Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention suggests as a source of inspiration 
the definition for the term proposed activity contained in the Espoo Convention: “any activity or any 
major change to an activity subject to a decision of a competent authority in accordance with an 
applicable national procedure”. Article 1(v), Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, Espoo, Finland, 25 February 1991, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1989, 
p. 309, entrered into force on 10 September 1997. J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall 
and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 131. 
269 Communication by the Center for Regional Development/Transparency International Armenia, the 
Sakharov Armenian Human Rights Protection Center and the Armenian Botanical Society (Armenia) 
with regard to compliance by Armenia UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/2/Add.1 para 28. 
270 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 182. 
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examine whether the acts are proposed activities. Following the definition of the Espoo 
Convention, the purpose of the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive 
is not allowing an activity, which is subject to a specific procedure, to start functioning but 
rather to maintain the activities in an already established system, the EU ETS. Second, these 
acts do not pave the way for the participants of the EU ETS to exercise their activities. In 
fact, the process of allowing an activity, which is subject to a specific procedure, happens at 
the Member State level through the permit procedure. Third, the result of the decision making 
of the Commission is equally applicable to all EU ETS participants under similar conditions. 
Therefore, the acts adopted under the EU ETS Directive and mapped out in section 4.2 do 
not fall under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention and, as a result, there is no obligation to 
ensure public participation for the adoption these acts, which can be derived from Article 6 
of the Aarhus Convention. 
4.4.2.  Public Participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the 
environment (Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention) 
Regarding the application of Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention, it has already been 
established that the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive do not 
constitute a plan or programme according to the Aarhus Regulation (see section 4.3). 
However, it still remains to be seen if they could be considered plans and programmes in 
accordance with the Aarhus Convention.  
The Aarhus Convention does not specifically define plans and programmes. The 
Implementation Guide, however, uses as an example the definition contained in the Kiev 
Strategic Environmental Assessment Protocol.271 According to the protocol, plans and 
programmes mean acts that are “required by legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provisions” and which are prepared and/or adopted “by an authority for adoption, through a 
formal procedure, by a parliament or a government”.272 This definition explains some 
requirements for being covered by the definition, i.e. who should produce273 and via which 
procedure, but it does not exactly define what plans and programmes are.  
                                                          
271 Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Kiev, 21 May 
2003, United Nations,  Treaty Series , vol. 2626, p. 119. Doc. MP.PP/2003/12 (entered into force on 8 
October 2009), (hereinafter Kiev Protocol), 
272 Article 2(5), Kiev SEA Protocol. 
273 In some cases, the decision making is carried out in a multi-level government structure, such as the 
application for the transitional free allocation for the modernisation of electricity generation, which 
requires the elaboration by a Member State, while the application needs approval by the Commission 
(Article 10c(6) EU ETS Directive). The Czech NGO Environmental Law Service challenged the 
national plan of the Czech Republic before the ACCC on the grounds of a breach of the public 
participation requirements by the Czech goverment and the Commission, because both were considered 
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The Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention acknowledges that plans and 
programmes “have common-sense and sometimes legal meanings throughout the ECE 
region”.274 Taking the definition at the EU level, mentioned in section 4.3, it can be concluded 
that the Aarhus Convention does not provide a broader definition of plans and programmes 
than the Aarhus Regulation. In this vein, the Commission measures taken under the EU ETS 
also cannot be considered a plan or programme under the Aarhus Convention.275  
Even after determining that the Commission measures taken under the EU ETS cannot be 
considered as plans and programmes, also under the Aarhus Convention, it is still necessary 
to investigate whether these acts could be considered policies. Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention also covers policies, and as with plans and programmes, the Aarhus Convention 
does not define policies. Policies can be considered as “a course or principle of action adopted 
or proposed by an organization or individual”.276 According to the Implementation Guide, 
policies receive a different treatment than plans and programmes, because they are less 
concrete and they “require a more thorough and profound understanding of the legalities and 
political context of a particular place. Policy incorporates history and culture and entire legal 
frameworks that extend beyond the finite area in which they are developed.” 277 In this vein, 
the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive do provide for concrete 
standards. The acts of the Commission have to be taken either without discretion (as with the 
cap) or set specific binding rules (as with allocation and auctioning of allowances). 
Consequently, the acts also do not fall under Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention. 
4.4.3.  Public Participation during the Preparation of Executive Regulations and/or 
Generally Applicable Legally Binding Normative Instruments (Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention) 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention is titled “Public participation during the preparation of 
executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative instruments”, 
and it states that public participation shall be ensured “during the preparation by public 
authorities of executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that 
may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Emphasis added) Thus, to understand if 
                                                          
responsible for preparation of plan (Environmental Law Service (Ekologiský právní servis) concerning 
compliance by the  Czech Republic UN Doc.  ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/9, 20 December 2013,  However, 
the ACCC only dealt with the compliance with the Aarhus Convention by the Czech Republic, thereby 
excluding the European Union from the scope of its decision, because it considered the Czech Replubic 
the only Party concerned. 
274 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 173. 
275 Article 7, Aarhus Convention. For further discussion, see section 5.2.2 of Chapter III. 
276 A. Stevenson and M. Waite, Concise Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 1110. 
277 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 176. 
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the acts adopted under the EU ETS Directive are covered by Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention, it is necessary to understand what are executive regulations and generally 
applicable legally binding rules that may have a significant effect on the environment. 
With regard to executive regulations, this term could be understood, in some legal systems, 
as “only immediately executable rules.”278 Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention also prescribes 
participation in the decision making of generally applicable legally binding rules that is used 
interchangeably with generally applicable legally binding normative instruments (in the 
title), which does not bring much clarity on the exact meaning of these terms. The 
Implementation Guide explains that “such generally applicable legally binding rules include 
decrees, regulations, ordinances, instructions, normative orders, norms and rules.”279 The 
scope seems very broad and has the potential to cover all the regulatory activities of public 
authorities,280 which are not acting in a legislative or judiciary capacity.281 Although the 
public authorities acting in a legislative capacity are exempted from the obligation to provide 
public participation, the obligation remains regarding the preparatory acts until the time the 
act is handed over to the legislative body.282  
Another condition for the applicability of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention is that the 
executive regulation and the legally binding rules may have a significant effect on the 
environment. The conditional may means that the possibility of a significant effect triggers 
the obligation under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention.283 The term significant effect is not 
defined by the convention and Parties have to decide its precise meaning, taking the 
objectives of the Convention into account. While testing the significance of an effect on the 
environment, the Parties should do so objectively and in a way that does not avoid public 
participation.284 Having established the scope of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, the 
remainder of this section will test whether the Commission acts adopted under the EU ETS 
Directive may be encompassed by this provision. 
                                                          
278 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 182. 
279 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 182. 
280 A. Berthier and L. Krämer, ‘The Aahrus Convention: Implementation and Compliance in EU Law’: 
ClientEarth, 2014), p. 48. 
281 Article 2(2), Aarhus Convention. 
282 L. Lavrysen, ‘An introduction to the Aarhus Convention’, 2009, pp. 4-5. 
283 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 132. Please note 
that the Implementation Guide, while discussing the term significant effect on the environment under 
Article 8 AC, refers to the commentaries to this term regarding Article 6(1) AC. This is the reason why 
the references regarding this term cite the pages of the Implementation Guide discussing significant 
effect on the environment under Article 6(1) AC.  
284 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 132. 
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i. Executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding normative 
instruments  
It seems that the aim of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention is to cover all the legally binding 
acts of a general scope of the executive branch that are not legislative acts. Therefore, in order 
to test whether the Commission acts adopted under the EU ETS Directive may be 
encompassed by Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, it is necessary to verify whether the 
acts adopted emanate from the executive branch and whether they are generally applicable 
legally binding instruments. 
As highlighted by Barnard and Peers (2014), the executive task of the Commission to adopt 
delegated acts or implementing measures “can be compared to the powers that are delegated 
to the executive and to civil servants in the Member States by acts of parliament in order to 
implement legislation (often known as ‘delegated legislation’, although that term is not used 
as regards the EU measures).”285 According to the TFEU, legislative acts are legal acts 
adopted by legislative procedures prescribed in the EU treaties (Article 289 TFEU). 
Regarding, non-legislative acts (acts that do not follow these legislative procedures), the 
TFEU provides for two categories: delegated (Article 290 TFEU) and implementing acts 
(Article 291 TFEU), although the clear distinction between these categories remains to be 
determined.286 The new delegated acts are in fact the old comitology regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny,287 and therefore some provisions of the EU ETS Directive which currently 
foresee the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny will have to be aligned with the new 
system contained in Article 290 TFEU.288 This does not change the current analysis, since 
these future acts would still be a “non-legislative act of general application” (Article 290 
TFEU), and the Commission will, therefore, not be acting in a legislative capacity.289 Some 
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authors consider that the delegated acts are a transfer or extension of legislative power and 
therefore quasi-legislative, rather than mere implementing acts.290 Regardless of the 
discussion on the nature of delegated and implementing acts, these acts are an emanation of 
the executive power with general application and should be considered as falling under 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
There is still a category of non-legislative acts that are not categorised by the TFEU.291 
Among those are the acts adopted by the Commission that are of an executive nature, but 
they do not intend to establish uniform conditions for implementation, as prescribed in Article 
291 TFEU. For instance, the decisions adopted by the Commission on the cap are taken by 
the Commission without the assistance of a Committee (no comitology procedure) and have 
general application.  
All the acts adopted by the Commission discussed in this chapter are acts of general 
application, because their addressees are not determined or determinable.292 Now that it has 
been established that the acts of the Commission adopted under the EU ETS Directive fall 
under the scope of executive regulations and/or generally applicable binding rules, the next 
step is to identify whether these acts may have a significant effect on the environment, and 
thus to determine whether the requirements of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention are 
applicable. 
ii. Significant effect on the environment 
a) The criteria for determining significant effect on the environment 
The Convention does not define what significant effect on the environment means and does 
not clarify whether significant effects comprise positive and negative effects. The 
Implementation Guide also does not define significant effect on the environment and suggests 
that some guidance on how to interpret the term in other contexts can be found in the Espoo 
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Convention.293 Paragraph 1 of  Appendix III of the Espoo Convention guides the Parties to 
identify criteria to determine significant adverse impact, as follows: 
“In considering proposed activities to which Article 2, paragraph 5, applies, the 
concerned Parties may consider whether the activity is likely to have a significant 
adverse transboundary impact in particular by virtue of one or more of the following 
criteria: 
(a) Size: proposed activities which are large for the type of activity; 
(b) Location: proposed activities which are located in or close to an area of special 
environmental sensitivity or importance (such as wetlands designated under the 
Ramsar Convention, national parks, nature reserves, sites of special scientific interest, 
or sites of archaeological, cultural or historical importance); also, proposed activities 
in locations where the characteristics of proposed development would be likely to 
have significant effects on the population; 
(c) Effects: proposed activities with particularly complex and potentially adverse 
effects, including those giving rise to serious effects on humans or on valued species 
or organisms, those which threaten the existing or potential use of an affected area 
and those causing additional loading which cannot be sustained by the carrying 
capacity of the environment.”294 (emphasis added) 
From the reading of the provision, three criteria can be identified: size, location and effects. 
There are two problems with this source of inspiration for the purpose of using them to 
determine the meaning of significant effect on the environment under Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention: (i) these criteria are used to measure the significance of the effect of project-
based activities, or as called in Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention and the Espoo Convention 
proposed activities, (ii) the Espoo Convention already determined that these criteria are to 
identify adverse impact, while Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not make a 
distinction between positive and negative effects. Therefore, for the analysis of Article 8 of 
the Aarhus Convention, the criteria for measurement (size, location and effects) has to be 
reinterpreted to considerer whether the Commission’s acts adopted under the EU ETS 
Directive may have a significant effect on the environment. 
b) Size and location 
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Most of the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS cover all installations of the 
scheme (size) and the territory of, at least, 28 countries (location). Even those that are 
addressed to a specific Member State, such as the allocation of free allowances for the 
modernisation of the electricity sector, cover a matter of a considerable size (gases and 
installations) and location (entire country). Therefore, by considering the geographical area 
and size of the EU ETS, the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS would fulfil 
the first two measurement criteria for identifying whether these acts may have a significant 
effect on the environment. 
Regarding the last criterion for determining significant effect on the environment, the effects, 
it is necessary to evaluate individually whether the acts adopted by the Commission under 
the EU ETS have an effect on the environment. 
c) Effects on the environment 
Since Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not specify which kind of effects should be 
considered, it can be argued that both positive and negative effects should be part of the 
evaluation of whether a measure has effect on the environment. Even measures adopted with 
the objective of the protection of the environment can also have a negative impact on the 
environment. For instance, a measure to reduce GHGs emissions, such as wind power, may 
cause a disturbance to routes of migratory birds or affect the breeding success of certain 
species.295 Therefore, the effects of the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS, 
either positive or negative, will be analysed as part of the assessment of the effects on the 
environment. 
c.1)  Cap 
Looking at the acts adopted by the European Commission under auspices of the EU ETS, 
those related to the cap concern the determination of the EU-wide cap, opt-in and opt-out and 
the use of international credits. The cap expresses in the number of emission allowances the 
overall volume that can be emitted by the sectors and subsectors that are covered by the EU 
ETS.296 This is a crucial element to achieve the objective of reducing GHGs, and ultimately 
protecting the environment. Mistakes on the calculation of the cap mean that this overall goal 
is undermined. Hence, the setting of the cap clearly has an effect on the environment. 
Regarding the opt-in of activities or gases, it means that more installations and gases will be 
covered by the scheme. This produces a positive effect on the environment, since more 
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emissions will be controlled and reduced by the scheme. The opt-out of installations are 
subject to the condition that the excluded installations are subject to equivalent measures as 
they were part of the EU ETS, and this condition could lead to the interpretation that there 
would not have been any effect on the environment. However, this depends on the content of 
the decisions on opt-out, so the decision can clearly have an impact on the environment and 
public participation could focus on the question on whether the measures are indeed 
equivalent to the EU ETS.  
The use of international credits may interfere with the cap and the credits can be created on 
the expenses of the environmental protection of the hosting countries. In this vein, the use of 
these credits has the potential of affecting the functioning of the EU ETS and, consequently, 
the protection of the environment and, at the same time, the environment of the hosting 
country.  
In sum, decisions on the cap, including opt-in and opt-out, may have a significant effect on 
the environment. 
c.2)  Allocation of Allowances 
The Commission’s acts concerning the allocation of allowances are related to auctioning, 
free allocation of allowances, the carbon leakage sector, and the option for transitional free 
allocation. Regarding the auctioning, the Commission’s act is related to the timing and 
administration of the auctions. At first sight, it could be said that no direct effect on the 
environment is foreseeable. However, a reliable auctioning system ensures that there is no 
fraud and that the auctioning of allowances really reflects the number of allowances that 
should be put on the market in accordance with the established cap. A wrong amount of 
allowances available for auction would have a negative effect on the environment, since the 
cap would not be respected.  
The benchmark criteria, which is used to allocate allowances for free, can, if it sets a strong 
benchmark in accordance with the EU ETS Directive, in the mid- to long-term, lead 
producers to strive to become more efficient and avoid extra production costs. Therefore, it 
amounts to a positive effect on the environment, since more efficient installations mean fewer 
emissions. 
The Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) guarantees that the number of allowances 
allocated for free is done in accordance with the limits established in the EU ETS. The CSCF 
entails a positive effect on the environment, since it guarantees that operators will not receive 
more free allowances than is prescribed. However, if the CSCF is calculated wrongly, even 
if the cap remains the same, more allowances will be allocated for free. It may discourage 
the operators from reducing emissions, since they do not have to buy allowances to 
compensate for their emissions. It may also slow down the process to move to cleaner 
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technologies, since they can still profit without changing their current behaviour. These 
potential outcomes in case of a wrong calculation of the CSCF are clearly potentially negative 
effects on the environment. 
For the carbon leakage sectors and subsectors, the same reasoning can be applied as for the 
CSCF. Since allowances will be allocated for free, the same phenomenon of slowing down 
the transition to cleaner technologies may happen. Therefore, also, in this case, a potentially 
negative effect on the environment can be foreseen. 
Regarding the option for transitional free allocation, although the cap remains the same, and 
bearing in mind that it is a measure to encourage installations to use cleaner technologies, 
more allowances allocated for free may discourage the operators to reduce emissions. 
Similarly, in this case, it can be argued that the acts adopted by the Commission regarding 
transitional free allocation may have an effect on the environment. Therefore, acts adopted 
by the Commission to manage the allocation of allowances may have a significant effect on 
the environment.  
c.3)  Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) are essential to ensure compliance and 
therefore guarantee that the reduction of emissions is being achieved. Therefore, it is the 
MRV that indicates whether the system is functioning properly. In this vein, a proper MRV 
is necessary in order not to validate a defective system, which could bring negative effects to 
the environment. At the same time, a strong MRV ensures that the system is achieving its 
objectives, which include the reduction of emissions entailing a positive effect on the 
environment. 
In sum, it can be argued that all the aforementioned acts, considering their size, location and 
potential effects on the environment, have a significant effect on the environment. Therefore, 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention applies to the acts adopted by the Commission under the 
EU ETS and the final step is to identify whether the Commission has fulfilled its public 
participation obligation with respect to the measures adopted under the EU ETS Directive. 
4.5. The extent to which the European Commission complies with Article 8 of 
the Aarhus Convention requirements 
Having established that the acts adopted by the European Commission under the EU ETS fall 
under the scope of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, it remains to be investigated to what 
extent the European Commission complies with the requirements stemming from Article 8. 
In order to comply with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention , Parties shall make efforts to 
promote timely and effective participation. To accomplish this objective, Parties should 
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guarantee that a proper timeframe for effective public participation is fixed, that the draft 
rules are made available to the public, that the public has the opportunity to comment, and 
that the result is taken into account as far as possible. Therefore, Parties are required to take 
concrete measures towards the achievement of Article 8 requirements. The assessment of 
compliance with the provision will be based on the steps taken towards the achievement of 
these goals and not on specific results.297 Here it is also interesting to note that Article 8, in 
contrast to Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, does not refer to the public concerned. It 
rather says that the public should be given participation opportunities. As explained by 
Kramer and Berthier (2014) “this is due to the fact that executive regulations are of general 
application and therefore concern everybody.”298 In this vein, the public under Article 8 of 
the Aarhus Convention can be connected to the definition of the public under Article 2(4) of 
the Aarhus Convention. 
Hence, the next step is to analyse whether, the EU, as a Party to the Aarhus Convention, has 
strived to promote public participation during the preparation by the Commission of the acts 
adopted under the EU ETS Directive as identified in section 4.2. In this vein, the next section 
first examines the legal obligation to provide for public participation contained in the EU 
ETS Directive. Second, the analysis will move to examine the consultation requirements 
applicable at the EU level and contained in the 2002 Communication,299 which was 
applicable at the time the acts adopted by the Commission identified in section 4.2 were 
adopted, and in the Better Regulation Package,300 applicable at the time of writing. The 
rationale for this analysis is grounded in the close connection between the concepts of 
participation and consultation. In what is known as Arnstein’s “ladder”, public participation 
ranges from non-participation to the full engagement of citizens that can even culminate in 
citizens’ control.301  The consultation is therefore seen as one step on the overall ladder of 
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public participation, the latter being a much broader concept.302 In this vein, consultations do 
not automatically imply public participation, and a further analysis of the legal framework 
for consultations at the EU level is needed to identify whether the stakeholders’ consultations 
could fulfil the obligations under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. Finally, the section 
analyses whether the current legal framework can fulfil the obligations contained in Article 
8 of the Aarhus Convention.  
4.5.1.  Legal Framework for public participation for acts adopted under the EU ETS 
Directive 
Neither the EU ETS Directive (see section 4.2) nor the Aarhus Regulation (see section 4.3) 
requires public participation for all the acts taken by the Commission under the EU ETS 
Directive. Therefore, the EU ETS Directive does not explicitly implement Article 8 of the 
Aarhus Convention. Nevertheless, the EU ETS Directive contains provisions to consult 
stakeholders. This is the case in respect of: (i) the decisions on free allocation of allowances 
and benchmark pursuant to Article 10a(1) and (2) of the EU ETS Directive which requires 
consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the sectors and subsectors concerned; and 
(ii) the definition of the list of the sectors and subsectors deemed to be in risk of carbon 
leakage according to Article 10a(13) which requires consultation with Member States, the 
sectors and subsectors and other relevant stakeholders.303 In these cases, the Commission was 
under a legal obligation to conduct a consultation. For all other decisions, there was no 
obligation for consultation deriving directly from the EU ETS Directive.  
The question is whether the obligation to consult stakeholders contained in Articles 10a(1) 
and  (13) could amount to public participation as prescribed by Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention . To what extent these provisions can amount to public participation as prescribed 
by the Aarhus Convention will be the subject matter of the following analysis.  
4.5.2.  Consultation at the EU level 
At the EU level, the European Commission can conduct consultations which are mandatory 
according to secondary legislation or the Commission may act suo motu. Such consultation 
may be closed or open.304 In the first type, the Commission approaches the specific 
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stakeholders that are considered to contribute their opinion or concern on the topic of the 
decision making.305 The open consultations are instead open to the general public and are 
online-based.306 Any citizen, NGO, business association, public authority, or private 
company may submit its considerations on a proposed subject that is open for consultation 
online.307 The two types of consultation can be (and often are) used together.308 
Although the EU already conducted consultations in earlier periods, this practice was only 
formalised with the “White Paper on European Governance”,309 which was followed by a 
“Communication from the Commission Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and 
dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties 
by the Commission” (hereafter the 2002 Communication).310 The rules and principles guiding 
the EU consultations have been “reviewed as part of reforming the EU Better Regulation 
policy.”311  
According to the 2002 Communication, which set out how the Commission should conduct 
the consultation, the Commission should conduct public consultation “on major policy 
initiatives”,312 with the Commission deciding what qualifies as a major policy initiative. This 
means that in practice the decision whether or not to hold consultation was still with the 
Commission in the end and, in the absence of an obligation in secondary legislation, was at 
its discretion. Therefore, the Commission could still decide to conduct consultations even 
when the general principles and minimum standards of the 2002 Communication do not 
apply. Despite having discretion on whether to hold a consultation, the Commission could 
also decide on which type of consultation it would conduct.313 Regarding who has access to 
the consultation process, if a consultation was open, the general public had access to it, but 
if the consultation is closed only the identified target group could participate. The definition 
of the target groups was to be made in accordance with the criteria set out in the 
                                                          
305 A. Bunea and R. Thomson, ‘Consultations with interest groups and the empowerment of executives: 
Evidence from the European Union’ 28(4) Governance, (2015), pp. 517-531, p. 520. 
306 A. Bunea, op. cit. (2017), p. 52. 
307 A. Bunea and R. Thomson, op. cit. (2015), p. 520. 
308 A. Bunea and R. Thomson, op. cit. (2015), p. 520. 
309 A. Bunea, op. cit. (2017), p. 47. European Commission, European Governance: a White Paper, 
COM(2001) 428 final (2001a). 
310 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002). 
311 A. Bunea, op. cit. (2017), p. 47. 
312 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002), p. 15. 
313 A. Bunea and R. Thomson, op. cit. (2015), p. 520. European Commission, 2002 Communication 
(2002), p. 11. 
198 
Communication.314 However, these criteria, although calling for equitable and adequate 
coverage of the affected parties, still left much discretion on how to select the target group.315 
In 2015 the Commission issued the “Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda” 
Communication,316 which builds upon the 2002 Communication and was itself subject to 
consultation.317 This 2015 Communication was accompanied by the Commission Staff 
Working Document Better Regulation Guidelines,318 which was updated in 2017.319 Despite 
the fact that the Commission retains the discretion to decide whether to hold public 
consultations, the 2015 Communication prescribes that stakeholders should be able to 
provide feedback on the draft of implementing and delegated acts, which are the categories 
of the Commission’s acts under analysis in this chapter.320  
4.5.3.  Compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention  
i. Could a soft law instrument fulfil the obligations under Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention? 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention requires Parties to strive to promote effective public 
participation, but it does not make clear how. Since the obligation contained in Article 8 of 
the Aarhus Convention is an obligation of effort, the determination of compliance is based 
on the steps taken towards the achievement of these goals.321 The EU has no hard law 
instruments (in the form of secondary legislation) to regulate the public participation for acts 
adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive. Instead, at the EU level, the matter 
is regulated through soft law instruments (communication and guidelines). This raises the 
question of whether the 2002 Communication, the 2015 and 2017 guidelines, and the 
accompanying toolboxes of the latter two could fulfil the requirements of Article 8 of the 
Aarhus Convention. 
Article 3(1) of the Aarhus Convention requires Parties to have a transparent and consistent 
framework, but it does not limit the type of instruments to achieve this. In fact, to achieve a 
transparent and consistent framework, Parties shall take the necessary legislative, regulatory 
and other measures. What exactly other measures means is not defined by the Convention. 
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The Implementation Guide suggests that “possible ‘other measures’ might include strategies, 
codes of conduct and good practice recommendations.”322 In this vein, communications and 
guidelines can be used to achieve a transparent and consistent framework. Therefore, the fact 
that the EU has used soft law to establish its public participation requirements at the EU level 
is in compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
It is also important to note that the Commission has expressed an evolving position regarding 
the binding nature of the requirements for public participation. In its 2002 Communication, 
it made it very apparent that there was no intention to establish a legally binding approach. 
In the words of the Commission: 
“[…] The Commission remains convinced that a legally-binding approach to 
consultation is to be avoided, for two reasons: First, a clear dividing line must be 
drawn between consultations launched on the Commission’s own initiative prior to 
the adoption of a proposal, and the subsequent formalised and compulsory decision 
making process according to the Treaties. Second, a situation must be avoided in 
which a Commission proposal could be challenged in the Court on the grounds of 
alleged lack of consultation of interested parties. Such an over-legalistic approach 
would be incompatible with the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the 
expectations of the citizens that the European Institutions should deliver on substance 
rather than concentrating on procedures.”323 
However, in the 2017 Guidelines, the Commission made a move towards the recognition of 
the legal implications of the instrument: “Such guidance may contain interpretation of EU 
law, which, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, may 
legally bind the Commission.”324 This reflects an understanding, already expressed in 
academic literature, that “soft law can create legal obligations for the enacting European 
institution, and the Courts require the institution to comply with such instruments.”325 If this 
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trend is upheld, soft law clearly contributes to achieving compliance with Article 8 of the 
Aarhus Convention. The concern is that the Commission can amend soft law unilaterally, but 
it cannot amend a piece of secondary legislation, such as the EU ETS, which could potentially 
include public participation requirements.  
Having determined that the use of soft law to establish public participation requirements at 
the EU level, as such, is in compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, the question 
that follows is whether the EU consultation framework could fulfil the public participation 
requirements of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
ii. 2002 Communication 
The 2002 Communication gave discretion to the Commission on whether or not to hold 
consultations and which type of consultations to conduct. Regarding whether or not to hold 
consultations, Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not foresee such discretion. In order 
for the Party, in this case, the EU, to comply with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, 
concrete steps towards achieving the requirements need to be taken. In this vein, the lack of 
certainty (given the Commission’s discretion) that these consultations would be carried out 
can be considered in violation of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention.  
Even considering that the 2002 Communication allowed for a margin of discretion that is not 
foreseen in Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, it is still relevant to consider whether a 
consultation conducted according to the 2002 Communication fulfilled the requirements 
mandated by Article 8. When the Commission has an obligation under the EU ETS Directive 
to conduct consultations (and therefore no discretion), such an analysis allows it to be 
identified whether the consultation requirements comply with Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention or not. According to the 2002 Communication, the consultation should take place 
early in the decision making process,326 clear and comprehensible information should be 
available,327 the consultation should be carried out within a reasonable timeframe,328 the 
results should be published, and there is an obligation to show how the input was taken into 
consideration.329 The open consultations, as described by the communication, could fulfil the 
minimum standards set by the Aarhus Convention, since the consultation was open to the 
public, the Commission had the obligation to notify the public of the consultation properly, 
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326 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002), p. 18. 
327 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002), p. 19. 
328 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002), p. 21. 
329 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002), p. 22. 
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while it was still possible to intervene, and there was a timeline and the outcome had been 
taken into consideration. Therefore, an open consultation that followed the 2002 
Communication Guidelines fulfilled the requirements mandated by Article 8.  
In the closed consultations, even if sufficient time was provided, the drafts of the acts were 
made available, and the feedback was taken into due account, the requirements mandate by 
Article 8 were not fulfilled since this provision requires the public to be consulted and not 
only target stakeholders. Article 8, unlike Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention, does not 
provide for any discretion for the public authorities to identify the members of the public who 
should participate in the decision making process.330 Therefore, the simple fact that the 
Commission consulted target groups instead of the public amounted to a breach of Article 8 
of the Aarhus Convention. In this vein, only open consultations that followed the 2002 
Communication Guidelines could fulfil the Article 8 requirements. However, as already 
mentioned, the mere fact that the Commission had discretion on whether to conduct the 
consultation (even if in practice it would always consult) was already in itself a breach of 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
iii. 2015 and 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines 
The Better Regulation Guidelines is the current instrument that details the procedures for 
consultations at the EU level. The first version of the guidelines is from 2015331 and the 
second version is from 2017.332 The guidelines are Commission staff working documents that 
have been accompanied by a toolbox that contains additional guidance to users in the 
application of Better Regulation Guidelines. Both versions will be examined in order to check 
whether the changes introduced by the 2017 version of the guidelines indicate a move 
towards more public participation. 
The 2015 guidelines stated that “the opportunity to provide feedback on delegated acts will 
apply with a limited number of exceptions.”333 For implementing acts, while the 2002 
Communication excluded acts adopted under the comitology procedure, the 2015 Guidelines 
provided that “the opportunity to provide feedback must be considered for acts adopted under 
committee control” (emphasis added).334 “However, several categories of exemptions apply 
                                                          
330 Article 7 AC reads: “The public which may participate shall be identified by the relevant public 
authority, taking into account the objectives of this Convention.” 
331 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, 
SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b). 
332 European Commission, 2017 Staff Working Document (2017c). 
333 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, 
SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b), p. 67. 
334 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, 
SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b), p. 67. 
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and due to the varied nature of implementing acts the final decision should be made on a 
case-by-case basis.”335 Therefore, it was still left up to the Commission to decide whether the 
acts adopted by the Commission through the use of the comitology procedure would fall 
under one of the exceptions and not be subject to public participation. Here it is interesting 
to note that the term feedback is used in the 2015 Guidelines. However, while referring to the 
exceptions, the guidelines say that “the Commission will not consult on draft of delegated 
and implementing acts” and provides a list of exceptions to the four-week public consultation 
requirement.336 Such a statement suggests that the guidelines used the terms feedback and 
public consultation interchangeably.   
As mentioned above, the 2015 Guidelines were updated in 2017. The 2017 text of the 
accompanying toolbox clarifies that “collecting feedback under the feedback mechanisms 
differs from collecting in put under consultation”,337 and add that “the collection of feedback 
offers an opportunity for stakeholders to express general views on a specific document […] 
not based on specific questions or consultation background documents.”338 Furthermore, the 
four-week feedback on the draft of delegated, implementing acts and regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny is the default,339 and the exceptions for not publishing the drafts should be 
interpreted restrictively.340 Regarding who can participate in this feedback opportunity, the 
text sometimes refers to stakeholder feedback. The term stakeholder seems to be used in a 
broad sense. The toolbox accompanying the text of the 2017 Guidelines explains that the aim 
of the feedback on drafts is to give “the public at large the possibility to react on actual draft 
act”,341 and that citizens and stakeholders can provide feedback.342 Even when the closed or 
public stakeholder consultation has taken place, they do not replace the opportunity for 
feedback.343 This shows that, although using sometimes the term stakeholders, the guidelines 
                                                          
335 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, 
SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b), p. 67. 
336 European Commission, Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda (2014c), p. 67.  
337 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 437. 
338 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 437. 
339 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 444. 
340 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 443-444. 
341 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 444. 
342 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 437. 
343 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 444. 
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aim to reach the public at large. This is a feature in compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention, which prescribes participation of the public. 
Furthermore, the rules contained in the 2017 Guidelines and its accompanying toolbox could 
fulfil the minimum standards set by Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, namely “(a) Time-
frames sufficient for effective participation should be fixed; (b) Draft rules should be 
published or otherwise made publicly available; and (c) The public should be given the 
opportunity to comment, directly or through representative consultative bodies.” 
Furthermore, “the result of the public participation shall be taken into account as far as 
possible.”344 According to the 2017 Guidelines, the consultation is open to stakeholders, a 
term that seems to embed the same meaning as the public; the timeframe of four weeks is 
fixed; the drafts of the acts are published;345 the stakeholders have the opportunity to 
comment; and the Commission has to explain how the feedback was taken into account.346 
However, there are two points of concern that amount to non-compliance with Article 8 of 
the Aarhus Convention. First, Article 8 does not provide for any exception to the rule that the 
drafts should be subject to public participation, while the 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines 
provide for the application of exceptions. Second, the four-week timeframe is applicable to 
all kinds of acts independent of the complexity of the act, while Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention requests that the timeframe should be sufficient for effective participation. 
Probably, the reasoning behind the four-week timeframe for feedback is that issues that are 
more complex are subject to impact assessments, which require public consultation.347 
Despite the fact that such an issue could only be solved on a case-by-case basis, what can be 
concluded is that the text of the 2017 Guidelines does not allow for flexibility in relation to 
the timeframe, which may amount to insufficient time for effective participation for all drafts.  
In sum, the fact that the provisions of the EU ETS Directive refer to consultation with 
stakeholders does not necessarily amount to compatibility with Article 8of the Aarhus 
Convention. Only the cases where the EU ETS prescribes consultation and an open 
consultation is conducted, then the Article 8 requirements are fulfilled. 
Even for the cases under the EU ETS Directive, where there is no obligation for the 
Commission to conduct consultation, the 2017 Guidelines provides for stakeholders’ 
feedback on the draft of implementing and delegated acts, which encompasses all the acts 
adopted by the Commission discussed in this chapter. This could amount to compliance with 
                                                          
344 Article 8, Aarhus Convention. 
345 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 441-442. 
346 European Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation 
Guidelines presented in SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 441-443. 
347 European Commission, 2017 Staff Working Document (2017c), p. 8 and 16. 
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Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. However, Article 8 does not provide for any exception 
to the rule that the drafts should be subject to public participation, and it requires that the 
timeframe should be sufficient for effective participation, while the Better Regulation 
Guidelines provides for the application of exceptions and no flexibility regarding the 
timeframe. 
4.6. Interim conclusion 
The analysis carried out in section 4.2 has shown that the EU ETS Directive does not have a 
general provision on public participation, which applies to all provisions of the Directive. 
Section 4.2 also investigated whether public participation requirements could be derived 
from specific provisions under the EU ETS Directive which serve as a legal basis for the 
adoption of the Commission’s acts. The investigation revealed that public participation is not 
required for the adoption of most acts. The only exception are the acts regulating the free 
allocation of allowances and the carbon leakage sector for which the EU ETS Directive 
prescribes the consultation of stakeholders. However, the provisions do not provide a further 
explanation on how the relevant stakeholders are to be selected. 
Having examined the specific provisions of the EU ETS Directive, section 4.3 explored 
whether the Aarhus Regulation imposes a general obligation regarding public participation 
for the acts described in section 4.2. The Aarhus Regulation only requires public participation 
requirements for plans and programmes.348 It was concluded that the acts adopted by the 
Commission in the EU ETS context and described in section 4.2 do not constitute plans and 
programmes, since they are clearly binding provisions setting rules, for instance, for 
auctioning and benchmarking, and are hence, in this respect, to be distinguished from plans 
and programmes. Therefore, the Aarhus Regulation does not impose any obligation regarding 
public participation for the acts described in the previous section. 
In the absence of public participation provisions under the Aarhus Regulation that would be 
applicable to the acts described in section 4.2, section 4.4 investigated whether there is still 
an obligation under the Aarhus Convention for the Commission to provide for public 
participation in the decision making process under the EU ETS. The analysis carried out in 
section 4.4 demonstrated that the acts described in section 4.2 qualify as “executive 
regulations and other generally applicable legally binding normative instruments”, because 
they are acts of general application as their addressees are not determined or determinable.349 
Furthermore, considering their size, location and potential effects on the environment, they 
have a significant effect on the environment. Therefore, they fall under the scope of 
                                                          
348 Article 9, Aarhus Regulation. 
349 These non-legislative acts took the form of a regulation or decision. Regulations and decisions are 
among the legal instruments available to the European institutions to exercise the Union’s competences, 
according to Article 288 TFEU. How they are adopted defines whether they are a legislative act or not. 
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application of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention and, as a consequence, there is a legal 
obligation for the Commission to strive to promote public participation. 
Having established that Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention applies, section 4.5 showed that 
consultation is seen as one-step of the overall ladder of public participation, but that 
consultations are not the same as public participation. Therefore, section 4.5 analysed 
whether the legal framework for stakeholders’ consultations at the EU level could fulfil the 
obligations under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. Consequently, the consultation 
requirements applicable at the EU level (and contained in the 2002 Communication, which 
was applicable at the time the acts adopted by the Commission identified in section 4.2 were 
adopted, and in the Better Regulation Package,350 applicable at the time of writing) were 
examined. 
Although consultation is not the same as public participation, section 4.5 argued that, where 
the EU ETS Directive requires consultation and an open consultation is conducted, then the 
requirements mandated by Article 8 would be fulfilled. For all the other situations, the 2002 
Communication cannot fulfil Article 8 requirements. This is due to the fact the 2002 
Communication gives discretion to the Commission on whether or not to hold consultations 
and which type of consultations to conduct. Regarding whether or not to hold consultations, 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not foresee such discretion. 
Under the current legal framework, the 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines provide for 
stakeholders’ feedback on the drafting of implementing and delegated acts. This could 
amount to compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention when implementing and 
delegated acts are adopted, which encompasses most of the acts adopted by the Commission 
discussed in this chapter. However, the 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines cannot ensure 
compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention regarding the acts adopted by the 
Commission acting alone, since these acts are not covered. Moreover, in contrast with Article 
8 of the Aarhus Convention, the Better Regulation Guidelines provide for the application of 
exceptions and no flexibility regarding the timeframe. Therefore, the guidelines, per se, 
cannot guarantee that the EU fully complies with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
  
                                                          
350 European Commission, Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda (2014c). This 2015 
Communication was accompanied by the Commission Staff Working Document Better Regulation 
Guidelines, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation 
Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b), which was updated in 2017, European Commission, 2017 
Staff Working Document (2017c). 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the access to EU ETS-related information and public participation in 
the acts adopted by the Commission under the EU ETS Directive. 
Section 2 showed that Phase III of the EU ETS is based on more harmonised rules which 
have empowered the European Commission to determine key elements of the EU ETS, 
among the most important: (i) the quantity of emission allowances; (ii) the sectors and 
subsectors, which are part of the carbon leakage sector and may, therefore, get 100% free 
allocation of allowances, up to the sector’s benchmark; (iii) the rules for the free allocation; 
and (iv) the rules for auctioning. 
Having established the importance of the Commission’s decision making for the functioning 
of the EU ETS, section 3 investigated access to information under the EU ETS Directive. 
Section 3 first identified that the general regime for access to environmental information 
under the EU ETS can be found within Articles 17, 15a, and 19 of the EU ETS Directive. 
The analysis carried out in section 3.2 showed that the scope of Article 15a and 17 is limited 
and, consequently, cannot cover all the possible requests for information under the EU ETS. 
To examine the definition of environmental information and the limits of the ground for 
disclosure of environmental information further, an investigation of the case law was carried 
out in section 3.3. Concerning the definition of environmental information, the case law dealt 
with information regarding data used for the calculation of the CSCF, information on the 
allocation of free allowances by a Member State and trading data. These cases reveal that a 
great number of EU ETS-related information falls within the definition of environmental 
information, although, in two of these cases, such an interpretation still needs to be confirmed 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Regarding the grounds for refusal, the case 
law showed that these grounds have to be interpreted in a restrictive way. For the EU ETS, it 
was argued that there is a need for further interpretation: at the time of the adoption of the 
Aarhus Convention, emissions trading was still a concept that needed further practical 
development, and it can be assumed that the broad term emissions was related to the actual 
release of substances from installations within more classic command-and-control 
instruments. With the advent of a market-based instrument such as emissions trading, there 
is a need for further interpretation in view of the potential release of substances and the 
creation of new concepts such as greenhouse gas emission allowances.  
Regarding the active dissemination of information by the Commission, section 3.4 showed 
that the EU ETS Directive empowers the Commission to adopt a regulation which provides 
for public access and confidentiality as appropriate, allowing for the possibility to tailor how 
and when the information is available. The compatibility of the exercise of this discretion 
with the Aarhus Convention has yet to be tested by the European courts. 
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With regard to public participation, the analysis carried out in section 4.2 showed that the EU 
ETS Directive does not provide a general provision on this matter which would apply to all 
decisions to be taken under this Directive. Furthermore, section 4.2 revealed that public 
participation is not required for the adoption of most acts. The exception to this are acts 
regulating the free allocation of allowances and the carbon leakage sector for which the EU 
ETS Directive prescribes the consultation of stakeholders. However, the provisions do not 
provide a further explanation of how the relevant stakeholders are to be selected. Having 
examined the specific provisions of the EU ETS Directive, section 4.3 concluded that the 
Aarhus Regulation does not impose any obligation regarding public participation for the acts 
described in the previous section 4.2. 
In the absence of a general obligation regarding public participation for the acts described in 
section 4.2, section 4.4 investigated whether there is still an obligation under the Aarhus 
Convention for the Commission to provide for public participation in the decision making 
process under the EU ETS. The analysis carried out in section 4.4 demonstrated that the acts 
described in section 4.2 qualify as “executive regulations and other generally applicable 
legally binding normative instruments”, because they are acts of general application as their 
addressees are not determined or determinable.351 Furthermore, considering their size, 
location and potential effects on the environment, they have a significant effect on the 
environment. Therefore, they fall under the scope of application of Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention and, as a consequence, there is a legal obligation for the Commission to strive to 
promote public participation. 
Having established that Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention applies, the final step was to 
identify whether the Commission has fulfilled its public participation obligation with respect 
to the measures adopted under the EU ETS Directive. Consultations do not automatically 
imply public participation, and therefore a further analysis of the legal framework for 
consultations at the EU level was needed to identify whether the stakeholders’ consultations 
could fulfil the obligations under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. Section 4.5 argued that, 
under the current legal framework, even for the cases under the EU ETS Directive where 
there is no obligation for the Commission to conduct consultations, the 2017 Better 
Regulation Guidelines provide for stakeholders’ feedback on the draft of implementing and 
delegated acts, which encompasses most of the acts adopted by the Commission discussed in 
this chapter. This could amount to compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention when 
implementing and delegated acts are adopted. However, the acts adopted by the Commission 
acting alone would not be covered and, therefore, no compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention could be achieved. Moreover, Article 8 does not provide for any exception to the 
                                                          
351 These non-legislative acts took the form of a regulation or decision. Regulations and decisions are 
among the legal instruments available to the European institutions to exercise the Union’s competences, 
according to Article 288 TFEU. How they are adopted defines whether they are a legislative act or not. 
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rule that the drafts should be subject to public participation, and it requires that the timeframe 
should be sufficient for effective participation, while the Better Regulation Guidelines 
provide for the application of exceptions and no flexibility regarding the timeframe. 
Therefore, the guidelines, per se, cannot guarantee that the EU fully complies with Article 8 
of the Aarhus Convention. 
On a more positive note, the chapter identified that, according to the 2017 Better Regulation 
Guidelines, the default is that all the delegated and implemented acts are now subject to 
public feedback. Moreover, the Commission made a move towards the recognition of the 
legal implications of the 2017 Guidelines by recognising that the guidelines may legally bind 
the Commission.352 
In light of the conclusions reached in this chapter, it can be argued that public participation 
under the EU ETS could be strengthened if the EU ETS Directive contained a specific 
provision on public participation. Since the centralisation of major decisions at the EU level, 
the Commission has assumed a more prominent role, but neither the EU ETS Directive nor 
the Aarhus Regulation guarantee public participation in the acts the Commission has to adopt. 
A specific approach under the EU ETS Directive regulating, precisely, public participation 
for the acts the Commission has to adopt would bring the adoption of these acts into line with 
the Convention’s requirements. It should be noted that this recommendation could lead to a 
fragmentation of EU environmental legislation. A less fragmented approach would consist 
of a proper implementation of the Aarhus Convention at the EU level, by making an 
amendment to the Aarhus Regulation. However, it remains to be seen whether a common 
provision would be suitable for all the different provisions in EU environmental law. 
 
 
                                                          
352 European Commission, 2017 Staff Working Document (2017c), p. 43. 
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Chapter V – Certification of Biofuels: Access to 
environmental information and public 
participation at the EU Level 
 
1. Introduction 
The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) was adopted in 2009 and contains the legally 
enforceable target for Member States to achieve 20% of renewable energy consumption in 
the European Union (EU) by 2020.1 Member States must also ensure that at least 10% of 
their transport fuels come from renewable sources by this deadline.2 In order to achieve this 
target, the RED incentivises the use of biofuels and bioliquids by Member States.3  
However, this push towards biofuels has been controversial because it is still uncertain to 
what extent they contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the possible land-use 
                                                          
1 Article 3(1), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. (hereafter referred to as Directive 
2009/28/EC or RED). Since the focus of this chapter is on the renewable energy targets until 2020, the 
consolidated version referred to in this chapter is the version of 05 October 2015 and not the recast 
dated from 21 December 2018, which already includes the rules for the period after 2020. 
The consolidated version of 05 October 2015 contains the following amendments: Council Directive 
2013/18/EU of 13 May 2013 adapting Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, by reason of the accession of 
the Republic of Croatia, OJ L 158/230; and Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and 
diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources, OJ L 239/1. 
2 Article 3(4), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
3 Recital 69, Preamble, Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. For after 2020, the 
European Commission did not propose new targets for renewable energy in the transport sector. 
Consequently, the demand for biofuels may be reduced. (Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions - A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, 
SWD(2014) 15 final / SWD(2014) 16 final, p. 6 (section 2.2)). The targets for 2021 and beyond are 
established in the recast of the Renewable Energy Directive: Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources (recast), OJ L 328/82.  
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change related to the cultivation of crops for biofuels.4 In an attempt to address some of these 
sustainability issues, the EU set out sustainability criteria in Article 17 of the RED and only 
the biofuels that fulfil these criteria can count towards national renewable energy targets. 
According to the sustainability criteria, biofuels shall achieve greenhouse gas savings of at 
least 60% in comparison to fossil fuels and shall not be made from raw material obtained 
from land with a high biodiversity value (such as primary forests or highly biodiverse 
grasslands) or from land with high carbon stock (such as wetlands or forests).5 Companies 
may choose from three methods in order to show that their biofuels comply with the 
sustainability criteria:6 (i) national systems; (ii) voluntary schemes; and (iii) international 
agreements.7 Article 18(4) empowers the European Commission to recognise voluntary 
national or international schemes as capable of checking for compliance with the EU’s 
biofuels sustainability criteria.8 It means that these voluntary schemes will verify that biofuel 
production did not take place on land with high biodiversity or with high carbon stock and 
that the production of biofuels leads to a sufficient level of greenhouse gas emissions savings. 
The recognition process conducted by the European Commission has so far not been analysed 
from a procedural rights perspective. Although biofuels, and especially the process of 
recognition of the voluntary schemes, which aim to guarantee that biofuels meet the 
sustainability criteria, have already been discussed substantially, an analysis in view of the 
Aarhus Convention requirements is still lacking.9 This chapter, therefore, assesses the regime 
                                                          
4 J. Lin, op. cit. (2011), p. 44.  S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), pp. 173-174. S. Romppanen, ‘Regulating 
Better Biofuels for the European Union’ 21(3) European Energy & Environmental Law Review, 
(2012b), pp. 123-141, pp. 124-126. 
5 Article 17(2), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. The 60% greenhouse gas emissions 
requirement for biofuels and bioliquids produced in installations starting operations after 5 October 
2015. For the installations that were in operation on or before 5 October 2015, biofuels and bioliquids 
shall achieve a greenhouse gas emission saving of at least 35% until 31 December 2017 and at least 
50% from 1 January 2018. 
6 According to Article 18(7) of the Renewable Energy Directive, no further proof maybe requested by 
a Member State if the proof of compliance has been made in accordance with Article 18(4) of this 
directive. Also, confirming that Article 18 of the Renewable Energy Directive gives economic operators 
the possibility to choose among the three methods to show Member State compliance with the 
sustainability criteria, see S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 178. 
7 Article 18 (4), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
8 All the discussions in this chapter also apply to bioliquids. There are no adopted binding criteria for 
the sustainability of solid and gaseous biomass for electricity, heating and cooling for the period studied 
in this thesis (up to 2020). However, the Commission made a recommendation to Member States for 
developing their own national schemes. T. Yue, op. cit. (2016), p. 114.  
9 Some authors have discussed the question of the transparency of the voluntary schemes, but there is 
no mention of the Aarhus Convention. See S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 175; J. Lin, op. cit. 
(2011), p. 56; Paiement, P., ‘Transnational delegation, accountability and the administrative governance 
of biofuel standards’, in S. Wood, R. Schmidt, K. Abbott, B. Eberlein and E. Meidinge (eds.), 
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of access to biofuel-related information and public participation in decision making of the 
recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes at the EU level in view of the Aarhus Convention 
requirements.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the sustainability criteria, explains 
the recognition process of biofuels voluntary schemes at the EU level, identifies the actors 
involved in the recognition process and provides a critical analysis of the RED requirement 
of having an adequate standard of transparency in this process. Section 3 discusses the legal 
framework for access to information related to biofuels in view of the literature and the 
relevant case law and tests its compatibility with the Aarhus Convention. Section 4 examines 
the legal framework for public participation in biofuels voluntary schemes and certification 
of biofuels decision making and tests its compatibility with the Aarhus Convention. Section 
5 concludes by highlighting the legal problems uncovered by this research and pointing at 
possible solutions. 
2. The sustainability criteria 
2.1. Introduction 
Article 17 RED lays down the sustainability criteria for biofuels.10 Paragraphs 2 to 6 establish 
the criteria that must be fulfilled before the biofuels can be counted towards the renewable 
energy target. There are also social and economic aspects among the sustainability criteria 
for which the Commission has obligations to report to the European Parliament and the 
Council, but they are not part of the mandatory sustainability criteria.11  
The mandatory sustainability criteria determine that (i) greenhouse gas emission saving from 
biofuels and bioliquids produced by installations that started operating after 5 October 2015 
shall be at least 60%;12 (ii) biofuels “shall not be made from raw material obtained from land 
with high biodiversity value”;13 (iii) biofuels “shall not be made from raw material obtained 
                                                          
Transnational business governance interactions: Enhancing regulatory capacity, ratcheting up 
standards and empowering marginalized Actors (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 
227-252, pp. 234-236. 
10 The sustainability criteria also apply to bioliquids, see Recital 67, Preamble, Directive 2009/28/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/39, 
OJ L140/16. 
11 Article 17(7), Renewable Energy Directive. 
12 Article 17(2), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. For installations that were in 
operation on or before 5 October 2015 the greenhouse gas emission saving criteria for biofuels and 
bioliquids is of at least 35% until 31 December 2017 and at least 50% from 1 January 2018. 
13 Article 17(3), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
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from land with high carbon stock”;14 (iv) “shall not be made from raw material obtained from 
land that was peatland in January 2008”; and (v) certain agro-environmental practices must 
be applied in the EU biofuel’s cultivation.15 Only the biofuels that fulfil these conditions can 
be used to achieve the national renewable energy targets. It means that biofuels that do not 
meet the sustainable criteria of the Directive may be commercialised, but they cannot be 
counted to fulfil national renewable energy targets.16 In order to use biofuels, which can be 
counted to fulfil the national targets, Member States are obliged to require economic 
operators to prove that the biofuels and bioliquids concerned comply with the sustainability 
criteria.17 As already stated in section 1, in order to prove compliance with the sustainability 
criteria, economic operators may choose among three methods: a) national systems;18 b) 
voluntary schemes recognised by the European Commission;19 and c) bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.20 
Of the three options, voluntary schemes have been considered the most important compliance 
mechanism, as they are applicable EU-wide.21 By November 2019, there are 14 active 
voluntary schemes recognised by the European Commission.22 The recognition of voluntary 
schemes is the focus of the present study, since this is the only method developed so far, at 
the EU level, to recognise biofuels as sustainable. Bilateral and multilateral agreements could 
have been part of the scope of this study, since they may be concluded by the EU. However, 
at the time of writing no such agreements had been concluded.23 
                                                          
14 Article 17(4), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
15 Article 17(6), Renewable Energy Directive. 
16 Article 17(1), Renewable Energy Directive. S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 176. M. Peeters, 
‘Instrument mix or instrument mess? The administrative complexity of the EU legislative package for 
climate change’, in M. Peeters and R. Uylenburg (eds.), EU Environmental Legislation: Legal 
Perspectives on Regulatory Strategies,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 173-192, p. 179. 
17 Article 18(1), Renewable Energy Directive. 
18 Article 18(3), Renewable Energy Directive. 
19 Article 18(4) second subparagraph, and Article 18(7) Renewable Energy Directive. 
20 Article 18(4) first subparagraph and Article 18(7), Renewable Energy Directive. 
21 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Comittee of the Regions, SWD(2015) 117 final 
(2015d), p. 15. 
22 European Commission. Voluntary schemes, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. See Annex with 
the name of the voluntary schemes and date of recognition. The European Commission has recognised 
more schemes over the years, but some of them did not request a new recognition after the decision has 
expired. 
23 “[…] bilateral agreements, there are as yet none in place or recognized by the Commission. Brazil 
and the USA have shown interest in developing such an agreement for the purpose of compliance with 
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Regarding the non-mandatory sustainability criteria, the RED prescribes that the Commission 
shall report every two years to the European Parliament and the Council on national measures 
taken regarding the greenhouse gas savings, biodiversity, carbon stock criteria, as well as 
soil, water and air protection in the countries which are a significant source of biofuels or of 
raw materials for biofuels consumed within the EU.24 In addition to this, there are further 
reporting obligations regarding soil, water and air protection, and also on socio-economic 
sustainability aspects.25 The European Commission may propose action to correct the 
sustainability criteria if there is evidence of negative impact of biofuels on the environment 
and on economic and social aspects, especially if “evidence shows that biofuel production 
has a significant impact on food prices”.26  
2.2. The voluntary schemes to demonstrate compliance of biofuels with the 
sustainability criteria 
                                                          
sustainability criteria of biofuels, but nothing has been recognized or established to date”. C. 
Hamelinck, M. Koper, L. Janeiro, C. Klessmann, R. Kuwahata, C. Nabe, M. Doering, M. Cuijpers, A. 
van den Bos, M. Spoettle, S. Alberici, M. Ragwitz, S. Steinhilber, J. Nysten, D. Fouquet, G. Resch, L. 
Liebmann, A. Ortner, C. Panzer, F. Johnson, O. Olsen, J. Godar, L. Karlberg, and G. Fischer, 
Renewable energy progress and biofuels sustainability (2014), p. 193.  
24 Article 17(7), Renewable Energy Directive. 
25 Article 17(7), Renewable Energy Directive. According to Article 17(7) RED, the European 
Commission shall also report to the European Parliament and the Council on soil, water and air 
protection, and as well on socio-economic sustainability aspects, such as the availability of foodstuffs 
at affordable prices, and the respect of land-use rights related, and the status of ratification by concerned 
countries of the Conventions on labour rights agreed under the International Labour Organisation (The 
RED lists the following labour right conventions: Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour (No 29), Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise (No 87), Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise 
and to Bargain Collectively (No 98), Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value (No 100), Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
(No 105), Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No 111), 
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No 138), Convention 
concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour (No 182)), as well as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 
26 Article 17(7), last indent, Renewable Energy Directive. The RED Directive does not define what a 
corrective action is. Different methods could be considered to correct a negative social impact caused 
by an increased demand for biofuels, depending on who it shall be addressed it could be a decision, a 
regulation or an amendment to the RED. For a discussion on the methods, see: E. Maitre and J. Meissner 
Pritchard, ‘Reporting obligations under the Renewable Energy Directive and the Fuel Quality 
Directive’  Legal Briefing ClientEarth, (2011), pp. i-20, p. 13. 
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At the time of writing, voluntary schemes are the only method used at EU level to show 
compliance with the sustainability criteria contained in the RED. Recital 79 of the preamble 
of the RED explains the objective and importance of these voluntary schemes: 
 “It is in the interests of the Community to encourage [...] voluntary international or 
national schemes that set standards for the production of sustainable biofuels and 
bioliquids, and that certify that the production of biofuels and bioliquids meets those 
standards. For that reason, provision should be made for such [...] schemes to be 
recognised as providing reliable evidence and data, provided that they meet adequate 
standards of reliability, transparency and independent auditing.” (Emphasis 
added) 
Article 18 RED authorises the Commission to decide on the approval of voluntary schemes 
and describes the procedure for the adoption of a decision which recognises the voluntary 
schemes: 
“4. […] The Commission may decide that voluntary national or international 
schemes setting standards for the production of biomass products contain 
accurate data for the purposes of Article 17(2), and/or demonstrate that 
consignments of biofuel or bioliquid comply with the sustainability criteria set 
out in Article 17(3), (4) and (5), and/or that no materials have been intentionally 
modified or discarded so that the consignment or part thereof would fall under Annex 
IX. […]; 
5. The Commission shall adopt decisions under paragraph 4 only if the agreement or 
scheme in question meets adequate standards of reliability, transparency and 
independent auditing. In the case of schemes to measure greenhouse gas emission 
saving, such schemes shall also comply with the methodological requirements in 
Annex V[...]. 
6. Decisions under paragraph 4 of this Article shall be adopted in accordance 
with the examination procedure referred to in Article 25(3). Such decisions shall 
be valid for a period of no more than five years.” (Emphasis added). 
In an attempt to provide more clarity on this recognition process, in June 2010, the 
Commission published Communication 160/01, which explains the requirements, the 
assessment and the recognition process undertaken by the European Commission to 
recognise voluntary schemes.27 
                                                          
27 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b). The European Commission 
has also published Communication from the Commission on the practical implementation of the EU 
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Within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) leads the 
recognition procedure of voluntary schemes.28 It assesses the voluntary schemes with the 
help of an evaluator/contractor, which analyses the technical aspects of schemes.29 The 
selection of the contractor is made through calls for tenders.30 The selected 
evaluator/contractor will assess the application and consider if there is a need to adjust the 
scheme in order to comply fully with the sustainability criteria. If there is a need for 
adjustments, the evaluator, on behalf of the Commission, will give the applicant the 
opportunity to find solutions.31 When the assessment indicates that a scheme meets the 
sustainability criteria, Communication 160/01 prescribes that the Commission shall “initiate 
the process leading to the adoption of a Commission decision”.32 The first step taken by the 
DG ENER is “an inter-service consultation with other Directorates-General for their co-
approval”.33 After the technical assessment has been approved by the Directorates-General, 
the DG ENER starts the process leading to the adoption of the Commission decision via 
comitology,34 which involves the Committee on the Sustainability of Biofuels and 
Bioliquids.35 The Committee votes and then DG ENER makes its recommendation to the 
European Commission regarding the adoption of an implementing decision recognising the 
scheme.36 The decision is valid for five years.37 If, during the validity of the decision, the 
operator of the voluntary scheme wants to implement changes, it may do so upon notification 
                                                          
biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme and on counting rules for biofuels, 2010/C 160/02, OJ C 
160/8 (2010a). 
28 T. Vogelpohl and D. Perbandt, ‘Biofuel sustainability certifications in the EU: democratically 
legitimate and socio-environmentally effective?’, in M. Vogt (ed.), Sustainability certification schemes 
in the agricultural and natural resource sectors: outcomes for society and the environment,  (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 179-198. 
29 S. Ugarte, J. van Dam, S. Spijkers and M. Gaebler, op. cit. (2013), p. 7. 
30 See for an example a selection that took place in March/April 2015. European Commission, Contract 
notice: Assessment of voluntary schemes and agreements used for sustainability claims (2015/S 060-
104704) OJ/S S60 (2015c). 
31 S. Ugarte, J. van Dam, S. Spijkers and M. Gaebler, op. cit. (2013), p. 7. 
32 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), section 2.1. 
33 S. Ugarte, J. van Dam, S. Spijkers, and M. Gaebler, op. cit. (2013), p. 7. 
34 “The term ‘comitology’ is shorthand for the way the Commission exercises the implementing powers 
conferred on it by the EU legislator, with the assistance of committees of representatives from the EU 
Member States.” European Commission. Comitology Register - Frequently Asked Questions, 19 June 
2020, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=FAQ.FAQ. 
35 The Committee on the Sustainability of Biofuels and Bioliquids was established by Article 25(2), 
Renewable Energy Directive. 
36 The decision is adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure Article 18(6), Renewable Energy 
Directive. 
37 Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive. 
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to the Commission. If such an amendment affects the basis of the initial scheme that was 
approved, then DG ENER will undertake a new assessment.38  
In case the scheme does not meet the sustainability criteria, the Communication only 
mentions that the applicant will be informed, and it does not make clear through which 
instrument the applicants will be informed.39 In fact, there is no formal decision taken by the 
Commission.40 
The flowchart below depicts the recognition process of the biofuels voluntary schemes 
combining the information from the RED, the Communication 160/01 and the literature:  
  
                                                          
38 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default 
values in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), 
Section 1, last indent and Section 2.1. 
39 “If the assessment indicates that a scheme does not meet the requirements, the Commission will 
inform the submitting organisation accordingly”. Communication from the Commission on voluntary 
schemes and default values in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ 
C 160/1 (2010b), Section 2.1. 
40 “The Commission cannot adopt a Decision to refuse recognition for a scheme which is not able to 
demonstrate compliance with the sustainability criteria. Therefore, even if an assessment is carried out 
to refuse recognition for a scheme, there are no formal documents which can be shared.” Personal 
communication via Europe Direct Contact Centre (12 April 2017). [Biofuels voluntary schemes - first 
answer]. Nevertheless, the message informing the organisation that the scheme will not be recognised 
may be challenged, since it implies a non-recognition decision. If the submitting organisation disagrees 
with the Commission’s non-recognition, it may start an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, 
since the implied decision is addressed to the submitting organisation itself. It would also be possible 
for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to request an internal review, which is part of the EU’s 
attempt to implement access to justice in case of an environmental law violation at the EU level. Article 
10, Aarhus Regulation. For an explanation of the internal review, see Chapter III, section 5.1. 
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Figure 02: Recognition of the biofuels voluntary schemes41 
 
  
                                                          
41 Flowchart developed by the author. 
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2.3. Identifying the actors involved in the recognition process 
Based on the recognition process of the voluntary schemes presented above, it is possible to 
identify the participation of public and private actors. First, the Commission is responsible 
for recognising the voluntary schemes. Second, the evaluator/contractor analyses the 
technical aspects of the schemes on the basis of a mandate received by the Commission. 
Third, the recognised voluntary scheme certifies the biofuels as sustainable and that it is 
operated by a private party. Besides the Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the private 
party operating the recognised voluntary scheme, the public is a potential actor. Members of 
the public, such as Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs), may request 
information from the aforementioned actors about the recognition and certification of 
biofuels and may also attempt to participate in the decision making process. Therefore, all of 
these actors play or may play an important role in access to biofuel-related information and 
public participation in the recognition of voluntary schemes. 
2.4. The requirement of an adequate standard of transparency for the recognition 
of voluntary schemes 
As stated above in section 2.2, Article 18(5) RED prescribes that voluntary schemes are only 
recognised if they meet an adequate standard of transparency. Transparency may encapsulate 
a broad meaning, which does not only refer to access to information but also the availability 
and accessibility of the information, and the ability of the public to be informed about 
governmental decision making.42 But transparency standards conventionally refer to public 
access to information held by the public authorities as well as information about 
governmental decision making.43 This chapter will deal with transparency to the extent that 
it relates to the right to access information. The focus is therefore on access to information 
and the required standard of transparency will be explored so as to understand whether it 
provides requirements for access to information. 
Transparency is not the only criterion that the Commission has to respect in its decision 
making regarding the voluntary schemes. Article 18(5) RED states that the recognition of 
voluntary schemes shall be granted by the Commission only if the schemes meet “adequate 
standards of reliability, transparency and independent auditing”. These are vague criteria and 
the Commission has given guidance in Communication 160/01 on what is to be understood 
by adequate standards of independent and reliable auditing.44 However, this communication 
                                                          
42 H. Kilmartin and E. Mendelson, ‘Transparency and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process’ 
Paper 238 Faculty Scholarship, (2008), pp. 924-972, p. 926. 
43 C. Coglianese, H. Kilmartin and E. Mendelson, Transparency and Public Participation in the 
Rulemaking Process: A Nonpartisan Presidential Transition Task Force Report (2008), p. V. 
44 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), Section 2.2.2. 
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does not give any guidance on what can be understood as an adequate standard of 
transparency. This lack of guidance may lead to different levels of transparency among the 
approved schemes.45 As shown by a study from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
“there is a variation in assurance requirements between systems for those points where the 
EU-RED lacks guidance or provides room for interpretation”.46 An example of this variation 
is the fact that not all voluntary schemes provide the summary reports of the audit 
assessments for the evidence related to the activities the voluntary schemes claim to be able 
to perform on their websites.47  
All Commission decisions recognising schemes before the 2015 amendment to the RED 
found that the schemes met “adequate standards of reliability, transparency and independent 
auditing.”48 The question that follows is how transparency standards have been evaluated if 
there are no assessment criteria for such standards. The assessment reports on which the 
Commission decisions are based also do not provide clarification regarding transparency.49 
Consequently, it can be stated that the assessment procedure “does not produce necessary 
information on the standards against which the voluntary certification schemes are assessed 
and selected”.50 
After the amendment brought by Directive 2015/1513 to the RED, this situation has 
improved. For the voluntary schemes that have been and will be recognised after the 
amendment, the Commission has prepared a new recognition template that includes a section 
                                                          
45 In fact, the only reference to the term “transparency” in Communication (2010/C 160/01) is to the 
“transparency platform”. 
46 J. Van Dam, S. Ugarte and S. van Iersel, Selecting a biomass certification system–a benchmark on 
level of assurance, costs and benefits, https://jvdconsultancy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/Selecting-a-biomass-certific-ation-system-–-a-benchmark-on-level-of-
assurance-costs-and-benefits-March-2012-.pdf (2012), p. 12. This study compares eight recognised 
schemes. On the different degree of transparency among the schemes, see also: I. Schlamann, B. Wieler, 
M. Fleckenstein, J. Walther-Thoß, N. Haase and L. Mathe, ‘Searching for Sustainability: Comparative 
Analysis of Certification Schemes for Biomass used for the Production of Biofuels’, (Düsseldorf: WWF 
Deutschland, 2013). 
47 J. Van Dam, S. Ugarte and S. van Iersel, Selecting a biomass certification system–a benchmark on 
level of assurance, costs and benefits, https://jvdconsultancy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/Selecting-a-biomass-certific-ation-system-–-a-benchmark-on-level-of-
assurance-costs-and-benefits-March-2012-.pdf (2012), pp. 23-24. For an overview of the all voluntary 
schemes see: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes 
48 This conclusion has been reached by examining all the Commission’s decisions. 
49 The assessment reports may be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. Expired decisions will be not available on this website but are on 
file with the author. 
50 S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 182. 
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on the transparency of the schemes.51 A similar section was not present in the templates used 
for the recognition of the schemes before the amendment.52 The section on transparency 
states that “voluntary schemes should make available information that is relevant for the 
operation of the system or for transparency purposes.”53 Furthermore, the section lists which 
information, in particular, should be published: the list of economic operators that are or have 
been recognised under the scheme; information on the withdrawal or suspension of 
certificates; the latest version of scheme documents; the auditing certification bodies; 
publication of contact details for the scheme; and the names of the voluntary schemes from 
which the applicant scheme accepts certified material.54 
Furthermore, pursuant to Directive 2015/1513, there is an obligation for the voluntary 
schemes to report to the Commission on many different aspects of the operation of the 
schemes. Regarding access to information and public participation, the schemes have to 
report on “transparency, particularly in relation to the accessibility of the scheme, the 
availability of translations in the applicable languages of the countries and regions from 
which raw materials originate, the accessibility of a list of certified operators and relevant 
certificates, and the accessibility of auditor reports”55 and also the “stakeholder involvement, 
particularly as regards the consultation of indigenous and local communities prior to decision 
making during the drafting and reviewing of the scheme as well as during audits and the 
response to their contributions”.56 The Commission has to analyse these reports, reviewing 
the operation of recognised voluntary schemes and identifying best practices and report to 
the Council and the Parliament.57 This is a novelty, since there was no provision in the RED 
                                                          
51 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. The protocol is from 
November 2015 (European Court of Auditors, The EU system for the certification of sustainable 
biofuels (2016), p. 54). 
52 All the schemes will have to be subject to a new decision after five years, which is the validity of any 
Commission decision recognising schemes according to Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive, 
consolidated version. It means that eventually all schemes will be approved in accordance with the new 
template. 
53 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
54 European Court of Auditors, The EU system for the certification of sustainable biofuels (2016), p. 
54. For instance, voluntary schemes may certify biofuels as being sustainable for which biomass 
certified by another voluntary scheme has been used. In this case, the applicant scheme should publish 
the names of the schemes from which it has accepted certified material. 
55 Article 18(6)(c), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
56 Article 18(6)(d), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
57 Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. According to Article 18(6), third 
block, last sentence, the report shall be based on the best information available, including following 
consultations with stakeholders, and on practical experience in the application of the schemes. 
Therefore, the provision requires the Commission to base the report also on information generated 
during stakeholders’ consultations, but the provision does not explicitly require the Commission to 
conduct consultations for the elaboration of the report. 
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explaining how the Commission would monitor the voluntary schemes. This report should 
contain a vast list of areas, among others, transparency in relation to the accessibility of the 
scheme and stakeholder involvement. However, these are only reporting obligations.  
Furthermore, for standards of independent auditing, the Commission may, based on a risk 
analysis or on these reports, set new standards and require all voluntary schemes to apply 
those standards.58 The Commission may repeal the decision to recognise the voluntary 
scheme, which does not comply with the new standards of independent auditing within a 
prescribed timeframe.59 Interestingly, the standard of transparency and reliability did not 
receive the same treatment. 
2.5. Interim Conclusion 
Despite the fact that all Commission decisions recognising voluntary schemes before the 
2015 amendment to the RED affirm that adequate standards of reliability, transparency and 
independent auditing have been met, the analysis carried out in this section found that neither 
the RED defines this standard, nor the assessment reports, on which the Commission 
decisions for recognising these schemes were based, provided clarification regarding the 
transparency standards that have been employed when recognising the voluntary schemes.60 
Therefore, the established legal framework and the subsequent decisions did not contain 
information on the transparency standards against which the voluntary certification schemes 
are assessed and approved.61 The amendment about brought by Directive 2015/1513 has 
improved this situation. As a consequence of this amendment, the RED currently includes 
more requirements regarding transparency on the recognition of voluntary schemes and an 
obligation for the Commission to prepare the report on the revision of the operation of the 
voluntary schemes.62 For the voluntary schemes that have been and will be recognised after 
the amendment, the Commission has prepared a new recognition assessment template that 
includes a section on the transparency of the schemes.63 A similar section was not present in 
the templates used for the recognition of the schemes before the amendment.64 This section 
on transparency from the Commission’s template requires the voluntary schemes to make 
                                                          
58 Article 18 (5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
59 Article 18 (5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
60 The assessment reports may be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. 
61 S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 182. 
62 Article 18 (6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
63 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
64 All the schemes will have to be subject to a new decision after five years, which is the validity of any 
Commission decision recognising schemes according to Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive, 
consolidated version. It means that, in the end, all schemes are expected to be approved in accordance 
with the new template. 
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information on their actions performed and operations available,65 such as the latest version 
of scheme documents and the list of economic operators that are recognised under the 
scheme.  
3. Access to biofuel-related information 
3.1. Introduction 
There is no general provision on access to information in the RED that would apply to all 
situations under the Renewable Energy Directive. In this vein, in order to understand the 
framework applicable in the case of the recognition of the voluntary schemes, it is necessary 
to look at the relationship of the RED with the Aarhus Regulation and the specific provisions 
governing the recognition process.  
First, this section analyses the legal framework for access to biofuel-related information and 
identifies the current and potential legal problems. Second, it explores whether biofuel-
related information can be considered environmental information and whether the actors 
involved in the recognition process can be considered to fall under the definition of public 
authority. Third, it discusses whether there exists a legal obligation for the European 
Commission, the evaluator/contractor who helps on the assessment procedure, and the 
recognised schemes to disseminate and disclose information upon request. Finally, it 
examines the legal problems related to requesting biofuel-related information through the 
lens of relevant case law. 
3.2. The RED and the Aarhus Regulation 
Recital 90 of the preamble of the RED states that its implementation should reflect, where 
relevant, the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, in particular as implemented through the 
Directive on Access to Environmental Information, which is applicable in case information 
is requested from national authorities.66 However, there is no specific reference in the RED 
covering access to information at the EU level. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, in the 
case of information held by the European Commission, Regulation 1367/2006 (the Aarhus 
Regulation), which implemented the provisions of the Aarhus Convention for the European 
institutions, will apply. However, the fact that the RED only mentions the Directive on 
Access to Environmental Information shows the missed opportunity of fine-tuning the 
provisions on access to environmental information.   
                                                          
65 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
66 Directive 2003/4, see footnote 33 of Chapter IV. 
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3.3. Setting the scene for access to environmental information 
According to the Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Regulation, rights and obligations 
regarding access to environmental information can only be exercised if the requested 
information falls under the definition of environmental information and if this information is 
requested from or disseminated by public authorities.  Therefore, this section examines 
whether information on biofuels is environmental information and whether the information 
is held by a public authority.  
3.3.1.  The definition of environmental information: Biofuel-related information 
Article 2(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Aarhus Regulation mirroring Article 2(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention provides that “‘environmental information’ means any information in written, 
visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on: (i) the state of the elements of the 
environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land etc.; and (ii) factors, such as 
substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, 
discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements 
of the environment[…]”. 
According to this definition, information on energy, affecting or likely to affect the 
environment, should be considered environmental information. Biofuels are a source of 
energy derived from biomass. However, to fall under the definition of environmental 
information, information on energy also needs to affect or be likely to affect the elements of 
the environment. A concern about the potential impact of biofuels on the environment (in 
this case land and atmosphere) is that an increase in biofuels consumption will change the 
use of the land from the production of local crops to the production of feedstock for biofuels. 
This change in the use of the land could increase deforestation and lead to extra carbon 
emissions due to more intensive agricultural use of uncultivated lands.67 This phenomenon is 
known as Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC).  
A 2015 study commissioned by the European Commission to evaluate the impact of land use 
change for biofuels consumed in the EU pointed out that “the total land use change caused 
by the EU 2020 biofuel mandate is 8.8 Mha (million hectares), of which 8 Mha is new 
cropland and the remaining 0.8Mha consists of short rotation plantations on existing 
cropland. From the 8.8 Mha, 2.9 Mha of conversion takes place in Europe by less land 
abandonment and 2.1 Mha of land is converted in Southeast Asia under pressure from oil 
                                                          
67 J. Lin, op. cit. (2011), p. 47. H. Valin, D. Peters, M. van den Berg, S. Frank, P. Havlik, N. Forsell, C. 
Hamelinck, J. Pirker, A. Mosnier, J. Balkovič, E. Schmid, M. Dürauer, and F. di Fulvio, The land use 
change impact of biofuels consumed in the EU: Quantification of area and greenhouse gas impacts, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Final%20Report_GLOBIOM_publication.pdf 
(2015), p. IV. 
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palm plantation expansion, half of which occurs at the expense of tropical forest and 
peatland.”68 These results show that the production of biofuels may have an impact on 
deforestation in response to the increased demand for biofuels. This is only one example of 
the potentially negative environmental effects of biofuel production69 and it is important to 
bear in mind that there might be different effects depending on the feedstocks used for this 
production.70 In this vein, it is possible to conclude that, in principle, biofuel-related 
information is environmental information in accordance with the definition of the Aarhus 
Regulation and the Aarhus Convention (although the qualification needs to be made for every 
specific request). 
3.3.2.  The definition of public authority: Commission, evaluator/contractor and 
recognised voluntary schemes  
Having established that biofuel-related information can in principle be qualified as 
environmental information in accordance with the definition of the Aarhus Regulation and 
the Aarhus Convention, it is now necessary to examine whether the information is held by a 
public authority.  
Regarding voluntary schemes, there are two levels where the information is held: (i) 
information held by the European Commission and the evaluator/contractor to assess the 
voluntary schemes, and (ii) information held by the operator of voluntary schemes for the 
certification of biofuels. The question that follows (and which is discussed in this section) is 
whether a legal obligation exists for the Commission, the private operators and operator of 
voluntary schemes to disseminate and disclose upon request the information held for the 
purposes of certification and recognition process. Such a question is important, because the 
duty to provide information is imposed only on public authorities.71  
The Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the operator of voluntary schemes for the 
certification of biofuels will only have an obligation to disclose information in case they can 
be considered public authorities. Article 2(1)(c) of Regulation 1367/2006 defines an EU 
                                                          
68 H. Valin, D. Peters, M. van den Berg, S. Frank, P. Havlik, N. Forsell, C. Hamelinck, J. Pirker, A. 
Mosnier, J. Balkovič, E. Schmid, M. Dürauer, and F. di Fulvio, The land use change impact of biofuels 
consumed in the EU: Quantification of area and greenhouse gas impacts, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Final%20Report_GLOBIOM_publication.pdf 
(2015), p. IX. 
69 Another example is that using biofuels is a combustion process that releases pollutants into the air. 
70 H. Valin, D. Peters, M. van den Berg, S. Frank, P. Havlik, N. Forsell, C. Hamelinck, J. Pirker, A. 
Mosnier, J. Balkovič, E. Schmid, M. Dürauer, and F. di Fulvio, The land use change impact of biofuels 
consumed in the EU: Quantification of area and greenhouse gas impacts, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Final%20Report_GLOBIOM_publication.pdf 
(2015), p. IX. 
71 Recital 9, Preamble and Articles 4 and 5, Aarhus Convention. 
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institution or body as “any public institution, body, office or agency established by, or on the 
basis of, the Treaty except when acting in a judicial or legislative capacity”. Under this 
definition, only the Commission is considered a public authority. 
The Aarhus Convention, however, in Article 2(2), contains a much broader definition of 
public authority, as it defines as follows: 
 “(a) Government at national, regional and other level;  
(b) Natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under 
national law, including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the 
environment;  
(c) Any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities or functions, 
or providing public services, in relation to the environment, under the control of a 
body or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or (b) above;  
(d) The institutions of any regional economic integration organization referred to in 
article 17 which is a Party to this Convention.” (Emphasis added) 
It is clear that the European Commission falls under alinea d. However, it seems that the 
European Commission also falls under alinea a, since the definition is broad enough to 
encompass institutions from all governmental levels. Therefore, there is no doubt that the 
European Commission is a public authority in accordance with the Aarhus Convention’s 
definition. 
The EU chose not to implement paragraphs b and c of the Aarhus Convention in the Aarhus 
Regulation. Furthermore, the RED does not establish any duty for the evaluator/contractor, 
and activities by the latter fall directly under the responsibility of the Commission. As far as 
the activities by the contractor to fulfil the Commission’s task prescribed by the RED are 
concerned, it may be assumed that information can be asked for through the Commission. 
For the classification of evaluators/contractors and the recognised schemes, more explanation 
is needed in order to conclude whether they can be classified as a public authority in light of 
the Aarhus Convention. The Implementation Guide clarifies that:  
“The first key difference between subparagraph (c) and (b) is the source of authority 
of the person performing public functions or providing public services. It can be 
distinguished from subparagraph (b) in that the bodies addressed derive their 
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authority not from national legislation, but indirectly through their control by 
those defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b).”72  
The evaluators/contractors are contracted by the Commission to assess the applications by 
the operators of voluntary schemes. Therefore, they cannot fall under alinea b, since 
evaluators/contractor derive their tasks from the Commission and not directly from national 
law (in this case EU law). To fall under alinea c, the following requirements need to be 
fulfilled: i) be a natural or legal person; ii) having public responsibilities or functions, or 
providing public services, in relation to the environment; and iii) be under control of a body 
or person falling within alineas a or b. First, the evaluators/contractors are private actors 
who perform supervisory functions (analyses of the technical aspects of schemes) on the basis 
of a mandate of the European Commission. Second, the technical assessments made by 
evaluators/contractors are related to the environment, since they evaluate whether the 
schemes have the tools to demonstrate that biofuels comply with the sustainability criteria. 
Third, the European Commission is covered by alinea a and has the power – by means of the 
contract – to exercise control over the evaluators/contractors. A narrow interpretation could 
lead to the understanding that the evaluators/contractors could not fall under alinea c, since 
the European Commission, which exercises the control, would only fall under alinea d, which 
is not included under the definition in c. Under this narrow interpretation, since alinea c refers 
only to a and b, the European Commission as an institution of a regional economic integration 
organisation would not be a body that could fulfil the condition required under alinea c. 
However, this interpretation would not align with the aim of the Aarhus Convention to 
provide for access to environmental information.73 Moreover, the inclusion of alinea d is a 
way of broadening the definition rather than narrowing it. By refuting such a narrow 
interpretation and including the Commission under the definition of alinea a, the 
evaluators/contractors qualify as public authorities under the Article 2(2)(c) of the Aarhus 
Convention. 
Regarding the question whether the operators of the voluntary schemes can also be qualified 
as a public authority according to the Aarhus Convention, the following analysis applies. The 
Renewable Energy Directive confers  the power on the Commission to recognise the biofuels 
voluntary schemes.74 The recognised voluntary schemes can then certify biofuels according 
to the sustainability criteria established in the RED. The Commission derives the authority 
from the RED, and the biofuels voluntary schemes, in turn, derive their authority from the 
Commission. Even if the RED establishes the sustainability criteria and allows for the 
existence of the voluntary schemes, the source of authority emanates indirectly from the RED 
and directly from the Commission. In the Fish Legal case, the CJEU confirmed that the 
                                                          
72 J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 47. 
73 Article 1, Aarhus Convention. 
74 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
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source of authority should come from national legislation in order for natural and legal 
persons to fall within the category of public authorities under alinea b.75 In this vein, the 
voluntary schemes do not fall under alinea b. Alinea c remains to be analysed. As mentioned 
above, according to alinea c, three conditions need to fulfilled: the natural or legal persons 
have public responsibilities or functions, or provide public services; these public 
responsibilities or functions, or public services are related to the environment; and the persons 
are under the control of a body or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or (b).  
First, the voluntary schemes are private actors, which perform public tasks (certification of 
biofuels). The Commission is empowered by the RED to recognise voluntary schemes, which 
certify biofuels in accordance with the sustainability criteria.76 Second, the assessment of the 
biofuels to certify them as compatible with the sustainability criteria made by the voluntary 
schemes are related to the environment, since they certify the biofuels that will count towards 
the renewable energy target. Third, the European Commission, which may be regarded as a 
person falling under alinea a, exercises control over the voluntary schemes.  
Even while the schemes conduct the certification process by themselves, the schemes are 
under the control of the Commission for the following reasons: the Commission can repeal 
the decisions recognising the schemes;77 the Commission may change the requirements for 
the recognition of the schemes;78 the recognised schemes have to report to the Commission 
regarding its activities (auditing, non-compliance, transparency, stakeholder 
involvement…).79 Consequently, voluntary schemes operated by private actors and 
recognised by the Commission fall under Article 2(2)(c) of the Aarhus Convention. 
After classifying evaluators/contractors and voluntary schemes as public authorities under 
Article 2(2)(c) of the Aarhus Convention, a last remark needs to be made. The Court held 
that natural or legal persons falling under similar provisions only have to disclose information 
that is related to the public environmental service provided.80 This conclusion relates to the 
                                                          
75 Note that in this case the Court interpreted Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC but, since the text is 
very similar to the text of the Aarhus Convention under examination in this section, the reasoning 
employed by the Court can be applied to the discussion of the classification of recognised voluntary 
schemes as public authorities. Case C-279/12, Fish Legal and Emily v. Information Commissioner, 
United Utilities Water plc, Yorkshire Water Services Ltd, Southern Water Services Ltd, 19 December 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:853, para 48. 
76 J. Lin, op. cit. (2011), p. 65. 
77 Article 18 (5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
78 Article 18 (5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
79 Article 18 (6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
80 Note that in this case the Court interpreted Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC but since the text is 
very similar to the text of the Aarhus Convention under examination in this section, the reasoning 
employed by the Court can be applied to the discussion of the classification of recognised voluntary 
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fact that the public function of the private entity is limited to the public responsibilities and 
functions exercised or public services offered. All the other activities will be considered 
private activities outside the scope of the Aarhus Convention. In practice, the distinction 
between the activities that derive from private or public functions may, however, be blurred 
and it may, therefore, be complex to distinguish which environmental information should be 
disclosed.  
3.4. The dissemination of biofuel-related information 
Having established that biofuel-related information is environmental information and 
assuming that the Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the recognised schemes fall 
under the definition of public authorities for the purposes of the Aarhus Convention, this 
section and the following one focus on the two sides of the right to access environmental 
information: active (this section 3.4) and passive (section 3.5).  
This section will concentrate on the active side by investigating whether there is a legal 
obligation incumbent upon the European Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the 
recognised schemes by virtue of the RED, the Aarhus Regulation and the Aarhus Convention 
to disseminate biofuels related information.  
3.4.1.  Limited dissemination of biofuel-related information: recognition of voluntary 
schemes 
The decisions taken by the Commission and the documents presented by the applicants for 
the recognition of voluntary schemes are made available on the transparency platform created 
according to Article 24 RED.81 This EU transparency platform is a website which comprises 
renewable energy-related information.82 However, such documents are only made available 
after the decisions on the recognition of the schemes have been taken. There is no register in 
the transparency platform of the application for recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes. 
In other words, by checking the transparency platform, it is not possible to know how many 
requests are (at a certain moment) in the pipeline and what the content of these requests is. 
This means that the public will most likely not know when a procedure for considering a 
request is taking place, which clearly limits the possibility of the public to request 
information. Since the Commission takes the decisions on the recognition of voluntary 
schemes through comitology, the draft decisions are made publicly available in the 
                                                          
schemes as public authorities. Case C-279/12, Fish Legal and Emily v. Information Commissioner, 
United Utilities Water plc, Yorkshire Water Services Ltd, Southern Water Services Ltd, para 83. 
81 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), Section 1.  
82 European Commission. Renewable energy: Moving towards a low carbon economy, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy. 
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Comitology Register.83 Following the 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines that provide for the 
four-week feedback on the draft of implementing acts,84 in 2017, for the first time, the 
Commission gave the opportunity for feedback during the recognition of a biofuels voluntary 
scheme,85 but the Commission did not receive any feedback.86 However, these drafts were 
not accompanied by the documents on which the Commission based its decision.87 The 
question that follows is whether there is a legal obligation for the Commission to disseminate 
information during the entire recognition process. With regard to this, the following analysis 
can be provided. 
Article 4 of Regulation 1367/2006 requires the EU institutions to disseminate environmental 
information that is “relevant to their functions and which is held by them”. Since it has been 
already established that biofuel-related information is environmental information, this article 
is applicable to the Commission. Article 4(2) of the Aarhus Regulation also requires that the 
databases or register shall include, among others, “authorisation with significant impact on 
the environment” or “risk assessments concerning environmental elements”. 
Interestingly, neither Article 4 of the Aarhus Regulation nor Article 5 of the Aarhus 
Convention (which deals with active dissemination of environmental information) contains 
requirements regarding the timeframe to make information available.88 It means that the fact 
that the information on the recognition of voluntary schemes is made available only after the 
decision was taken seems to be in compliance with the Aarhus Regulation and the Aarhus 
Convention. Despite this, the lack of information since the very beginning of the recognition 
of voluntary schemes has drawn the attention of an ENGO, which has called for transparency 
in this process. More precisely, the ENGO recommends that “schemes submitted for 
recognition are published on the transparency register as soon as their application is 
received”.89 
                                                          
83 European Commission. Comitology Register - Frequently Asked Questions, 19 June 2020, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=FAQ.FAQ. 
84 Better Regulation “Toolbox” which  complements the Better Regulation Guidelines presented in 
SWD(2017) 350 (2017b), p. 437. 
85 Further information on this feedback can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-313032_en. 
86 Personal communication via Europe Direct Contact Centre (18 May 2017). [Biofuels voluntary 
schemes - third answer]. 
87 Personal communication via Europe Direct Contact Centre (5 May 2017). [Biofuels voluntary 
schemes - second answer]. 
88 Article 4(2)(f), Aarhus Regulation and Article 5(1), Aarhus Convention. Article 297 TFEU states 
that “Other directives, and decisions which specify to whom they are addressed, shall be notified to 
those to whom they are addressed and shall take effect upon such notification.”  
89 G. Nastasi, ‘Biofuels – Driving best practice in voluntary certification’, Client Earth Briefing, (2013), 
pp. 1-2, p. 2. 
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A second issue related to the active dissemination of information to the public by the 
Commission is the fact that the documents which are made available after the decision to 
recognise the voluntary schemes is taken have many parts that are blacked out.90 It shows 
that the European Commission treated this information as confidential, but it is not clear 
which exceptions of the Aarhus Regulation the Commission were relied upon to keep the 
information confidential. Nevertheless, the blacked-out information may be subject to a 
request for environmental information.91 If the requested information does not fall under one 
of the exceptions provided in Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention, the information would 
have to be disclosed.92  
3.4.2.  Limited dissemination of biofuel-related information: certification of biofuels 
Regarding a decision on the certification of biofuels taken by a voluntary scheme, considering 
that such a decision can be qualified as “authorisations with significant impact on the 
environment” or “risk assessments concerning environmental elements”, then there would be 
a legal obligation making to make this decision available to the public according to Article 4 
of Regulation 1367/2006.93 However, as explained in section 3.3.2, the recognised schemes 
do not fall under the definition of EU institutions or bodies and therefore the Aarhus 
Regulation is not applicable.  
Nonetheless, considering that actors operating the recognised schemes fall under the 
definition of public authority under the Aarhus Convention,94 the obligations for the 
dissemination of information will apply. According to Article 5(2) of the Aarhus Convention, 
there is an obligation for the Parties to ensure, within its national legislation, that public 
authorities disclose environmental information to the public in a transparent way and that the 
environmental information is effectively accessible. In this vein, the lack of clear rules in the 
RED on how the recognised schemes should disseminate information about the certification 
of biofuels, and the non-applicability of the Aarhus Regulation, shows a breach of Article 5 
of the Aarhus Convention by the European Union.95 
                                                          
90 See documentation of the voluntary schemes which are available at European Commission. 
Voluntary schemes, 20 June 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. 
91 Article 3, Aarhus Regulation. 
92 Article 6(1), Aarhus Regulation. 
93 Article 4(2)(f) and (g), Aarhus Regulation. 
94 See section 3.3.2 of this chapter. 
95 Moreover, according to Article 3(1) of the Aarhus Convention: “Each Party shall take the necessary 
legislative, regulatory and other measures, including measures to achieve compatibility between the 
provisions implementing the information, public participation and access-to-justice provisions in this 
Convention, as well as proper enforcement measures, to establish and maintain a clear, transparent and 
consistent framework to implement the provisions of this Convention.” 
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Even though not all information is made readily available during the application procedure 
of the recognition of voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels, in principle, 
environmental information shall be disclosed upon request, unless an exception applies.96 
This access to biofuel-related information upon request is discussed in the next section. 
3.5. Requesting biofuel-related information 
This section focuses on the passive form of access to environmental information. The 
definition of environmental information is broad and it has not yet been crystallised precisely 
what kind of information is part of the definition and what kind of information falls outside 
its scope and is, consequently, not covered by provisions on access to environmental 
information.97 Since the array of information that individual and legal persons would like to 
receive can be manifold, this section will investigate, through the case law of the CJEU, the 
problems surrounding access to biofuel-related information. The section will use concrete 
examples to point to the difficulties for ENGOs to access biofuel-related information 
(sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2), and it delves into the limits of application of the grounds for refusal 
to provide environmental information (section 3.5.3) in the context of the recognition of 
biofuels voluntary schemes. 
3.5.1.  Delay to disclose information on the application for recognition of biofuels 
voluntary schemes 
Even if there is no registration or information disclosure in the transparency platform of the 
application for recognition of voluntary schemes, it can happen that a member of the public 
becomes aware that such a procedure has started. Then, this person might submit a request 
for information while the schemes are being assessed, trying to get information on, for 
instance, the application for recognition. 
This was what happened with a group of NGOs that discovered during “a conversation with 
Commission officials that the Commission did not intend to disclose details of the various 
voluntary certification schemes that had been submitted to it seeking recognition for the 
purposes described under Article 18 of Directive 2009/28/EC”.98 This information referred 
to the first batch of schemes that were recognised in 2011. Due to the potential environmental 
impact these schemes can have, the NGOs sought, through a formal request under Regulation 
                                                          
96 Article 6, Aarhus Regulation which needs to be read in conjunction with Article 4, Regulation 
1049/2001. 
97 A further explanation on the definition of environmental information may be found in section 3.3.1 
of Chapter III. 
98 ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and Corporate Europe Observatory, 
‘Application for Annulment under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
in Case T-278/11’, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/RIR%20EPS.pdf, p. 13. 
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1049/2001 and the Aarhus Regulation, to obtain information on the organisations that had 
applied for recognition of the schemes and all the documents related to the approval of the 
voluntary certification schemes held by the European Commission.99  
The Aarhus Regulation, while addressing the right to get access to environmental information 
upon request, refers to Regulation 1049/2001. According to this Regulation, the public 
authority shall answer the request within 15 working days, which can be extended for 15 
more working days in exceptional cases, such as when the application deals with a very large 
document.100 However, in this case, the Commission did not respect the timeframe set by 
Regulation 1049/2001. The request was made on 22 October 2010 and on 12 November 2010 
the Commission informed the applicants that the period would be extended for another 15 
working days. On 7 December 2010, the Commission released only one document which 
implied a refusal to disclose the other documents. The applicants seeking reconsideration 
from the Commission to release the documents submitted a confirmatory application in 
accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation 1049/2001.101 Again the Commission did not 
respect the time-limit prescribed by Regulation 1049/2001 to answer a confirmatory 
application, which is also a maximum of 30 working days.102 The NGOs exchanged many 
letters with the Commission expressing their concern with the delay. Faced with the lack of 
response regarding the release of the documents in time, they started an action for annulment 
in relation to the implicit refusal of the requested documents.103 However, the two-month 
time limit to start an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU had already elapsed and 
the case was found inadmissible.104 The applicants argued that the delay to start the action 
for annulment was due to having to wait for an answer from the Commission. However, the 
General Court held that the time waiting for an answer from the Commission cannot change 
the time-limit for bringing actions for annulment, since the time-limit is “a matter of public 
                                                          
99 Article 3, Aarhus Regulation and Article 2, Regulation 1049/2001. 
100 Article 7(1) and (3), Regulation 1049/2001. 
101 ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and Corporate Europe Observatory, op. 
cit. 2011, p. 15. Confirmatory application is the term used in Regulation 1049/2001 to describe the act 
of the applicant requesting the institution to reconsider its opinion. 
102 Article 8(1) and (3), Regulation 1049/2001. 
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and S. Nóbrega, op. cit. (2014), pp. 361-362. 
104 The Court understood that “the contested decision, taking the form of an implied negative decision, 
was made on 4 February 2011” (Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europ Stichting 
FERN and  Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v. European Commission, para 40) and the action 
was brought on 25 May 2011 (Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europ Stichting FERN 
and  Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v. European Commission, para 41). 
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policy”105 and is not subject to the discretion of the Parties or the Court.106 The Court has not 
accepted to extend the time-limit for bringing actions for annulment even if the Commission 
had explicitly extended the time-limit beyond what is allowed by Regulation 1049/2001. It 
means that, even when the Commission informs an applicant that the time-limits have been 
extended and the 30 working days have passed, the Court will understand this extension as 
invalid and the extension cannot be used by the applicant to justify the delay in bringing an 
action for annulment.107 
The NGOs finally received the information in September 2011, almost 11 months after the 
initial request (October 2010) and, notably, after the decisions on the voluntary schemes had 
been taken (July 2011).108 This delay from the European Commission in disclosing the 
information clearly hindered the access to information right. Unfortunately, however, the 
Court ruling does not shed any light on the obligation to provide such information within the 
prescribed time, since the case was found to be inadmissible.109 The NGOs also did not bring 
a complaint before the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention which could have 
analysed whether the behaviour of the Commission was in compliance with the Convention.  
3.5.2.  Delay to disclose information on studies on the impact of biofuels 
In addition to the reporting obligations prescribed in Article 17 RED which were explained 
in section 2, the European Commission has to report about two important topics which are 
not included in the biofuel sustainability criteria: indirect land use change and on 
                                                          
105 Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europ Stichting FERN and  Stichting Corporate 
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108 L. Krämer, ‘The EU, access to environmental information and the open society’ 14(4) ERA Forum, 
(2013), pp. 463-474, p. 472. 
109 Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europ Stichting FERN and Stichting Corporate 
Europe Observatory v. European Commission, para 47. 
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requirements for the sustainability of solid and gaseous biomass used for electricity, heating 
and cooling.110  
With regard to the sustainability of solid and gaseous biomass for electricity, heating and 
cooling, there were no binding criteria at the EU level until the recast of the Renewable 
Energy Directive in December 2018.111 Under the recast Renewable Energy Directive, the 
EU sustainability criteria have been extended to cover biomass fuels for electricity, heating 
and cooling, and Member States have to transpose these rules until 30 June 2021.112 
With regard to Indirect Land Use, the 2010 Report on Indirect Land Use Change issued by 
the European Commission recognised that indirect land use change may have an impact on 
GHG emissions savings of biofuels.113 Before this report was published, a group of NGOs 
requested access to the studies on which the findings of the report were based. More 
precisely, ClientEarth, the European Federation for Transport and Environment, the 
European Environment Bureau and BirdLife International in two separated cases requested: 
(i) access to all documents related to the modelling of the impacts of indirect land-use change 
caused by the augmentation of biofuels production;114 and (ii) access to drafts of a report 
entitled Global Trade and Environmental Impact of the EU biofuels mandate.115 For instance, 
the Global Trade and Environmental Impact of the EU biofuels mandate,116 which is one of 
the studies used in the elaboration of the 2010 Report on Indirect Land Use Change, was 
concluded in March 2010 and the NGOs requested access to this information in April 2010. 
They only got access to part of the documents on 6 December 2010 and the report which was 
                                                          
110 Article 19(6) states that “the Commission shall, by 31 December 2010, submit a report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council reviewing the impact of indirect land-use change on 
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based on these documents was released on 22 December 2010.117 This means that there was 
no possibility for the NGOs to have access to these documents during the preparation of the 
report by the Commission. 
Again, the Commission did not respect the time-limit to provide the requested information 
provided in Regulation 1049/2001118 and the applicants considered the non-response of the 
Commission as an implied negative reply.119 The applicants requested the General Court to 
annul the implied decisions but, before the ruling of Court, the Commission granted access 
to part of the documents. However, it refused access to other parts on the grounds that this 
would undermine the protection of commercial interests.120 The Court held that the 
Commission’s decisions “in fact withdrew”121 the implied decisions which consequently no 
longer existed, and there was no need to adjudicate on the actions.122 The cases could have 
received a different ruling if the applicants had amended the form of order sought, i.e., if they 
had requested the Court to rule on the explicit decision of the Commission. Since the 
applicants did not amend the form of order sought, they would have had to initiate a new case 
if they had wished to challenge the new decision of the Commission, which partially withheld 
the requested information. Since the cases were not further adjudicated, it has not become 
clear whether it is possible to make the Commission accountable for not providing the 
requested information within the prescribed time-limits. Meanwhile, the European 
Ombudsman reached the conclusion that such behaviour amounts to maladministration.123 
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time-limit shall be considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court 
proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant 
provisions of the EC Treaty” (Emphasis added).  
120 The Commission refers to the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001. Case T-449/10, 
ClientEarth and others v. Commission, para 11. 
121 Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, para 52; Case T-449/10, ClientEarth and 
others v. Commission, para 39. 
122 Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, para 51 and 56; Case T-449/10, ClientEarth 
and others v. Commission, para 38 and 43. 
123 Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing His Inquiry into Complaint 339/2011/AN against 
the European Commission (19 January 2012), found at: 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/11193/html.bookmark. In the event of a 
total or partial refusal, the applicant may institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make 
a complaint to the Ombudsman, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Articles 263 TFEU and 
228 TFEU, respectively (see Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, para 35). See also 
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However, there is no sanction on the basis of a finding of the Ombudsman to force the 
Commission to act within the timeframe.124 A way of forcing the Commission to respect the 
time-limits would be if the Court would establish that the non-compliance with the time for 
disclosure constitutes a negative answer that cannot be overruled by later disclosure.125 The 
Court has nevertheless understood that “annulment of the implied decisions on grounds of a 
procedural defect could do no more than give rise to new decisions, identical in substance to 
the express decisions.”126 The only remaining effort to give effect to the time-limits would 
be to start an action for damage pursuant to Article 340 TFEU, as it has already been 
suggested by the General Court that: “Compensation for any loss occasioned by failure to 
comply with the time-limits for responding can be sought before the General Court, in the 
context of an action for damages.”127 However, the potential success of an action for damages 
brought by an NGO is very limited since “an environmental organization is hardly able to 
prove damage, when it could not pursue its statutory objectives, due to the fact that it could 
not accede to information.”128 
A new study on the ILUC effect commissioned by the European Commission was also not 
released by the time of the consultation on the Preparation of a new Renewable Energy 
Directive for the period after 2020 which was closed on 10 February 2016.129 Although, as 
was reported, the Commission had the study for at least seven months,130 the study was 
released only in March 2016 after the request from the Members of the European 
Parliament.131 It shows that the behaviour of the Commission has not changed even after the 
considerations of the Ombudsman and the cases brought before the CJEU by NGOs.  
  
                                                          
Case T-111/11, ClientEarth v. Commission, in which it was decided that the administration does not 
lose its power to respond to an application, even outside the time-limits laid down for that purpose (para 
119). 
124 L. Krämer, op. cit. (2013), p. 471. 
125 L. Krämer, op. cit. (2013), p. 471. 
126 Cases T‑494/08 to T‑500/08 and T‑509/08, Ryanair Ltd v. European Commission, para 46. 
127 Joined Cases T‑355/04 and T‑446/04, Co-Frutta Soc. Coop. v. Commission, 19 January 2010, 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:15, para 60. 
128 L. Krämer, op. cit. (2013), p. 471. 
129 Information about the public consultation can be found here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/preparation-new-renewable-energy-directive-period-
after-2020 
130 G. Gotev. Late publication of biofuels study raises questions, 16 March 2016, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/late-publication-of-biofuels-study-raises-questions/. 
131 G. Gotev. Late publication of biofuels study raises questions, 16 March 2016, 
https://www.euractiv.com /section/energy/news/late-publication-of-biofuels-study-raises-questions/. 
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3.5.3.  Exception for disclosure to protect commercial interest 
In all the three cases dealing with access to biofuel-related information mentioned above,132 
the European Commission, applying the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 
1049/2001, refused access to environmental information under the argument that the 
disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interests.133 However, since two 
of the cases were not adjudicated and one was found inadmissible, there is no clarification 
on the application of the exception which allows the non-disclosure of information in order 
to protect commercial interests.134 However, although not dealing with biofuels, the Stichting 
Greenpeace Nederland case clarifies the issue regarding the application of the exception to 
protect commercial interests in cases where the request for environmental information deals 
with emissions into the environment.135 
In 2010, Greenpeace and Pesticide Action Network Europe sought access to documents 
relating to the authorisation for the placing on the market of glyphosate for use in plant 
protection products under Directive 91/414. They wanted to access information on the 
“detailed chemical composition of the active substance produced by each of them, detailed 
information concerning the process by which each of them produced the substance, 
information on the impurities, the composition of the finished products and the contractual 
relations between the various operators which had sought the inclusion of glyphosate”.136 
The Commission refused the disclosure of the requested information on the basis of the 
exception in the Aarhus Regulation that allows for the protection of commercial interests 
(Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation that must be read in combination with Article 4(2) 
Regulation 1049/2001). However, the same provision provides for an absolute obligation for 
disclosure if the information relates to emissions into the environment. As already discussed 
                                                          
132 Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, Case T-449/10, ClientEarth and others v. 
Commission and Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europ Stichting FERN and  Stichting 
Corporate Europe Observatory v. European Commission. 
133 Case T-120/10, Client Earth and others v. Commission, para 18; Case T-449/10, ClientEarth and 
others v. Commission, para 11. ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and Corporate 
Europe Observatory, op. cit. 2011, p. 14. Article 4(2) of the Regulation 1049/2001 was mostly used in 
combination with Article 4(3) which allows the non-disclosure of documents in case it would 
undermine the institution’s decision making process, if there is no overriding public interest in the 
disclosure. 
134 Article 4(2), Regulation 1049/2001. In Cases T-120/10 and T-449/10, the court decided there was 
no need to adjudicate (para 52 and para 39, respectively); and in Case T-278/11, the court found the 
action manifestly inadmissible (para 47). 
135 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other. 
136 Case T‑545/11, Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other v. European Commission, 8 October 
2013, ECLI:EU:T:2013:523, para 7. 
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in Chapter IV, section 3.3.2, ii, a.2, the Court of Justice ruled that emissions into the 
environment encompass actual and potential emissions but not hypothetical ones.137 
Although the Stichting Greenpeace Nederland case deals with plant protection products and 
not with biofuels, it does clarify the concept of emissions into the environment which can be 
applied to the discussion of the release of any kind of emission into the environment. By 
analogy, it is possible to say that, in the biofuels cases discussed so far, all information related 
to GHG emissions saving from the use of biofuels, including modelling for such a calculation, 
shall be made available, since, with this information, it is possible to determine the emissions 
into the environment produced by biofuels.  
3.6. Interim conclusion 
The purpose of this section was three-fold: first, it examined the legal framework for access 
to biofuel-related information; second, it investigated current and potential legal problems 
for access to biofuel-related information; third, it determined whether the legislative 
framework is in compliance with the Aarhus Convention. This interim conclusion 
summarises the findings. 
Section 3.3 demonstrated that biofuel-related information can be considered environmental 
information within the scope of Article 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Aarhus Regulation, since it is 
information on energy affecting or likely to affect the environment. Section 3.3 also argued 
that, even though the evaluator/contractor hired by the Commission to help with the 
recognition of voluntary schemes and the voluntary schemes themselves do not fall under the 
Aarhus Regulation definition of public authority, they should be considered as public 
authorities according to Article 2(2)(c) of the Aarhus Convention, because they are legal 
persons having public responsibilities or functions under the control of the European 
Commission. As a consequence, they are subject to the obligation to disseminate and to 
provide biofuel-related information upon request. Such an interpretation shows that the EU, 
by limiting public authorities to EU institutions and bodies, has not sufficiently transposed 
the Aarhus Convention. 
Having established that biofuel-related information is environmental information and that the 
European Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the voluntary schemes themselves are 
public authorities according to the Aarhus Convention, section 3.4 proceeded to examine the 
active form of access to environmental information. More precisely, it investigated which 
biofuel-related information has been made available to the public and if this published 
information would fulfil the obligations provided by the Aarhus Regulation and the Aarhus 
Convention. With respect to information held by the European Commission, there is no 
                                                          
137 Case C-673/13 P European Commission v. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and other, para 71. See 
also V. A. Buonsante and A. Friel, op. cit. (2017), p. 457. 
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register in the transparency platform of the application for the recognition of voluntary 
schemes. However, the Commission discloses these documents used for the recognition of 
the schemes (with some blacked-out parts) via its transparency platform after the decision is 
taken. The post-decision publication of the decision can still be considered in compliance 
with the provisions to disseminate information of the Aarhus Regulation and the Aarhus 
Convention, since the applicable provisions do not prescribe a timeframe for doing so.138 
However, the way the information is made available leads to two conclusions: (i) the non-
registration in the transparency platform of the application for the recognition of voluntary 
schemes means that there is no proper early access to information in the procedure for the 
recognition of voluntary schemes; and (ii) despite the fact that the draft decision is published 
on the Comitology Registry and there is an opportunity for feedback on the Commission’s 
draft decision, this participation is limited, since there is no access to the scheme documents 
on which the Commission based its decision.139 Whether this procedure is in breach of the 
right to participate in the decision making process set out in the Aarhus Convention, which 
stipulates an obligation for effective public participation at an appropriate stage, is discussed 
further in section 4. 
Concerning the information made available by voluntary schemes, the current Commission’s 
recognition template includes a section on the transparency of the schemes.140 This improves 
the previous situation where there was no mention of transparency standards. Pursuant to 
Directive 2015/1513, there is an obligation for the voluntary schemes to report to the 
Commission on many different aspects on the operation of the schemes, including on 
transparency and stakeholder involvement.141 The Commission has to analyse these reports, 
reviewing the operation of recognised voluntary schemes and identifying best practices and 
report to the Council and the Parliament.142 However, these are only reporting obligations. In 
contrast, for standards of independent auditing, the Commission may, based on a risk analysis 
or on these reports, set new standards and require all voluntary schemes to apply those 
standards.143 If the voluntary scheme does not comply with the standards of independent 
auditing, the Commission may repeal decisions recognising voluntary schemes, which do not 
comply with the new standards within a prescribed timeframe.144 Interestingly, the standard 
of transparency and reliability did not receive the same treatment. This illustrates the low 
                                                          
138 However, the application of public participation requirements may oblige the disclosure of 
information at an early stage of the decision making process. For further discussion, see section 4.4.1. 
139 The participation will still be limited since “the scheme documents are not published at this stage”. 
Personal communication via Europe Direct Contact Centre (5 May 2017). [Biofuels voluntary schemes 
- second answer]. 
140 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
141 Article 18(6)(d), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
142 Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
143 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
144 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
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weight that the EU legislator apparently gives to transparent decision making, also when 
important environmental decision making, such as assessing the sustainability of biofuels, is 
outsourced to private actors.  
Subsequently regarding the analysis of the active form of access to information, section 3.5 
focused on the passive form of access to environmental information. Analysis of case law 
from the CJEU revealed that the Commission did not respect the prescribed deadlines which 
amounted to a delay on the disclosure of biofuel-related information. Every single applicant 
was an NGO with no case so far brought by individuals or by the industry sector. Since the 
first case before the CJEU dealing with voluntary schemes related information, 14 voluntary 
schemes have been approved.145 However, there are no further cases before the CJEU or any 
Communication before the ACCC by any member of the public, despite the fact that the 
recognition process has not changed much since then. 
4. Public participation in voluntary schemes decision making 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to analyse which obligations the current legal framework 
provides in terms of public participation for the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes at 
the EU level and the certification of biofuels by these recognised schemes. This analysis also 
includes the identification of the current and potential obstacles individuals and NGOs may 
face while trying to participate in these processes and whether the current legal framework 
complies with the obligations imposed by the Aarhus Convention. 
The Renewable Energy Directive allows the Commission to adopt decisions regarding the 
recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes, and these recognised schemes can, in turn, certify 
biofuels in accordance with the sustainability criteria. Section 4.2 investigates whether the 
Renewable Energy Directive requires public participation during the decision making 
process for the adoption of decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes and 
certification of biofuels. Since the decision on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes 
is a measure adopted by an EU institution and the decision on the certification of biofuels is 
adopted by these recognised schemes to which the Commission has delegated its power, 
section 4.3 examines to what extent the Aarhus Regulation, which implements the Aarhus 
obligations of EU bodies and institutions, provides a framework for public participation 
during the adoption of these decisions. Section 4.4 explores if, according to the Aarhus 
                                                          
145 These approvals include voluntary schemes that made the application for the first time and those 
that had their decision expire after the five-year period validity. See: Memo: Certification schemes for 
biofuels. European Commission. Voluntary schemes, 19 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. 
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Convention, obligations regarding public participation remain for the Commission and the 
recognised schemes.  
4.2. Public participation under the Renewable Energy Directive 
The RED does not provide any specific provision on public participation that applies to all 
provisions of the Directive. As mentioned in section 3.2, the RED does state that the 
implementation of the Directive should reflect, where relevant, the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention, “in particular as implemented through Directive 2003/4/EC […]”.146 Hence 
while the RED refers to the Directive on Public Access to Environmental Information, it does 
not refer to the secondary EU legislation on public participation.147 Also, the RED does not 
refer to the Aarhus Regulation which implements the provisions of the Aarhus Convention 
vis-à-vis the European institutions and bodies.  
As identified above, there is no general provision on public participation in the RED, which 
applies to all measures adopted within the scope of the RED. In this vein, the following step 
is to analyse if specific provisions will require public participation. Given that this research 
focuses on the EU level, the analysis concentrates on the measures which are adopted as a 
consequence of the powers conferred on EU institutions by the RED. Article 18 (4) of the 
RED gives the Commission the power to adopt decisions regarding the recognition of the 
voluntary certification schemes.148 Article 18(6) of the RED states that the recognition of 
voluntary schemes shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred 
to in Article 25(3) which refers to the Comitology Regulation.149 The comitology procedure 
is a system of procedures for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of its 
implementing powers and does not foresee any rule for public participation.150  
European Commission Communication 160/01 on the recognition of voluntary schemes also 
does not foresee any possibility for public participation. The communication intends to show 
the steps the Commission will take to adopt these decisions and to provide information for 
                                                          
146 Recital 90, Preamble, Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
147 Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment 
and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC 
and 96/61/EC, OJ L156/17. 
148 Article 18 (4), subparagraph 2, Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
149 Article 18 (6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. The RED has also been amended 
in order to align the implementing and delegated powers conferred upon the Commission to Articles 
290 and 291 TFEU. Recital 29, Preamble, Directive (EU) 2015/1513. 
150 H. C. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe and A. H. Türk, Administrative law and policy of the European Union: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 400. G. Winter, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Public Participation in 
Administrative Decision-Making’, in G. D. Bándi (ed.), Environmental democracy and law: public 
participation in Europe,  (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2014), pp. 21-36, p. 33. 
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Member States, third countries, economic operators, and non-governmental organisations;151 
but none of these steps includes requirements for public participation during the recognition 
process of the voluntary schemes.152 Once a voluntary scheme is recognised by the 
Commission, the scheme is authorised to certify biofuels in accordance with the sustainability 
criteria.153 The RED requires that the recognised schemes meet adequate standards of 
reliability, transparency and independent auditing, but it does not define such standards.154 
The Communication also does not include among these standards the requirement for public 
participation to be followed by the voluntary schemes during the certification of biofuels. 
The template used by the Commission for the assessment of the voluntary schemes details 
what exactly is checked by the Commission.155 However, the template does not contain any 
requirement regarding public participation that would be taken into consideration by the 
Commission during the recognition process.  
Pursuant to Directive 2015/1513, there is an obligation for the voluntary schemes to report 
to the Commission on many different aspects on the operation of the schemes. The only 
obligation regarding public participation for the recognised schemes is to report on the 
“stakeholder involvement, particularly as regards the consultation of indigenous and local 
communities prior to decision making during the drafting and reviewing of the scheme as 
well as during audits and the response to their contributions”.156 Therefore, the voluntary 
scheme has no legal obligation to provide for public participation during the certification 
process of biofuels. 
4.3. The Aarhus Regulation and the recognition of voluntary schemes 
Since neither the RED nor the Communication on the recognition of voluntary schemes 
provides for public participation, it is necessary to investigate if the Aarhus Regulation 
provides any obligation regarding the decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes and 
the certification of biofuels. 
                                                          
151 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), Section 1. 
152 The assessment and recognition process is described in Section 2.1, Communication from the 
Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability 
scheme 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b). The words “public”, “public participation” and 
“consultation” are not even mentioned in the text of the Communication. 
153 Article 18(4) second subparagraph, Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels and 
bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01, OJ C 160/1 (2010b), Section 2.1. 
154 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
155 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a). 
156 Article 18(6)(d), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
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As discussed in Chapter III, although the Aarhus Regulation (in its Article 9) was meant to 
implement all obligations which derive from the Aarhus Convention for EU institutions and 
bodies, regarding public participation, this regulation only partially implements Article 7 of 
the Aarhus Convention.157 This means that Articles 6 and 8 have not been implemented at all 
by the Aarhus Regulation. 
According to Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation, “plans and programmes relating to the 
environment” are subject to public participation. Plans and programmes relating to the 
environment are plans and programmes which fulfil the cumulative conditions of Article 9 
of the Aarhus Regulation: i.e. those measures (i) which are adopted by EU institutions or 
bodies; and (ii) which are required by law or administrative provisions; and (iii) which 
contribute to achieving the objectives of the EU environmental policy.158  
The decision to recognise a biofuels voluntary scheme is adopted by an EU institution – in 
this case the Commission – which is required by law, the RED. It contributes to the objectives 
of EU environmental policy, since it is part of the measures to achieve the EU’s renewable 
energy target. However, can the Commission’s decision on the recognition of voluntary 
schemes be considered a plan or programme? Formally, a decision on the recognition of 
voluntary certification is not a plan or a programme since it is not titled as such. 
Substantively, it is necessary to analyse if the measure falls under what can be understood, 
according to the Aarhus Regulation, as plans and programmes. Since the Aarhus Regulation 
sets the criteria for plans and programmes relating to the environment but it does not define 
plans and programmes, it was determined in Chapter III that the possible interpretation of 
plan and programmes is “an organised and co-ordinated system in order to reach certain 
objectives”.159 The decision on the recognition of a voluntary scheme is not per se a system 
but rather a specific measure (a scheme), which is an option that producers of biofuels may 
use to prove compliance with the sustainability criteria. Also in view of the implementation 
of the Renewable Energy Directive, the decision on the recognition of voluntary schemes 
does not intend to propose how the objectives of the Directive are going to be implemented 
or carried out, but it is rather one possible step for the achievement of the renewable energy 
targets. Since the decision is not a plan, neither formally nor substantially, it does not fall 
under the scope of Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation.  
                                                          
157 D. Obradovic, ‘EU Rules on Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making Operating at 
the European and National Levels’ The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions Between 
Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law, (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 
2011), pp. 149-187, p. 159. For further explanation, see Chapter III, section 6.4. 
158 Article 2 (e), Aarhus Regulation. L. Krämer, op. cit. (2015), p. 90. 
159 An in-depth discussion of the definition of plans and programmes has already been presented in 
Chapter III, section 6.4. 
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Regarding the certification of biofuels as sustainable by the voluntary schemes, the voluntary 
schemes do not fall under the narrow definition of EU institutions or bodies and therefore the 
Aarhus Regulation will not be applicable in this case.160 Consequently, for both types of 
decision, there is no obligation for public participation under the Aarhus Regulation. Of 
course, it is possible that obligations for public participation may stem from the Aarhus 
Convention. This will be examined in the next section. 
4.4. Public participation in the recognition process of voluntary schemes and the 
certification of biofuels: an analysis of the compatibility with the Aarhus 
Convention161 
The participatory rights of the Aarhus Convention are laid down in Articles 6, 7 and 8. In 
order to choose the right legal basis for public participation under the Aarhus Convention, it 
is important to define the nature of the decisions on the recognition of the voluntary 
schemes.162 Thus, this section will first analyse if the decision can be considered a specific 
activity, a plan, programme or policy, an executive regulation, and/or other generally 
applicable legally binding normative instrument. Once the right provision is found, a 
discussion on the possible legal requirements for public participation will follow, 
accompanied by a compliance check by the public authorities with the Aarhus requirements.  
4.4.1.  Public participation in decisions on specific activities 
i.  Scope of application 
a) What are specific activities or proposed activities? 
The title of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention refers to decisions on specific activities, while 
alineas a and b refer to decisions on proposed activities. Despite this difference, it seems that 
the terms specific activities and proposed activities have the same function: to define which 
kind of activities the article is referring to. However, neither proposed activities nor specific 
activities are terms defined in the Aarhus Convention.  
                                                          
160 Article 2(1)(c), Aarhus Regulation defines Community institution or body as “any public institution, 
body, office or agency established by, or on the basis of, the Treaty except when acting in a judicial or 
legislative capacity.” At the time of the adoption of the Aarhus Regulation, it was the European 
Community and therefore the definition refers to Community institutions or body. 
161 As discussed in section 3.3.2, the Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the operator of the 
recognised schemes are public authorities according to the broad definition of the Aarhus Convention. 
Therefore, the public participation requirements of the Aarhus Convention apply and will be discussed 
in this section. 
162 J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2009), p. 504. 
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Paragraph 1 of Article 6 states which activities are subject to the public participation 
requirements and divide these activities in two alineas (a and b). Alinea a refers to the 
activities listed in Annex I of the Aarhus Convention. Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention 
was drafted based on Directive 85/337 (the old EIA Directive)163 and the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive164 (by now replaced by the Industrial Emissions 
Directive).165 Although the list of Annex I of the Aarhus Convention and the one in the EIA 
Directive are not identical, they are very similar.166 It shows that the provision focuses on 
projects that require approval, via a permit, since they are already predetermined as 
presumably having a significant effect on the environment. The ACCC, while deciding 
whether an activity would fall under Article 6 or Article 7, stated that an Article 6-type 
decision is the one related to “the carrying out of a specific annex I activity in a particular 
place by or on behalf of a specific applicant”.167  
Alinea b refers to “proposed activities not listed in Annex I which may have a significant 
effect on the environment”. Here the lack of a definition of specific activities becomes more 
significant, since there is no list to check which activities are included. As explained in 
Chapter IV of this thesis,168 the Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention suggests 
that a source of inspiration can be the definition for the term proposed activity found in the 
Espoo Convention: “any activity or any major change to an activity subject to a decision of 
a competent authority in accordance with an applicable national procedure”.169 As to the 
                                                          
163 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment, OJ L 175/40. The original Directive of 1985 and its three 
amendments have been codified by Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
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Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
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164 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control, OJ L 257/26. This Directive was repealed with effect from 7 January 2014 by the Industrial 
Emissions Directive. 
165 J. Jendrośka, ‘Public Participation under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention: Role in Tiered 
Decision-Making and Scope of Application’, in G. Bándi (ed.), Environmental democracy and law: 
public participation in Europe,  (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2014), pp. 113-138, p. 118. J. 
Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, op. cit. (2014), p. 6. 
166 A. Alemanno, ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and 
Democracy’ 39(1) European Law Review, (2014), pp. 72-90, p. 122. 
167 Alliance for the Protection of the Vlora Gulf with regard to compliance by Albania UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2007/4/Add.1, 31 July 2007, para 67. J. Jendrośka, op. cit. (2014), p. 122. 
168 See section 4.4.1 of Chapter IV. 
169 Article 1(v), Espoo Convention. J. Ebbesson, H. Gaugitsch, J. Jendrośka, F. Marshall and S. Stec, 
op. cit. (2014), p. 131. 
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question of the application of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, the Compliance Committee 
to the Aarhus Convention has already decided that: “The extent to which the provisions of 
article 6 apply […]  depends inter alia on the extent to which the [decisions] can be considered 
‘decisions on specific activities’, that is, decisions that effectively pave the way for specific 
activities to take place.” 170 (Emphasis added) Moreover, the Implementation Guide states 
that the decision making under Article 6 results in directions only to those involved in the 
particular matter before the authority (such as permits, authorisations or any other required 
administrative procedures).171  
Based on the aforementioned observations, it is possible to construct the definition of specific 
activities as those that are subject to a decision of a competent authority to allow for such an 
activity to take place and this decision is only addressed to those involved. The characteristic 
of the decision being addressed only to parties involved is fundamental for a clear-cut 
distinction with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention, which encompasses decisions of a 
general scope. The Implementation Guide states that the term proposed activities is “broad 
enough to cover both the terms project in the EIA Directive and installation used by the 
Industrial Emissions Directive.”172 By referring to the old EIA Directive and the Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (by now replaced by the Industrial Emissions 
Directive), the line of reasoning presented by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
seems to favour the interpretation that Article 6(1)(b) should be interpreted as encompassing 
only activities in the meaning of paragraph (a), i.e., carrying out of a specific activity in a 
particular place by or on behalf of a specific applicant.173 The question that follows is: would 
only site-specific activities, such as projects or installations, be included in the activities 
covered by Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention?   
The ACCC has not yet provided clear guidance as to the scope of Article 6 (1)(b),174 “perhaps 
due to the fact that it have (sic) not as yet had to undertake a comprehensive examination of 
the legal scheme envisaged in subparagraph (b)”.175 However the discussion on the scope of 
Article 6(1)(b) AC has evolved along the years among scholars and Parties to the Aarhus 
Convention.  
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Among scholars, Krämer176 and Wennerås177 argue that the broader phrasing of Article 
6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention would encompass decisions authorising the placing on the 
market of “substances and products, such as pesticides, chemicals or genetically modified 
food”.178 Winter reads Article 6(1)(b) as imposing public participation obligations for all 
activities presenting significant adverse effects on the environment.179 However, the author 
uses significant adverse effects on the environment instead of significant effects on the 
environment as actually contained in the text of Article 6(1)(b). Such an interpretation could 
potentially exclude activities which produce positive effects on the environment. The text of 
the Convention by not qualifying the kind of effect (by using the term significant effect on 
the environment without any precedent adjective) leads to a broad interpretation: indicating 
that Article 6(1)(b) includes measures affecting the environment in any way, the effect being 
either positive or negative. 
The documents resulting from the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention (MoP) 
have also revealed that the scope of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention is far from clear 
and has demanded attention for further interpretation.  
The draft of the first Strategic Plan of the Aarhus Convention, from 2009 to 2014, 
acknowledged that “The scope of public participation gradually expands beyond site-
specific activities and the placing on the market of genetically modified organisms to 
possibly encompass product-related and other decision-making having a significant 
impact on the environment through patterns of production and consumption.”180 
(Emphasis added) However, the final text adopted by the Parties did not point out the 
potential evolution of the provision by encompassing not only site-specific activities and did 
not sign to the potential enlargement of the definition. The final text was rather limited and 
only called for further assessment and elaboration on what exactly the provision encompasses 
by saying that: “The provisions on public participation in decisions having a significant 
impact on the environment, encompassing, inter alia, product-related decision-making are 
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ECE/MP.PP/2008/L.10 (2008b), p. 8.  
248 
assessed, further reflected on and, where appropriate, elaborated on.”181 (Emphasis added) 
Overall, the final text does preserve the idea that the Parties agree that further clarification 
on the scope of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention is needed. Furthermore, product-
related decision making is one example to be assessed, since by using the term inter alia 
other decisions might also be included in what the provision encompasses.  
The second, and still running, Strategic Plan of the Aarhus Convention, from 2015 to 2020, 
maintained the same text as the first strategic plan regarding the need for discussion about 
the scope of decisions having a significant impact on the environment.182 Such an unchanged 
text shows that, although the discussion is considered relevant, the discussion is still very 
much ongoing and not conclusive. 
In addition to the strategic plans, the MoP has also elaborated working programmes, which 
break down the strategies into more concrete steps to achieve the goals of the plans. The 
working programme details, for instance, who is responsible for each task and which budget 
is allocated for each area. For public participation, it is the Task Force on Public Participation 
in Decision-making, created in 2010, and the Secretariat to the Aarhus Convention that lead 
the activities to achieve the goals.183  
By the time of writing, the MoP had released four working programmes. The first working 
programme put public participation as one of the priority areas and decided to establish an 
ad hoc expert group to advise the Working Group of the Parties on the creation for a task 
force on public participation. The objective and expected outcome are generally formulated 
and centred on the identification of the main problems in this area. The most concrete 
outcome is draft guidance on the implementation in whole or in part of Articles 6, 7 and 8.184 
The second working programme focuses on the information collected and on the exchange 
of the collected information and best practices. Furthermore, it calls for the preparation of 
draft recommendations on improving the implementation of the public participation 
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provisions.185 The third work programme became more specific regarding the areas in which 
the discussion on public participation should focus, including: “decision-making for 
sustainable development; climate change-related decision-making, the nuclear domain; 
energy-related planning and policymaking, and the extractive sector; and if resources allow, 
decision-making on chemicals; food and agriculture; emerging technologies (e.g., 
nanotechnology) and product-related decision-making.”186 The text of the third working 
programme shows that the Parties acknowledged the need for a further interpretation of the 
application of the second pillar of the Convention in view of the number of developments 
which occurred since the adoption of the Convention, in 1998. The fourth working 
programme, which runs until 2021,187 calls for special attention, among other things, for 
public participation in climate change-related decision making with a focus in the following 
areas: public participation in decision making on the extractive sector; chemicals; emerging 
technologies (e.g., nanotechnology); product-related decision making; and energy-related 
issues.188 Again, climate change-related decision making is at the centre of the discussion by 
the Parties on promoting effective public participation in decision making. Yet, an open 
question remains what the scope of application of Article 6(1)(b) is. 
b) The potential limits on the discretion of the Parties on the application of Article 
6(1)(b) AC 
Article 6(1)(b) prescribes that Parties shall determine whether a proposed activity not listed 
in Annex I which may have a significant effect on the environment is subject to Article 6 AC. 
In other words, Parties have to determine whether a decision on an activity which is not listed 
in Annex I to the Convention should be subject to Article 6(1)(b), but they have the discretion 
to choose how to determine. Regarding this discretion, the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee (ACCC) states that: 
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“[…] article 6, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention requires Parties to determine 
whether an activity which is outside the scope of annex I, and which may have a 
significant effect on the environment, should nevertheless be subject to the provisions 
of article 6. Therefore, when this is determined for each case individually, the 
competent authority is required to make a determination which will have the effect of 
either creating an obligation to carry out a public participation procedure in 
accordance with article 6 or exempting the activity in question from such an 
obligation. Under Czech law, that determination is in practice made through the EIA 
screening conclusions. As such, the Committee considers the outcome of the EIA 
screening process to be a determination under article 6, paragraph 1 (b).189 
However, the Committee does not clearly specify how Parties should implement Article 
6(1)(b). The question is thus: how should Parties consider a decision which is not listed in 
the Annex I of the Convention and which may have a significant effect on the environment 
as falling under Article 6(1)(b)? Jendrośka argues that there is a minimum obligation for the 
Parties to “provide evidence as to the considering the issue according to some established 
criteria.”190 This interpretation would impose an obligation on the Parties to consider whether 
the measure is a specific activity which causes significant effects on the environment. 
However, such individual tests could result in a very differentiated application of Article 6 
among Parties. In order to provide a more uniform interpretation, the Meeting of the Parties 
endorsed recommendations of the Task Force on Public Participation on the application of 
Article 6 (1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention.191 The recommendation makes it clear that Article 
6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention requires Parties to establish a mechanism within their 
national system to determine whether a decision on a proposed activity not listed in Annex I 
may nevertheless have a significant effect on the environment.192 To establish such a 
mechanism, the first step to be taken by the Parties, as stipulated by the recommendation, is 
to detect all activities which potentially may have an effect on the environment.193 Following 
this, the Parties need to identify which of them may have a significant effect on the 
environment. Parties could do so through the establishment of a list (as has been done in 
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Article 6(1)(a) AC),194 or by requesting public authorities to examine every case (case-by-
case approach),195 or a mix of the two.196 Therefore, even though Parties have the discretion 
on how to establish the mechanism, there remains the obligation to consider whether the 
activities that may be authorised may have a significant impact on the environment. 
ii. Possible interpretation of the recognition of voluntary schemes and certification of 
biofuels as decisions which may have a significant impact on the environment 
Having discussed what Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention entails, the next step is to analyse 
whether decisions related to the certification of sustainable biofuels can fall under this 
provision. There are two types of decisions that need to be analysed: i) the decisions taken 
by the Commission recognising the biofuels voluntary schemes; and ii) the decisions taken 
by the voluntary schemes which certify the biofuels as sustainable. 
Both types of decision would fall outside the scope of Article 6(1)(a) of the Aarhus 
Convention, because neither of them constitutes a permit for one of the activities listed in 
Annex I of the Convention and they have also not been included as part of an impact 
assessment procedure in accordance with EU law.197 
Both types of decision may, however, potentially constitute “decisions on proposed activities 
not listed in Annex I which may have a significant impact on the environment”, according to 
Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention. The decisions taken by the Commission to 
recognise biofuels voluntary schemes are decisions taken by a competent authority, (the 
European Commission) which allows a specific activity (the functioning of the schemes) to 
take place, and the decision is addressed only to those involved (the operators of the 
schemes). Therefore, all the elements identified by the Implementation Guide are present. 
However, the decision on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes is not a decision 
about site-specific activities as suggested by the Implementation Guide. 
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Yet, from the attention given to the topic by the Parties and the interpretation proposed by 
scholars, it is possible to suggest that the recognition of voluntary schemes may fall under 
Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention for two reasons. First, as suggested earlier in this 
section, scholars have proposed a broader interpretation of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus 
Convention and the MoP has recognised the need for a further interpretation of this provision, 
although no final conclusion has been reached so far. Second, the decision on the recognition 
of biofuels voluntary schemes is a climate change-related decision and, more specifically, 
deals with an energy-related issue (since it allows schemes to certify biofuels which are 
counted towards the 10% of renewable energy target in transport), which is one of the areas 
flagged for attention by the MoP for the further implementation of the public participation 
provisions of the Convention.198  
The certification of biofuels as sustainable by the voluntary schemes may fall under a broader 
interpretation of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, which also encompasses product-
related decision making. These decisions are taken by a competent authority – the recognised 
scheme which is a public authority in accordance with Article 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention; 
the decisions allow a specific activity – the placing on the market of sustainable biofuels – to 
take place; and the decisions are addressed only to those involved – the economic operator 
which request the certification of its biofuels. Therefore, all the elements identified by the 
Implementation Guide are present. However, the Implementation Guide indicated that the 
scope of Article 6 would be limited to site-specific activities and the decision on the 
certification of biofuels, although, being a specific activity, it is not a site-specific activity.  
Despite the Implementation Guide interpretation, Krämer199 and Wennerås200 argue that the 
placing on the market of products falls under Article 6(1)(b), and the MoP has recognised 
product-related decision making as one of the areas to be considered while strengthening the 
implementation of the public participation provisions.201 One might still wonder whether the 
certification of biofuels as sustainable may constitute a procedure for authorising the placing 
of a substance or product on the market, since even non-certified biofuels may enter the EU 
market. However, by certifying biofuels as sustainable, the voluntary schemes allow biofuels 
to be counted towards achieving the renewable energy target in transport. Therefore, de facto 
decisions on the certification of biofuels constitute an authorisation to be counted towards 
the renewable energy targets on transport.202 As a result, the decisions on the certification of 
biofuels should be regarded as falling under Article 6 (1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, 
although such an interpretation has not been tested by either the ACCC or the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. 
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The last step for the purpose of checking whether the recognition of voluntary schemes and 
the certification of biofuels are decisions which may have a significant impact on the 
environment is to identify whether these activities have a significant impact on the 
environment. The Commission’s decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes may 
have an impact on the environment, since they are the bodies which verify compliance with 
the sustainability criteria. The decision taken by the schemes may also have an impact on the 
environment, since the certified biofuels count towards the transport target, and an unreliable 
certification means that non-compliant biofuels may be counted towards the transport target. 
However, since, at the EU level, there are no criteria defined on the test regarding the 
significance of an effect, it is difficult to affirm whether the decisions on the recognition of 
voluntary schemes would fall within the scope of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention. 
Nevertheless, based on the current evidence, it can be asserted that there is an obligation for 
the Commission to, at least, consider whether these decisions have a significant impact on 
the environment or not. 
iii. The extent to which the European Commission and the voluntary schemes comply 
with Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention requirements 
The interpretation that the decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes and on the 
certification of biofuels may fall within the scope of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention 
has not been crystallised yet. However, in the scenario that this will be the recognised 
interpretation (and strong evidence to this end has been shown above), it is thus important to 
consider whether the EU would comply with the Aarhus Convention requirements. 
In the Commission’s view, the first part of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, which relates 
to activities listed in Annex I to the Convention (Article 6(1)(a)), did not need implementation 
at EU level since the “decisions to authorise the listed activities are not taken at Community 
level, but by Member States, at local, regional or national level”.203 Likewise, the 
Commission understood that Article 6(1)(b), which provides for public participation in 
decisions on other proposed activities “which may have a significant effect on the 
environment”, would also be inapplicable at the EU level on the basis of the following 
grounds: 
“Administrative decisions on the authorisation of chemicals, pesticides and biocides 
are, as a rule, taken at the level of Member States. Decisions taken at Community 
level, such as the establishment of lists of active substances or the classification of 
                                                          
203 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the application of the provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC institutions and 
bodies, COM(2003) 622 final C 96/22 (2004), p. 13. 
254 
substances, are as such not aimed at as specific activities in the sense of Article 6. 
Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 on ozone-depleting substances provides for 
administrative decisions at Community level. However, the decisions concerned do 
not have a significant effect on the environment, as they concern only the 
management of the different quota for the placing on the market or importation of 
such substances.”204 (Emphasis added) 
The interpretation that the decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes and on the 
certification of biofuels fall under Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention clearly 
contradicts the point of view presented in the Commission’s proposal to Regulation 
1367/2006 to not implement this provision, since the Commission stated that there were no 
decisions taken at the EU level that could significantly affect the environment. The non-
implementation of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, under the interpretation proposed 
above, therefore strongly points to a violation by the EU of public participation requirements 
set by the Aarhus Convention.  
Regarding the decisions on the certification of biofuels, before discussing whether Article 6 
of the Aarhus Convention applies, it is necessary to examine whether the voluntary schemes 
would be considered public authority and therefore subject to the obligations prescribed in 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. As concluded in section 3.4.2, the voluntary schemes 
fall under the definition of public authorities of the Aarhus Convention. However, they are 
not considered public authorities under the definition of EU institutions and bodies contained 
in the Aarhus Regulation.  
In order to achieve compliance with the Aarhus Convention, the EU would thus have to 
reconsider its position on the implementation of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention and 
review the definition of EU institutions and bodies, which would possibly amount to a need 
for an amendment of the Aarhus Regulation.205  
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4.4.2.     Public Participation during the preparation of plans and programmes and policies 
In case the applicability of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention would be denied, it can be 
examined whether public participation is required according to Articles 7 and 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention. The analysis of these articles will be carried out in this and the next section. 
Regarding the application of Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention, it has already been 
established that the decision on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes and the 
decisions certifying biofuels as sustainable do not constitute a plan or programme according 
to the Aarhus Regulation (see section 4.3). However, it still remains to be seen if they could 
be considered plans and programmes in accordance with the Aarhus Convention.  
The Aarhus Convention does not specifically define plans and programmes. The 
Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention acknowledges that plans and programmes 
“have common-sense and sometimes legal meanings throughout the ECE region”.206 The 
Implementation Guide uses as an example the definition contained in the Kiev Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Protocol. According to the protocol, plans and programmes 
include those that are “required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions”; and 
which are prepared and/or adopted “by an authority for adoption, through a formal procedure, 
by a parliament or a government”.207 This definition establishes the cumulative requirements 
for a plan or programme being covered by the definition, i.e. who should produce and via 
which procedure, but it does not exactly define what plans and programmes are. Formally, 
the decisions on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes and the decisions certifying 
biofuels as sustainable are not plans or programmes, since they are not called as such. 
Substantially, since there is no definition in the Convention, and the example proposed by 
the guide also does not define plans and programmes, it is logical to look at the meaning of 
the words and combine this with the requirements set out in the definition. Looking at the 
meaning of the words plan, “a set of decisions about how to do something in the future”,208 
or programme, “an officially organized system of services, activities, or opportunities that 
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help people achieve something”,209 the decision on the recognition of biofuels voluntary 
schemes and the decisions certifying biofuels as sustainable does not fit under these 
definitions. This is despite the fact that they fulfil the two requirements present in the 
definition suggested by the Implementation Guide:  they are required by law, the RED, and 
are adopted by an authority, in this case the Commission and the voluntary scheme. 
Article 7 also covers policies but, as with plans and programmes, the Aarhus Convention 
does not define policies. Policies can be considered as “a course or principle of action adopted 
or proposed by an organization or individual”.210 According to the Implementation Guide, 
policies are subject to a different treatment than plans and programmes because they are less 
concrete and they “require a more thorough and profound understanding of the legalities and 
political context of a particular place. Policy incorporates history and culture and entire legal 
frameworks that extend beyond the finite area in which they are developed.”211 In this sense, 
the decisions on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes and the certification of 
biofuels as sustainable do not provide for action which has a broad scope and also tries to 
encompass historical and cultural aspects. In fact, the decisions on the recognition of 
voluntary schemes and on the certification of biofuels are part of the actions to achieve the 
renewable energy target, which is part of the EU policy to tackle climate change. As a 
consequence, they do not qualify as policies. 
4.4.3.    Public participation during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally     
applicable legally binding normative instruments 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention states that: 
“Each Party shall strive to promote effective public participation at an appropriate 
stage, and while options are still open, during the preparation by public authorities of 
executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that may 
have a significant effect on the environment.” (Emphasis added) 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention stipulates public participation during the preparation of 
executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding normative instruments. 
Thus, it is necessary to verify whether the decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes 
and on the certification of biofuels are executive regulations or other generally applicable 
legally binding rules. Union legislative acts may confer implementing powers on the 
European Commission, which can then adopt implementing measures (Article 291 TFEU). 
This is the case in the RED, which gives the Commission the power to adopt decisions 
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regarding the recognition of the voluntary certification schemes.212 These decisions are 
adopted according to the Comitology Regulation that applies to implementing acts as 
governed by Article 291 TFEU.213 The recognition of voluntary certification schemes is an 
implementing act with a specific addressee (the certification scheme). The decision on the 
certification of biofuels as sustainable, taken by the schemes, also have a specific addressee 
(economic operators which request the certification of their biofuels). Consequently, both 
decisions are not of general application and cannot fall under Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention.  
4.5. Interim conclusion 
Section 4 showed that there is no clear framework for public participation at the EU level 
regarding the decisions on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes and on the 
certification of biofuels. This conclusion is a result of the analysis developed in three main 
sections. 
Section 4.2 revealed that neither the Renewable Energy Directive nor the Commission’s 
Communication on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes provides for public 
participation requirements. However, even if the RED does not refer to Regulation 
1367/2006, which implemented the provisions of the Aarhus Convention for the European 
institutions and bodies, this regulation applies in the framework of the decisions taken under 
the Directive. 
Section 4.3 demonstrated that the Aarhus Regulation only partially implemented Article 7 of 
the Aarhus Convention, and it only requires public participation for plans and programmes 
which fulfil the cumulative criteria of its Article 9. The decisions on the recognition of 
biofuels voluntary schemes do not fall under the scope of Article 9 of the Aarhus Regulation, 
since they are not a plan or programme required by law or administrative provisions. 
Regarding the certification of biofuels as sustainable by the voluntary schemes, the voluntary 
schemes will not fall under the narrow definition of EU institutions or bodies and therefore 
the Aarhus Regulation will not even be applicable in this case. Consequently, for both types 
of decision, there is no obligation for public participation under the Aarhus Regulation. 
The findings of sections 4.2 and 4.3 show that there is no legal framework for public 
participation applicable to the decisions on the recognition of voluntary biofuels schemes and 
on the certification of biofuels at the EU level. However, the question that remained was if 
such a lack of public participation is in compliance with the Ahus Convention. Therefore, an 
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examination of the participatory rights of the Aarhus Convention, which are laid down in its 
Articles 6, 7 and 8, was carried out in section 4.4. 
Section 4.4 first explored the scope of the provision of Article 6 for public participation in 
specific activities. The Aarhus Convention does not provide a definition of specific activities, 
but it has been shown that Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention was inspired by the 
Environmental Impact Assessment and IPPC Directives. It indicates that the provision was 
drafted based on activities which commonly have a specific installation, operate in a precise 
geographical area and usually require a permit or authorisation to initiate these activities. 
Article 6(1)(a) provides for public participation for specific activities which are listed in 
Annex I of the Convention. As the decisions on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes 
and the certification of biofuels are not one of the activities listed in Annex I, they are outside 
of the scope of this provision. However, the scope of application of Article 6(1)(b) is not as 
clear as for Article 6 (1)(a). Article 6(1)(b) establishes public participation in decisions on 
other proposed activities not listed in Annex I which may have a significant effect on the 
environment. Whether the scope of Article 6(1)(b) should be interpreted as including all 
activities which may have a significant effect on the environment, and not only those which 
are similar to activities of Article 6(1)(a), has not been tested yet either by the ACCC or by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, the developments in the scholarship 
and in the discussions on the implementation of public participation provisions by the MoP 
suggest a broader interpretation of Article 6(1)(b), which includes more than site-specific 
activities. This would mean that the decisions on the recognition of voluntary and on the 
certification of biofuels would fall under the scope of Article 6(1)(b), as they are decisions 
on activities not listed in Annex I which may have a significant effect on the environment.214 
As a consequence, the decisions would be subject to the most precise set of requirements for 
public participation provided by the Aarhus Convention. This would mean that the public 
concerned would have to be informed early in the decision making procedure and in an 
adequate, timely and effective manner.215 In this vein, for instance, the documents used by 
the Commission on the assessment of the voluntary schemes would have to be made available 
to the public concerned together with the drafts. An extension of the interpretation of the 
scope of Article 6(1)(b) would also allow the Convention to respond to some of the new 
measures adopted to tackle climate change.  
The proposed broad interpretation has not yet been confirmed by the MoP, for instance, 
through an interpretative guideline or by the ACCC via its findings and recommendations. In 
view of this uncertainty, it is not possible to affirm that the EU is in non-compliance with the 
Aarhus Convention. However, if it turns out that Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention 
has such a broad scope, as proposed in this chapter, the EU would not be in compliance with 
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the Convention. This is because Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention has not been 
implemented at the EU level under the argumentation that there are no decisions taken at the 
EU level that could fall under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention.216 It shows that the EU 
did not implement public participation for decisions on specific activities which points to a 
violation of Article 6. In order to achieve compliance with the Aarhus Convention, the EU 
would thus have to reconsider its position, which would require an amendment to the Aarhus 
Regulation, or, alternatively, would require to include public participation provisions in the 
specific laws, such as the Renewable Energy Directive. 
Second, section 4.4 focused on Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention that concerns plans, 
programmes and policies relating to the environment.  The Aarhus Convention does not 
provide a definition of plan, programmes or policies. An investigation of the possible scope 
of these terms has shown that the decision on the recognition of the biofuels voluntary 
schemes and on the certification of biofuels cannot be considered as a plan, programme or 
policy.  
Third, section 4.4 analysed the possible application of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention 
provides for public participation during the preparation of executive regulation and other 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments. It has been shown that the 
decision on the recognition of voluntary schemes and on the certification of biofuels cannot 
fall under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention because these are not decisions of general 
scope. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the access to biofuel-related information and public participation in 
the recognition of voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels. 
Section 2 investigated the requirement of an adequate standard of transparency prescribed by 
the RED in order to understand whether this requirement provides for access to information. 
Section 2 found that no definition regarding a transparency standard can be found in the RED 
or in the assessment reports, on which the Commission decisions for recognising these 
schemes were based.217 This means that there was no information on the transparency 
standards on which the voluntary certification schemes are assessed and approved.218 
Surprisingly, all Commission decisions recognising voluntary schemes before the 2015 
                                                          
216 See section 6.3 of Chapter III. 
217 The assessment reports may be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. 
218 S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 182. 
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amendment to the RED affirm that adequate standards of reliability, transparency and 
independent auditing were met. After the amendment brought by Directive 2015/1513, the 
Commission has prepared a new recognition assessment template that includes a section on 
the transparency of the schemes.219 This section on transparency requires the voluntary 
certification schemes to make information on the operation of the system or for transparency 
purposes available,220 in particular, the list of economic operators that are or has been 
recognised under the scheme; information on the withdrawal or suspension of certificates; 
the latest version of scheme documents; the auditing certification bodies; publication of 
contact details for the scheme; and the names of the voluntary schemes the scheme is 
recognising. 
Having established what the adequate transparency standard under the RED entails, section 
3 moved to understand what the requirements for the dissemination and disclosure upon 
request of biofuel-related information are. Regarding the active form, most of the information 
held by the European Commission is only disclosed after the decisions on the recognition of 
biofuels voluntary schemes have been taken. Concerning the passive form, the case law of 
the CJEU revealed that the European Commission did not respect the prescribed timeframe 
for providing environmental information. Since the court proceedings take a few years to 
provide an answer whether the information should be disclosed by the Commission, it is 
possible to disrespect the timeframe without any further consequences for the Commission. 
This is because, on the basis of the case law discussed, by the time the Court reaches a 
decision on the non-disclosure, challenging the substantive measure may no longer be 
possible due to the applicable time-limits. Furthermore, if a decision on the recognition of a 
voluntary scheme has already been taken, the information released could not be used by the 
members of the public to participate in the decision making process. Furthermore, there is no 
sanction foreseen in the case the Commission fails to provide the information within the 
prescribed time-limit. It is true that this failure of the Commission to comply with the 
applicable time-limits could lead to an action for liability before the General Court, in the 
context of an action for damages. However, the potential success of an action for damages 
brought by an NGO is very limited, since the NGO would have to prove that, due to non-
access to the requested information, the NGO could not pursue its statutory objectives and 
suffered damage.221 Another remarkable point is that all applicants in the discussed case law 
were NGOs, with no case so far brought by individuals or by the industry sector. In sum, 
section 3 showed that there is limited access to biofuel-related information. 
Regarding public participation, the findings of section 4 have shown that there is no legal 
framework for public participation in the recognition of voluntary schemes and certification 
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of biofuels. Neither the Renewable Energy Directive nor the Commission’s Communication 
on the recognition of biofuels certification schemes provides for public participation. The 
Aarhus Regulation only partially implemented Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention requiring 
public participation only for plans and programmes. The decisions on the recognition of 
biofuels voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels do not fall under its definition of 
plan and programme.  
The examination of the participatory rights of the Aarhus Convention, which are laid down 
in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Aarhus Convention, revealed that the decisions on the recognition 
of voluntary schemes and the decisions on the certification of biofuels may be interpreted as 
decisions on proposed activities which may have a significant effect on the environment for 
the purposes of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention and are therefore subject to the 
requirements of public participation described in this Article. This interpretation of Article 
6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention has not been confirmed by the MoP or the CJEU. If this 
interpretation is crystallised, the EU will not be in compliance with the Aarhus Convention. 
This is because Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention has not been implemented at the EU level 
under the argumentation that there are no decisions taken at the EU level that could fall under 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention.222 Compliance by the EU with this provision could be 
achieved by an amendment to the Aarhus Regulation (the EU would thus have to reconsider 
its position), or introducing public participation requirements in the RED or in the 
Commission’s Communication on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes.  
Finally, it is remarkable that, despite the strong debate on the potential negative impacts of 
biofuels on the environment, there is no communication before the ACCC challenging the 
lack of public participation requirements in the recognition of voluntary schemes and the 
certification of biofuels. Further research into the strategies employed by ENGOs on how to 
use the rights to get access to environmental information and to participate into 
environmental decision making, including an investigation of the barriers that may hinder 
such use, may clarify the reasons for this reluctant use. 
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Chapter VI – Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
The precise legal obligations for governments to enable individuals and ENGOs to make use 
of environmental procedural rights, especially access to environmental information and 
public participation, have so far remained mostly underexplored in EU climate law. This 
thesis attempted to fill this gap in knowledge by investigating procedural rights with respect 
to EU climate law. More precisely, it endeavoured to answer the following question: 
To what extent do rights of access to environmental information and participation in 
governmental environmental decision making have to be provided for individuals and 
ENGOs at the EU level in the field of EU climate change law?  
In its journey to uncover the current legal framework for access to information and 
participation in climate change decision making at the EU level, the thesis was divided into 
four main chapters, which break down the main research question into sub-questions.  
Chapters II and III focus on the international obligations of the EU with regard to providing 
access to environmental information and enabling the public to participate in environmental 
decision making. Chapter II examined the legal framework established by the UNFCCC for 
access to information and public participation in climate change decision making and 
explored the obligations they entail for the Parties. Chapter III complemented the 
international picture by delineating the obligations emanating from the Aarhus Convention 
and examining how these obligations have been implemented by the EU.  
Chapters IV and V delve into the question of how the EU legal framework provides for access 
to information and public participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level under 
two core instruments of the EU climate policy, namely the EU ETS Directive (Chapter IV) 
and the recognition of voluntary schemes for assessing the sustainability of biofuels under 
the Renewable Energy Directive (Chapter V).  
The present chapter, Chapter VI, will summarise the conclusion of these four chapters and 
will provide a look ahead at the role of procedural rights in the area of climate change decision 
making, in view of the lessons learned from the EU’s experience.  
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2. The UNFCCC requirements for access to climate information and 
public participation in climate change decision making 
This section presents the main findings of Chapter II, which analysed the following sub-
question: 
Which provisions regarding access to information and public participation are 
established in the UNFCCC? What kind of obligation do they entail for the Parties?  
Article 6 of the UNFCCC provides an obligation for the Parties to the UNFCCC to promote 
and facilitate access to information and public participation in climate change decision 
making. A textual and systematic interpretation revealed that these obligations require the 
Parties to make an effort towards promoting and facilitating public access to information and 
public participation, without including any targets or clear and specific commitments. 
Therefore, the obligations contained in Article 6 are obligations of effort. 
In addition to examining Article 6 itself, the decisions establishing the work programmes on 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC adopted by the Conference of the Parties (CoP) were examined to 
investigate whether the content of these decisions gives more body to Article 6 of the 
UNFCCC. For this examination, the methodology proposed by Wiersema was used. 
Wiersema proposes an analysis of the legal status of the consensus-based CoP activities based 
on four different axes: voting and level of consent, delegated consent, intent on the original 
obligations, and effect of the decisions in the implementation of the provision.1 She proposes 
such a method of interpretation, because the traditional classification into hard law, soft law 
and non-law would not reflect the intricate relationship between consensus-based COP 
activity and the underlying treaty obligations of the Parties to a specific treaty.2 A 
combination of the four axes showed that there is no sign that the CoP decisions hardened 
the legal effects of Article 6 of the UNFCCC. On the contrary, this thesis identified that the 
obligations contained in Article 6 of the UNFCCC lean towards soft legal commitments. 
Furthermore, the agreements adopted under the umbrella of the UNFCCC were examined, 
since they potentially could provide for further commitments. First, the Kyoto Protocol 
establishes in its Article 10(e) that Parties shall facilitate at the national level public 
awareness of and public access to information on climate change. However, the provision 
deals with access to information in a vague and imprecise manner, and public participation 
is not even actually mentioned in this text. Therefore, it does not provide elements that make 
the general obligations of Article 6 of the UNFCCC more concrete. 
                                                          
1 See Chapter II, section 2.4. A. Wiersema, op. cit. (2009), pp. 250-259. 
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Second, the Paris Agreement establishes in its Article 12 that Parties shall cooperate in taking 
measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, 
public participation, and public access to information. The focus of this provision is on the 
cooperation between the Parties and it does not provide for more specific provisions 
compared to Article 6 of the UNFCCC. The mandatory character of Article 12 of the Paris 
Agreement is the same: it creates legal obligations for Parties to make an effort without 
specific commitments, also characterising it as an obligation of effort.  
All the relevant international provisions analysed in Chapter II were thus regarded as 
obligations of effort. These provisions are formulated in a vague way and no specific 
procedural obligations can be derived from them. Consequently, there are no clearly 
identifiable results that need to be achieved by the Parties. However, while there are no 
precise legal commitments under the UNFCCC and while a global treaty on procedural rights 
is also absent,3 environmental procedural rights can also be established by other legal sources. 
Since the EU is also a Party to a regional agreement on procedural rights, which is the first 
of its kind: the Aarhus Convention (AC), the following step was to study the legal framework 
established by the Aarhus Convention and its relationship with climate change, followed by 
the Aarhus Convention’s implementation at the EU level.  
3. The Aarhus Convention, the EU and climate change  
Chapter III focused on the specific procedural provisions that confer rights on access to 
environmental information and on public participation in governmental environmental 
decision making to individuals and representative associations in their relationships with EU 
institutions. More specifically, this chapter investigated if the Aarhus Convention 
encompasses the climate change phenomenon, introduced the rights to access environmental 
information and to public participation, as foreseen by the Aarhus Convention, and examined 
the implementation of these rights at the EU level. In this vein, the chapter analysed the 
following sub-questions: 
- Does the climate change phenomenon fall under the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention?  
- If yes, which obligations regarding access to information and public participation 
are established in the Aarhus Convention?  
- How are they implemented at the EU level, as far as the EU institutions and bodies 
are concerned? 
                                                          
3 See Chapter II, section 2.2.2. J. Razzaque, op. cit. (2010), p. 292.  
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3.1. The definition of environmental information and climate change 
The term climate change is not mentioned anywhere in the Aarhus Convention. In the 
absence of a term, as is the case of climate change in the Aarhus Convention, the interpreter 
may resort to the context of the treaty.4  
Although the Aarhus Convention addresses access to information, public participation in 
decision making and access to justice in environmental matters, it does not provide a 
definition of the environment. Nonetheless, the Aarhus Convention provides a definition of 
environmental information. The meaning given to environmental information acts as a guide 
when interpreting whether environmental issues are covered by the Convention, since it is 
from this definition that it becomes possible to interpret whether environmental issues,5 such 
as climate change, are covered by the Convention. Therefore, this analysis proceeded with a 
textual examination of the definition of environmental information contained in Article 2(3) 
of the Aarhus Convention. Chapter III reached the conclusion that climate change is part of 
the implied definition of the environment and therefore covered by the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention. In this vein, in principle, all the provisions of the Aarhus Convention apply to 
the climate change decision making process. This conclusion was accompanied by the caveat 
that it is not clear what exactly is encompassed by the definition of the term environment and 
hence which climate information and decision making are covered by the first two pillars of 
the Aarhus Convention specifically. This question is further explored in Chapter IV and V.  
Subsequent steps were taken to identify the obligations regarding environmental information 
and public participation in environmental decision making, as it was established that these 
obligations are applicable to climate change decision making.  
3.2.  Access to environmental information under the Aarhus Convention and its 
implementation at the EU level 
The framework for access to environmental information under the Aarhus Convention 
(Articles 4 and 5) provide explicit commitments establishing what has to be done by public 
authorities and, therefore, are characterised as obligations of result. This means that the 
Parties not only have to achieve a specific result of ensuring that their public authorities 
provide environmental information upon request (Article 4) but they also must disseminate 
environmental information (Article 5). 
The EU has adopted the Aarhus Regulation in which several articles of the Aarhus 
Convention are implemented with regard to access to environmental information and public 
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participation in governmental decision making for EU institutions and bodies. Regarding 
access to environmental information, it was concluded that the provisions have mostly been 
transposed in a way which ensures compliance with the Aarhus Convention. However, 
regarding the implementation of the exceptions to the obligations to provide access to 
environmental information upon request, the analysis revealed that the EU requirements 
impose more limitations than those allowed by the Aarhus Convention. For instance, the 
ground for refusal to protect commercial interests, as it was implemented by the EU, allows 
for a greater variety of interests to be kept confidential than under the Aarhus Convention.6 
This amounts to non-compliance with the Aarhus Convention.  
The Aarhus Convention provides for access to justice in cases of violation of the right to 
receive information upon request. According to the Aarhus Regulation, read in combination 
with Regulation 1049/2001, applicants may seek reconsideration from an EU institution with 
regard to a decision concerning a request for environmental information, which is followed 
by the possibility of instituting court proceedings. This shows that the EU’s regulatory 
framework is in compliance with the Aarhus Convention requirements for access to justice 
to redress a violation of the right to access environmental information upon request. 
Regarding the obligation imposed on public authorities to disseminate information, the 
Aarhus Convention does not contain similar specific provisions for access to justice to redress 
a violation of the obligation of public authorities to actively disseminate environmental 
information. Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which provides for redress in the case of 
a violation of national environmental law, could be of help to remedy this problem. This 
would be possible, because the non-dissemination of environmental information amounts to 
a breach of Article 4 of the Aarhus Regulation. In turn, the violation of the Aarhus Regulation 
constitutes a breach of national environmental law, in this case EU environmental law, for 
the purposes of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. However, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention has not been fully implemented at the EU level.7 This means that, in practice, a 
member of the public would not have access to justice at the EU level in case of a violation 
of the obligation to disseminate information.  
3.3.  Public participation in environmental decision making 
In Chapter III, the examination regarding public participation started with a discussion on 
whether the Aarhus Convention followed a specific public participation theory. It was found 
that the Convention is the result of the aspirations and compromises of the negotiating parties 
and there is no evidence that the Aarhus Convention followed a specific public participation 
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of Chapter III. 
7 See Chapter III, section 4.4. M. Eliantonio, op. cit. (2018), pp. 759-762.  
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theory. Despite not having a background theory for public participation, the Aarhus 
Convention does provide minimum requirements against which the legal framework of the 
Parties has to be assessed. 
The core provisions of the Aarhus Convention on public participation are Articles 6, 7 and 8. 
Concerning the obligations contained in Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, this provision 
establishes public participation in decisions on specific activities and it can be generally 
characterised as an obligation of result. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum to 
Regulation 1367/2006 states that there are no measures related to specific activities which 
are taken at the EU level. Consequently, the provision was not transposed. It was shown that 
this approach is controversial, since some EU decisions may amount to a decision on specific 
activities within the scope of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention.8 
Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention on public participation concerning plans, programmes 
and policies relating to the environment establishes two separate regimes for public 
participation. First, for plans and programmes, parts of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention 
requirements apply to ensure participation during the development of plans and programmes. 
Therefore, the part of Article 7 which establishes public participation requirements for plans 
and programmes is characterised by an obligation of result. Second, for policies, Parties are 
only required, to the extent appropriate, to endeavour to provide opportunities for public 
participation. This weak and imprecise formulation, which fails to explain the exact result to 
be achieved, makes the part of Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention concerning policies as an 
obligation of effort. The Aarhus Regulation only provides for public participation concerning 
plans and programmes. This is due to the fact that the Aarhus Regulation is limited, according 
to its explanatory memorandum, to the “legally binding requirements” of the Aarhus 
Convention. Therefore, only public participation requirements concerning plans and 
programmes relating to the environment were foreseen. However, it must be noted that, even 
if they are obligations of efforts, there remains an obligation for EU institutions and bodies 
to endeavour to provide opportunities for public participation during the preparation of 
policies. 
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention only requires Parties to strive to promote effective public 
participation. In this vein, this provision is also characterised as an obligation of effort. There 
is no implementation of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention at the EU level, since the 
European Commission understood Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention as not providing any 
legally binding requirement. However, Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention creates an 
obligation to make efforts to achieve it, and this obligation applies to each of the EU 
institutions and bodies. 
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The Aarhus Convention, in its Article 9(2), also provides for access to justice in cases of a 
violation of the right to participate in decision on specific activities, which is foreseen in 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. However, since Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention was 
not implemented at the EU level, there is no specific provision for access to justice in case of 
a violation of this provision. Regarding the right to participate in the preparation of plans, 
programmes and policies relating to the environment (Article 7 AC), neither the Aarhus 
Convention nor the Aarhus Regulation provides for a specific provision on access to justice 
in the case of a violation of this right. However, since the preparation of plans and 
programmes needs to follow the requirements of Article 6 (3), (4) and (8) of the Aarhus 
Convention, they are also subject to the review procedures provided by Article 9(2). In this 
vein, there is an obligation for the EU to ensure access to justice to redress violations of 
Articles Article 6 (3), (4) and (8) of the Aarhus Convention.  
Regarding policies and executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding 
normative instruments, the Convention does not provide for a specific provision on access to 
justice in the case of a lack of participation in their elaboration. It was argued that Article 
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which establishes access to justice in the case of a violation 
of national law relating to the environment, has the potential to fulfil this gap. This would 
occur if a Party has adopted public participation requirements in its national law for executive 
regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative instruments and during the 
preparation of policies relating to the environment, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention 
may be used to guarantee access to justice. This would be possible, since a breach of the 
national legislation which implemented public participation requirements would constitute a 
contravention of provisions of national law relating to the environment, for the purpose of 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. However, as already explained above, Article 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention has not been fully implemented by the EU. Moreover, Article 8 and 
the obligations concerning policies contained in Article 7 have also not been transposed in 
the Aarhus Regulation. Hence, even in the case that the EU would have fully implemented 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, it would still not be possible to base a claim on this 
provision. This is due to the fact that there is no implementation of Articles 7 regarding 
policies and Article 8 concerning executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally 
binding normative instruments at the EU level, and, therefore, there would be no breach of 
national law that could trigger the application of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
4. The EU Emissions Trading System: Access to environmental 
information and public participation at the EU level 
Chapter IV analysed the EU ETS Directive in view of: (i) legal requirements for access to 
environmental information and public participation in the decision making of acts adopted 
under the EU ETS Directive; (ii) the compatibility of this framework with requirements 
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imposed by the Aarhus Convention. More precisely, Chapter IV answered the following 
question: 
How does the EU legal framework provide for access to information and public 
participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level under the auspices of the 
EU Emissions Trading System Directive? And how compatible is this framework with 
the EU’s international obligations? 
4.1. Access to environmental information 
Regarding access to environmental information, Chapter IV identified that the general regime 
for access to environmental information under the EU ETS can be found in Articles 17, 15a, 
and 19 of the EU ETS Directive. Articles 17 and 15a deal specifically with access to 
information, while Article 19 focuses on the registries, which disseminate key information to 
the public about the function of the EU ETS. 
The analysis carried out in this chapter showed, first of all, that Article 17 of the EU ETS 
Directive does not reflect the shift of decision making from the national level to the EU level 
brought by the 2009 amendments of the EU ETS Directive, since the Article only refers to 
Directive 2003/4 and not to the Aarhus Regulation. This omission, however, does not change 
the applicability of the Aarhus Regulation to the access to environmental information 
requests addressed to the Commission, since EU institutions are bound, in any case, by the 
Aarhus Regulation. The analysis of Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive also showed that this 
provision creates a double obligation for public authorities: to disseminate environmental 
information and to disclose it upon request.  
Secondly, the analysis proceeds with observing that Article 15a of the EU ETS Directive 
refers neither to Directive 2003/4 nor the Aarhus Regulation. However, in the second part of 
Article 15a of the EU ETS Directive, which regulates an exception to disclosure by means of 
introducing professional secrecy (an aspect which is not present in Article 17 of the EU ETS 
Directive), and implicit reference to these two pieces of legislation is given by the mention 
of “applicable laws, regulations or administrative provisions”. 
Despite the existence of two specific provisions on access to information (Article 15a and 17 
of the EU ETS Directive), their limited scope cannot cover all the possible requests for 
information under the EU ETS. Therefore, an investigation through the existing CJEU case 
law on access to environmental information was carried out, particularly in view of how in 
this case law the Aarhus Regulation is applied with regard to such requests. Hence, the 
analysis of the case law built further on the definition of environmental information and on 
the limits of the grounds for disclosure of environmental information.  
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Regarding the definition of environmental information, three types of information were 
discussed in three cases brought before the CJEU as falling under the definition of 
environmental information. The CJEU confirmed in  the Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland 
case that the list of installations covered by the EU ETS and also the number of allowances 
allocated for free by a Member State constitute environmental information within the 
definition of the Aarhus Regulation.9 In two other cases, although not receiving particular 
attention in the judgment, the opinions of the Advocate General showed that the raw data 
needed to replicate the calculation should be made available to the public10 and that trading 
data constitutes environmental information.11 These cases reveal that a great number of EU 
ETS-related information potentially falls within the definition of environmental information, 
although, in the latter two cases, such an interpretation still needs confirmation by the CJEU. 
Regarding the grounds for refusal, three cases dealt with two different grounds for refusal: 
(i) refusal of information when it is requested in the course of the decision making, and (ii) 
refusal of information in order to protect the confidentiality of commercial and industrial 
information. For the first ground, the CJEU made clear in the Saint-Gobain case that there is 
a need to make a distinction between the decision making itself and the entire administrative 
procedure which leads to a decision.12 It concluded that all information that is part of the 
administrative procedure needs to be disclosed. Second, the Ville de Lyon and Cross-Sectoral 
Correction Factor cases,13 despite not dealing directly with this exception, allowed for the 
possibility to explore its application, since the public authority relied on the same ground to 
refuse access to the environmental information. The application of this exception, according 
to the Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Regulation when dealing particularly with 
emissions into the environment, must be even stricter, and the analysis of whether the 
information should be disclosed has to take into consideration that, in these cases, the ground 
for refusal (i.e. protection of commercial and industrial information) is not applicable. In 
sum, the analysis of the three cases revealed that these grounds have to be interpreted in a 
restrictive way, which is to ensure the right of access to environmental information. 
Furthermore, the discussion on what constitutes emissions into the environment suggests that 
there is a need for an interpretation of the Aarhus Convention in light of the new 
developments to combat climate change, such as emissions trading. At the time of the 
                                                          
9 Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v. European Commission. 
10 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases C-191/14, C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14, and 
C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. Bundesminister für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others, para 140. 
11 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations, para 33. 
12 Case C-60/15 P, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v.  Commission, para 76. 
13 Case C-524/09, Ville de Lyon v. Caisse des dépôts et consignations; and Joined Cases C-191/14, C-
192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14 and C-391/14 to C-393/14, Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and others v. 
Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and others. 
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adoption of the Aarhus Convention, emissions trading was still a concept that needed further 
practical development, and it can be assumed that the broad term emissions was related to 
the actual release of substances from installations within more classic command-and-control 
instruments. With the advent of a market-based instrument such as emissions trading, there 
is a need for further interpretation in view of the potential release of substances and the 
creation of new concepts, such as greenhouse gas emission allowances.  
Regarding the active dissemination of information by the Commission, the Union Registry 
is the main tool to make information available to the public, according to Article 19 of the 
EU ETS Directive. However, in reality, the EU ETS information related to the allocation and 
transaction of allowances is scattered along three webpages. The fact that the EU ETS 
Directive empowers the Commission to adopt a regulation, which provides for public access 
and confidentiality as appropriate, allows the Commission to tailor how and when the 
information is available.14  
The compatibility of the exercise of this discretion – such as the change in the way the 
information about international credits or the time transaction-related information is released 
to the public – with the Aarhus Convention has yet to be tested by the courts. 
Nevertheless, on the topic of the dissemination of information, it is important to note that 
there is no registry available to the public that would provide information on the number and 
nature of requests to access EU ETS-related information. This is an indication of limitations 
on access to environmental information rights in the EU. A readily available registry with a 
compilation of all requests would not only help the members of the public to get information, 
but it would also prevent civil servants from having to answer the same questions 
repeatedly.15 These examples demonstrate that there is still much room for further and more 
ambitious interpretations and implementation of the Aarhus Convention with regard to 
disclosing environmental information under the EU ETS. 
  
                                                          
14 Article 19(3), EU ETS Directive, consolidated version. 
15 This suggestion is based on an interpretation of Article 5(3)(d) of the Aarhus Convention wich reads 
that: “Each Party shall ensure that environmental information progressively becomes available in 
electronic databases which are easily accessible to the public through public telecommunications 
networks. Information accessible in this form should include: […] (d) Other information, to the extent 
that the availability of such information in this form would facilitate the application of national law 
implementing this Convention, provided that such information is already available in electronic form.” 
Since the requests for EU ETS-related information are based on the Aarhus Regulation read in 
combination with Regulation 1049/2001, this information can be considered as information that would 
facilitate the application of national law, in this case EU law, implementing the Aarhus Convention. 
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4.2. Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making 
The EU ETS Directive does not have a general provision on public participation, which 
would apply to all decisions to be taken under this Directive. Therefore, it was investigated 
whether public participation requirements could be derived from specific provisions under 
the EU ETS Directive, which serve as the legal basis for the adoption of the Commission’s 
acts under this Directive. This investigation revealed that public participation is not required 
by the EU ETS Directive for the adoption of most acts. The exception is that the acts 
regulating the free allocation of allowances and the carbon leakage sector for which the EU 
ETS Directive (only) prescribes the consultation of stakeholders. However, the provisions do 
not provide a further explanation on how the relevant stakeholders are to be selected.  
Having examined the specific provisions of the EU ETS Directive, the investigation 
continued by exploring whether the Aarhus Regulation imposes a general obligation 
regarding public participation for the acts adopted under the auspices of the EU ETS 
Directive. The Aarhus Regulation only requires public participation requirements for plans 
and programmes.16 It was concluded that the acts adopted by the Commission in the EU ETS 
context do not constitute plans and programmes, since they are clearly binding provisions 
setting rules, for instance, for auctioning and benchmarking, and they are hence, in this 
respect, to be distinguished from plans and programmes. Therefore, the Aarhus Regulation 
does not impose any obligation regarding public participation for the acts adopted under the 
EU ETS Directive. 
In the absence of public participation provisions under the Aarhus Regulation that would be 
applicable to these acts, it was examined whether there is still an obligation under the Aarhus 
Convention for the Commission to provide for public participation in the decision making 
process under the EU ETS. The analysis carried out demonstrated that these acts qualify as 
executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding normative instruments 
because they are acts of general application, as their addressees are not determined or 
determinable.17 Furthermore, considering their size, location and potential effects on the 
environment, they have a significant effect on the environment. Therefore, they fall under the 
scope of application of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention and, as a consequence, there is a 
legal obligation for the Commission to strive to promote public participation. 
Having established that Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention applies, the final step was to 
identify whether the Commission has fulfilled its public participation obligation with respect 
to the measures adopted under the EU ETS Directive. This analysis showed that consultation 
                                                          
16 Article 9, Aarhus Regulation. 
17 These non-legislative acts took the form of a regulation or decision. Regulations and decisions are 
among the legal instruments available to the European institutions to exercise the Union’s competences, 
according to Article 288 TFEU. How they are adopted defines whether they are a legislative act or not. 
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is seen as one step of the overall ladder of public participation but that consultations do not 
automatically imply public participation and a further analysis of the legal framework for 
consultations at the EU level was needed to identify whether the stakeholders’ consultations 
could fulfil the obligations under Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. Consequently, the 
consultation requirements applicable at the EU level and contained in the 2002 
Communication were examined,18 which were applicable at the time the acts adopted by the 
Commission analysed in this chapter were adopted, and in the Better Regulation Package,19 
applicable at the time of writing. 
Although consultation is not the same as public participation, it was argued that, where the 
EU ETS Directive requires consultation, and an open consultation is conducted, Article 8 
requirements would be fulfilled. For all the other situations, the 2002 Communication cannot 
fulfil Article 8 requirements. This is due to the fact the 2002 Communication gives discretion 
to the Commission on whether or not to hold consultations and which type of consultation to 
conduct. Regarding whether or not to hold consultations, Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention 
does not foresee such discretion. 
Under the current legal framework, even for the cases under the EU ETS Directive where 
there is no obligation for the Commission to conduct consultations, the 2017 Better 
Regulation Guidelines provide for stakeholders’ feedback on the draft of implementing and 
delegated acts, which encompasses most of the acts adopted by the Commission discussed in 
this chapter. This could amount to compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention when 
implementing and delegated acts are adopted. However, the acts adopted by the Commission 
acting alone would not be covered and, therefore, no compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention could be achieved. Moreover, Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not 
provide for any exception to the rule that the drafts should be subject to public participation, 
and it requires that the timeframe should be sufficient for effective participation, while the 
Better Regulation Guidelines provides for the application of exceptions and no flexibility 
regarding the time-frame. Therefore, the Guidelines, per se, cannot guarantee that the EU 
fully complies with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. 
On a more positive note, the chapter identified that, according to the 2017 Better Regulation 
Guidelines, the default is that all the delegated and implemented acts are now subject to 
public feedback. Moreover, the Commission made a move towards the recognition of the 
                                                          
18 European Commission, 2002 Communication (2002). 
19 European Commission, Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda (2014c). This 2015 
Communication was accompanied by the Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation 
Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111 final (2015b), which was updated in 2017 (European Commission, 2017 
Staff Working Document (2017c). 
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legal implications of the 2017 Guidelines by recognising that the Guidelines may legally bind 
the Commission.20 
In light of the conclusions reached in Chapter IV, it can be argued that public participation 
under the EU ETS could be strengthened if the EU ETS Directive contained a specific 
provision on public participation. Since the centralisation of major decisions at the EU level, 
because the 2009 amendments of the EU ETS Directive, the Commission has a prominent 
role under the current phase of the EU ETS, particularly with regard to its decision making 
related to the allocation of allowances. However, neither the EU ETS Directive nor the 
Aarhus Regulation guarantees public participation in the acts the Commission has to take 
under the EU ETS Directive. A specific approach under the EU ETS Directive regulating, 
precisely, public participation for the acts the Commission has to adopt would bring the 
adoption of these acts into line with the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. It should be 
noted, however, that this recommendation goes against the horizontal approach of the Aarhus 
Convention, which tries to avoid a fragmented legal framework for specific areas of 
environmental law. A less fragmented approach would consist of a proper implementation of 
the Aarhus Convention at the EU level, by making an amendment to the Aarhus Regulation. 
In addition to this, it remains to be seen whether a common provision would be suitable for 
all different subject matters in EU environmental law, especially in view of their 
particularities which may require specific public participation requirements. 
5. Certification of Biofuels: Access to environmental information 
and public participation at the EU Level 
Chapter V assessed the regime of access to biofuel-related information and public 
participation in decision making for the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes at the EU 
level in view of the Aarhus Convention requirements. The sub-questions discussed were as 
follows: 
- How does the EU legal framework provide for access to information and public 
participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level for the recognition of 
voluntary schemes under the auspices of the Renewable Energy Directive?  
- How compatible is this framework with the EU’s international obligations? 
5.1. Access to environmental information 
First, Chapter V investigated the requirement of an adequate standard of transparency 
prescribed by the Renewable Energy Directive in order to understand whether this 
                                                          
20 European Commission, 2017 Staff Working Document (2017c), p. 43. 
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requirement encompasses access to information. Despite the fact that all Commission 
decisions recognising voluntary schemes before the 2015 amendment to the RED affirm that 
adequate standards of reliability, transparency and independent auditing were met, it was 
found that neither the RED defines this standard, nor the assessment reports, on which the 
Commission decisions for recognising these schemes were based, provided clarification 
regarding the transparency standard.21 Therefore, the established legal framework and the 
subsequent decisions did not contain information on the transparency standards against which 
the voluntary certification schemes are assessed and approved.22 The amendment brought by 
Directive 2015/1513 has improved this situation. After this amendment, the RED includes 
more requirements regarding transparency on the recognition of voluntary schemes and an 
obligation for the Commission to prepare the report on the revision of the operation of the 
voluntary schemes.23 For the voluntary schemes that have been and will be recognised after 
the amendment, the Commission has prepared a new recognition assessment template that 
includes a section on the transparency of the schemes.24 A similar section was not present in 
the templates used for the recognition of the schemes before the amendment.25 This section 
on transparency from the Commission’s template requires the voluntary schemes to make 
information on their actions performed and operation available,26 such as the latest version 
of scheme documents and the list of economic operators that are recognised under the 
scheme. Although the changes are motivated by the amendments to the RED, it is important 
to point out that the requirement to make information available is not part of a legally binding 
instrument but only of an assessment template. 
Having established what transparency standard under the Renewable Energy Directive 
means, the analysis went on to examine what the requirements for the dissemination and 
disclosure upon request of biofuel-related information entail. Along these lines, the analysis 
examined whether information on biofuels is environmental information and whether the 
information is held by a public authority. These are important delimitations since, according 
to the Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Regulation, rights and obligations regarding access 
to environmental information can only be exercised if the requested information falls under 
the definition of environmental information and if this information is requested from or 
disseminated by public authorities. It was demonstrated that biofuel-related information can 
                                                          
21 The assessment reports may be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes. 
22 S. Romppanen, op. cit. (2012a), p. 182. 
23 Article 18 (6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
24 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
25 All the schemes will have to be subject to a new decision after five years which is the validity of any 
Commission decision recognising schemes according to Article 18(6) of the Renewable Energy 
Directive, consolidated version. It means that in the end all schemes will probably be approved in 
accordance with the new template. 
26 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
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be considered environmental information within the scope of Article 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Aarhus 
Regulation, since it is information on energy affecting or likely to affect the environment. It 
was also argued that, even though the evaluator/contractor hired by the Commission to help 
with the recognition of voluntary schemes and the voluntary schemes themselves do not fall 
under the Aarhus Regulation definition of public authority, they should be considered public 
authorities according to Article 2(2)(c) of the Aarhus Convention, because they are legal 
persons having public responsibilities or functions under the control of the European 
Commission. As a consequence, they are subject to the obligation to disseminate and to 
provide upon request biofuel-related information, unless an exception to the disclosure of the 
information would apply. Such an interpretation shows that the EU, by limiting public 
authorities to EU institutions and bodies, has not sufficiently transposed the Aarhus 
Convention. 
Having established that biofuel-related information is environmental information and that the 
European Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the voluntary schemes themselves are 
public authority according to the Aarhus Convention, the next step was to examine the active 
form of access to environmental information. 
With respect to information held by the European Commission, there is no register in the 
transparency platform for the application for the recognition of voluntary schemes. However, 
the Commission discloses these documents used for the recognition of the schemes (with 
some blacked-out parts) via its transparency platform after the decision is taken. The post-
decision publication of the decision can still be considered to be in compliance with the 
provisions to disseminate information of the Aarhus Regulation and the Aarhus Convention, 
since these provisions do not prescribe a timeframe for doing so.27  
Concerning the information made available by voluntary schemes, the current Commission’s 
recognition template provides a section on the transparency of the schemes.28 This improves 
the previous situation where there was no mention of transparency standards. Pursuant to 
Directive 2015/1513, there is an obligation for the voluntary schemes to report to the 
Commission on many different aspects on the operation of the schemes, including on 
transparency and stakeholder involvement.29 The Commission has to analyse these reports, 
reviewing the operation of recognised voluntary schemes and identifying best practices and 
report to the Council and the Parliament.30 However, these are only reporting obligations. In 
contrast, for standards of independent auditing, the Commission may, based on a risk analysis 
                                                          
27 However, the application of public participation requirements may oblige the disclosure of 
information at an early stage of the decision making process. For a further discussion, see section 4.4.1 
of Chapter V. 
28 European Commission, Assessment Protocol Template (2015a), Section 6.13. 
29 Article 18(6)(d), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
30 Article 18(6), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
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or on these reports, set new standards and require all voluntary schemes to apply those 
standards.31 If the voluntary scheme does not comply with the standards of independent 
auditing, the Commission may repeal decisions recognising voluntary schemes, which do not 
comply with the new standards within a prescribed timeframe.32 Interestingly, the standard 
of transparency and reliability did not receive the same treatment. This illustrates the low 
weight that the EU legislator apparently gives to transparent decision making, also if 
important environmental decision making, such as assessing the sustainability of biofuels, is 
outsourced to private actors.  
Concerning the passive form, the case law of the CJEU revealed that the European 
Commission did not respect the prescribed timeframe for providing environmental 
information. Since the court proceedings take a few years to provide an answer whether the 
information should be disclosed by the Commission, it is possible to disrespect the timeframe 
without any further consequences for the Commission. Based on the case law discussed, by 
the time the Court reaches a decision on the non-disclosure, challenging the substantive 
measure may no longer be possible due to the applicable time-limits. In addition, if the 
decision has already been taken, the information released could not be used by the members 
of the public to participate in the decision making process. Furthermore, there is no sanction 
foreseen if the Commission fails to provide the information within the prescribed time-limit. 
It is true that this failure of the Commission to comply with the applicable time-limits could 
lead to an action for liability before the General Court, in the context of an action for damages. 
However, the potential success of an action for damages brought by an NGO is very limited, 
since the NGO would have to prove that, due to lack of access to the requested information, 
the NGO could not pursue its statutory objectives and suffered damage.33 Another remarkable 
point is that all applicants of the discussed case law were NGOs with no case so far brought 
by individuals or by the industry sector. 
5.2. Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making 
The findings regarding public participation have shown that there is no legal framework for 
public participation in the recognition of voluntary biofuels scheme at the EU level.34 Neither 
the Renewable Energy Directive nor the Commission’s Communication on the recognition 
of biofuels certification schemes provides for public participation. The Aarhus Regulation 
only partially implemented Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention requiring public participation 
only for plans and programmes and the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes and the 
certification of biofuels do not fall under its definition of plan and programme.  
                                                          
31 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
32 Article 18(5), Renewable Energy Directive, consolidated version. 
33 L. Krämer, op. cit. (2013), p. 471. 
34 Section 4 of Chapter V. 
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The examination of the participatory rights of the Aarhus Convention, which are laid down 
in its Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Aarhus Convention, revealed that the decisions on the 
recognition of voluntary schemes and the decisions on the certification of biofuels may be 
interpreted as decisions on proposed activities which may have a significant effect on the 
environment for the purposes of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, and they are 
therefore subject to the most precise set of requirements for public participation provided by 
the Aarhus Convention. According to the proposed interpretation, the public concerned 
would have to be informed early in the decision making procedure and in an adequate, timely 
and effective manner.35 Following this line of reasoning, the non-registration in the 
transparency platform of applications for the recognition of voluntary schemes means that 
there is no proper early access to information in the procedure for the recognition of voluntary 
schemes. Furthermore, despite the fact that the draft decision on the recognition of a 
voluntary scheme is published on the Comitology Registry and there is opportunity for 
feedback on the Commission’s draft decision, this participation is limited, since there is no 
access to the scheme documents on which the Commission based its decision and this means 
that there is no effective participation.36  
This interpretation proposing an extension of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention  
would allow the Convention to evolve in order to respond to some of the new measures 
adopted to tackle climate change. If this interpretation would be confirmed by the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention, for instance via an interpretative guideline, or by the 
ACCC, via its findings and recommendations or, even by the CJEU,37 the EU would not be 
in compliance with the Aarhus Convention. This is because Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention has not been implemented at the EU level, based on the argumentation that there 
are no decisions taken at the EU level that could fall under Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention.38 In order to achieve compliance with the Aarhus Convention, the EU would 
thus have to reconsider its position, which would require an amendment to the Aarhus 
Regulation or, alternatively, would require including specific public participation provisions 
in the specific laws, such as the Renewable Energy Directive. Another possible way of 
achieving compliance would be by incorporating public participation requirements in the 
Commission’s Communication on the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes. However, 
in this case, the requirements would not be part of a legally binding instrument and, therefore, 
incapable of providing the same legal certainty. 
                                                          
35 Article 6(2), Aarhus Convention. 
36 The participation will still be limited since “the scheme documents are not published at this stage”. 
Personal communication via Europe Direct Contact Centre (5 May 2017). [Biofuels voluntary schemes 
- second answer]. 
37 See section 2.2.3 of Chapter III. 
38 See section 6.3 of Chapter III. 
280 
Finally, it is remarkable that, despite the strong debate on the potential negative impacts of 
biofuels on the environment, there is no communication before the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee challenging the lack of access to information and public participation 
requirements in the recognition of voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels. Further 
research into the strategies employed by ENGOs on how to use the rights to get access to 
environmental information, and to participate in environmental decision making, including 
an investigation of the barriers that may hinder such use, may clarify the reasons for this 
reluctant use. 
6. Conclusion 
The current EU legal framework seems unable to provide sufficient access to environmental 
information and public participation in decision making under the EU ETS and the 
Renewable Energy Directive as is required by the Aarhus Convention. In order for the EU to 
overcome the challenges identified in this thesis, various measures could be taken. 
Regarding access to information, three main challenges need to be addressed by the EU. First, 
a further interpretation of the definition of environmental information, which would 
encompass all climate change-related information, would help to address the problem of 
interpretation on what precisely constitutes climate change-related information. Second, a 
further interpretation by the CJEU on the application of the grounds for refusal to disclose 
information in accordance with the limits established by the Aarhus Convention would 
compel the Commission to apply these grounds accordingly. Third, since there is no sanction 
in the case of not providing requested information in the prescribed time by the Aarhus 
Regulation, the EU needs to find a way to steer the behaviour of its institutions. This thesis 
suggested that a way of forcing the Commission to respect the time limits would be if the 
CJEU would establish that the non-compliance with the time for disclosure would constitute 
a negative answer that cannot be overruled by later disclosure.39 However, it would require a 
change in the position of the CJEU in this matter, which would mean the CJEU would have 
to come back on a past ruling against such a suggestion. 
Concerning public participation in decision making, the Aarhus Regulation only provides for 
public participation concerning plans and programmes which is a fraction of the provisions 
of the Aarhus Convention. The latter is more demanding by also requiring public 
participation in decisions on specific activities, policies relating to the environment and on 
the preparation of executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules, 
which were not transposed into the Aarhus Regulation. Furthermore, a way of strengthening 
public participation under the EU ETS, and during the recognition of voluntary schemes and 
                                                          
39 See section 3 of Chapter V. 
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certification of biofuels, would be if the EU ETS Directive and the Renewable Energy 
Directive would contain specific provisions on public participation.  
Nevertheless, the case study on the EU ETS Directive in this thesis showed that neither the 
EU ETS Directive nor the Aarhus Regulation guarantee public participation in the decision 
making process leading to the adoption of acts the Commission is empowered to take under 
the EU ETS Directive. This shortcoming becomes even more relevant given the centralisation 
of major decisions at the EU level which give a prominent role to the European Commission. 
The Aarhus Convention serves as a fallback in cases when implementation at the EU level 
falls short. Chapter IV argued that the Commission acts adopted under the auspices of the 
EU ETS Directive fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention. Therefore, 
there is an obligation for the Commission to strive to promote effective public participation 
in the decision making leading to the adoption of acts the Commission is empowered to take 
under the EU ETS Directive. These findings are not limited to the third phase of the EU ETS, 
which runs until 2020. They are also valuable for the fourth phase of the EU ETS (2021-
2030), since the Commission will continue to have a prominent role by adopting measures in 
crucial areas, such as identifying sectors at risk of carbon leakage, establishing the rules for 
auctioning and the Union-wide rules for the allocation of allowances.40 
The recognition of biofuels schemes and the certification of biofuels include the outsourcing 
of functions by the Commission to private actors. The issue here is how the Aarhus 
Convention could respond to this increased use of this type of arrangements. This thesis 
argued that the Aarhus Convention’s definition of public authority encompasses the private 
actors that operate the voluntary schemes and, therefore, they should also be under the same 
obligations as those applying to public authorities, both for access to information and for 
public participation in decision making. Being able to classify the private actors as public 
                                                          
40 Directive (EU) 2018/410 which amended the EU ETS Directive by establishing the rules for the 
period for 2021-2030 empowers the Commission to adopt delegated acts, among others, in respect to: 
detailed arrangements for the auctioning by Member States of aviation allowances (Articles 3d(3), EU 
ETS Directive), the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (Article 10(4), EU ETS 
Directive), the Union-wide and fully harmonised rules for the allocation of allowances (Article 10a(1), 
EU ETS Directive), the rules on the operation of the innovation fund, including the selection procedure 
and criteria (Article 10a(8), EU ETS Directive), the determination of sectors and subsectors deemed at 
risk of carbon leakage (Article 10b(5), EU ETS Directive),  the requirements concerning the Union 
Registry (Article 19(3), EU ETS Directive), the issuing of allowances or credits from projects 
administered by Member States that reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the EU ETS 
(Article 24a(1), EU ETS Directive). 
Directive 2018/04 also empowers the Commission to adopt implementing measures, among others, 
concerning: the determination of the revised benchmark values for free allocation (Article 10a(2), EU 
ETS Directive), the detailed arrangements for the monitoring and reporting of emissions (Article 14(1), 
EU ETS Directive), and the verification of emission reports and for the accreditation and supervision 
of verifiers (Article 15, EU ETS Directive). 
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authorities does not smooth the task of identifying whether there are obligations for public 
participation in the recognition of biofuels schemes. This thesis reasoned that the recognition 
of voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels are specific activities in the sense of 
Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. It argued that Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention is not 
limited to site-specific activities, as proposed, for instance, by the Implementation Guide to 
the Aarhus Convention. It would be necessary to reinterpret Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention as encompassing not only traditional means of environmental control (as the 
classic permits of command-and-control instruments) but also specific activities which are 
not limited to a geographical space, such as the recognition of voluntary schemes. This 
proposed interpretation could potentially ensure that the public concerned would be informed 
and would participate in the recognition process voluntary schemes for the certification of 
biofuels in the years to come. This is because the voluntary schemes continue to be a method 
of proving compliance with the sustainability criteria under the new Renewable Energy 
Directive, which provides the legal framework for beyond 2020.41 The voluntary schemes 
assume even more importance, since the EU sustainability criteria are extended to cover 
biomass fuels for heating and cooling and power generation and voluntary schemes will be 
also used for biomass fuels.42 
Overall, this thesis has shown that there is a need for a more consistent and clearer legal 
framework which should ensure access to climate change-related information and 
participation in climate change decision making. Climate change challenges will become ever 
more pressing in coming years and the analysis of two EU measures from a procedural rights 
perspective provided some insight on how puzzling access to environmental information and 
public participation can be in the context of new regulatory measures adopted to tackle it. In 
this complex context, the participation of ENGOs can be of much value on the precondition 
that they have the resources, the knowledge and the time to engage in the technical 
discussions climate change decision making may require. In this vein, in many cases where 
individuals might be reluctant to participate in view the need for an intricate level of 
knowledge, ENGOs can fill this gap by participating in the decision making with technical 
arguments.   
The market-based nature of the regulatory approach by means of the EU ETS, and also the 
outsourcing of decision making to private actors in the case of the recognition of biofuel 
                                                          
41 Article 30(4), Directive 2018/2001. Directive 2018/2001 is a recast of the Renewable Energy 
Directive (Directive 2009/28). 
42 Article 30(4), Directive 2018/2001. With regard to the sustainability of solid and gaseous biomass 
for electricity, heating and cooling, there was no binding criteria at the EU level until the recast of the 
Renewable Energy Directive in December 2018. Under the new Renewable Energy Directive, the EU 
sustainability criteria, which was applicable only to biofuels and bioliquids, have been extended to 
cover biomass fuels for electricity, heating and cooling, and Member States have to transpose these 
rules until 30 June 2021. 
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voluntary schemes and the certification of biofuels require specific interpretations of the 
Aarhus Convention, which was adopted at a time with more emphasis on command-and-
control approaches, particularly the permitting of pollutant activities. This thesis has shown 
that, despite the fact that the Aarhus Convention did not even mention the term climate 
change, it already provides for minimum requirements for governments to respect access to 
environmental information and public participation in climate change decision making. 
However, it will depend on further interpretations by the Parties to the Aarhus Convention, 
including their courts, and the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, whether the 
environmental procedural rights, as provided by the Aarhus Convention, will be ambitiously 
respected in the case of new regulatory developments to combat climate change.  
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Annex – Voluntary schemes approved by the European Commission 
Abbreviation Name of Sustainability scheme Date of EC 
recognition or re-
recognition 
ISCC-EU 
International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification EU Scheme 
19 July 2011 
9 August 2016 
Bonsucro EU Bonsucro EU Certification Scheme 
19 July 2011 
21 March 2017 
RTRS EU RED 
Round Table on Responsible Soy EU RED 
Scheme 
 
19 July 2011 
17 November 2017 
RSB EU RED 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels EU 
RED Scheme 
19 July 2011 
9 August 2016 
RBSA 
Abengoa RED Bioenergy Sustainability 
Assurance Scheme 
19 July 2011  
(expired) 
Greenergy 
Greenergy Brazilian Bioethanol 
Verification Programme 
19 July 2011  
(expired) 
2BSvs 
Biomass Biofuels Voluntary Scheme 
 
19 July 2011 
26 August 2016 
ENSUS 
Voluntary Scheme under RED for Ensus 
Bioethanol Production 
23 April 2012 
(expired) 
Red Tractor 
 
Red Tractor Farm Assurance Combinable 
Crops & Sugar Beet Scheme 
16 July 2012 
13 December 2017 
SQC 
Scottish Quality Farm Assured Combinable 
Crops Scheme Agricultural 
24 July 2012 
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9 June 2015 
REDCert 
Renewable Energy Directive Certification 
Scheme 
24 July 2012 
10 August 2017 
NTA 8080 
Netherlands Technical Agreement 8080 
Certification Scheme 
24 July 2012 
(expired) 
RSPO EU RED 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Production RED Scheme Palm 
23 November 2012 
(expired) 
 Biograce GHG calculation tool 
30 May 2013 
(expired) 
 
HVO Renewable Diesel Scheme for 
Verification of Compliance with the RED 
sustainability criteria for biofuels 
9 January 2014 
(expired) 
GTAS Gafta Trade Assurance Scheme 
3 June 2014 
(expired) 
KZR INIG System 
INIG System of certification of biofuels 
and bioliquids 
3 June 2014 
 
Trade Assurance Scheme for Combinable 
Crops 
17 September 2014 
13 December 2018 
UFAS Universal Feed Assurance Scheme 
17 September 2014 
(expired) 
SSAP EU 
U.S. Soybean Sustainability Assurance 
Protocol EU  
29 January 1019 
 
 
327 
Summary 
It is now scientifically proven that humans’ activities interfere with the climate system.1 One 
of the consequences of the increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the Earth’s atmosphere 
is climate change. The fact that humans contribute to climate change raises the question how 
the public engages in the decision making on measures to tackle climate change. Based on 
this premise, this thesis investigated to what extent rights of access to environmental 
information and participation in governmental environmental decision making have to be 
provided for individuals and ENGOs at the EU level in the field of EU climate change law 
in the light of international treaty law, more particularly the UNFCCC and the Aarhus 
Convention. In order to answer this question, the thesis was divided into four main chapters, 
which break down the main research question into sub-questions. 
Chapter II examined the legal framework established by the UNFCCC for access to 
information and public participation in climate change decision making and explored the 
obligations they entail for the Parties. Article 6 of the UNFCCC provides an obligation for 
the Parties to the UNFCCC to promote and facilitate access to information and public 
participation in climate change decision making. A textual and systematic interpretation 
revealed that these obligations require the Parties to make an effort towards promoting and 
facilitating public access to information and public participation, without including any 
targets or clear and specific commitments. Therefore, the obligations contained in Article 6 
are obligations of effort. In addition to examining Article 6 itself, the decisions establishing 
the work programmes on Article 6 of the UNFCCC adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
(CoP) were examined to investigate whether the content of these decisions gives more body 
to Article 6 of the UNFCCC. This thesis identified that the obligations contained in Article 6 
of the UNFCCC do not have clear and specific commitments, which renders the provision 
lacking a precise result to be achieved. Furthermore, the agreements adopted under the 
umbrella of the UNFCCC were examined, since they potentially could provide for further 
commitments. This thesis concluded that neither Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol nor 
Article 12 of the Paris Agreement provide elements that make the general obligations of 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC more concrete. In sum, all the relevant international provisions 
analysed in Chapter II were thus regarded as obligations of effort and there are no clearly 
identifiable results that need to be achieved by the Parties.  
                                                          
1 The IPCC stated: “It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average 
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG 
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, 2014b, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf, p. 5. 
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Chapter II demonstrated that there are no precise legal commitments under the UNFCCC. 
However, the EU is also a Party to a regional agreement on procedural rights: the Aarhus 
Convention (AC). In this vein, Chapter III studied the legal framework established by the 
Aarhus Convention and its relationship with climate change, followed by the implementation 
of the Aarhus Convention at the EU level. Although there is no mention of the term climate 
change in the text of the Aarhus Convention, the interpretation of the definition of 
environmental information demonstrates that the term environmental encompasses the 
climate change phenomenon.  
The framework for access to environmental information of the Aarhus Convention provides 
for explicit commitments as to what has to be done by public authorities. Therefore, the 
commitments contained in these provisions can be characterised as obligations of result. This 
means that the Parties have to achieve a specific result, ensuring that their public authorities 
provide upon request (Article 4) and disseminate environmental information (Article 5). At 
the EU level, the implementation of the provisions has taken place via the Aarhus Regulation, 
which should be read in combination with Regulation 1049/2001 regarding requests for 
environmental information. Concerning access to environmental information, it was 
concluded that the provisions of the Aarhus Regulation are mostly in compliance with the 
Aarhus Convention. However, regarding the implementation of the exceptions to the 
obligations to provide access to environmental information upon request, the analysis 
revealed that the EU requirements impose more limitations than those allowed by the Aarhus 
Convention.  
The obligations contained in Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention establishing public 
participation in decisions on specific activities can be generally characterised as an obligation 
of result. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum to the Aarhus Regulation’s proposal 
clarifies that there are no measures related to specific activities which are taken at the EU 
level. As a consequence, the provision was not transposed. It was shown that this approach 
is controversial, since some EU decisions may amount to decisions on specific activities 
within the scope of application of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention on public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to 
the environment establishes two separate regimes for public participation. First, parts of the 
requirements contained in Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention apply to ensure participation 
during the development of plans and programmes. This first part of Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention is characterised by an obligation of result. The second part, for policies, Parties 
are only required, to the extent appropriate, to endeavour to provide opportunities for public 
participation. This weak and imprecise formulation, which fails to explain the exact result to 
be achieved, makes the second part of Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention an obligation of 
effort. The Aarhus Regulation only provides for public participation concerning plans and 
programmes. Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention concerning public participation during the 
preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative 
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instruments does not require parties to achieve effective public participation and it is also 
characterised as an obligation of effort. There is no implementation of Article 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention at the EU level, since the European Commission understood that Article 8 does 
not provide any legally binding requirement. However, Article 8 creates an obligation to 
make efforts to achieve effective public participation, and this obligation applies to the EU 
institutions and bodies. 
Chapters IV and V delved into the question of how the EU legal framework provides for 
access to information and public participation in the context of acts adopted at the EU level 
under two core instruments of the EU climate policy, namely the EU ETS Directive (Chapter 
IV) and the recognition of voluntary schemes for assessing the sustainability of biofuels 
under the Renewable Energy Directive (Chapter V).  
Chapter IV analysed the EU ETS Directive in view of: (i) legal requirements for access to 
environmental information and public participation in the decision making for acts adopted 
under the EU ETS Directive; and (ii) the compatibility of this framework with requirements 
imposed by the Aarhus Convention.  
Chapter IV identified that there is a general regime for access to environmental information 
under the EU ETS. Despite the existence of specific provisions on access to information, 
their limited scope cannot cover all the possible requests for information under the EU ETS. 
Therefore, an investigation through the existing CJEU case law on access to environmental 
information was carried out, particularly in view of how the Aarhus Regulation is applied 
with regard to such requests. Hence, the analysis of the case law built further on the definition 
of environmental information and on the limits of the grounds for a refusal to disclose 
environmental information. These cases revealed that: (i) a great number of EU ETS-related 
information potentially falls within the definition of environmental information; and (ii) the 
grounds for refusal have to be interpreted in a restrictive way, to ensure the right of access to 
environmental information. 
The EU ETS Directive does not have a general provision on public participation, which 
would apply to all decisions to be taken under this Directive. Therefore, it was investigated 
whether public participation requirements could be derived from specific provisions under 
the EU ETS Directive. This investigation revealed that public participation is not required by 
the EU ETS Directive for the adoption of most acts. It was also demonstrated that the Aarhus 
Regulation does not impose any obligation regarding public participation for the acts adopted 
under the EU ETS Directive. Further, it was examined whether there is nevertheless an 
obligation under the Aarhus Convention for the Commission to provide for public 
participation in the decision making process under the EU ETS. The analysis demonstrated 
that these acts qualify as executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding 
normative instruments, because they are acts of general application, as their addressees are 
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not determined or determinable.2 Furthermore, considering their size, location and potential 
effects on the environment, they have a significant effect on the environment. Therefore, they 
fall under the scope of application of Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention and, as a 
consequence, there is a legal obligation for the Commission to strive to promote public 
participation. According to the 2017 Better Regulation Guidelines, stakeholders can provide 
feedback on the draft of implementing and delegated acts, which encompasses most of the 
acts adopted by the Commission discussed in chapter IV. This could amount to compliance 
with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention when implementing and delegated acts are adopted. 
However, the acts adopted by the Commission acting alone would not be covered and, 
therefore, no compliance with Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention could be achieved. 
Moreover, Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention does not provide for any exception to the rule 
that the drafts should be subject to public participation, and it requires that the timeframe 
should be sufficient for effective participation, while the Better Regulation Guidelines 
provides for the application of exceptions and no flexibility regarding the time-frame. 
Therefore, the Guidelines, per se, cannot guarantee that the EU fully complies with Article 8 
of the Aarhus Convention. In light of the conclusions reached in Chapter IV, it can be argued 
that public participation under the EU ETS could be strengthened if the EU ETS Directive 
contained a specific provision on public participation.  
Chapter V assessed the regime of access to biofuel-related information and public 
participation in decision making for the recognition of biofuels voluntary schemes at the EU 
level in view of the Aarhus Convention requirements. The European Commission is 
empowered by the Renewable Energy Directive to recognise voluntary schemes as capable 
of checking for compliance with the EU’s biofuels sustainability criteria.  Only the biofuels 
that fulfil certain sustainability criteria established in the RED count towards national 
renewable energy targets. It was found that biofuel-related information is environmental 
information and that the European Commission, the evaluator/contractor and the voluntary 
schemes themselves are public authorities according to the Aarhus Convention, and therefore 
these entities are under the obligation to disclose information. However, the case law of the 
CJEU revealed that the European Commission did not respect the prescribed timeframe for 
providing environmental information. Regarding public participation, the findings have 
shown that there is no legal framework for public participation in the recognition of voluntary 
biofuels schemes at the EU level. The examination of the participatory rights of the Aarhus 
Convention, which are laid down in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Aarhus Convention, revealed 
that the decisions on the recognition of voluntary schemes and the decisions on the 
certification of biofuels may be interpreted as decisions on proposed activities which may 
have a significant effect on the environment for the purposes of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus 
                                                          
2 These non-legislative acts took the form of a regulation or decision. Regulations and decisions are 
among the legal instruments available to the European institutions to exercise the Union’s competences, 
according to Article 288 TFEU. How they are adopted defines whether they are a legislative act or not. 
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Convention, and they are therefore subject to the most precise set of requirements for public 
participation provided by the Aarhus Convention. 
Overall, this thesis has shown that there is a need for a more consistent and clearer legal 
framework which should ensure access to climate change-related information and 
participation in climate change decision making. Climate change challenges will become ever 
more pressing in the coming years and the analysis of two EU measures from a procedural 
rights perspective provided some insight into how puzzling access to environmental 
information and public participation can be in the context of the new regulatory measures 
adopted to tackle it. 
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Valorisation Addendum 
1. Relevance:  
Climate change is real and greenhouse gases produced by human activities are interfering 
with the Earth’s temperature.1 The imminent threat of climate change and the clear 
contribution of humankind to this process call for concrete responses from all to tackle this 
problem. This has prompted the public to take action in diverse forms around the world. For 
instance, a movement started by the Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg in August 2018 
pushed thousands of students around the world to engage in demonstrations calling for action 
against climate change.2  
In addition to individuals taking to the streets, many non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have been using legal instruments to attempt to force action on climate change-
related issues. This thesis highlights as examples ClientEarth and Friends of the Earth, which 
have repeatedly used legal tools available to influence the decision making by governments 
in a more environmentally friendly direction.3 
The engagement of the public, particularly environmental NGOs (ENGOs), demanding for a 
suitable and timely response prompts the question of what rights members of the public 
actually have to access climate change-related information and to participate in climate 
change decision making. This thesis, therefore, examined how these procedural rights are 
provided for in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) Directive and the Renewable 
Energy Directive at the EU level, and assessed their compatibility with the Aarhus 
Convention.4 The findings from this research have filled an important gap in the extant 
academic literature by showing that, in the area of EU climate change - in particular regarding 
                                                          
1 The IPCC stated: “It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average 
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG 
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, 2014b, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf, p. 5. 
2 S. Laville, M. Taylor and D. Hurst, ‘It’s our time to rise up’: youth climate strikes held in 100 
countries, The Guardian, 15 March 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/15/its-
our-time-to-rise-up-youth-climate-strikes-held-in-100-countries. 
3 At the EU level, these NGOs, for instance, have started legal action against the European Union (EU) 
in view of the denial to access environmental information. See Case T‑278/11, ClientEarth, Friends of 
the Earth Europe, Stichting FERN and  Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v. European 
Commission, 13 November 2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:593. 
4 The regional Convention on Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (known as the Aarhus Convention). 
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access to information and participation in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) and in 
the recognition of biofuels schemes-, adjustments in the legal framework are needed.  
In addition to its academic scope, this thesis could have important social, environmental and 
economic relevance.  There is clearly a large part of society that is interested in engaging in 
the discussion on how to best tackle climate change. This thesis provides a clear description 
of the EU legal framework available to the public (individuals, NGOs and economic actors 
alike) for access to environmental information and public participation in climate change 
decision making. It also identifies opportunities to engage in the debate more actively, such 
as the possibility for the public in general to provide feedback on acts adopted by the 
European Commission,5 but also shortcomings, such as the delay on the disclosure of 
information by the European Commission6 that can become points of action for individuals 
and ENGOs. The findings are also useful for governments, since the thesis discusses the 
compatibility of the EU legal framework with international law. From an environmental 
perspective, if the public uses the results of this thesis to participate more in the decision 
making concerning the measures to tackle the adverse effects of climate change, this could 
eventually help to voice the diversity of possible solutions to the climate change problem. 
From an economic perspective, measures taken to mitigate the effects of climate change, such 
as emissions trading, involve economic costs as they put a price on carbon used to produce 
goods consumed by the public. The European Union has established the EU ETS, which was 
developed through numerous legal instruments. To participate in the acts adopted under the 
EU ETS, the public needs to possess sufficient knowledge of the system and of the specific 
legislation applicable. This thesis, by providing thorough analysis of the measures adopted 
under the EU ETS in view of access to information and public participation may provide the 
public tools to engage in the discussion of how to implement such a complex system.  
The outcome of this research, hence, does not only provide an important contribution to the 
academic debate by providing an in-depth understanding of the minimum requirements for 
procedural rights given by international and EU law in view of legal instruments aiming to 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions and stimulating renewable energy, but it also provides 
crucial information that can be used directly in the practice of climate policies. 
  
                                                          
5 See section 4.5 of Chapter IV. 
6 See section 3.5 of Chapter V. 
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2. Target groups:  
The climate change problem reverberates throughout society and the findings of this thesis 
may be of interest to a wide range of interest groups. Apart from academics, individual, 
NGOs, economic actors, and governments are target groups, since all these actors may 
interact through procedural rights in the context of climate change decision making. 
The public, including individuals, NGOs and economic actors, by addressing the findings of 
the thesis, may rely on the rights to access to environmental information and public 
participation to engage in climate change decision making at EU level. For instance, by 
engaging in the public consultations and feedbacks opportunities provided the European 
Commission. Moreover, in many instances, environmental NGOs need to acquire specific 
knowledge in order to assess whether an intended action may be successful. The results of 
this thesis identify restrictive access to environmental information and limited public 
participation in the EU legal framework that could serve as starting point for these actions.  
In a broader perspective, the thesis, by discussing the climate change problem from a 
procedural rights perspective, may have an impact on public awareness regarding the legal 
instruments available to get access to climate change-related information and public 
participation in climate change decision making, which has the potential of putting the public 
closer to governmental decision making.  
Concerning governments, especially at the EU level, this thesis provides a careful analysis 
of the EU legal framework on access to information and public participation regarding the 
EU ETS and the recognition of biofuels schemes and its compatibility with its international 
commitments. The legal and policy shortcomings identified in this thesis can foster further 
discussions on the steps needed to achieve compliance and prioritize actions. The lessons 
learned under the analysis of the EU legal framework may also benefit other governmental 
actors, which can reflect upon the results while implementing and/or improving their own 
legal framework.  
3. Activities/Products:  
The research findings emerging from this thesis may benefit the public, including NGOs, by 
strengthening the arguments for litigation and advocacy for the protection of the 
environment. 
Besides Europe, which already has seen the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention, the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) adopted a 
regional treaty on access to environmental information, public participation and access to 
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justice in environmental matters.7  This new development is highly influenced by the 
experience with the Aarhus Convention, even while facing challenges in responding to the 
measures created to tackle climate change. The unique experience of the EU described in this 
thesis may be, therefore, an important source for countries to learn about the success and 
obstacles to the implementation of a convention on environmental procedural rights. 
4. Innovation:  
No other study has provided an in-depth examination of the rights of access to environmental 
information and participation in governmental environmental decision for the public, 
especially individuals and ENGOs, at the EU level in the field of EU climate change law. 
Therefore, it is another piece of the complex puzzle on how procedural rights may eventually 
contribute to the achievement of a fossil-free economy and society.   
5. Planning & Implementation:  
This thesis will be on open access,8 which makes access to the results of this thesis 
unrestricted. In addition, the outcome of the research is not only provided through a written 
PhD thesis, but will also be made accessible to the public in the form of a summary of the 
research (in accessible language) to be put on the internet and to be directly sent to ENGOs.  
Part of the findings have also been publicised through two academic publications and through 
several conferences and workshops where I have given oral presentations. 
Furthermore, part of the findings had been incorporated in the teaching of Environmental 
Law to bachelor students in a university of applied science. Many of these students have 
heard about environmental procedural rights for the first time and they can apply this 
knowledge in their professional life. 
  
                                                          
7 Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental 
Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, Escazú on 4 March 2018 (not yet entered into force). 
8 The PhD theses of Maastricht University can be found here: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/ 
publications/?nofollow=true&format=&type=%2Fdk%2Fatira%2Fpure%2Fresearchoutput%2Fresear
choutputtypes%2Fthesis%2Fdoc. 
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